1 Authorized by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), Section E3.1.2.2.
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)
[NAME REDACTED] )       ISCR Case No. 10-02334
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Tovah A. Minster, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant’s personal ties to her family in Morocco, and her family’s property
interests there do not pose a security concern. However, she failed to mitigate the
security concerns about her continued possession and use of a Moroccan passport.
Applicant also failed to mitigate the security concerns about her deliberate falsification
of her security clearance application. Based on a review of the pleadings and exhibits,
Applicant’s request for eligibility for a security clearance is denied.
On November 9, 2009, Applicant submitted a Questionnaire for National Security
Positions (SF 86) to obtain a security clearance required for her work with a defense
contractor. After reviewing the results of the ensuing background investigation,
adjudicators for the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued to
Applicant interrogatories1 to clarify or augment information in the background
investigation. After reviewing the results of the background investigation and Applicant’s
2 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.
3 The adjudicative guidelines were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. These
guidelines were published in the Federal Register and codified through 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).
Pending official revision of the Directive, they take precedence over the guidelines listed in Enclosure 2 to the
Directive.
4 See Directive, Enclosure 3, Section E3.1.7. The FORM included five documents (Items 1 -5) proffered in
support of the Government’s case.
2
responses to the interrogatories, DOHA adjudicators were unable to make a preliminary
affirmative finding2 that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to allow Applicant
access to classified information. On September 1, 2010, DOHA issued to Applicant a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts which, if established, raise security
concerns addressed in the adjudicative guidelines3 (AG) under Guideline B (foreign
influence), Guideline C (foreign preference), and Guideline E (personal conduct).
On November 15, 2010, Applicant responded to the SOR through a notarized
statement and requested a decision without a hearing. On December 9, 2010,
Department Counsel issued a File of Relevant Material (FORM)4 in support of the
Government’s preliminary decision. Applicant received the FORM on December 16,
2010, and was given 30 days to file a response thereto. Applicant timely submitted a
notarized response, which has been included in the record without objection. The case
was assigned to me on March 2, 2011.
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline C, the Government alleged that Applicant exercises dual
citizenship with Morocco (SOR 1.a) by renewing her Moroccan passport on March 11,
2009, valid through March 10, 2014 (SOR 1.a(1)); and by using her Moroccan passport
instead of her U.S. passport for travel to Morocco in 2009 (SOR 1.a(2)). 
Under Guideline B, the Government alleged that Applicant’s mother (SOR 2.a),
stepmother (SOR 2.b), sister (SOR 2.c), and three brothers (SOR 2.d) are all citizens of,
and reside in, Morocco. The Government also alleged that Applicant and her siblings
own, by inheritance from their father, a home and a shopping center in Morocco. (SOR
2.e)
Under Guideline E, the Government alleged that Applicant deliberately falsified
her SF 86 on November 9, 2009, when she answered “no” to question 6 of section 20B
(Have you EVER held or do you now hold a passport that was issued by a foreign
government?). (SOR 3.a) In a notarized response to the SOR (FORM, Item 3),
Applicant admitted with explanation the allegations in SOR 1.a, 1.b, and 2.a - 2.d. She
denied the allegations in SOR 2.e and 3.a. In addition to the facts established through
her admissions, I have made the following findings of relevant fact.
Applicant is 33 years old and has worked for a defense contractor since March
2007 in a position that requires her to have a security clearance. She was born in
5 There is no direct support in the Government’s information for SOR 2.e. Applicant answered “no” to SF 86
questions in Section 20 (Foreign Activities) regarding foreign financial interests. One must assume that this
information was discussed during the subject interview on January 7, 2010, referred to, but not documented,
in DOHA interrogatories question 2 (FORM, Item 5).
3
Morocco, but became a naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2005. Applicant stated that she
came to the United States “almost fourteen years” ago. (Response to FORM) She
obtained an associate’s degree, a bachelor’s degree, and a master’s degree through
schools in the United States, which she attended between 1998 and 2009. (FORM Item
4) Available information shows she has lived, worked, and studied in the United States
without interruption since 1998. (FORM, Item 4)
Applicant received a U.S. passport in 2006. In March 2009, she renewed a
Moroccan passport that she held before she was naturalized. Her foreign passport is
due to expire in March 2014. (FORM, Items 3 and 5) Applicant has used her Moroccan
passport on at least one occasion when she traveled to that country. Applicant
explained that she presented both her U.S. and Moroccan passports when entering
Morocco, but found it simpler, in light of questioning by Moroccan authorities, to use
only her Moroccan passport. (FORM, Item 3)
Applicant asserted, in response to the SOR, that she was willing to relinquish her
Moroccan passport. However, in response to DOHA interrogatories in June 2010, she
had stated that she wished to keep her foreign passport, as it served as her only means
of identification when she travels to Morocco. (FORM, Items 3 and 5) In response to the
FORM, Applicant claimed that she “returned” her Moroccan passport in November
2010. However, she did not specify to whom she returned the passport, and she did not
provide any documentation to support her claim.
When Applicant submitted her security clearance application in November 2009,
she answered “no” when asked if she had “EVER” (emphasis in the original) held a
foreign passport. Applicant’s position is that she misunderstood the question, because
she never viewed Morocco as a country foreign to her. (FORM, Item 3)
Applicant and her husband, also a naturalized U.S. citizen from Morocco, have
been married since January 2007. As alleged in SOR 2.c and 2.d, Applicant has a sister
and three brothers, who are citizens of and reside in Morocco. Applicant admitted the
allegations in SOR 2.a and 2.b; however, the SF 86 (FORM, Item 4) indicates that
Applicant’s mother and stepmother are both deceased. Applicant also indicated in her
response to the SOR (FORM, Item 3) that her mother is deceased. 
Applicant tacitly5 admits the SOR 2.e allegation that she and her siblings owned
property in Morocco inherited from their father. However, Applicant averred that she and
her siblings surrendered their interests in the properties to one of her brothers (FORM,
Item 3; Response to FORM), and that she currently holds no assets in Morocco.
6 Directive. 6.3.
7 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
8 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.
4
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,6
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the adjudicative
guidelines. Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors listed in ¶ 2(a) of the
new guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole-person” concept, those factors are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information. In this case, the pleadings and the information presented by the parties
require consideration of the security concerns and adjudicative factors addressed under
AG 6, Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and AG ¶ 9, Guideline C (Foreign Preference).
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest7 for an applicant to either receive or continue to
have access to classified information. The Government bears the initial burden of
producing admissible information on which it based the preliminary decision to deny or
revoke a security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, the Government must prove
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the Government meets its burden, it then falls
to the applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case. Because no
one has a “right” to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy burden of
persuasion.8 
A person who has access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. Thus, the Government
has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests as his or her
own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of
9 See Egan; Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 2(b).
5
any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access to classified information
in favor of the Government.9
Analysis
Foreign Preference
Applicant admitted the allegations at SOR 1.a and 1.b. Her possession and use
of a foreign passport in preference to her U.S. passport raises a security concern
expressed at AG ¶ 9 (Guideline C: Foreign Preference) as follows: 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
More specifically, available information requires application of the disqualifying
conditions at AG ¶ 10(a) (exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign
citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign
passport...), and AG ¶ 10(b) (action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign
citizenship by an American citizen). As to AG ¶ 10(b), by using her Moroccan passport,
Applicant used her status as a Moroccan citizen for the ease of travel to that country.
Applicant also has expressed her desire to retain her foreign passport as a means of
identification when she travels there. However, she did not explain why she could not
use her U.S. passport for the same purpose. 
By contrast, of the mitigating conditions listed under AG ¶ 11, only those at AG ¶
11(b) (the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship); AG ¶
11(d) (use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority); and
AG ¶ 11(e) (the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security
authority, or otherwise invalidated) are pertinent to the facts and circumstances of this
case. However, the record does not support their application. 
The mitigating condition at AG ¶ 11(b) does not apply because Applicant,
although she expressed a willingness to give up her foreign passport, has never
articulated any willingness to relinquish the foreign citizenship which entitles her to that
passport. As to AG ¶ 11(d), there is nothing in the record to indicate that her renewal
and use of a foreign passport has been approved by anyone in a position to do so.
Finally, AG ¶ 11(e) does not apply despite Applicant’s claim that she has “turned in” her
Moroccan passport. She has not corroborated her claim through any official
documentation from the Moroccan government or any other cognizant authority. On
balance, Applicant has failed to mitigate the security concerns raised by her continued
possession and use of a foreign passport.
6
Foreign Influence
The Government alleged in SOR 2.a - 2.e that Applicant’s family ties and
property interests in Morocco raise a security concern, which is expressed at AG ¶ 6, as
follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism. 
At the outset, SOR 2.a and 2.b are resolved for the Applicant. The Government’s
own information reflects that Applicant’s mother and stepmother are deceased. 
Of the disqualifying conditions that are pertinent to the facts and circumstances
of this case under Guideline B, AG ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) (emphasis added), AG ¶ 7(b)
(connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information), and AG ¶ 7(e) (a substantial business, financial, or property
interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business,
which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation)
must be considered.
As to AG ¶ 7(a), it must be shown that Applicant has contact with persons who
are citizens of or resident in a foreign country. It also must be shown that those contacts
create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation. The Government established that
Applicant has a sister and three brothers who are citizens of and reside in Morocco, and
that Applicant may have had a shared interest in property there that Applicant avers is
now in the hands of one of her siblings. Her family ties are presumed to be close, and
the financial interest, if she still holds it, significant. However, the FORM did not contain
any information about the country of Morocco, its government, or its relationship with
the United States. It cannot be determined if, for example, Morocco is an open society
or if its citizens are repressed; if it has an independent judiciary; or if it is ruled through a
monarchy, dictatorship, or through freely-elected representatives and executives. Nor
can it be determined if Morocco’s interests are aligned with those of the United States,
or if Morocco is active in obtaining information about our military or economic interests.
Absent such information about Morocco, the record does not support a conclusion that
the facts and circumstances in this case create a heightened risk of exploitation. 
10 Directive, E3.1.14.
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Additionally, the record does not support application of the disqualifying condition
at AG ¶ 7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create
a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information). Again, without more information about Applicant’s
interests in Morocco, about her relatives’ employment or connections in Morocco, or
about Morocco itself, it cannot be determined that there is a potential conflict of interest.
As to AG ¶ 7(e) (a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the
individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation), Applicant denied the
allegation (SOR 1.e) about foreign financial interests. Thus, the burden remained on the
Government to produce sufficient, reliable information to support that allegation.10 Aside
from Applicant’s acknowledgment that she may have had a partial property interest in
Morocco, and that she no longer holds the interest alleged, there is nothing in the
FORM to support the SOR 1.e. Thus, AG ¶ 7(e) does not apply. 
Finally, Department Counsel argues (FORM at 7) that Applicant’s travel to
Morocco in 2009, which was only alleged as a passport-related concern under Guideline
C, SOR 1.b, supports application of the disqualifying condition at AG ¶ 7(i) (conduct,
especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to
exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country).
There is no basis for this assertion. In and of itself, travel abroad is not disqualifying,
although it may indicate the strength of Applicant’s ties to a foreign country. Just as the
Government did not establish that the mere presence of Applicant’s siblings in Morocco
presents a heightened security risk, it has failed to show how simply traveling to that
country presents a heightened risk of exploitation. On balance, the Government has not
established that Applicant’s connections to Morocco disqualify her from holding a
security clearance. 
Personal Conduct
The Government also alleged that Applicant deliberately falsified her answer to
and SF 86 question about her possession of a foreign passport. Such conduct, if
established, raises security concerns expressed at AG 15, as follows:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Applicant answered “no” when asked if she had ever held a foreign passport. The
question is straightforward and not subject to misinterpretation under these
circumstances, even if English is not Applicant’s first language. Applicant has an
11 See footnote 6, supra.
8
advanced education received in the United States, she has lived, worked and studied
here since she was about 21. Thus, her explanation that she did not view Morocco as a
foreign country does not make sense and is insufficient to account for her negative
answer to the question at issue. All of the available information bearing on Applicant’s
intent when she answered that question shows that she intended to conceal her
possession of a foreign passport. Such information requires application of the
disqualifying condition at AG ¶ 16(a) (deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification
of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement,
or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications,
award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or
award fiduciary responsibilities).
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, of the mitigating conditions listed
at AG ¶ 17, the mitigating conditions at AG ¶ 17(a) (the individual made prompt,
good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being
confronted with the facts), AG ¶ 17(b) (the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or
concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate
advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made aware of the
requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and
truthfully), and AG ¶ 17(c) (the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment) must be considered here.
However, there is no support for application of any of those mitigating conditions.
Applicant did not make a good-faith effort to correct her false statement, and she has
not shown that she was advised by anyone to withhold information. Further, making
false statements to any agency of the United States concerning a matter within its
jurisdiction is a violation of federal criminal law. More important, it is a fundamental
breach of a basic tenet of the Government’s personnel security programs. Thus, it
cannot be considered minor. Applicant failed to present any information to otherwise
explain her falsification. Accordingly, she has not mitigated the security concerns about
her personal conduct.
Whole-Person Concept
I have evaluated the facts presented and have applied the appropriate
adjudicative factors under Guideline C. I have also reviewed the record before me in the
context of the whole-person factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant is 33 years old and
presumed to be a mature, responsible adult. Available information shows only that she
is a well-educated product of U.S. colleges, who has been steadily employed in a
variety of businesses since at least 1998. There is no other information about her job
performance, character, or trustworthiness. As such, available information is insufficient
to overcome the doubts about her suitability for access raised by the Government’s
information. A fair and commonsense assessment11 of all available information shows
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Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by the Government’s
information.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.b: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.e: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the foregoing, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest
for Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a security
clearance is denied.
                            
                                                    
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge