DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 09-05557 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
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CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Based on a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits, eligibility for access to 
classified information is denied. 
 
On November 12, 2008, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) as part of his employment with a defense contractor. 
(Item 4) On July 8, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns for foreign 
influence under Guideline B and foreign preference under Guideline C. (Item 1) The 
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information 
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
1992), as amended (Directive), and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the 
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006.  
  
 Applicant answered the SOR in writing on July 30, 2010. (Item 2) He admitted 
two and denied three of the SOR factual allegations under Guideline C. He admitted the 
 
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four SOR factual allegations under Guideline B. He elected to have the matter decided 
on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the 
Government’s written case on November 24, 2010. Applicant received a complete file of 
relevant material (FORM) on January 7, 2011, and was provided the opportunity to file 
objections, and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the disqualifying 
conditions. Applicant provided additional information on January 24, 2011. The case 
was assigned to me on January 31, 2011 
 
Procedural Issues 
 
 Department Counsel in the FORM asked that administrative notice be taken of 
certain facts concerning Taiwan (Item 7). I have considered the request and the 
documents provided by Department Counsel. Administrative notice is taken of the facts 
as noted below in the Findings of Fact. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the following 
essential findings of fact.   
 
 Applicant is a 50-year-old project scientist who has worked for his employer for 
approximately six years. He will be on projects in the near future requiring access to 
classified information. Applicant was born in Taiwan where he completed his 
undergraduate education. While in Taiwan, he also served his mandatory two-year tour 
of military service in the Taiwan Army. He came to the United States in 1988 to attend 
graduate school and earned a Master's degree in 1990. He continued his studies and 
earned a doctorate at a United States University in 1995. He obtained grants to finance 
his graduate studies and living expenses while pursuing his studies in the United States. 
Applicant has worked for his present employer since receiving his doctorate. He is 
single having never married. He became a United States citizen in October 2006, and 
received a United States passport in December 2006. He was not required to renounce 
his Taiwanese citizenship when he received his United States citizenship. He is a dual 
citizen of the United States and Taiwan. (Item 6 at 5-6) 
 
 Applicant admits that his mother and father are residents and citizens of Taiwan. 
His parents owned a clothing store in Taiwan but are now retired. He admits that he has 
three siblings who are residents and citizens of Taiwan. His oldest brother is a 
restaurant owner and his next oldest brother is a newspaper distributor. His sister works 
in the restaurant business. His oldest brother and his sister live with his parents. His 
other brother lives nearby with his family. None of his immediate family has worked for 
the Taiwanese government or in any intelligence position. He has four to five monthly 
contacts with his family in Taiwan by telephone or e-mails. Applicant admits he has 
nieces and nephews who are citizens and residents of Taiwan, but he is not close to 
them. (Item 6 at 2-3) Applicant admits that since 2004, he has traveled to Taiwan every 
February during the Chinese New Year to visit his family. (See Answer to SOR) 
 
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 Applicant admits he has a Taiwanese passport that was renewed in 2002 and 
does not expire until July 19, 2012. He uses his Taiwanese passport to travel to and 
from Taiwan since it expedites his entry and exit. He last used it in February 2010. 
However, he has not used the passport for travel to Canada as partially alleged in SOR 
1.b. Applicant traveled to Canada in 2007 using his United States passport. He traveled 
to Canada prior to becoming a United States citizen in 2006 and using his Taiwan 
passport, the only passport he had at the time. (Item 6; Item 2, Applicant's Response to 
the SOR, dated July 30, 2010; Applicant's Response to the FORM, dated January 24, 
2011)  
 
 Applicant denies voting in Taiwanese elections since becoming a United States 
citizen. He lasted voted in a Taiwanese election in 1986. Elections in Taiwan are in 
October and November and Taiwan does not have an absentee voting procedure. He 
travels to Taiwan only in January or February each year during the Chinese New Year 
and not in October or November. (Response to SOR, dated July 30, 2010; Response to 
FORM dated January 24, 2011) 
 
 Applicant denies that he is required to visit Taiwan every two years to maintain 
his Taiwanese citizenship. He does admit that he has to visit Taiwan every two years to 
maintain his status as a Taiwan resident. Appellant also admits that he received a 
monetary payment from Taiwan in 2009 as a Taiwan citizen as part of an economic 
stimulus program, (Response to SOR, dated July 30, 2010)  
 
 During World War II and after, a civil war was fought on the mainland of China 
between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Chinese. In 1949, the 
Chinese Communist Party was victorious and established a government on the 
mainland. The Nationalist Chinese fled to the island that is now Taiwan and established 
a government. Taiwan has developed steadily since then and is now the world’s 17th 
largest economy. Taiwan became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2002, 
further expanding its trade opportunities and further strengthening its standing in the 
global economy. This prosperity established economic and social stability.   
 
 Until 1986, Taiwan's political system was effectively controlled by one party, the 
Kuomintang. Since ending martial law in 1987, Taiwan has taken dramatic steps to 
improve respect for human rights and create a democratic political system. The United 
States has been committed to maintaining cultural, commercial, and other nonofficial 
relations with Taiwan since January 1979, when it formally recognized the government 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China. By 
formal act of Congress (Taiwan Relations Act of 1979), the United States is committed 
to provide Taiwan with military defensive arms in support of Taiwan's security and 
stability in the region. The United States also stated it would maintain cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. Despite the United 
States clear and consistent position that Taiwan and the mainland are part of one 
China, the United States expanded the commercial ties with Taiwan and is supportive of 
Taiwan's membership in international organizations, such as the World Trade 
 
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Organization and the Asian Development Bank (See Item 7, United States, Department 
of State's Background Note: Taiwan, dated November 3, 2010).   
 
While still pursuing a closer relationship with Taiwan, the official United States 
position on Taiwan and mainland China seems to be a criticism of mainland China’s 
buildup opposite Taiwan with periodic cautions and warnings to the effect that United 
States support for Taiwan is not unconditional, but has limits. Smooth United States and 
PRC relations are an important tool in cooperating against terrorism and maintaining 
stability in the Pacific region. Faced with competing pressures and the continuing 
transformation on both the PRC and Taiwan systems, the United States government 
may be facing new and more difficult policy choices in the future The current dynamic 
as Taiwan moves closer to the PRC poses difficult, competing policy challenges for the 
United States. (See Item 7, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress: 
Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, dated November 2, 2009). 
 
 The Government claims through Administrative Notice that Taiwan poses a 
threat to national security because, in the past, it was one of the countries most actively 
engaged in industrial espionage and the collection of foreign economic information. The 
request cites to the Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial Espionage of 2000. This report lists Taiwan as one of the most active 
collectors of industrial and economic intelligence. However, the Government also 
attached to its request the more recent Annual report from 2008. The report does not list 
Taiwan as being one of the biggest collectors of economic and industrial espionage.  It 
does list the PRC and Russia as the most active collectors. The report states the United 
States is targeted by a large number of foreign countries for economic and industrial 
espionage. The report notes that the foreign private sector is the most active collector of 
this type of economic and industrial intelligence, but there is ample evidence that foreign 
intelligence services and other government organizations remain aggressive in 
collecting information by using the private sector to collect information for them and by 
their own continued direct intelligence gathering operations.   
 The report lists a number of factors that could cause concern for the United 
States. Among the concerns are the number of foreign visitors from any country to 
United States sensitive sites, the number of non-immigrant persons from a country that 
are admitted as visitors to the United States, and the number of requests from a country 
for visits to military and defense industry sites. There are a large number of visitors from 
Taiwan to the United States for business, pleasure, or other purposes. Taiwan does not 
appear to be any more active in the collection of economic and industrial intelligence 
than many other allied counties. (See Item 7) 
 The Government also presented information concerning individuals in the United 
States convicted of engaging in espionage practices on behalf of Taiwanese companies 
or officials, as well as companies that violate export control requirements in sending 
items to Taiwan. Some of these cases involve individuals in the United States, both 
native born and foreign born and both citizens and non-citizens of the United States, 
that formed friendships with Taiwan Intelligence agents and then provided the agents 
 
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with classified information. While the government presented information only on Taiwan 
cases, it is not difficult to assume that there are cases that pertain to other countries as 
well. The fact that there are cases of Taiwan intelligence agents accepting intelligence 
information from sources in the United States, no matter how obtained, does raise 
security concerns. 
 The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is defined in the Taiwan 
Relations Act which recognizes Taiwan. (Public Law 96-8) Taiwan has a long history of 
friendly relations with the United States, including substantial levels of foreign trade. 
Taiwan is an ally and friend but can also pose a security threat because of its activities 
and efforts to obtain economic, industrial, and national security information.  
Policies 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
 
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Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. 
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which 
the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such 
consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)  
 
 Applicant's parents, siblings, and nieces and nephews are residents and citizens 
of Taiwan. Applicant has frequent and continuing contact with his parents and siblings in 
Taiwan contacting them telephonically or by e-mail a number of times a month. He has 
little contact with his nieces and nephews. Applicant returns to Taiwan each year during 
the Chinese New Year to visit his family. These contacts and travel to see family are a 
security concern and raise Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) AG ¶ 7(a) 
(contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or 
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion); and FI DC AG ¶ 7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group, government, or 
country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign 
person, group, or country by providing that information). The Government's security 
concern is based on the strength and depth of Applicant's connections to Taiwan 
through his family. 
 
 The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise 
the above disqualifying conditions. The nature of Applicant’s contacts and relationships 
must be examined to determine whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. “Heightened” is a relative 
term denoting increased risk compared to some normally existing risk that can be 
inherent anytime there are foreign contacts and relationships. A factor that heightens 
the risk in Applicant's case is the extent, degree, and level of his connection to his family 
in Taiwan. Under these guidelines, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed 
to determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the 
United States interest. 
 
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 Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns for the contact and 
relationship with his family in Taiwan. I have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating 
Conditions (FI MC) AG ¶ 8(a) (The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the 
country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, 
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.); FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) (There is no 
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the 
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such 
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be 
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest); and FI MC AG ¶ 
8(c) (Contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there 
is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation). 
 
 Applicant's contact with his parents and siblings in Taiwan is strong and frequent. 
He talks to them often and sees them yearly. They are not members of any political 
organization and do not hold any government office, but are ordinary citizens leading 
normal lives. He has little contact with his nieces and nephews, however. The extensive 
contacts with family members place a heavy burden on Applicant in mitigating the 
disqualifying conditions and the security concerns. In evaluating the potential conflict of 
interests between his family and the interests of the United States, I considered that 
Taiwan is an ally of the United States, has a defense agreement with the United States, 
and is one of the United States’ substantial trading partners. However, there are strong 
indications that elements in Taiwan target and seek economic and sensitive information 
from their contacts in the United States. Taiwan or elements in Taiwan could engage in 
espionage against United States interests. A friendly relationship is not determinative, 
but it makes it less likely that a foreign government would attempt to exploit a United 
States citizen through relatives or associates in that country. Even friendly countries 
may engage in espionage against United States economic, scientific, or technical 
interest. Even though Taiwan is not a hostile country and its interests are not inimical to 
the United States, it is reasonable to consider that Taiwan could take an action that may 
jeopardize their friendly position with the United States if it needed trade and defense 
information from sources in the United States. Based on an evaluation of all of these 
factors, Applicant has not met his burden to establish that his family members in Taiwan 
will not place him in a position of having to choose between the interests of his family 
and the interests of the United States.  
 
 Applicant has also raised FI MC ¶ 8(b) (There is no conflict of interest either 
because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, 
government, or country is minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding 
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest). Applicant came to the Unites States 12 
years ago to earn a graduate degree. He became a United States citizen five years ago 
after earning his doctorate degree. Applicant has kept in frequent contact with his family 
and returned to Taiwan every year for at least the last seven years. Applicant has a 
strong sense of loyalty and obligation to his family in Taiwan. While he has a connection 
 
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and relationship to the United States, he has not established that it is stronger than the 
connection and sense of obligation he has to his family in Taiwan. He has not 
demonstrated that his feeling of loyalty to the United States will overcome his strong 
feelings and relationship with his family in Taiwan. Accordingly, FI MC AG ¶ 8(a), FI MC 
AG ¶ 8(b), and FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) do not apply. Applicant has not met his heavy burden to 
show that his contacts and relationships with Taiwan do not cause a security concern. I 
conclude Applicant has not mitigated security concerns for contacts with Taiwan.  
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
 
 When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign 
country over the United States, then he may be prone to provide information or make 
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States. (AG ¶ 9) The principal 
goal of the foreign preference assessment is to determine the risk, based on foreign 
associations, that information may be compromised if access to sensitive information is 
granted. It is not a measure of Applicant's loyalty to the United States. 
 
 Applicant is a dual citizen of Taiwan and the United States. He was born and 
raised in Taiwan and came to the United States as a young man in his twenties to earn 
a graduate degree. He received his master's degree in 1988 and a doctorate in 1995, 
and became a United States citizen in 2006. He received a United States passport in 
2006 after becoming a United States citizen. He has a Taiwanese passport that was 
issued in 2002 but does not expire until 2012. He uses this passport to ease entry into 
Taiwan when he travels there yearly to visit his family. He is not required to travel to 
Taiwan to remain a Taiwanese citizen but is required to register every two years to 
maintain his status as a resident of Taiwan. He also received a payment from Taiwan in 
2009 as a citizen and resident of Taiwan. However, he has not voted in a Taiwanese 
election since becoming a United States citizen. His actions that exercise his Taiwan 
citizenship status raise Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition (FP DC) AG ¶ 10(a) 
(Exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a 
United States citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This 
includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport), and (5) using 
foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interest in another country.  
 
In response to this disqualifying condition, Applicant raised Foreign Preference 
Mitigating Conditions (FP MC) AG ¶ 11(b) (The individual has expressed a willingness 
to renounce dual citizenship); and FP MC AG ¶ 11(e) (The passport has been 
destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a right under the United States 
Constitution for United States citizens to have a dual citizenship with another country. 
(Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). The mere fact that a United States citizen is 
eligible for dual citizenship with another country is not a security concern. Applicant has 
stated he does not intend to renounce his dual citizenship with Taiwan. His failure to 
renounce dual citizenship is not a disqualifying condition since the renunciation of a dual 
citizenship is very often a meaningless gesture because of the citizenship laws of the 
other nation.  
 
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Applicant's exercise of dual citizenship does create a security concern. He has a 
foreign passport and used it for his travels. He still possesses a current Taiwanese 
passport and does not intend to relinquish control of the passport. While he has not 
voted in a foreign election since becoming a United States citizen, he has used his 
Taiwanese citizenship to maintain his status as a resident of Taiwan and to obtain a 
monetary benefit offered to citizens and residents of Taiwan. His exercise of dual 
citizenship shows there may be a conflict between his loyalty to the United States and 
his loyalty to Taiwan. Applicant has not mitigated security concerns for his exercise of 
Taiwanese citizenship. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for access to 
sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The whole-person concept requires 
consideration of all available information about Applicant, not a single item in isolation, 
to reach a determination concerning Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified 
information. Applicant has a frequent and close relationship and contact with his family 
in Taiwan. He possesses a current Taiwanese passport which he uses, and travels to 
Taiwan to maintain his status as a Taiwan resident. In addition, he received a monitory 
benefit from Taiwan based on his Taiwanese citizenship and residence. These facts 
alone are sufficient to raise security concerns for Applicant’s potential vulnerability to 
coercion, exploitation, or pressure. In addition, Applicant has not established he has 
such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties to the United States so that he 
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. While 
Taiwan is an ally of the United States, there is a security concern because of the efforts 
of Taiwan or on the behalf of Taiwan to gain sensitive United States economic and 
technical information. Applicant's connections to Taiwan create a heightened risk 
related to national security. Applicant's exercise of dual citizenship and his relationship 
 
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and connection with family members in Taiwan leaves me with questions and doubts 
about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for access to classified information. For all 
these reasons, I conclude Applicant has not met the heavy burden of mitigating 
potential security concerns arising from his contacts in Taiwan and his exercise of 
Taiwanese citizenship. Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from 
foreign influence and foreign preference, and access to classified information is denied. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraph 1.a:   Against Applicant 
   Subparagraph 1.b:   Against Applicant except for  
        travel to Canada 
   Subparagraph 1.c:   For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 1.d;   For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 1.e:   Against Applicant 
 
  Paragraph 2, Guideline B:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraphs 2.a:   Against Applicant 
   Subparagraph 2.b:   Against Applicant 
   Subparagraph 2.c:   For Applicant 
   Subparagraph 2.d:   Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for access to 
classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge