DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 ---, ---- ------ )  ISCR Case No. 08-07693 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Jr., Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: William Savarino, Esquire 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HOWE, Philip S., Administrative Judge: 
 
On February 1, 2007, Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 
86 or e-QIP). On March 24, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) 
issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under 
Guidelines M (Use of Information Technology Systems) and E (Personal Conduct). The 
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information 
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the 
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006.  
  
 Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on March 31, 2010. He answered 
the SOR in writing through counsel on April 13, 2010, and requested a hearing before 
an administrative judge. DOHA received the request on April 15, 2010. Department 
Counsel was prepared to proceed on August 12, 2010, and I received the case 
assignment on September 18, 2010. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on September 8, 
2010, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on October 6, 2010. The Government 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
offered Exhibits 1 through 4, which were received without objection. Applicant testified 
and submitted Exhibits A and B, without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the 
hearing (Tr.) on October 14, 2010. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and 
testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his Answer, Applicant admitted the Guideline M allegations in ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b of 
the SOR. He denied ¶ 1.c, with explanation. Applicant admitted and denied parts of the 
Personal Conduct concerns alleged in ¶ 2.a through ¶ 2.c. He denied the allegations in 
¶¶ 2d, 2.e, and 2.g. Applicant admitted the allegation in ¶¶ 2.f. He also provided 
additional information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.  
 
 Applicant is 51 years old and a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He served 
seven years on active duty in the Navy. He is married and has two children. Since his 
separation from the Navy in 1998, Applicant has worked in the field of information 
technology (computers) for several defense contractors. Applicant is a database 
administrator for his present employer for whom he has worked since 2007. His current 
employer is a government contractor to the Navy. Applicant has held a top secret 
clearance since 1988. (Tr. 83-85, 91, 144, 150, 199; Exhibit 1) 
 
 As a database administrator, Applicant shared group passwords with other 
administrators. Applicant had 7 to 30 passwords to remember each day, and would 
guess his password or a group password if it were necessary. As an administrator, he 
could not research an existing password if someone in the user group forgot their 
password. Applicant could only assign a new password if the existing password was 
forgotten or lost. This practice of guessing passwords in such circumstances was 
commonplace in his company and his computer experience. There were no company 
policies on the sharing of passwords by database administrators, except the guessing of 
someone else’s password when it is not a situation of helping the person remember 
their password or another administrator recollect the group password for work purposes 
is considered hacking in the computer business. (Tr. 95-106, 178, 181, 183; Exhibits 2, 
3) 
 
 Applicant used outside disks and other media on company computers during his 
civilian work career since 1988. He did so only to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the company’s computer systems. Applicant made certain to scan all 
such outside disks and media using company issued anti-virus screening software prior 
to inserting such into his employer’s computer system. In Applicant’s 13 years of 
working as a government contractor, this practice of scanning outside media before 
using it on a company computer was common in the industry. The company’s policy 
was that the person who brought in the outside media was initially responsible for 
screening it for viruses.  
 
Applicant was never admonished by his supervisors for any of his actions 
involving the use of outside media on company computers. Applicant thought he was 
 
3 
 
 
following all standard Navy and company procedures. The computers Applicant 
managed were not connected to the internet or any computer outside of the company’s 
network. The Government did not offer any evidence that the Navy or Applicant’s 
company had policies, rules or procedures that prohibited this practice. Applicant 
introduced software patches into the computers to repair errors in software. That 
process was also routine in the industry and Applicant’s experience. (Tr. 106-111, 166, 
184-188; Exhibits 2, 3)  
 
 Applicant took company office supplies, e.g., staplers, pads, computer mice, 
paperclips, and paper home to do company work. Applicant’s manager was aware he 
was taking office supplies home, and his supervisors did not object. Other employees 
also took office supplies home, with the understanding the items would be used for 
company business. (Tr. 111-116) 
 
 Applicant never had classified material in his workplace. He never took classified 
information home. Applicant did take home documents, which included company 
propriety data. When transporting this material, Applicant kept it locked in the trunk of 
his car or on his person. Applicant did not have his manager’s authorization to take 
company information. (Tr. 117-125) 
 
 Applicant expanded administrative accounts when he was installing software on 
company computers. He used a particular command on the computer that allowed him 
to make the installation, but it also recorded an audit trail about what action was taken. 
Only super-users were to use this command. Applicant used it, and thought he had the 
authority to use it because the installation proceeded as planned. No one from his 
employer told Applicant his actions exceeded his authority. (Tr. 127-130) 
 
 Applicant removed an acronym for his company from the label on a media disk. 
Security banners on unclassified and/or For Official Use Only (FOUO) documents that 
he brought home to use in his home office did not have a sensitive material label on 
them. One time, in 2001, Applicant removed a label on a document because it 
contained the name of the machine and the acronym for the Navy command for which 
he worked. He shredded that label. Applicant did not verify the sensitivity level of the 
disk, nor whether he should have taken it from the facility, before he removed it. 
However, he did not see any label requiring that the document remain on the 
employer’s premises. The document remains in his home safe with the tag excised. (Tr. 
119-127, 130-133) 
 
 Applicant did not disclose on his February 2007 SF-86, the adverse security 
decision by another federal agency “disapproving” him access to sensitive compartment 
information (SCI) in 2004. Specifically, Question 26 B, asked Applicant: 
 
To your knowledge, have you ever had a clearance or access 
authorization denied, suspended, or revoked, or have you ever been 
debarred from government employment? [An administrative downgrade or 
termination of a security clearance is not a revocation.]  
 
4 
 
 
 
Applicant thought this adverse decision was an administrative determination 
instead of a denial. The language used in the agency decision was that it “disapproved 
you for access to classified information.” In its February 13, 2004 decision, the other 
federal agency took this adverse action because of alleged security violations, misuse 
of information technology systems, and personal conduct. These allegations stem from 
an interview conducted by a polygraph examiner. The examiner questioned Applicant 
over the course of three days. He inquired as to Applicant’s removal of items from his 
employer’s offices, and “multiple attempts to enter classified and unclassified 
information technology systems without proper authorization.” The agency also stated in 
its February 13, 2004 letter that Applicant “changed your access on other systems and 
broadened your area access, without authorization. You also knowingly circumvented 
security procedures.” Furthermore, the agency stated Applicant admitted he removed 
disks and hard copy information from the workplace without authorization. “You advised 
taking home classified information with banner pages intact and then cutting them off 
and shredding them.” (Exhibit 3) 
 
When Applicant answered Question 26 B he “believed their action to be 
administrative and considered it a termination, because up to that point, I had been at 
(the agency) doing unclassified work.” When this decision was made, Applicant was 
removed from that project (working for the other federal agency) and sent to work on 
another (unrelated) project. He considered himself terminated from the project with the 
other federal agency. In response to DOHA interrogatories, Applicant freely supplied a 
copy of the February 2004 letter from the other federal agency. He did not appeal the 
other agency’s decision because he continued to maintain his Top Secret clearance, so 
in his estimation he did not lose anything by the decision. (Tr. 92, 133-139, 147, 152-
157, 164; Exhibits 1, 3, 4) 
 
 Applicant did share group passwords while he worked at the other federal 
agency. He guessed his own passwords at that agency and expanded the authority of 
the group account. To his knowledge he did not violate any explicit instructions of that 
agency regarding computer use. (Tr. 139, 140) 
 
 Applicant’s former supervisor testified on his behalf. They worked together for 
four years. She considered him thorough and careful in his work. They are peers now at 
their present employer. In her experience, the sharing of passwords is common for 
database administrators to do. She was not aware of any prohibition on the sharing of 
passwords. She would bring in outside disks and other media from her home, scan 
them with anti-virus software, and insert them into their employer’s computer system. 
She, and other staff members, routinely took office supplies home to work on company 
business. This witness never saw any “FOUO” documents. She was not aware of any 
company policy about taking documents home to work on company issued laptops. She 
was also not aware of any restrictions on Applicant’s authority to install software on their 
employer’s computer system, and grant access privileges. This witness never saw any 
security banners on documents at their company. On occasion she would guess what 
her password was to enter her computer. (Tr. 25-51) 
 
5 
 
 
 
 The president of Applicant’s present employer also testified on Appellant’s 
behalf. He explained his background in consulting on computers and the employment of 
Applicant. His company does not have a policy prohibiting the guessing of passwords. 
The company does not have restrictions on “FOUO” documents being taken home. His 
company does not have restrictions on broadening access. Where he works there are 
no security banners or sensitive material designations. He employs Applicant also as a 
data transfer agent in his capacity as a database administrator. Two weeks earlier the 
Navy changed its policy of bringing in outside media to prohibit or restrict it. Prior to this, 
no such prohibition existed at their workplace. (Tr. 52-80) 
 
 Applicant answered all questions directly and without hesitation. He explained 
the nature of his work and his background in computers. Applicant was credible and 
persuasive in his presentation.  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
 
6 
 
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration 
of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline M, Use of Information Technology Systems 
 
 AG ¶ 39 expresses the security concern pertaining to use of information 
technology systems: 
 
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations 
pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns 
about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question 
the willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, 
and information. Information Technology Systems include all related 
computer hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the 
communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or 
protection of information. 
 
 AG ¶ 40 describes eight conditions that could raise a security concern and may 
be disqualifying: 
 
(a) illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system or 
component thereof; 
 
(b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial 
of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in an information 
technology system; 
 
(c) use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized access 
to another system or to a compartmented area within the same system; 
 
(d) downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on or to any 
unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology system; 
 
7 
 
 
 
(e) unauthorized use of a government or other information technology 
system; 
 
(f) introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or 
media to or from any information technology system without authorization, 
when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations; 
 
(g) negligence or lax security habits in handling information technology 
that persist despite counseling by management; and 
 
(h) any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or negligent, 
that results in damage to the national security. 
 
 Four disqualifying conditions may apply. AG ¶ 40 (a) and (c) apply to any illegal 
or unauthorized entry into an information technology system or component thereof, and 
the use of any such system to gain unauthorized access to another system or a 
compartmented area within the same system. Applicant was guessing passwords to 
gain entry into computer systems. He installed software in computer systems to which 
he was not authorized access. His entry of code that mimicked a “super-user” allowed 
him access for his installation work. Appellant testified no one ever told him his work 
was not authorized. It did exceed his authority. 
 
 The third condition is the unauthorized use of a government or other information 
technology system. Applicant was the database manager for his employers. He 
admitted he guessed his own computer password when he could not remember it 
amongst the 30 he had within his control. He admitted he shared group passwords with 
other contractors and other authorized personnel to access his employer’s computers 
for work purposes. AG ¶ 40 (e) applies.  
 
 The fourth condition involves the introduction of media into his company’s 
information technology system without authorization, when prohibited by rules, 
procedures, guidelines or regulations. Applicant admitted he engaged in the introduction 
of media from his home laptop computer into the company’s computers for work 
purposes only. Also, he always screened any media with anti-virus software. He added 
software to the company computers while appearing to be a “super-user,” which status 
he did not have. No rules, regulations, procedures, or guidelines that prohibited this 
conduct were submitted as exhibits. Applicant denied there were any such rules or 
procedures. He acted in accordance with what he knew or thought he knew to be the 
company procedures. However, AG ¶ 40 (f) applies because he did not have the 
authority to be a “super-user” and introduce software and media into a computer 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 AG ¶ 41 provides three conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it 
happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur 
and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or 
good judgment; 
 
(b) the misuse was minor and done only in the interest of organizational 
efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another person use one's 
password or computer when no other timely alternative was readily 
available; and, 
 
(c) the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a 
prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and by notification of 
supervisor. 
 
 All of these mitigating conditions apply based upon the evidence in the record. 
The first mitigating condition provides that the behavior happened under such unusual 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on Applicant’s integrity. 
The testimony of Applicant and his two witnesses showed the SOR allegations were 
commonplace practice within the last two companies for whom Applicant worked. He is 
the database administrator and had to take these actions to help keep the company 
operating on a daily basis. AG ¶ 41 (a) applies. 
 
 The misuse, if any, by Applicant was minor and done only to make the 
organization’s computers operate more efficiently and effectively. Applicant only 
guessed at his own password or group passwords that he was authorized to use as the 
database administrator.  AG ¶ 41 (b) applies.  
 
 Over the past 13 years Applicant has followed his employer’s information 
technology rules and procedures. His actions were in conformity with the rules and 
procedures as he understood them to be. Therefore, he did not act intentionally in a 
malicious or criminal manner. He never compromised national security. Applicant’s 
supervisor at his previous company and the president of his current employer both 
testified that they had no concerns or problems with Applicant’s work. To Applicant 
there was no situation to correct because he was always following the correct 
procedures all the time. No supervisor admonished or counseled him. AG ¶ 41 (c) 
applies because any action that might have been contrary to a policy was inadvertent or 
unintentional, designed only to promote his employer’s work for the client, and his 
supervisors knew he was introducing the media as part of his standard actions. They 
knew and did nothing to stop Applicant, so they acquiesced in his actions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
 AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct: 
 
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. 
 
The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative 
termination of further processing for clearance eligibility: 
 
(a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate 
with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a 
security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or 
releases, and cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation; and, 
 
(b) refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of 
investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in 
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination. 
 
 AG ¶ 16 describes seven conditions that could raise a security concern and may 
be disqualifying: 
 
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from 
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or 
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment 
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance 
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; 
 
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning 
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent 
medical authority, or other official government representative; 
 
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is 
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single 
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information; 
 
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any 
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse 
 
10 
 
 
determination, but which, when combined with all available information 
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply 
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the 
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes 
but is not limited to consideration of: 
 
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of 
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, 
unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other 
government protected information: 
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the 
workplace;  
 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and, 
 
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other 
employer's time or resources. 
 
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, 
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such 
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's 
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another 
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is 
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a 
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence 
service or other group; 
 
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to 
the employer as a condition of employment; and 
 
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity.  
 
 The seven allegations in Paragraph 2 of the SOR fall within three disqualifying 
conditions. First, Applicant did not make full disclosure about a denial of a security 
clearance by another agency in 2004. Question 26 B on the SF-86 of February 2007 
asked if Applicant had ever been denied. He answered “no.” The agency’s letter uses 
the word “disapproved.” AG ¶ 16 (a) applies.  
 
 The remaining six allegations fall within the purview of both AG ¶ 16 (c) and (d). 
The allegations under Guidelines E and M when considered as a whole support a 
whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, 
lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules, or other characteristics indicating 
Applicant may not properly safeguard protected information. They also contain credible 
adverse information not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be 
sufficient individually for an adverse determination, but when combined with all available 
 
11 
 
 
information would support a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly 
safeguard protected information.  
 
 Applicant admitted he took office supplies from empty office cubicles to use at 
home when doing company work. He denied he took multiple documents home without 
authorization that had “FOUO” or sensitive designations on them. He admitted he 
broadened administrative accounts without authority and to accomplish the company’s 
work.  
 
 Next, the allegation was made that Applicant was told his access was denied by 
another agency in February 2004. The denial was based on security violations, misuse 
of information technology and personal conduct.  
 
 Finally, the three allegations in SOR Paragraph 1 were incorporated into 
Paragraph 2 under personal conduct. Those allegations concern access to computer 
systems, introduction of media into computer systems, and guessing passwords.  
 
 AG ¶ 17 provides seven conditions that could mitigate security concerns: 
 
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, 
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts; 
 
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was 
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of 
authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual 
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made 
aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the 
individual cooperated fully and truthfully. 
 
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is 
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling 
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the 
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, 
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; 
 
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; 
 
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable 
reliability; and 
 
12 
 
 
 
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or 
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's 
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules 
and regulations. 
  
 The falsification issue is a matter of semantics and Applicant’s understanding of 
the agency’s action six years ago in 2004. The agency stated he was “disapproved.” 
The government alleges it was a denial and should have been disclosed. Applicant 
knew he had no security clearance at that agency so he assumed it was an 
administrative determination that did not have to be disclosed in response to Question 
26 B. His understanding of the action is not a reasonable interpretation of the agency’s 
action. He did not disclose an adverse action by the other agency concerning his SCI 
and security clearance application on his SF-86. That denial is an important fact to be 
considered by the government in deciding whether to grant Applicant another security 
clearance for five years. Applicant graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and served 
seven years on active naval duty. He knows what a falsification is and his duty to 
disclose based on his experience as an officer and a corporate employee. He did not 
take any action to correct his omission before being confronted with the facts.  
 
 The other allegations are not mitigated under AG ¶ 17 (c) because Applicant 
admitted freely he did them and he continued to do them over several years. Taking 
corporate property merely because someone else did is not justification for that action. 
Removing sensitive material from the workplace, exceeding his authority on computer 
operations, and removing security banners are actions under the Personal Conduct 
Guideline that are not minor in their totality nor were they infrequent. These actions 
Applicant performed over several years and are likely to continue based on that 
precedent. 
 
 No other mitigating conditions apply. No evidence concerning improper or 
inadequate advice from authorized personnel or legal counsel concerning the security 
clearance process was submitted by Applicant, so AG ¶ 17 (b) does not apply. 
Applicant has not changed any of his behaviors to allow AG ¶ 17 (d) to apply. No 
positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation or duress were taken. 
AG ¶ 17 (e) does not apply. The information was substantiated and admitted by 
Applicant. AG ¶ 17 (f) does not apply. Finally, there was no evidence or admission of 
any association with criminals, so AG ¶ 17 (g) does not apply.   
  
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the “whole-person concept,” the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
 
13 
 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 AG ¶ 2(c) requires each case must be judged on its own merits.  Under AG ¶ 
2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance 
must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the 
guidelines and the whole person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Regarding information technology 
systems, Applicant is an experienced former naval officer and database administrator. 
He acted in his employment the way he thought was proper to accomplish the work for 
which he was hired. No employer or supervisor every counseled or disciplined him for 
his actions. His witnesses showed his actions were within the industry norm and they 
had no concerns about Applicant. Any conduct was motivated by a desire to keep his 
company’s computers operating and to improve his work performance. 
 
However, Applicant did not make a full disclosure about his denial of a security 
clearance and SCI by another agency. The total number and type of actions Applicant 
took regarding sensitive information and the computer systems under his control show 
personal conduct that was done by an experienced and professional adult which was 
serious. It was also undertaken voluntarily and done frequently. There were no changes 
in the behavior over the past several years, the continuation of the actions is likely, and 
there is the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress. These are not 
actions of an experienced professional, particularly the falsification of his questionnaire 
concerning the denial of an earlier application for SCI and security clearance by another 
agency.  
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s 
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude 
Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his use of information technology 
systems. He did not mitigate the security concerns under personal conduct. I conclude 
the “whole-person” concept against Applicant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline M:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a to 1.c:  For Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a to 2.g:  Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
_________________ 
PHILIP S. HOWE 
Administrative Judge