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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
--------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 09-07466
SSN: — – ---- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Marc G. Laverdiere, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant failed to mitigate the security concern posed by either his Russian wife,
his stepdaughter, or his Ukrainian friends. Clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case
On August 17, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline B,
Foreign Influence. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR on September 7, 2010, admitting all of the
allegations, and requesting an administrative determination. On September 20, 2010,
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Department Counsel requested a hearing. I received the case assignment on October 1,
2010. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on October 7, 2010, scheduling it for October 28,
2010. I held the hearing as scheduled. During the hearing, I received four Government
exhibits, marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 4, nine Applicant exhibits
marked as Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through I, and Applicant’s testimony. Also, at the
Government’s request, I took administrative notice of the adjudicative facts set forth in 13
documents, marked as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I through XIII. DOHA received the hearing
transcript (Tr.) on November 4, 2010.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 54-year-old married man with no children. Applicant and his current
wife have been married since July 2006. (AE 2 at 5)
Applicant served in the United States (U.S.) Navy from 1974 to 1980. He was
discharged honorably. (AE A) In 1989, Applicant completed college, earning a bachelor
of science degree in the field of physical sciences. (AE B)
Applicant has spent his career working in a variety of science and engineering
positions. (see generally, GE 1 at 10-16) Since 2009, he has worked for a defense
contractor as a radar test engineer. (Id. at 10)
Applicant is fascinated by Slavic culture and Slavic architecture (AE F at 18-21,
24-27, 31; Tr. 48) Over the years, he has taken Russian classes at a local community
college. He has visited Russia once and visited Ukraine multiple times. Applicant’s visit
to Russia occurred in 2000. He travelled there to sightsee and with the intention of
marrying a woman to whom he had been referred through a matchmaking service. (Tr.
90) 
Applicant’s returned to the U.S. with the woman he met through the dating
service. He married her shortly after returning to the U.S. (Tr. 92) They separated two
weeks after the marriage, and the woman returned to Russia. (Tr. 94) They were legally
divorced in 2002. (Tr. 92)
Between 2002 and 2003, Applicant visited Ukraine twice. (AE 1 at 37) Each time,
he opted to rent an apartment rather than stay at a hotel. (Tr. 98) On his second trip, in
November 2003, Applicant befriended a woman and her two teenage daughters. (Tr. 98)
They remained friends after Applicant returned home.
In early 2005, Applicant received news that his Ukrainian friend was critically ill
with brain cancer. That May, he returned to Ukraine and visited her at the hospital. He
then promised her that after her death, he would support her children financially. (Tr. 51)
Shortly after Applicant returned to the U.S., his Ukrainian friend died. Since then,
he has kept his promise, sending her daughters two to three hundred dollars per month,
and periodically sending them clothing. (Tr. 63) He also provides financial support to the
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girls’ aunt, who is now their legal guardian. Specifically, he helped finance dental school
tuition for the aunt’s son. (Tr. 66, 67)
Applicant has returned to Ukraine four times since 2004 to visit his friends. His
most recent trip was in early 2010. He  loves his Ukrainian friends and considers them
his surrogate family. (Tr. 48, 59) His relationship with them “is more important to [him]
than getting a clearance.” (Tr. 52)
Currently, the oldest of the two Ukrainian girls lives in the U.S. on a work visa. (AE
C) She works part-time at two jobs as a waitress and a maid.
Applicant’s current wife was born and raised in Russia. She immigrated to the
U.S. in 2004. (GE 2 at 5) Applicant met her in 2005 through his Russian professor, with
whom she was then working as a nanny. After dating for a year, Applicant married her.
Applicant’s wife earned the U.S. equivalent of an associate’s degree in the field of
culinary arts in 1992. (AE D) Since marrying Applicant, she has been a homemaker. She
is a permanent U.S. resident. (AE I)
Applicant’s parents-in-law are deceased. He has two adult stepchildren, a man
and a woman, who live in Russia. Applicant’s stepson works as a mechanic for an oil
company where he lays pipelines. (Tr. 96) Applicant does not know whether the oil
company for whom his stepson works is state-owned. Applicant has never met his
stepson, and has only talked to him on three or four occasions. (Tr. 96)
Applicant’s stepdaughter is unemployed. (Tr. 97) She and her three-year-old
daughter recently visited Applicant and his wife in the U.S., staying for three months and
living at their home. When Applicant’s stepdaughter is home in Russia, they usually
communicate with her using Skype. (Tr. 89) Applicant characterized his relationship with
his stepdaughter as good. (Tr. 44)
At the hearing, Applicant engaged in a profane tirade, characterizing the
responsibility of maintaining a security clearance as “a . . . pain in the . . . ass.” (Tr. 80)
During his closing argument, he described maintaining a security clearance as “a big
hassle,” and stated that he did not trust the U.S. government. (Tr. 123)
Russia has an aggressive, ongoing intelligence collection program targeting the
U.S. (HE V at 1) Its espionage focuses on military technology and gas and oil industry
expertise. (Id. at 2) Over the past few years, Russia’s foreign policy objectives have
grown increasingly inimical to U.S. interests. (HE X) In June 2010, the U.S. Department
of Justice arrested ten alleged Russian spies who had been carrying out long-term deep-
cover assignments in the U.S. (HE 12) The following month, all ten defendants pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government within the U.S., and were
immediately expelled. (HE 13)
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Although Russia has made some progress in respecting human rights since the
breakup of the Soviet Union, significant problems remain. For example, several human
rights activists and journalists have been killed under mysterious circumstances over the
years. (HE VI at 2) The press has, at times, been brutally suppressed. (Id. at 29) Russian
law requires telephone and cellular companies to grant its Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Federal Security Service 24-hour remote access to their client databases. (HE 2 at 16)
Also, these agencies require Internet companies to provide dedicated lines to enable
tracking of private e-mail communications. (Id.) It is not unusual for foreigners to become
victims of harassment, mistreatment, or extortion by Russian law enforcement officials.
(HE VIII at 8)
Ukraine is a multi-party republic with a parliamentary/presidential system of
government. (HE II at 1) The Ukrainian constitution provides citizens the right to change
their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through
“periodic, free, and fair elections based on universal suffrage.” (HE II at 15) Over the
years, it has been gradually moving from its Soviet past to a market economy, integrating
into the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence, and developing its nascent democracy. (GE III
at 1)
In April 2008, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a roadmap for strengthening their ties.
(HE IV at 13) The roadmap covers several areas including trade, investment, energy
security, defense cooperation, and technology cooperation. (Id.) U.S. aid to Ukraine
ranged between 60 and 96 million dollars between 2005 and 2009. (Id. at 14) Among
other things, the aid funded efforts to increase Ukraine’s “interoperability with U.S. and
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces.” (Id.  at 15) 
Russia does not approve of Ukraine’s integration into Western European military
and economic alliances. (HE IV at 8) Nevertheless, Ukraine has continued to pursue
these ties.
Ukraine’s evolution to a representative democracy supportive of the rule of law
has been most successful as to its implementation of fair elections and respect for an
independent media. (Id. at 11) However, Ukraine continues to struggle with fighting
corruption, establishing the rule of law at all levels of government, and constitutional
reform. (Id.) Police brutality is widespread. As independent media in Ukraine grow
stronger, they are increasingly exposing government misconduct. (Id. at 8-10)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied together with the factors
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listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in the U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest” (AG
¶ 6). Moreover, “adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of
the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including,
but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target
United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism” (Id.).
Russia’s continued disrespect for human rights, its increasingly inimical stance
toward U.S. foreign policy objectives, and its ongoing espionage program that targets the
U.S. render AG ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that
contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion” clearly applicable to Applicant’s relationship with his wife and
stepchildren. Although Ukraine has a growing relationship with the U.S., Applicant’s
testimony that he does not trust the U.S. government, and values his contact with his
surrogate family more than his job, renders AG ¶ 7 applicable to Applicant’s surrogate
family, also.
Applicant has never met his Russian stepson and has only talked with him on
three to four occasions. AG ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so
casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation,” applies to Applicant’s relationship with his stepson.
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Conversely, Applicant stays in frequent contact with his stepdaughter. AG ¶ 8(c)
does not apply to Applicant’s relationship with his stepdaughter.
None of the remaining mitigating conditions apply. Applicant has failed to mitigate
the foreign influence security concern.
 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
The good character that Applicant demonstrated by following through on a
promise to provide financial support to two Ukrainian girls upon their mother’s death is
outweighed by his troubling testimony and flippant attitude regarding the maintenance of
a security clearance. Upon considering this case in the context of the whole person, I
conclude Applicant has failed to mitigate the security concern.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
SOR subparagraphs 1.a - 1.e: Against Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge