KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline E
DIGEST: Applicant did not demonstrate timely repayment of delinquent debts.  He failed to
mitigate the security concerns arising from his false answer to the security clearance application. 
Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASE NO: 08-01392.a1
DATE: 02/24/2011
DATE: February 24, 2011
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-01392
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On April 8, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and
Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as
amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On December 7, 2010, after the hearing,
Administrative Judge Jennifer I. Goldstein denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge:
1) erred in concluding that Applicant’s efforts to resolve his indebtedness were insufficient to
mitigate the government’s security concerns, and 2) failed to accept his explanation as to why his
omission of information from his Security Clearance Application (SCA) was not deliberate and
intentional.  Applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary,
capricious or contrary to law.
On appeal, Applicant submits a credit report which post-dates the Judge’s decision by three
weeks and was not part of the record evidence.  The Board cannot consider this new evidence.  See
Directive ¶ E3.1.29.
The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a
favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as
a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice
versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  In this case, the Judge
found that Applicant had a lengthy history of not meeting financial obligations.  At the time the case
was submitted for decision, Applicant still had significant outstanding debts, and was still trying to
resolve his financial problems. Although some of his outstanding debts had been paid, his actions
had not been timely, and two of the debts had been paid involuntarily through garnishment. Decision
at 7.  In light of the foregoing, the Judge could reasonably conclude that Applicant’s financial
problems were still ongoing.   See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-07747 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007).  The
Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the length and seriousness of
the disqualifying conduct, considered the possible application of relevant conditions and factors.
While she found in favor of Applicant as to several of the SOR factual allegations, she reasonably
explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome the government’s security
concerns.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue
for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
With respect to the falsification of Applicant’s SCA, the Judge specifically considered
Applicant’s explanations for why he failed to disclose the information in question.  Decision at 2-3,
12.  However, the Judge was not bound, as a matter of law, to accept or reject that explanation.
Rather, the Judge considered that explanation in light of the record evidence as a whole, including
his statement that he had failed to disclose his outstanding debts because he was embarrassed, and
concluded there was a sufficient basis to find that Applicant’s omissions were deliberate and
intentional.  On this record, the Judge’s finding of deliberate falsification is sustainable.  See
Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1.
The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for her decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan       
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin             
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields        
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board