This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, DoD Directive 5220.6, dated January 2, 1992, as1
amended (Directive), and revised adjudicative guidelines which became effective within the Department of
Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.
 Applicant’s unclear responses to the SOR allegations were clarified on the record (Tr. p. 15-17).2
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-00272
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Pamela Benson, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
                                                              
______________
Decision
______________
LAZZARO, Henry, Administrative Judge
Applicant failed to overcome the foreign influence security concern that arises
from his close relationship with his mother-in-law who resides part-time in Iran.
Clearance is denied. 
On May 26, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant stating it was unable to find it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant.  The SOR alleges security concerns under Guidelines B (foreign influence)1
and C (foreign preference). Applicant’s response to the SOR was received by DOHA on
July 21, 2010. He admitted all SOR allegations except that contained in SOR
subparagraph 1.b, and he requested a hearing.2
2
The case was assigned to me on August 31, 2010. A notice of hearing was
issued on December 2, 2010, scheduling the hearing for January 12, 2011. The hearing
was conducted as scheduled. 
The Government submitted 18 documentary exhibits that were marked as
Government Exhibits (GE) 1-18. GE 1-3 were admitted into the record without objection.
Administrative notice was taken of the contents of GE 4-18 over Applicant’s objection.
Department Counsel submitted a document containing written comments on the
contents of GE 4-18 for my consideration which was marked as Appellate Exhibit (App.
Ex.) I, and made part of the record without objection. Applicant testified and submitted
one documentary exhibit that was marked as Applicant Exhibit (AE) 1, and admitted into
the record without objection. The transcript was received on January 20, 2011.     
Findings of Fact
Applicant’s admissions to the allegations in the SOR are incorporated herein. In
addition, after a thorough review of the pleadings, testimony and exhibits, I make the
following findings of fact:
Applicant is a 50-year-old man who has been employed as a senior scientist by a
defense contractor since May 2009. He previously worked for a different government
contractor from November 1997 until April 2008. Applicant has possessed a security
clearance at either the top secret or secret level since 1998. No previous action has
been taken to downgrade or revoke his clearance for adverse reasons. His top secret
clearance was downgraded to secret in either 2001 or 2002, solely because Applicant
no longer required the higher clearance.
Applicant was born in Iran. He attended high school in Iran, and he then came to
the U.S. on a student visa in 1978, at the age of 18, to attend a prestigious U.S.
university. The U.S. university awarded Applicant a bachelor of science degree in
electrical engineering in 1982, a master of science degree in electrical engineering in
1983, and a doctoral degree in electrical engineering in 1988. Applicant was employed
as an assistant professor at another university from 1988 until 1997.
Applicant left his employment with the government contractor in April 2008, after
his work schedule was reduced to part-time and in anticipation of being laid off due to a
lack of work in the area in which he was assigned. He was employed as a principal
technical consultant outside the defense industry from April 2008 until March 2009.
Applicant’s mother, father, and the youngest of his two brothers first came to the
U.S. in 1984 for a visit. They went back to Iran in or about 1984, but then returned to the
U.S. in 1986. Applicant’s father once again returned to Iran in 1989 or 1990, while his
mother stayed in the U.S. She returned to Iran for a short period of time after her
mother died in 1992, but she then again returned to the U.S. 
3
The record does not disclose when Applicant’s father returned to the U.S.
However, he died in January 2001, before he could become a naturalized U.S. citizen,
and he is buried in a cemetery in the U.S. Applicant adopted his youngest brother, who
is 17 years his junior, to allow him to remain and obtain his education in the U.S.
Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in August 1995. Applicant’s mother
became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2002. Applicant’s youngest brother is also a
naturalized U.S. citizen, although the year he was naturalized is unknown. 
Applicant’s second brother fled Iran in either 1984 or 1985 to avoid serving in the
Iranian military. He fled into Pakistan from where he was transferred to a United Nations
refugee camp in Sweden. He was allowed to immigrate to Canada in or about 1987,
where he obtained Canadian citizenship. He moved to the U.S. in 1989, and he has
lived here since. He apparently has not sought U.S. citizenship.
Applicant’s oldest brother is a senior vice president of a large U.S. bank.  His
younger brother is a software scientist employed as a manager of a consulting firm.
Applicant’s brothers and his mother reside together in the United States. 
Applicant has been married since April 1999. He was introduced to his wife, who
was living in Iran at the time, by relatives through telephone conversations about two
years earlier. They frequently spoke by phone and Applicant traveled to Iran to meet her
personally during the course of a Hajj (a pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia) he made in
1999. Applicant used an Iranian passport to enter Saudi Arabia and Iran during the trip
because he was advised he should only use a single passport for all travel connected
with the Hajj and his visit to Iran.
Applicant and his wife were married in Iran. She followed him to the U.S. several
months after they were married, and she has resided in the U.S. since. Applicant’s wife
became a naturalized U.S. citizen in or about 2004. 
Applicant and his wife have two children who were born in the U.S. and are U.S.
citizens. Applicant’s daughter is eight years old, and his son is six months old. Applicant
registered his daughter with the Iranian Interest Section in the U.S. in 2002, to comply
with Iranian procedures that will allow her to travel to Iran in the future if she so desires.
He has not registered his son because he no longer has a valid Iranian passport which
is a prerequisite for him to register the child. He and his wife are exploring other
avenues to get that child registered. 
Applicant’s mother-in-law, an Iranian citizen, has resided with him and his wife for
approximately six to seven months each year since she first came to the U.S. in 2005.
She resides in Iran the remainder of the year. She is a permanent resident alien of the
U.S., but, due to her inability to learn the English language, she has not applied for U.S.
citizenship. 
4
Applicant traveled to Iran in 1979 and 1982, before he became a U.S. citizen. He
traveled to Iran in 1999, 2001, and 2005, after he became a U.S. citizen. Applicant
visited Iran for about four or five weeks in 2001 because his wife was homesick. His
wife returned to Iran in 2005 with their daughter for an extended visit of about six
months, and he joined them there for about four weeks.  As required to comply with
Iranian entrance requirements for Iranian citizens, Applicant used an Iranian passport
for all travel to Iran. Applicant notified the appropriate security officials of his employer of
each of his foreign travels and he was never made aware that such travel or the use of
a foreign passport might create a security concern.   
Applicant twice renewed his Iranian passport after he became a U.S. citizen to
allow him to travel to Iran. His Iranian passport expired in December 2008. During an
interview conducted in March 2010, he stated he would have to renew his Iranian
passport if he planned to travel to Iran in the future. He explained at the hearing that is a
correct statement because the only way he could travel to Iran would be on an Iranian
passport. However, he clarified that he does not intend to renew his Iranian passport or
travel to Iran in the future now that he is aware such travel creates a security concern.
In response to an amnesty offer to person’s who had illegally fled the country, the
older of Applicant’s two brothers traveled to Iran in 2008. He was detained at the airport
in Iran for about 12 hours, and he was not allowed to return to the U.S. for about four or
five weeks. When Applicant was notified of his brother’s detention, he contacted the
Iranian Interest Section in Washington, D.C. to protest the detention.    
U.S. Department of State publications provide the following information:
As of August 5, 2010, Iran was identified by the U.S. to be the most active
state sponsor of terrorism. 
Iran’s financial, material, and logistic support for terrorist and militant
groups throughout the Middle East and Central Asia had a direct impact
on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in
the Gulf and undermined the growth of democracy. (GE 8)
The Department of State warns U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks
of travel to Iran. Dual national Iranian-American citizens may encounter
difficulty in departing Iran. . . .
Some elements in Iran remain hostile to the United States. As a result,
American citizens may be subject to harassment or arrest while traveling
or residing in Iran. Since 2009, Iranian authorities have prevented the
departure of a number of Iranian-American citizens, including journalists,
who traveled to Iran for personal or professional reasons, in some case for
several months. Iranian authorities also have detained or imprisoned
Iranian-American citizens on various charges, including espionage and
posing a threat to national security. Americans of Iranian origin should
 ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at p. 2.3
 ISCR Case No. 97-0016 (December 31, 1997) at p. 3; Directive, Enclosure 3, Item E3.1.14. 4
 Department of the Navy v. Egan 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).5
 ISCR Case No. 01-20700 (December 19, 2002) at p. 3 (citations omitted).6
5
consider the risk of being targeted by authorities before planning travel to
Iran. Iranian authorities deny access to the U.S. Interests Section in
Tehran to dual nationals because Iranian authorities consider them to be
solely Iranian citizens. (GE 18) 
The government’s poor human rights record degenerated during the year
(2009). . . . The government executed numerous persons for criminal
convictions as juveniles and after unfair trials. Security forces were
implicated in custodial deaths and the killings of election protestors and
committed other acts of politically motivated violence, including torture,
beatings, and rape. The government administered severe officially
sanctioned punishments, including death by stoning, amputation, and
flogging. Vigilante groups with ties to the government committed acts of
violence. Prison conditions remained poor. Security forces arbitrarily
arrested and detained individuals, often holding them incommunicado.
Authorities held political prisoners and intensified a crackdown against
women’s right reformers, ethnic minority rights activists, student activists,
and religious minorities. . . . (GE 14)
Policies
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines to consider when evaluating a
person’s eligibility to hold a security clearance. Chief among them are the disqualifying
and mitigating conditions for each applicable guideline. Clearance decisions must be fair
and impartial decisions based upon relevant and material facts and circumstances, the
whole person concept, and the factors listed in ¶ 6.3.1 through ¶ 6.3.6 of the Directive.
Although the presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or against
clearance is not outcome determinative, the adjudicative guidelines should be followed
whenever a case can be measured against this policy guidance. Considering the
evidence as a whole, Guidelines B (foreign influence) and C (foreign preference), with
their disqualifying and mitigating conditions, are most relevant in this case. 
  
The sole purpose of a security clearance decision is to decide if it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an
applicant.  The government has the burden of proving controverted facts.  The burden3 4
of proof in a security clearance case is something less than a preponderance of
evidence,  although the government is required to present substantial evidence to meet5
its burden of proof.  “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a6
 ISCR Case No. 98-0761 (December 27, 1999) at p. 2.7
 ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at pp. 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, Item E3.1.15.8
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 (January 27, 1995) at pp. 7-8; Directive, Enclosure 3, Item E3.1.15.9
 Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.10
 Id at 531.11
 Egan, Executive Order 10865, and the Directive.12
6
preponderance of the evidence.”  Once the government has met its burden, the burden7
shifts to an applicant to present evidence of refutation, extenuation, or mitigation to
overcome the case against him.  Additionally, an applicant has the ultimate burden of8
persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance decision.9
No one has a right to a security clearance  and “the clearly consistent standard10
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”   Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access11
to classified information must be resolved in favor of protecting national security.   12
   
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has
divided loyalties or financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign
person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this
Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the
foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens
to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Applicant’s brother was detained at the airport in Iran when he attempted to enter
that country in 2008, and he was prohibited from exiting the country and returning to the
U.S. for several weeks thereafter. Applicant contacted the Iranian Interest Section in the
U.S. solely to protest the detention of his brother. The record does not contain any
information from which to conclude that Applicant’s brother will travel to Iran in the
future. This incident does not create any independent security concern other than to
highlight the risk that exists from Applicant’s mother-in-law’s travels to and part-time
residency in Iran. 
Iran is a country with interests inimical to those of the U.S. It actively supports
terrorism and is repressive to its own citizens. Applicant’s mother-in-law, despite having
obtained permanent resident alien status in the U.S., divides her time almost equally
7
between residing in Iran and with Applicant and his family in the U.S. Disqualifying
Conditions (DC) 7(a): contact with a foreign family member . . . or other person who is a
citizen of or resident in a foreign country it that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion: and DC 7(d):
sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that
relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion apply. 
I have considered all mitigating conditions and find that none apply. Specifically,
Mitigating Condition (MC) 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the
country in which these persons are located . . . are such that it is unlikely the individual
will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual  . . . and the interests of the U.S. does not apply because of the obvious close
relationship between Applicant and his wife and her mother and the nature and history
of the Iranian Government. 
Applicant’s mother-in-law regularly travels to and resides in Iran. Further,
Applicant’s actions in registering his daughter and attempting to find ways to register his
son so they can travel to Iran in the future if they desire indicates that there is and will
be a continuing likelihood that persons who are extremely close to Applicant will travel
to Iran and be exposed to the threat that will exist when and if they enter that country. It
is impossible to predict what Applicant would do were his mother-in-law or other relative
detained by Iranian officials in the future. Accordingly, MC 8(b): there is no conflict of
interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign
person . . . is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. does not apply.
MC 8(c): contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation obviously does not apply because Applicant’s mother-in-law resides with
him for about six or seven months every year. The remaining mitigating conditions have
no applicability to the facts of this case.
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Foreign preference is a concern because when an individual acts in such a way
as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she
may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests
of the United States.
Applicant exercised his Iranian citizenship rights by using an Iranian passport to
travel to Iran on three occasions after he became a U.S. citizen. He notified his
employer’s security officials each time he traveled to Iran and they voiced no objection
to such travel. Applicant credibly testified he did not realize that use or possession of a
valid Iranian passport created a security concern and that he has no intention of
8
obtaining an Iranian passport in the future or traveling to Iran. Applicant’s use of an
Iranian passport was mandated by Iranian law and not by any preference he had for
Iran over the U.S.  
Applicant registered his daughter with the Iranian interest section in the U.S.
solely to allow her to exercise her option to travel to Iran in the future if she desired to
do so. He made clear in his testimony that he has no loyalty to Iran and the act of
registering his daughter was exclusively to permit her the freedom to make travel
choices connected to her heritage. I have considered all potential disqualifying
conditions and conclude none apply under the particular facts of this case.  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” In this case, there is no reason to doubt that Applicant is a loyal
American citizen or suspect he would ever consider doing harm to the interests of the
United States. Still, his continuing contacts with Iran as a result of his mother-in-law’s
travel to Iran and her part-time residency in that country, the potential for his immediate
family members to travel to Iran in the future, and the nature of the Iranian Government
and its relationship with the U.S. create a security concern that has not been overcome. 
  
Considering all relevant and material facts and circumstances present in this
case, the whole-person concept, the factors listed in ¶ 6.3.1 through ¶6.3.6 of the
Directive, and the applicable disqualifying conditions, Applicant has failed to mitigate the
foreign influence security concern that exists in this case. He has failed to overcome the
case against him in this regard or satisfy his ultimate burden of persuasion. Guideline B
is decided against Applicant. It is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
Applicant a security clearance. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a : Against Applicant
Subparagraphs 1.b and 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a-d: For  Applicant
9
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Henry Lazzaro
Administrative Judge
10
11