KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: At the time the case was submitted for decision Applicant still had significant
outstanding debts.  The Judge could reasonably conclude that the problems were ongoing. 
Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 09-08405.a1
DATE: 02/01/2011
DATE: February 1, 2011
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-08405
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On May 11, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
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Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On November 24, 2010, after the hearing, Administrative Judge David M.
White denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge
did not correctly weigh Applicant’s mitigating evidence.  Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse
decision focused exclusively on the government’s older credit report, showing approximately
$90,000 in delinquent debt, rather than Applicant’s more recent credit report, showing a 60%
reduction in that delinquent debt in the three months prior to the hearing.  He also argues that the
Judge failed to give adequate weight to his favorable employment and character evidence under the
whole-person concept.  Applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
In reaching his decision, the Judge gave due consideration to “[t]he strong testaments to
[Applicant’s] good character, integrity, and trustworthiness by his supervisor and coworkers.”
Decision at 8.  However, the presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge
to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the
evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence,
or vice versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  A party’s
disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different
interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or
reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR
Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a lengthy history of not meeting financial
obligations.  At the time the case was submitted for decision, Applicant still had significant
outstanding debts, and was still trying to resolve his financial problems.  In light of the foregoing,
the Judge could reasonably conclude that those problems were still ongoing.   See, e.g., ISCR Case
No. 05-07747 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007).  The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by
Applicant against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the
possible application of relevant conditions and factors.  He specifically considered the evidence
referenced by Applicant in his appeal brief and reasonably explained why that evidence was
insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns:
Even if the $50,411 in debt that no longer reflects on Applicant’s credit reports . . .
is excluded, almost $40,000 in delinquent debt remains.   If Applicant’s estimate of
$1,350 in surplus income per month is truly available, it would take 29 months to
resolve this debt.  Thus the beginning of mitigation was established . . . but the track
record of actual debt repayment is far too short to provide substantial mitigation of
the foregoing security concerns.  Moreover, uncollectible debt may no longer support
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concerns about financial coercion or duress, but ignoring financial obligations for
that lengthy period does not alleviate concerns about Applicant’s judgment or
willingness to comply with rules and regulations.  Decision at 6-7. 
The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan     
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody              
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields          
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board