KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Applicant was not denied due process.  The Judge’s findings of fact were based upon
substantial record evidence.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASE NO: 09-05176.a1
DATE: 12/14/2010
DATE: December 14, 2010
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-05176
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On March 24, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On September 30, 2010, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Arthur E.
Marshall, Jr., denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to
Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal: whether she was denied due process;
whether the Judge’s findings of fact were supported by substantial record evidence; and whether the
Judge erred in his application of the mitigating conditions.  Consistent with the following discussion,
1While it is possible that, when Applicant lost her job in January 2008, processing of her SCA halted, there is
no record evidence from which to draw a conclusion. 
we affirm the decision of the Judge.
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant is a senior contract
specialist working for a Defense contractor.  She previously held a security clearance in the 1990s
while working for a prior employer.  In 2007 she took a job requiring a security clearance and
submitted a security clearance application (SCA) in August of that year.  “When she started her
present job, she was unaware that her 2007 [SCA] had not been approved.”  Decision at 2.
Applicant has numerous delinquent debts, for such things as a judgment against her
following her eviction from an apartment, medical expenses, a student loan, a repossessed vehicle,
etc.  These delinquencies originated during a period of unemployment in the early 2000s.  Applicant
was employed, although with frequent job changes, in the years since.  For purposes of this appeal,
it is pertinent to note the Judge’s finding that, in January 2008, Applicant was dismissed from the
job she had taken in 2007 and for which she had submitted a SCA.  
In the Analysis portion of the decision, the Judge acknowledged that Applicant’s
unemployment had been a circumstance beyond her control.  However, he went on to state that
Applicant had provided little evidence of efforts to resolve her bad debts or of other kinds of
mitigation, such as the receipt of financial counseling, etc.  The Judge concluded that Applicant had
failed to meet her burden of persuasion as to mitigation.
Applicant contends that she was denied due process.  She states that, until she read the
Judge’s sentence quoted above, she was not aware that her 2007 SCA had been disapproved.  She
contends that, had she known about the prior disapproval, she would have presented her case
differently at the hearing.
We have considered this issue in light of the record as a whole.  The Judge’s statement
appears to refer to Applicant’s own testimony concerning the circumstances of her SCA: “[The 2007
SCA] was my first re-application . . . Q: So when you started at [current employer] . . . A:  I didn’t
even realize the clearance had not been approved.”  Tr. at 27.  There is nothing in the record to
indicate that her 2007 SCA had been adjudicated and denied.1  Moreover, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that Applicant was denied adequate notice of the security concerns alleged against
her or access to the evidence which the Government used in presenting its case at the hearing.
Neither is there any basis to conclude that Applicant was denied other due process rights afforded
by the Directive.
Concerning her claim that the Judge made factual errors, the record demonstrates that the
Judge’s material findings are based on substantial evidence, or constitute reasonable
characterizations or inferences that could be drawn from the record.  Applicant has not identified
any harmful error likely to change the outcome of the case.  Considering the record evidence as a
whole, the Judge’s material findings of security concern are sustainable.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No.
08-11735 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2010).  Furthermore, we have considered the Judge’s treatment
of the pertinent mitigating conditions and conclude that it is sustainable.
The record supports a conclusion that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated
a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).  The Judge’s adverse decision is sustainable on this record.  “The general standard is that
a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  
Order
The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan        
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields            
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody              
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board