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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-05973
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se  
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, I deny Applicant’s eligibility
for access to classified information.
Statement of the Case
Applicant signed an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) version of a security clearance application (SF-86) on April 12, 2010. The Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons
(SOR) on December 6, 2010, detailing security concerns under Guideline C, Foreign
Preference, and Guideline B, Foreign Influence, that provided the basis for its
preliminary decision to deny her a security clearance. The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
Item 4.1
Id.; Item 5.2
Item 5.3
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(Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines For Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information (AG) implemented on September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant received the SOR on December 13, 2010. She submitted a notarized,
written response to the SOR allegations, which DOHA received on January 10, 2011.
She requested a decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. 
Department Counsel prepared a File of Relevant Material (FORM) and mailed
Applicant a complete copy on February 11, 2011. Applicant received the FORM in
February 2011. She had 30 days from receipt of the FORM to file objections and submit
material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. She did not submit a response. DOHA
assigned this case to me on April 26, 2011. The Government submitted five exhibits,
which have been marked as Items 1-5 and admitted into the record. Applicant’s
response to the SOR has been marked and admitted as Item 3, and the SOR has been
marked as Item 1.
Findings of Fact
In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the factual allegations in the
SOR. Her admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and
thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following additional findings of
fact.  
Applicant, who is 27 years old, works as a travel assistant for a Department of
Defense contractor. She started her current employment in March 2010. Applicant
graduated from high school and attended college. She has not graduated from college.1
Applicant’s mother and father emigrated from Poland to the United States in
1981. Applicant and her sister were born in the United States and are citizens of the
United States by birth. Applicant’s mother became a United States citizen in 1991. Her
father is a permanent resident of the United States. Her parents reside in the United
States, as does her sister. Applicant has a half-brother, who is a citizen and resident of
the United States.2
In June 2004, Applicant traveled to Poland to attend a wedding. She met a young
man at the wedding. They corresponded and visited with each other for nearly two
years. Applicant moved to Poland in May 2006 and married her boyfriend in June 2006
in Poland. She continued to live in Poland until March 2010. She returned to the United
States in March 2010 to work.3
Id.4
Item 4; Item 5.5
The source of the facts on Poland is the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs6
February 18, 2011, “Background Note: Poland,” available at http://www.state.gov See Exhibit 1.
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Shortly after she married, in July 2006, Applicant actively sought Polish
citizenship to be able to live and work in Poland or the United States. She considers the
United States home. During the nearly four years she lived in Poland, Applicant voted in
a Polish gubernatorial election and worked for an American company, receiving a lump
sum social security retirement benefit of $600 to $700 from Poland. She has no other
financial interests in Poland. She holds only a U.S. passport and travels on her U.S.
passport. She intends to retain her Polish citizenship.4
Applicant’s husband was born in Poland. He is a citizen and current resident of
Poland. He came with her to the United States in March 2010 through a visitor visa, but
has since returned to Poland temporarily. He is a lawyer and wants to work in the
United States. Applicant’s father-in-law died in 2009. Her mother-in-law is a citizen and
resident of Poland. Since her return from Poland, Applicant speaks with her mother-in-
law infrequently. Applicant talks with a close friend in Poland at least once a month.5
Poland6
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Poland. At the end of
World War I, Poland became an independent country. In 1939, Germany and the Union
of Socialist Soviet Republics (the Soviet Union) invaded Poland. Following World War II,
the Soviet Union’s communist party solidified its control of Poland. During the 1980s,
the Polish people sought democratic reforms. In May 1990, the first free local elections
occurred. By December 1990, Poland had elected its first popular President.
The Republic of Poland has a constitution and a democratic form of government.
The current government structure consists of a council of ministers led by a Prime
Minister, typically chosen from the majority coalition in the bicameral legislature's lower
house (Sejm). The president, elected every five years for no more than two terms, is the
head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The judicial branch plays a
minor role in decision-making.
Poland successfully transformed its farm economy to market principles following
the end of communism, but has now entered a period of greater state control of the
market due to its membership in the European Union. Poland’s agricultural policy is
dominated by the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and by its open borders with the
other 26 EU members.
Poland, a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European
Union, applies the EU's common external tariff to goods from other countries--including
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the United States. While foreign trade is an important part of the Polish economy,
Poland remains much less trade dependent than its Central European neighbors.
Poland became an associate member of the EU and its defensive arm, the Western
European Union, in 1994. In a June 2003 national referendum, the Polish people
approved EU accession by an overwhelming margin, and Poland gained full
membership in May 2004.
Changes since 1989 have redrawn the map of Central Europe, and Poland has
had to forge relationships with seven new neighbors. Poland has actively pursued good
relations, signing friendship treaties replacing links severed by the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact. The Poles have forged special relationships with Eastern neighbors,
particularly Ukraine and Georgia, in an effort to firmly anchor these states to the West.
Poland became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in March 1999 as part of the first wave of enlargement outlined at the July 1997 NATO
Summit in Madrid. Poland's top national security goal is to further integrate with NATO
and other West European defense, economic, and political institutions while
modernizing and reorganizing its military. Polish military doctrine reflects the same
defense posture as its Alliance partners. Poland continues to be a regional leader in
support and participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program and has actively
engaged most of its neighbors and other regional actors to build stable foundations for
future European security arrangements. Poland has recently focused its participation in
international security missions on those managed by NATO and the EU, and it
continues to maintain a battalion in NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR). Poland is a leading
contributor to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
Polish military forces also served in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and
Operation Iraqi Freedom and continue to serve in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.
The United States and Poland have enjoyed warm bilateral relations since 1989.
Every post-1989 Polish government has been a strong supporter of continued American
military and economic presence in Europe. In addition to supporting international
counterterrorism efforts and NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Poland cooperates
closely with the United States on such issues as democratization, nuclear
nonproliferation, human rights, regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, and
UN reform.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
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factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under AG ¶ 9 the security concern involving foreign preference arises, “[W]hen
an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over
the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
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(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member.  This includes but is not limited to:
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other
such benefits from a foreign country;
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship
requirements; and
(7) voting in a foreign election;
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an
American citizen.
Applicant decided to become a Polish citizen in 2006. After becoming a Polish
citizen, she voted in a gubernatorial election and received social security retirement
benefits from the Polish government because she worked in Poland. The Government
has established a prima facie case under the above disqualifying conditions.
Applicant can mitigate security concerns arising under Guideline C by showing
that her dual citizenship was due solely on her parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign
country (AG ¶ 11(a)); by expressing a willingness to renounce dual citizenship (AG ¶
11(b)); the exercise of any rights of citizenship occurred before Applicant became a
United States citizen (AG ¶ 11(c)); use of a foreign passport is approved by the
cognizant security authority (AG ¶ 11(d)); the passport has been destroyed,
surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated (AG ¶ 11(e); or
the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States Government (AG ¶
11(f)). 
I have reviewed the facts of this case under the above mitigating conditions. I find
that none apply. Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised under
Guideline C, which is found against her.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in
AG & 6:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
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considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism. 
Under the potential disqualifying conditions described in AG ¶ 7, the following
conditions could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
Applicant’s mother, sister, and half-brother, are U.S. citizens, and her father is a
permanent U.S. resident. All reside in the United States. Applicant’s husband is a Polish
citizen, currently residing in Poland as he is not a permanent U.S. resident. Her mother-
in-law is a citizen and resident of Poland. Applicant has a close relationship with her
husband and maintains a normal familial relationship with her mother-in-law. There is no
evidence Applicant provides financial support to her family in Poland. Applicant moved
to Poland in May 2006 to marry her husband and lived in Poland continuously until
March 2010, when she returned to the United States. Her family relationships are not
per se a reason to deny Applicant a security clearance, but her contacts with her family
members must be considered in deciding whether to grant Applicant a clearance. The
Government must establish that these family relationships create a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion by the Polish
Government or would create a potential conflict of interest between her obligations to
protect sensitive information and her desire to help her family members. 
In determining if a heightened risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationship
and contacts with family members as well as the activities of the Government of Poland.
The risk that an applicant could be targeted for manipulation or induced into
compromising classified information is real, not theoretical. Applicant’s relationship and
contacts with her husband and mother-in-law in Poland does not raise a heightened risk
of security concerns because the information of record fails to show that the Polish
Government engages in espionage activities in the United States or that it targets U.S.
citizens in the United States or Poland by exploiting, manipulating, pressuring, or
coercing them to obtain protected information. Poland supports the counterterroism
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efforts of the United States and Europe. The record does not contain any information
about terrorist activities in Poland. Guideline B is found in favor of Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
In reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s
parents immigrated to the United States before she was born. Applicant was born and
raised in the United States. Because her parents were born and raised in Poland, she
periodically visited family in Poland. In a 2004 trip to Poland, she met her future
husband, a citizen and resident of Poland. Two years later, she moved to Poland,
married in Poland, lived in Poland for four years, and worked in Poland, earning Polish
retirement benefits. Immediately after her marriage, she actively sought and attained
Polish citizenship, which she is not willing to renounce. She did not give up her U.S.
citizenship and travels on her U.S. passport.  After becoming a Polish citizen, she voted
in a local gubernatorial race. Because he is not a permanent resident of the United
States, her husband is currently residing in Poland. Her mother-in-law is a Polish
citizen, living in Poland. She does not have plans to move to the United States. 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
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conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising under Guideline B, but she
has not mitigated the security concerns under Guideline C.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge