1
                                                             
                           
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 10-03412
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Kathryn D. MacKinnon, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: James R. Klimaski, Esq.
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
On September 20, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B
(Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative
guidelines (AG) effective within the DOD on September 1, 2006. 
In her undated response to the SOR, Applicant admitted the three allegations
raised under Guideline B and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The
case was assigned to me on November 4, 2010. Department Counsel and Applicant
agreed to a December 7, 2010, hearing date. A Notice of Hearing setting the hearing
for that date was issued by DOHA on November 16, 2010.
The hearing took place as scheduled. Department Counsel submitted three
exhibits (Ex.) which were accepted into the record as Exs. 1-3 without objection. I also
accepted Department Counsel’s memorandum requesting administrative notice of
certain facts related to the People’s Republic of China (China). It was accepted without
 Tr. 11-12, 81.1
 Tr. 53.2
2
objection as HE-1. Applicant gave testimony, introduced four witnesses, and offered
two files, which were accepted into the record without objection as Exs. A-B. The
transcript (Tr.) was received on December 15, 2010, and the record was closed. Based
upon a review of the case file, exhibits, and testimony, security clearance is denied.
Administrative Notice
The Government requested administrative notice of certain facts and materials
regarding China. Its submission (HE-1) included 15 official documents to support the
Government’s summation about China (HE-1 I-XV). Applicant did not object to my
consideration of those exhibits.  The facts administratively noticed are limited to matters1
of general knowledge and matters not subject to reasonable dispute. The facts
administratively noticed are as follows: 
China is a large and economically powerful country, with a population of over a
billion people and an economy growing at about 10% per year. It has an authoritarian
government dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. China has a poor record with
respect to human rights and the suppression of political dissent. It engages in arbitrary
arrests and detentions, forced confessions, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners. 
China is one of the most aggressive countries in the world for seeking sensitive
and protected U.S. technology and economic intelligence. It targets the United States
with active intelligence gathering programs, both legal and illegal. As a result, it is a
growing threat to U.S. national security. In China, authorities routinely monitor
telephone conversations, facsimile transmissions, e-mail, text messaging, and internet
communications. Authorities open and censor mail. Its security services have entered
personal residences and offices to gain access to computers, telephones, and fax
machines. Hotel guestrooms are sometimes bugged and searched for sensitive or
proprietary materials. There are several reports of recent cases involving actual or
attempted espionage and the illegal export of information to China.
Findings of Fact
In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the three factual allegations at
issue (SOR allegations ¶¶ 1.a-1.c). Specifically, she admitted that her parents (¶ 1.a); a
cousin (¶ 1.b); and three aunts, three additional cousins, and an uncle-in-law (¶ 1.c) are
all citizens and residents of China with whom she maintains ongoing contact. Her
admissions are incorporated into the findings below.  
Applicant is a 45-year-old technical manager who has worked for the same
defense contractor since 2003. She grew up in China, the daughter of two academics.
After seeing the film The Little House on the Prairie, she thought, “that’s the American
dream I want to have.”  She also felt that she did not fit into Chinese society as it now2
 Tr. 72.3
 Tr. 73.4
 Tr. 49.5
 Tr. 57-58.6
 Tr. 58. Applicant only returns to China to check on and care for her parents. Tr. 60. She generally visits by7
herself. Her one trip with her young children proved to be too stressful. Tr. 80.
 Tr. 66-69.8
 Tr. 57.9
 Tr. 62-63.10
 See, e.g., Tr. 82.11
 Tr. 75-76. Applicant did not provide testimony or evidence indicating to what degree Applicant’s parents12
might be dependent on this pension.
3
exists.  She arrived in the United States in the late 1980s, after completing her3
undergraduate studies and working for about two years. She focused on graduate
studies. She became more disillusioned with China during the Tiananmen Square
incident.  After completing graduate school, she held multiple positions until starting her4
current job in 2003.  In the interim, she became a U.S. citizen in 1999.   5
In 2005, Applicant married a U.S. citizen with whom she shared common
interests. They now have two young children. In 2007, with Applicant’s help, her parents
arrived in the United States. They received green cards in 2008. They later returned to
China for medical care. While there, both suffered physical setbacks which have
prevented them from returning to the United States.  6
Without friends in China upon whom she can call for assistance, Applicant visits
her parents at their home in China “quite often to attend to their health and care.”   They7
are in their 70s. Neither parent is highly communicative, and Applicant’s mother suffers
from dementia.  Her father has Parkinson’s Disease.  Applicant noted: “these are my8 9
parents. I have to take care of them. And I’m the only child. My relatives are not willing to
help because, at this stage, it’s a burden to everybody. . . . For some reason, they
decided it’s better to stay away. . . .”  Applicant also maintains telephonic contact with10
her parents, although conversations are limited due to their age and infirmities.11
Applicant’s parents receive Chinese government benefits in the form of
government pensions which supplement their personal savings.  Between visits,12
Applicant’s parents receive assistance from hired help, who cook, clean, and provide
care. Applicant’s parents did open their home to a cousin of Applicant’s, who was a
young child when Applicant came to the United States. The cousin does not provide any
 Tr. 65.13
 Tr. 67.14
 There is no evidence as to how Applicant is related to the uncle-in-law.15
 Tr. 67. 16
 Tr. 68.17
 Tr. 60.18
 Tr. 61.19
 Tr. 79.20
 Tr. 67.21
  Tr. 84.22
 Tr. 20-21.23
4
domestic or health care support and works very long shifts. Applicant does not “really
know her,” but the younger woman agreed to give up her apartment and live with
Applicant’s parents “in case anything happens.”  Applicant and the cousin, who is in her13
early or mid-20s, share no emotional ties, although Applicant appreciates the cousin for
being the only family member willing to help with Applicant’s parents.14
In China, Applicant also has three aunts, three additional cousins, and an uncle-
in-law.  Having lived in the United State the majority of her adult life, she has had “very15
limited contact” with these relations, who otherwise avoid contact with Applicant’s ailing
parents.  She noted that now that her mother is uncommunicative, “they want to run16
away as fast as they can or as far away as they can. I don’t think I owe them anything.”17
Applicant is a responsible U.S. citizen. She votes in elections because she “wants
to put in [her] opinion to make this a better place for everybody.”  She is proud to work18
in the defense industry, helping to make the country stronger for her husband and
children.  She owns a single family home and a townhouse, which are cumulatively19
worth about $1,250,000. She maintains a significant savings account, IRA account, and
a 401(k) account. Her only debt is related to the balance owed on a mortgage.  She has20
no assets in China. Applicant considers the United States to be her home. It is where
she wishes to share her life with her husband and raise their children. She noted that,
given her parents’ illnesses, she only finds emotional and family support here. She only
returns to China to make sure her parents are receiving proper medical and domestic
care.  Applicant last visited in China in 2010, and she plans to return in 2011.21 22
Applicant is highly valued at work. A former supervisor praised Applicant for her
natural candor, integrity, and technical knowledge.  A personal friend confirmed that23
 Tr. 32.24
 Tr. 41.25
 Tr. 45-47.26
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).27
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).28
5
Applicant is a trustworthy, direct, and truthful individual.  A childhood acquaintance24
described Applicant as a loving wife, mother, and daughter, and a “regular U.S.
citizen.”  A neighbor confirmed this positive assessment.25 26
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations
for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions, which are required in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access
to classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead,
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. Under AG
¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
“whole-person concept.” All available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable, must be and were considered in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching my decision, I have
drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence
submitted.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in
the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a27
preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  28
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
 Id.29
 Id.30
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.31
6
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access29
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.   The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily30
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the31
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
Based upon consideration of the evidence, I find Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
to be the most pertinent to the case. Conditions pertaining to this AG that could raise a
security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate such
concerns, are discussed below.
Analysis
Guideline B – Foreign Influence
The concern under Guideline B is that foreign contacts and interests may be a
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government
in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. Consideration should be given to the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to,
such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S. citizens to
obtain protected information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. Conditions
pertaining to this adjudicative guideline that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security concerns, are discussed in
the conclusions below.
The country at issue is China. It targets the United States with active intelligence
gathering programs, both legal and illegal, and poses a considerable threat to U.S.
7
national security. Consequently, given the heightened risk associated with that country,
a high degree of scrutiny is used in my assessment below.
Applicant maintains regular contact with her parents by telephone and through
regular visits to China, a country demanding heightened scrutiny. Such facts are
sufficient to give rise to Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions AG ¶ 7(a) (contact
with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person
who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened
risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) and AG ¶ 7(b)
(connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information). With disqualifying conditions thus raised, the burden shifts to
Applicant to mitigate security concerns.
Applicant’s parents are in their 70s. They are retirees receiving pensions from the
Communist-dominated Chinese government. Although they are infirm, they remain
independent of group living or other assisted care. Applicant is a loving daughter who
has dutifully and personally taken the responsibility to oversee her parents care from
abroad. In her absence, she made arrangements so that they receive periodic
monitoring from others. In contrast, Applicant only has a nominal relationship with the
cousin who now lives with Applicant’s parents. With regard to other relatives in China
who have apparently distanced themselves from Applicant and her parents, Applicant
maintains no notable contact, is generally dismissive, and she feels she owes them
nothing. Given these facts, Foreign Influence Mitigating Condition AG ¶ 8(a) (the nature
of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located,
or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely
the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.)
applies with regard to her cousins, aunts, and uncle-in-law, but not to her parents.
As noted, Applicant maintains regular telephonic contact with her parents and
visits them in China. In contrast, her contact with one cousin is transient and incidental
to the well-being of her parents, while her contact with her other relatives in China is
nonexistent. Therefore, AG ¶ 8(c) (contact or communication with foreign citizens is so
casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation) applies to Applicant’s cousins, aunts, and uncle-in-law, but not
to her parents. 
There is no suggestion that Applicant is anything less than a loyal American
devoted to her life in the United States. Her husband, children, investments, homes,
work, and social life are all in the United States. Her devotion, support, and sense of
obligation for her parents is notable. She helped them come to the United States, where
they remained for a time before seeking medical care in China. Since their health issues
precluded their return to the United States, she oversees their health and well-being
8
from the United States, traveling to China regularly to check on their care. Such behavior
demonstrates her dutiful execution of her role as only child and loving daughter, and
highlights a significant tie to China. Under these facts, AG ¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of
interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty to or obligation to the foreign
person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep
and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest) does not apply to
her parents. However, given the earlier facts noted about her relationships with her
cousins, aunts, and uncle-in-law, AG ¶ 8(b) applies to those relations. In light of the SOR
allegations, none of the other mitigating conditions apply.
Applicant is clearly a loyal U.S. citizen and her relationships with her cousins,
aunts, and uncle-in-law are, at best, negligible. Her understandable devotion to her
parents, however, is worrisome, especially given the country at issue. Their age and
vulnerability, in conjunction with her obvious love for them, invites the potential of
manipulation or coercion. Foreign influence security concerns remain unmitigated.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a). Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate
determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall
commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the
whole-person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the “whole-person” factors.
Applicant is a highly credible, mature, and blunt individual who has found much success
in the United States. She is well-educated and has a stellar career. Applicant is married
and is raising two children. She is a valued employed, friend, and neighbor. She has two
homes, considerable savings, and a happy life in the United States.
Remaining in China are several relatives and Applicant’s parents. Applicant had
little contact with the younger cousin, who now lives with Applicant’s parents, before
Applicant came to the United States. They had not developed a significant relationship
due to their age gap. Today, Applicant appreciates her young cousin’s willingness to live
with Applicant’s parents, but the two only maintain a casual relationship. As for
Applicant’s other cousins, aunts, and uncle-in-law, time, distance, and apathy appear to
have eliminated any familial bonds. 
Sustaining security concerns are Applicant’s parents. While elderly and infirm,
they live independently in their own home. They are often at home alone. Applicant and
her parents share an understandable bond that has led Applicant to oversee their care
9
from abroad and maintain regular telephonic contact. An only child, Applicant has acted
dutifully in her oversight of their care and well-being. She understandably loves her
parents. At present, their living situation, age, vulnerability, and their, at least, partial
dependence on a Chinese government pension, however, tend to make them
susceptible to manipulation. Given the country at issue, this represents a very real
threat, despite Applicant’s loyalty to the United States. 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration in these
cases. Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to
sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive information.
In light of the facts and the significant concerns raised by China, I find that Applicant
failed to mitigate foreign influence security concerns. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraphs 1.b-1.c: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance denied.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge