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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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)       ISCR Case No. 10-01273
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)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: David F. Hayes, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant’s mother, a dual U.S./Iranian citizen, has traveled to Iran nearly every
year for the past ten years and intends to return in the future. This generates a security
concern for Applicant that he failed to mitigate. Clearance is denied. 
Statement of the Case
On September 10, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline
B, Foreign Influence. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG).
Applicant answered the SOR on November 12, 2010, admitting the allegations,
and requesting a hearing. On January 25, 2011, I received the case assignment. DOHA
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issued a notice of hearing on February 16, 2011, scheduling it for March 9, 2011. I held
the hearing as scheduled. During the hearing, I received two Government exhibits,
marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2, seven Applicant exhibits marked as
Applicant Exhibits (AE) A through G, and Applicant’s testimony. Also, at the
Government’s request, I took administrative notice of the adjudicative facts set forth in 12
documents, marked as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I through XV. I denied the Government’s
request to take administrative notice of adjudicative facts listed in three exhibits marked
HE VII through HE IX. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on March 17, 2011.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 30-year-old single man with no children, who is a consultant for an
information technology firm that contracts with several DoD agencies. He earned a
bachelor’s degree in management information systems in 2003, and worked for a
municipality during his first two years after graduation. Since then, he has worked for his
current employer.
Applicant is highly respected on the job. His supervisor characterizes him as “one
of the most well rounded consultant that [he has] had the pleasure to work with.” (AE F)
His second line supervisor describes him as “an excellent consultant, employee, and
developer,” who is “a team player . . . always willing to help others and go the extra mile.”
(AE C) According to a coworker, Applicant excels at all of his tasks and frequently
performs duties that [are] outside of the realm of his job duties. (AE D)
Applicant is an Iranian-American, born and raised in the United States. His
parents immigrated to the United States from Iran after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Both are naturalized U.S. citizens. (GE 1 at 31, 32) The Iranian government considers
Applicant to be an Iranian citizen by virtue of his father’s Iranian citizenship. (Tr. 43)
Applicant’s father was a pilot in the Iranian Air Force during the Shah’s regime. He
received training in the United States. (AE G) After the Revolution, he, along with much
of the Iranian Air Force, remained supportive of the Shah and friendly toward the United
States. As the architects of the Revolution consolidated power and began purging
dissenters, Applicant’s father fled the country and moved to the United States. (Tr. 24)
After Applicant’s father immigrated to the United States, he initially sought to work
for the U.S. military. Later, he worked as a computer programmer for several years, then
worked as a gas station mechanic. About 20 years ago, he purchased a convenience
store and operated it until he and Applicant’s mother divorced approximately ten years
ago. Since the divorce, Applicant’s contact with his father has been sporadic. (Tr. 45)
His father continues to live in the United States.
Applicant lives with his mother, sister, nephew, half-sister, and brother-in-law. (Tr.
44) Applicant’s mother is a hair stylist. (Tr. 55) She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
the early 1990s. (Tr. 51) She has no Iranian property interests. (Tr. 55) She travelled to
Iran nearly every year over the past decade to visit her family. (Tr. 47) She has not
visited since 2008 because of the political instability. (Tr. 47) She intends to return in the
 For ease of reference, I will refer to the uncles as U1, U2, U3, U4, and U5.1
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future. Applicant travelled with his mother to Iran in 2003 and 2008 to visit relatives and
sightsee.
Applicant’s sister was born in Iran and was five years old when her parents
immigrated to the United States. She is a naturalized U.S. citizen. She has worked at
various retail jobs over the years. She has not returned to Iran since immigrating to the
United States with her parents. (GE 2 at 8) She is divorced and has a son, Applicant’s
nephew.
Applicant has a half-sister whom he did not grow up with. (Tr. 53) She immigrated
to the United States from Iran in 1997. (Tr. 53) She works various odd jobs in the retail
industry. (Tr. 66) Since immigrating to the United States, she has visited Iran once, to
attend her father’s funeral in 2010. (Tr. 67)  
Applicant’s brother-in-law, his half-sister’s husband, is an Iranian citizen with
permanent U.S. residency status. (GE 1 at 29; Tr. 61) He and Applicant’s half-sister
married before immigrating to the United States. (Tr. 61) Because of health problems, he
did not have to fulfill Iran’s mandatory military requirement. He works at an airport
directing travellers to the proper security lines. (Tr. 65) He travelled to Iran in 2010 to
attend his mother’s funeral. (Tr. 65) This is the only time he has travelled to Iran since
immigrating to the United States.
Applicant’s maternal grandmother lives in Iran. She is a homemaker who is in her
mid-eighties. Applicant travelled to Iran with his mother in January 2003 and February
2008 to visit his grandmother and other relatives. (Answer) Applicant talks to his
grandmother once per year. (Tr. 70)
Applicant has five maternal uncles living in Iran.  U1 is a retired carpenter who1
currently runs a school for orphans. (Tr. 93) Applicant saw him in 2008 when he visited
his grandmother. Applicant only talks to him approximately once per year, if his mother
calls him and Applicant happens to be at home. (Tr. 71)
U2 is retired from the Iranian Air Force. Applicant last saw him during his trip to
Iran in 2003. (Tr. 72) U2 worked briefly as a test pilot for a private Iranian company after
retiring from the Iranian Air Force. (Tr. 73) Like Applicant’s father, he did not support the
Revolution.
Applicant met U3 during his 2003 Iranian trip. He has no contact with him and
knows nothing about him. (Tr. 75)
U4 is a captain of a private shipping company and U5 works for a real estate
investment company. (Tr. 75) Applicant has neither spoken to, nor seen U4 and U5 since
2003. (Tr. 75-77) 
 I will refer to the cousins as C1 through C6.2
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Applicant has several cousins who are either living in Iran or are Iranian citizens
living elsewhere. He is acquainted with six of them.   C1 completed his mandatory2
military requirement, then moved to the United Kingdom (U.K.) where he has permanent
residency status. Although Applicant has never met him, they are social networking
friends. (Tr. 82) They exchange e-mails on birthdays and special occasions.
C2 is the sibling of C1. She is a student living in Iran who is currently attempting to
immigrate to the U.K.  Applicant keeps abreast of what she is doing through his mother.
Applicant is not in touch with C3 and does not know what she does for a living. C4 is a
high school student, and C5 and C6 own boutique clothing stores. (Tr. 83) Applicant
could not recall C6's name. (Tr. 83) Applicant only talks to these cousins approximately
once per year, if they call for his mother and he happens to be at home. 
Iran is a brutally repressive theocracy that is virulently anti-American, and seeks
to dominate the Middle East through sponsoring terrorism, fomenting unrest in other
countries, and developing weapons of mass destruction. (see generally, administrative
notice documents) The United States has not had diplomatic or consular relations with
Iran since November 1979 when militant Iranian students occupied the U.S. Embassy
and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. (HE II at 10) Iran has the largest inventory
of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and it continues to expand the scale, reach, and
sophistication of these missiles. (HE VI at 13) Iran’s government employs draconian
methods such as  torture, rape, flogging, and amputations of dissenters to instill fear and
retain power. (HE VI) Since 2007, several U.S. citizens have been detained by the
Iranian government and held without consular access. (HE XIII)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions
listed in the adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law.
Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied
together with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the
entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-
person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a
decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
 ISCR Case No. 02-04786 at 5 (App. Bd. June 27, 2003).3
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mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in the U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest” (AG
¶ 6). Moreover, “adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of
the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including,
but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target
United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism” (Id.).
Applicant’s contact with his relatives who are citizens and/or residents of Iran, a
country that is both intensely authoritarian and hostile to the United States, raises the
issue of whether the following disqualifying conditions apply:
AG ¶ 7(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or a resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion, and
AG ¶ 7(d), sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
Although friendly countries can engage in activities involving coercion, persuasion or
duress of an individual to gather classified information as readily as hostile countries, the
risk of such activity is heightened with hostile countries because such countries are “not
likely to have scruples about pressuring one of its citizens” to obtain classified
information.  3
Applicant’s sister left Iran when she was five years old and has not returned. The
disqualifying conditions listed above apply to neither her nor her 10-year old son,
Applicant’s nephew. 
Although Applicant’s half-sister and his brother-in-law grew up in Iran, they have
been living in the United States for nearly 15 years. Since then, neither have traveled to
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Iran more than once. The above disqualifying conditions do not apply to these relatives,
either.
Although Applicant’s mother has been living in the United States for more than 30
years, she travels to Iran frequently and intends to return. AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(d) apply to
Applicant’s relationship to his mother and AG ¶ 7(a) applies to his relatives in Iran.
Applicant has not seen his grandmother since 2008 and only talks to her
approximately once per year. AG ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens
is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for
foreign influence or exploitation,” applies to their relationship. 
Applicant only talks to U1 and U2 approximately once per year. Although he met
U3 in 2003, he has no relationship with him. Applicant has neither spoken to, nor seen
U4 and U5 since 2003. Applicant’s contact with C1 is limited to social networking and he
only talks to his other cousins if they call for his mother and he happens to be home. AG
¶ 8(c), also applies to these relationships.
Although Applicant’s contact with his relatives living in Iran is casual and
infrequent, his mother travels to Iran nearly every year and intends to return. Because
Iran is a country where U.S. travellers have been detained over the years, Applicant’s
mother’s trips to Iran generate a security concern.
Iran’s hostile and repressive nature renders AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the
positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,”
inapplicable.
Applicant was born and raised in the United States, and has only visited Iran twice
in his life. He is a U.S. college graduate who has built a solid career since graduating,
and is well-respected by his employer and coworkers. These attributes, however, are
unable to overcome the heavy burden that applicants must overcome who have relatives
from hostile countries such as Iran. AG ¶ 8(b), “there is no conflict of interest, either
because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest,” does not apply.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
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(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Applicant is an impressive individual who testified in an engaging manner. Given
the frequency of his mother’s trips to Iran, and the nature of the Iranian government, the
burden is simply too high for him to overcome. Applicant has failed to mitigate the foreign
influence security concern.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraphs 1.b - 1.i: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge