1 
 
 
                                                              
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 (Redacted) )  ISCR Case No. 07-06023 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Fahryn Hoffman, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines K (Handling 
Protected Information), E (Personal Conduct), and F (Financial Considerations). The 
Guideline K security concerns are mitigated, but the Guideline E and F concerns are not 
mitigated.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on June 26, 2006. On 
February 9, 2009, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent her a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny her 
application, citing security concerns under Guidelines K, E, and F. DOHA acted under 
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial 
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended 
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the Department of 
Defense on September 1, 2006.  
 
 
2 
 
 
 Applicant received the SOR on February 12, 2009; answered it on March 6, 
2009; and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA received the 
request on March 9, 2009. DOHA sent Applicant an amendment to the SOR on August 
9, 2010, adding three allegations under Guideline E. Applicant answered the 
amendment to the SOR in an undated document.1 Department Counsel was ready to 
proceed on August 12, 2010, and the case was assigned to me on August 17, 2010. 
DOHA issued a notice of hearing on September 9, 2010, scheduling it for September 
28, 2010. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 10 
were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified, and submitted 
Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through D, which were admitted without objection.  
 
During Department Counsel’s cross-examination, Applicant indicated that she did 
not desire to continue with the hearing. I recessed the hearing to allow Applicant to 
decide whether she desired to withdraw her request for a hearing. (Tr. I at 81-83.2) The 
transcript of this portion of the hearing was received on October 4, 2010. 
 
 On October 14, 2010, Applicant informed Department Counsel that she desired 
to continue with the hearing, and that she intended to retain a lawyer. On October 28, 
2010, DOHA issued a second notice of hearing, scheduling the hearing to continue on 
November 22, 2010. I reconvened the hearing as scheduled. Applicant appeared and 
stated that she had decided to continue representing herself. (Tr. II at 5.) 
 
After Department Counsel completed her cross-examination, Applicant presented 
the testimony of one witness and submitted AX E through J, which were admitted 
without objection. I kept the record open until December 1, 2010, to enable Applicant to 
submit additional documentary evidence, and she timely submitted AX K, which was 
admitted without objection. Department Counsel’s comments regarding AX K are 
attached to the record as Hearing Exhibit I. The transcript of the second day of the 
hearing was received on December 1, 2010. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 3.c, 
3.f, 3.g, 3.h-3.m, and 3.o-3.t. She denied all the remaining allegations in the SOR and 
the amendment to the SOR. Her admissions in her answer and at the hearing are 
incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 40-year-old employee of a federal contractor, currently working as 
a deployment coordinator. (Tr. I at 44.) She has worked for her current employer since 
                                                          
1 The page numbering on the amendment to the SOR indicates that it consists of three pages, but only 
two pages were in the file. The copy in the file was Applicant’s facsimile transmission of her answer, and 
her facsimile cover sheet indicates that only two pages were transmitted. The third page is included as 
the last page of GX 10.  
 
2 Separate transcripts were prepared for each day of the hearing. The transcript of the proceedings on 
September 28, 2010 is cited in this decision as Tr. I. The transcript of the proceedings on November 22, 
2010 is cited as Tr. II. 
 
3 
 
 
July 2005. Her SCA reflects that she has held a security clearance since April 2002. 
(GX 1 at 8.) She testified she has held a security clearance since she was 18 years old. 
(Tr. I at 47.) She previously worked for other federal contractors from August 1997 to 
July 2005. She was a federal employee from 1988 to August 1997.  
 
 Applicant married in July 1993 and divorced in October 2000. She has a 16-year-
old daughter who lives with the daughter’s father. Applicant and her daughter’s father 
have an informal agreement that Applicant will pay for their daughter’s education. 
 
 In March 1999, while working for a previous employer, Applicant was appointed 
as the custodian for her employer’s communications security (COMSEC) account. She 
completed the COMSEC Managers Course in 1999 and attended annual COMSEC 
Managers Seminars. In August or September 2004, her supervisor began shifting some 
of her responsibilities to others because he believed she was being overworked with too 
many duties. In April 2005, the account was audited in preparation for a change of 
custodians. The audit revealed that (1) COMSEC inventories for 2000, 2002, 2003, and 
2004 were not completed and forwarded as required; (2) COMSEC keying material was 
reported as being destroyed but was still on hand; (3) COMSEC keying material was 
missing; (4) superseded COMSEC keying material was not destroyed as required; (5) 
COMSEC keying material was improperly stored; and (6) COMSEC devices were not 
properly safeguarded. (GX 5; GX 6.) The last finding included an incident where she 
stored classified COMSEC keying material in her desk drawer rather than a classified 
safe. As a result of these discrepancies, Applicant was suspended for one week without 
pay. These findings are alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a and were admitted by Applicant in her 
answer.  
 
A report of investigation (ROI)3 by the security manager reflects that during the 
investigation Applicant was asked if she had sufficient time and resources to perform 
her duties, and she responded, “No, I was swamped with work and training new hires, 
but ultimately knew that I was responsible for maintaining the account.” (GX 6 at 8.) The 
ROI also reflects that the new custodian and another employee conducted the change-
of-custodian inventory without Applicant’s participation due to “management interest” in 
completing the inventory quickly. (GX 6 at 5.) The applicable COMSEC Manual requires 
that a newly appointed custodian and the departing custodian conduct an inventory of 
all COMSEC material held by the account. The ROI does not reflect whether Applicant 
was invited or directed to participate in the inventory.  
 
 On April 25, 2008, Applicant submitted an affidavit to a security investigator from 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in connection with her application to 
continue her clearance. She stated that her duties required a “general audit” of all 
COMSEC equipment every six months and an annual “full audit” to be submitted to the 
supervising federal agency. When she was scheduled for reassignment in late 2004 or 
                                                          
3  The ROI is not covered by the authentication requirements of Directive ¶ E3.1.20, because it was not a 
“DoD personnel background report of investigation” and was not “furnished by an investigative agency.” 
The investigation was conducted by the federal contractor’s employees regarding a suspected security 
violation. Applicant did not object to admission of the ROI. 
 
4 
 
 
early 2005, two audits that should have been completed over an approximate nine-
month period (in 2003-04) had not been done, and the supervising federal agency had 
sent her notice that the required audits had not been received. When she received the 
notice of missing inventories, she notified the supervising agency of the impending 
change of custodians.  
 
In Applicant’s April 2008 affidavit, she stated that she intended to have her 
supervisor, who was the assistant custodian, assist with the required audits, but she 
conducted the audit alone because her supervisor was involved in personal matters that 
left insufficient time to participate in the audit. Applicant stated that she conducted the 
audit, discovered that some property was missing, and reported her discovery to her 
supervisor and her security manager. Applicant used the term “audit” instead of 
“inventory,” but it is clear that she was talking about an inventory of COMSEC material. 
Applicant’s affidavit does not state whether she conducted a “general” semi-annual 
audit, the annual “full” audit required by the supervising agency, or the required change-
of-custodian inventory. (GX 4 at 1-2.)  
 
The amended SOR ¶ 2.b alleges that Applicant falsified her affidavit by stating 
that she conducted the change-of-custodian inventory. Applicant denied this allegation 
in her answer to the Amended SOR. At the hearing, she testified that she could not 
explain the apparent discrepancy because it was so long ago, but she remembered 
specifically that she did her own inventory. (Tr. II at 44-45.) 
 
 The ROI also found that the required inventories were not completed and 
submitted in 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004. The amended SOR ¶ 2.c alleges that 
Applicant falsified her affidavit of April 25, 2008, by stating that she had not completed 
the two inventories required in a nine-month period in 2004-05, but failing to disclose 
that the required inventories were not conducted in 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004. 
Applicant denied this allegation in her answer to the Amended SOR.  
 
 Finally, the ROI quoted Applicant as stating, “The [supervising agency] did 
request an annual inventory every year and this was conducted through 2003 and the 
results were sent to the [supervising agency].” The report of investigation also states 
that an inventory dated May 19, 2003, was found in the supervising agency’s records 
but it was not signed by Applicant or the assistant custodian. (GX 6 at 4, 8.) The 
amended SOR ¶ 2.d alleges that Applicant made false statements during the 
investigation when she stated that she completed the required inventories every year 
through 2003. Applicant denied this allegation in her answer to the amended SOR. At 
the hearing, she testified that she denied all three allegations of falsification because 
she could not remember the dates of the various inventories because of the passage of 
time. (Tr. II at 46.) 
 
The SOR alleges 20 delinquent debts. The debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 3.a-3.i and 
3.t were incurred and became delinquent between 2001 and 2004. The remaining debts 
became delinquent on or before September 2007.  
 
 
5 
 
 
 Applicant attributed her financial problems to her divorce in October 2000 that led 
to alcohol abuse and involvement in an abusive relationship. (GX 2 at 13.) She 
terminated the abusive relationship in August 2001. After a conviction for driving under 
the influence in May 2005 and completion of court-ordered counseling, she reduced her 
consumption to one or two beers once or twice a month. (GX 2 at 4-7; Tr. II at 50-51.) 
 
The table below summarizes the evidence concerning the delinquent debts 
alleged in the SOR. 
 
SOR Debt Amount Answer Status Evidence 
3.a Judgment (rent) $4,022 Deny Satisfied by wage 
garnishment; not on 
current credit report 
GX 7 at 1;  
GX 8 at 1;  
Tr. I at 56-57 
3.b Credit card $1,830 Deny Unpaid GX 7 at 2;  
Tr. I at 61 
3.c Credit card $566 Admit Unpaid GX 9 at 8 
3.d Judgment (rent) $4,654 Deny Unpaid GX 9 at 4 
3.e Judgment (dental) $528 Deny Satisfied, Nov. 04 GX 7 at 1 
3.f Judgment $1,811 Admit Unpaid GX 9 at 5;  
Tr. I at 62-63 
3.g Medical $104 Admit Unpaid GX 7 at 2 
3.h Medical $75 Admit Unpaid GX 7 at 2 
3.i Medical $400 Deny Unpaid GX 7 at 1 
3.j Medical $103 Admit Unpaid GX 7 at 2 
3.k Pizza (bad check) $69 Admit Unpaid GX 3 at 10 
3.l Medical $127 Admit Unpaid GX 9 at 13 
3.m Credit card $1,441 Admit Unpaid GX 3 at 9 
3.n Veterinary $251 Deny Unpaid GX 9 at 12 
3.o Pizza (bad check) $62 Admit Unpaid GX 3 at 10 
3.p Credit card $282 Admit Unpaid GX 8 at 1 
3.q Car repossession $12,291 Admit Made payments 
totaling $3,845 
GX 7 at 2;  
AX K at 2 
3.r Credit card $468 Admit Unpaid GX 7 at 2 
3.s Car insurance $404 Admit Unpaid GX 9 at 11 
3.t Cell phone $1,784 Admit Unpaid GX 9 at 11 
 
 Applicant testified that in August 2008 she borrowed about $13,000 from her 
parents in order to consolidate her debts. She has been repaying her parents monthly 
and still owes them about $2,400. (Tr. I at 49-50.)  
 
 Applicant testified that the judgments alleged in SOR ¶¶ 3.d and 3.f were for the 
same debt. The two judgments were obtained by the same creditor, but the amounts 
are significantly different, and they were obtained on different dates, one in October 
2003 and one in July 2004. Applicant did not present any documentation to support her 
testimony. 
 
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Applicant’s father testified that he and Applicant’s mother had helped her several 
times by loaning her money, but they always made it clear that it was a loan and they 
expected to be repaid. In addition, they required that she provide them with a financial 
analysis and a financial plan. (Tr. II at 16-18.) He testified that they loaned Applicant 
money about three times in the last ten years, usually in amounts around $2,000 or 
$3,000. Applicant has always made an effort to repay her parents, but they have not 
been strict in enforcing a payment schedule. (Tr. II at 22-26.) Applicant’s father 
understands the relationship between a security clearance and financial stability, having 
held a security clearance for 20 years in the Navy and another ten years as a 
contractor. (Tr. II at 26.) 
 
Applicant presented a written budget reflecting net monthly pay of $4,060, fixed 
monthly expenses of $3,860, and a remainder of $320. Her budget includes monthly 
loan repayments of $400 to her parents, $100 monthly savings for her daughter, and 
monthly payments of $250 on the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 3.q. It does not reflect 
payments on the delinquent debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 3.b-3.d, 3.f-3.p, and 3.r-3.t. (AX J.) 
 
Applicant’s performance appraisals for 2007, 2008, and 2009 rated her in the top 
category. (AX A, B, and C.) Her supervisor for the past three years described her duties 
as requiring the ability to “multitask, exercise sound judgment, and make proper 
decisions routinely, without direct supervision.” Her supervisor regards her as 
“completely trustworthy.” She has “the utmost confidence in [Applicant’s] loyalty, 
honesty, and capability.” (AX E.)  
 
Applicant’s supervisor in her former job believes that she fully appreciated the 
seriousness of her mistakes that led to her disciplinary action, has expressed genuine 
regret for them, and has matured and learned from her experience. (AX F.) The director 
of security at the time of Applicant’s security violations believes that she “was asked to 
assume several new roles which stretched her abilities as a security professional.” He 
describes her as genuinely remorseful, and he recommends that her security clearance 
be continued. (AX G.) 
 
A project manager for whom Applicant served as a facility security officer for six 
years found her performance to be outstanding. He states that her professionalism and 
integrity are beyond reproach. (AX H.) 
 
A coworker for five years describes Applicant as exceptionally caring, devoted, 
and energetic. She also describes Applicant as a “wonderful humanitarian” who 
volunteers to work at military hospitals with wounded soldiers, where she demonstrates 
fearlessness and compassion in situations where others are not strong enough to deal 
with the soldiers’ tragedies. (AX I.) 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
 
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“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in 
conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it 
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security 
clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity 
clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 
U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information 
 
 The SOR alleges the numerous security violations that were found during the 
change-of-custodian inventory of Applicant’s COMSEC account. The security concern 
under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 33: “Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with 
rules and regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt 
about an individual's trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to 
safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern.” Applicant’s admissions, 
corroborated by her former employer’s ROI, establish two disqualifying conditions under 
this guideline: AG ¶ 34(b) (“collecting or storing classified or other protected information 
at home or in any other unauthorized location”) and AG 34(g) (“any failure to comply 
with rules for the protection of classified or other sensitive information”). AG 34(h) 
(“negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by management”) is 
not established because there is no evidence that Applicant was counseled about her 
security habits.  
 
 Since the Government produced substantial evidence to raise the disqualifying 
conditions in AG ¶¶ 34(b) and (g), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence 
to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has 
the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts 
to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005) 
 
Security violations are one of the strongest reasons for denying or revoking 
access to classified information. Once a security violation is established, an applicant 
has a heavy burden of demonstrating that he or she should be entrusted with classified 
information. Because security violations strike at the very heart of the industrial security 
program, an administrative judge must give any claims of reform and rehabilitation strict 
scrutiny. ISCR Case No. 03-02688 (App. Bd. Oct. 5, 2006).  
 
Security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated if “so much time has 
elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual 
circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 35(a). The first prong of this 
mitigating condition focuses on whether the conduct was recent. There are no Abright 
line@ rules for determining when conduct is Arecent.@ The determination must be based 
on a careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence. See ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 
(App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). If the evidence shows Aa significant period of time has passed 
without any evidence of misconduct,@ then an administrative judge must determine 
whether that period of time demonstrates Achanged circumstances or conduct sufficient 
to warrant a finding of reform or rehabilitation.@ Id.  
 
Applicant’s mishandling of the COMSEC account occurred more than five years 
ago. She retained her security clearance and has not been cited for a security violation 
since she began working for her current employer in July 2005. Her performance 
 
9 
 
 
appraisals for the past three years have been outstanding, and her supervisor trusts her 
completely. I conclude that the first prong of AG ¶ 35(a) (“so long ago”) is established.  
 
Applicant’s mishandling of the COMSEC account spanned several years and 
involved multiple derelictions. Therefore, I conclude that the second prong of AG ¶ 35(a) 
(“so infrequent”) is not established.  
 
Applicant held a security clearance for many years before her security violations 
during 2000-2005. Her violations coincided with the breakup of her marriage, her 
involvement in an abusive relationship, excessive alcohol consumption, lack of 
involvement by her supervisor, and a stressful environment in which she was 
overworked. The record reflects that her personal life is no longer in turmoil, she has 
moderated her alcohol consumption, and her work environment is less stressful. 
Accordingly, I conclude that the third prong of AG ¶ 35(a) (“unusual circumstances”) is 
established.  
 
In light of all the above circumstances, Applicant’s past security violations do not 
cast doubt on her current reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment. Accordingly, I 
conclude that AG ¶ 35(a) is established. 
Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated if “the individual 
responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates 
a positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities.” AG ¶ 35(b). The 
record does not reflect “counseling” or remedial training, but it does reflect disciplinary 
action and Applicant’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her derelictions. Her 
performance appraisals, the endorsements by former and current supervisors, and her 
testimony and demeanor at the hearing demonstrated a positive attitude toward security 
responsibilities. I conclude that the second prong AG ¶ 35(b) (“positive attitude”) is 
established. 
Finally, security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated if “the security 
violations were due to improper or inadequate training.” AG ¶ 35(c). I conclude that this 
mitigating condition is not established because the record reflects that Applicant 
received proper training and was aware of her responsibilities.  
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 SOR ¶ 2.a cross-alleges Applicant’s security violations as personal conduct. 
SOR ¶¶ 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d allege that Applicant falsified material information during her 
employer’s investigation into her management of the COMSEC account and during her 
OPM background investigation. The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15 
as follows:  
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
 
10 
 
 
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.  
 When falsification allegations are controverted, as in this case, the Government 
has the burden of proving them. An omission or misstatement, standing alone, does not 
prove falsification. An administrative judge must consider the record evidence as a 
whole to determine an applicant’s state of mind at the time of the omission.  See ISCR 
Case No. 03-09483 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 17, 2004).  
 SOR ¶ 1.b alleges that Applicant falsely stated in an affidavit given to an OPM 
security investigator in April 2008 that she conducted an inventory in February 2005, 
when in fact the inventory was conducted by two of her colleagues. This allegation is 
not supported by substantial evidence. In her affidavit, Applicant stated that she knew 
that two required inventories had not been completed in the preceding nine months, and 
that she conducted an inventory alone because her supervisor was not available to 
assist her. Applicant was knowledgeable about the inventory requirements and would 
have known that the change-of-custodian inventory should be conducted jointly by the 
outgoing custodian and incoming custodian. Applicant’s affidavit did not state that she 
conducted the change-of-custodian inventory. A fair reading of her affidavit is that she 
conducted one of the missing semi-annual inventories, not the change-of-custodian 
inventory. As such, her affidavit is not inconsistent with her former employer’s ROI. I 
conclude that SOR ¶ 1.b is not supported by substantial evidence. 
 SOR ¶ 1.c alleges that Applicant told an OPM investigator that she did not 
conduct the inventories required during the a nine-month period in 2004-2005, but that 
she falsified material information by failing to disclose that she had not conducted the 
required inventories in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004. SOR ¶ 1.d alleges that Applicant 
falsely stated to her employer’s investigators that she had completed the required 
inventories through 2003. These two allegations are supported by her former 
employer’s ROI, showing that she did not complete the required inventories in 2000 and 
2002. Applicant’s falsifications establish AG ¶ 16(b) (“deliberately providing false or 
misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security 
official, competent medical authority, or other official government representative”). 
 The disqualifying condition relevant to the alleged security violations cross-
alleged under this guideline is AG ¶ 16(c): 
[C]redible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is 
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single 
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information. 
 
11 
 
 
AG ¶ 16(c) is established by Applicant’s security violations and her falsifications about 
her security violations during her employer’s investigation 2005 and her OPM 
background investigation in April 2008.  
 Security concerns raised by false or misleading answers during a security 
investigation may be mitigated by showing that “the individual made prompt, good-faith 
efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with 
the facts.” AG ¶ 17(a). This mitigating condition is not established because there is no 
evidence that Applicant attempted to correct her OPM affidavit or her statements to her 
former employer’s security investigators. 
 Security concerns raised by personal conduct may be mitigated if “the offense is 
so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened 
under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on 
the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 17(c). For the 
reasons stated in the above discussion of Guideline K, I conclude that this mitigating 
condition is established for the security violations cross-alleged under this guideline. 
However, it is not established for Applicant’s false statements. While overwork, lack of 
supervisory support, turmoil in her personal life, and negligence were significant factors 
causing her security violations, those factors do not justify intentional falsification. Her 
OPM affidavit was recent, having been submitted more than three years after her 
security violations and in connection with her current application to continue her 
clearance.  
 
 Security concerns raised by personal conduct also may be mitigated if “the 
individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the 
behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or 
factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such 
behavior is unlikely to recur.” AG ¶ 17(d). This mitigating condition is partly established 
for Applicant’s security violations, but not for her falsifications. Applicant has not 
obtained counseling, but she has acknowledged and accepted responsibility for her 
security violations. She has terminated the abusive relationship and moderated her 
consumption of alcohol. However, she has not acknowledged her falsifications, and she 
has not demonstrated that the factors that caused her to provide false and misleading 
information about her security violations have been alleviated. 
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
The SOR alleges 20 delinquent debts, of which only three have been resolved. 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18:  
 
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
 
12 
 
 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds. 
 
 Applicant’s financial history establishes three disqualifying conditions under this 
guideline: AG ¶ 19(a) (“inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts”);  AG ¶ 19(c) (“a 
history of not meeting financial obligations”); and AG ¶ 19(e) (“consistent spending 
beyond one=s means, which may be indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant 
negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis”). 
 
 Security concerns based on financial problems can be mitigated by showing that 
“the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual=s 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 20(a). This mitigating 
condition is not established because Applicant’s delinquent debts are ongoing, 
numerous, and not the product of circumstances making them unlikely to recur. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the 
conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person=s 
control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical 
emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly 
under the circumstances.” AG ¶ 20(b). Both prongs, i.e., conditions beyond the person=s 
control and responsible conduct, must be established.  
 
 Applicant’s marital breakup in 2000 triggered a period of emotional turmoil, 
alcohol abuse, and financial mismanagement. However, she has not acted responsibly 
despite continuous employment and financial support from her parents. I conclude AG ¶ 
20(b) is not established.  
 
 Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the 
person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear 
indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control.” AG ¶ 20(c). This 
mitigating condition is not established because there is no evidence that Applicant has 
sought or received counseling and her financial problems are not under control. 
 
 Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing that “the 
individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve 
debts.” AG ¶ 20(d). Good faith means acting in a way that shows reasonableness, 
prudence, honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation. ISCR Case No. 99-0201, 1999 
WL 1442346 at *4 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 1999). An applicant is not required, as a matter of 
law, to establish resolution of every debt alleged in the SOR. An applicant need only 
establish a plan to resolve financial problems and take significant actions to implement 
the plan. There is no requirement that an applicant make payments on all delinquent 
debts simultaneously, nor is there a requirement that the debts alleged in the SOR be 
paid first. See ISCR Case No. 07-06482 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 21, 2008).  
 
 
13 
 
 
 The judgment alleged in SOR ¶ 3.a was satisfied by involuntary wage 
garnishment and not by Applicant’s good-faith efforts. The evidence reflects that the 
judgment alleged in SOR ¶ 3.e has been satisfied, and Applicant is making payments 
on the debt alleged in SOR ¶ 3.q. She has not resolved the remaining debts alleged in 
the SOR and has no plan for doing so. I conclude that AG ¶ 20(d) is established for the 
debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 3.e and 3.q, but not for the other delinquent debts alleged in 
the SOR. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “the 
individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is 
the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of 
the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue.” AG ¶ 20(e). Applicant 
has not disputed any of the debts. She testified that the judgments alleged in SOR ¶¶ 
3.d and 3.f were duplicates. When the same conduct is alleged twice in the SOR under 
the same guideline, one of the duplicative allegations should be resolved in Applicant=s 
favor. See ISCR Case No. 03-04704 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2005) at 3 (same debt alleged 
twice). However, she provided no documentation to show that the two judgments were 
for the same debt. I conclude that AG ¶ 20(e) is not established. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my 
comments under Guidelines K, E, and F in my whole-person analysis. Some of the 
factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant 
additional comment. 
 
 Applicant is mature, intelligent, and hard working. She has worked as a 
Government employee or Government contractor and held a security clearance for all of 
her adult life. She has earned the respect of her supervisors in spite of her security 
violations five years ago. She has not, however, learned how to manage her personal 
 
14 
 
 
finances, and her falsifications during her former employer’s investigation in 2005 and in 
her OPM affidavit in April 2008 raise doubts about her current trustworthiness and 
reliability. 
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines K, E, 
and F, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on her handling of protected 
information, but she has not mitigated the security concerns raised by her lack of candor 
during two security investigations and her continuing financial problems. Accordingly, I 
conclude she has not carried her burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the 
national interest to continue her eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline K:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a-2.b:   For Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 2.c-2.d:   Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 3, Guideline F:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 3.a-3.d:   Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 3.e:    For Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 3.f-3.p:   Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 3.q:    For Applicant 
  Subparagraph 3.r-3.t:   Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to continue 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge