Consisting of the transcript (Tr.) and Government exhibits (GE) 1-6.1
DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February2
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG)
effective within the DoD on 1 September  2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-03426
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: 
Marc C. Laverdiere, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: James S. DelSordo, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  Applicant’s clearance is denied.1
On 26 August 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant raising security concerns under Guidelines B
(Foreign Influence) and F (Financial Considerations).  Applicant timely answered,2
requesting a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 21 October 2010, and I convened
a hearing 1 December 2010. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 7 December 2010.
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations under foreign influence but denied the
financial allegations. He is a 57-year-old senior engineer employed by a defense
contractor since July 2003. He seeks to retain the clearance he has held since 1998. 
Applicant was born in Pakistan in January 1953. He grew up there and attended
college there. He immigrated to the U.S. and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
October 1996. Het got his first clearance in August 1998. He got his most recent U.S.
passport in March 2008 (GE 1).
Applicant’s brother, sister, and two life-long friends are resident citizens of
Pakistan. The rest of his siblings are U.S. citizens living in the U.S. His brother drives a
bus. His sister is a stay-at-home mom. Her husband works in the private sector, as do
his two friends. None of them have any connection to the Pakistani government. He
talks to his friends by telephone once or twice a year. His contacts with his siblings are
only slightly more frequent, aside from his visits to Pakistan. Applicant traveled to
Pakistan on vacation in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2009.  He stays with his sister
when he is in Pakistan. He follows company security rules for foreign travel, giving the
company advance notice of his itinerary and getting a security briefing before travel. He
has not had any problems with foreign officials when traveling.
Applicant has no financial or property interests in Pakistan. All his property and
financial interests are located in the U.S. He does not stand to inherit any property in
Pakistan. Applicant does not intend to return to Pakistan.
Pakistani law does not permit dual citizenship or nationality except with the U.K.
and Commonwealth nations. Under the Pakistan Citizenship Law of 1951, both
Applicant and his wife ceased to be Pakistani citizens when they acquired U.S.
citizenship. Applicant’s two children—one born in Pakistan; one born in Algeria—have
become U.S. citizens.
Pakistan is an Islamic parliamentary democracy with a poor human rights record,
including extrajudicial killings, torture and rape by security forces, lack of judicial
independence, arbitrary arrest, wide-spread government corruption, and the
disappearance and imprisonment of political opponents. Nevertheless, Pakistan has
had diplomatic relations with the U.S. since 1947 and has actively cooperated with the
U.S. in the global war on terrorism. However, terrorist groups operate in Pakistan,
making safety and security an issue. Extremist groups in Pakistan target American and
other Western interests, senior Pakistani officials, and members of minority indigenous
and religious groups. Pakistan is not on the National Counterintelligence Center’s list of
most active nations engaging in foreign economic collection and industrial espionage. It
is not known to be an active collector of U.S. intelligence information, nor is it known to
target its expatriate former citizens to obtain U.S. information.
3
The SOR alleges, and government exhibits confirm, two delinquent debts totaling
nearly $198,000. The debts are for the deficiency balance on a short-saled investment
property (SOR 1.a) and the foreclosed second mortgage on another investment
property (SOR 1.b). Applicant bought the properties in 2006 to take advantage of the
real-estate boom then in progress. It does not appear that he had any particular
expertise to make these sensible investments. The record is unclear whether he
intended to rent the properties and was unsuccessful or had renters but was unable to
keep them. However, he intended to resell one of the properties (SOR 1.b) after six
months (GE 1). The other property was in default within six or seven months of its
purchase (GE 2).
Applicant claims, without corroboration, to have paid on both mortgages for a
time, until he exhausted his personal savings. He claims (GE 1) that the creditor at debt
1.a cancelled the debt after the short sale of the property. However, documentation from
the creditor in June 2009 (GE 2) confirms only that the creditor agreed to the short sale,
but specified that the remaining balance was still owed and collectible. Applicant stated
(Tr. 40-41) that neither lender is currently demanding payment, but provided no proof
that either lender had forgiven the debt or intended to forgive the debt. Applicant is
otherwise current on his finances.
Applicant’s work reference (Tr. 77) considers Applicant reliable and trustworthy,
and he has no problems handling classified information.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors to evaluate a person’s suitability for
access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also show a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). The applicability of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is
not, by itself, conclusive. However, specific guidelines should be followed when a case
can be measured against them, as they are policy guidance governing the grant or
denial of a clearance. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guidelines are Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline F
(Financial Considerations). 
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, disputed facts alleged in the SOR. If it does, the
burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the required judgment,
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
¶ 6.4
¶ 7 (a).5
4
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels deciding any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the Government.3
Analysis
The Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline B, but
Applicant mitigated the security concerns. Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an
applicant’s foreign contacts and interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1)
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to
help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S.
interests, or 3) is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign
influence adjudications can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located—including, but not limited to,
whether the country is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information
and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications4
for access to protected information requires careful assessment of both the foreign
entity’s willingness and ability to target protected information, and to target expatriates
who are U.S. citizens to obtain that information, and the individual’s susceptibility to
influence, whether negative or positive. More specifically, an individual’s contacts with
foreign family members (or other foreign entities or persons) raise security concerns
only if those contacts create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion.5
Applicant has been a U.S. citizen for 14 years, and has held a clearance without
incident for most of that time. The residency and citizenship of his siblings and friends
have already been adjudicated. While that fact is no bar to revisiting the issue of foreign
influence, it nevertheless gives a framework for evaluating the issue now. None of
Applicant’s foreign contacts have any connection to the Pakistani government, and
while Pakistan is not the most stable of regimes in the region, is not known to pursue
U.S. government information or to target its former citizens for that information. What
remains to be assessed is Applicant’s several trips to Pakistan over the last seven
years. That travel increases Applicant’s exposure to the Pakistani government, but
given that the Pakistan government does not seek U.S. information or target its former
citizens, I conclude the risks are minimal. I resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
The Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline F, and
Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns. Setting aside for a moment the wisdom
of Applicant’s real-estate investments, the speed with which the properties fell into
default suggest that Applicant was not really prepared for his venture. He has not
¶ 19(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; (c) a history of not meeting financial obligations;6
¶ 20(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that7
it is  unlikely to recur . . . 
¶ 20(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control . . . and8
the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
¶ 20(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that9
the problem is being resolved or is under control;
¶ 20(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.10
5
documented any efforts to keep the properties current, and while he has documented
one short sale, he has not documented that he has been relieved of his financial liability
on the debts.  Nor has he addressed his potential income tax liability if the nearly6
$200,000 is forgiven.
This case falls outside the normal outline for financial cases, so the mitigating
factors for financial considerations provide less guidance than usual. However, his
financial difficulties are both recent and multiple, although largely through events
unlikely to recur.  Again setting aside the wisdom of his investment plan, the decline in7
the housing market was largely beyond his control, but he has not shown that he acted
responsibly in addressing his debts.  He has not documented his claimed efforts to deal8
with the mortgages without resorting to short sales. And while short sales are a legal
means of resolving mortgage debt, they do not automatically signify responsible dealing
with debt. He has received no credit or financial counseling, although on the facts of this
case such counseling seems unnecessary. Nevertheless, without proof that the
creditors have foregone their right to collect Applicant’s debts, I cannot conclude that his
financial problems are under control  or that he has made a good-faith effort to satisfy9
his debts.  I conclude Guideline F against Applicant.10
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-b: Against Applicant
6
Conclusion
In view of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance denied.
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge