DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
     )  ISCR Case No. 07-08793 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Braden Murphy, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Sheldon Cohen, Esq. 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
RICCIARDELLO, Carol G., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant failed to mitigate the Government’s security concerns under Guideline 
B, Foreign Influence. Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On April 29, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued 
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B. 
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense 
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) 
effective within the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
 
 Applicant answered the SOR on May 21, 2010, and requested a hearing before 
an administrative judge. The case was assigned to another judge on January 12, 2011, 
and reassigned to me on March 2, 2011. Applicant’s attorney requested the case be 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
                                                          
scheduled for sometime after July 26, 2011. The request was denied and the case was 
scheduled for May 17, 2011. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on March 28, 2011. 
Applicant’s attorney submitted a motion for reconsideration of the hearing date.1 
Department Counsel opposed the delay.2 I denied the motion.3 I convened the hearing 
as scheduled on May 17, 2011. The Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 5. 
Applicant did not object and they were admitted into evidence. The Government 
requested administrative notice be taken of HE IV through XV. I granted the request. 
Applicant testified on his own behalf. He offered Exhibits (AE) A through R, which were 
admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant requested administrative notice be 
taken of HE XVI. I granted the request over the objection of the Government.4 DOHA 
received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on May 24, 2011.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant admitted all of the allegations in the SOR. After a thorough and careful 
review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact. 
 
 Applicant is 53 years old. He has been married to his present wife since 2005. 
He was married three previous times. His wife, who is 56 years old, was married twice 
before. Applicant has a 29-year-old son. His wife had two daughters, both are 
deceased. He has worked for different government contractors since about 2003. He 
has held a secret security clearance since 1978. Applicant has an associate’s degree 
and a bachelor’s degree. He was commissioned in the Army Reserve and is eligible to 
retire as a major (O-4). He held jobs from 1996 to 2001, with different state and federal 
government agencies.5  
 
 In 2001, Applicant was recalled to active duty and was stationed in South Korea. 
He was released from active duty in early 2003, and was offered and accepted a job 
with a federal contractor in South Korea. He returned to South Korea in July 2003. In 
2007, he transferred to a new job in a foreign country, with a different federal contactor. 
Among other things, he worked on joint exercises between the United States and 
Russia in 2007 and 2009. He has been involved in planning exercises with other 
eastern European countries.6  
 
1 Hearing Exhibit (HE) I. 
 
2 HE II. 
 
3 HE III. 
 
4 Department Counsel objected to the following attachments to HE XVI: 1, 3, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, and 21. I concluded I would consider the documents and determine the appropriate weight to give 
them.  
 
5 Tr. 31-39, 57-59. 
 
6 Tr. 34, 39-53; HE XVI. 
 
3 
 
 
                                                          
 In September 2003, while working in South Korea, Applicant met his wife. 
Applicant’s wife is a citizen of Russian. While living in Russia, she answered a 
newspaper advertisement soliciting people to work in a factory in South Korea. 
Applicant did not know what the financial arrangements were for her employment. She 
took the job and moved to South Korea. She was there for a short while and before she 
started work, she decided that she did not want the job. Applicant was told by her that 
shortly before she was to return to Russia, she was approached on the street by a man 
that wanted her to appear in a television program on South Korean television. Applicant 
did not know what financial arrangements were made. He stated that the director 
reimbursed the factory and took over her work contract. He did not know if she received 
some type of compensation or travel stipend when she accepted the factory job. He did 
not know what transpired as far as her agreement with the television person and what 
took place for her to remain in the country legally. She apparently was on a television 
show for two years and then on a different show for another year. Her contract was not 
renewed, and she returned to Russia in 2004.7  
 
 After meeting in 2003 in South Korea, Applicant and his wife dated approximately 
a year. He did not report his contact with her to his security officer, because he did not 
believe he was required to because he was not cohabitating with her. In 2004, he 
traveled to Russia to visit her. He properly advised his security manager of the trip. 
While in Russia, he stayed with his future wife’s niece and husband at their residence. 
He stayed a week. He does not know anything about his wife’s ex-husbands. He 
understood through his wife that they are deceased.8  
 
 In March or April 2005, Applicant traveled to Russia to ask his wife to marry him. 
He properly advised his security manager of the trip and his intentions. He stayed at his 
wife’s apartment. He was there a week.  
 
 In May or June 2005, he traveled to Russia and married his wife in a civil 
ceremony. They received a Russian marriage certificate. Her relatives attended the 
wedding. After they wed, he returned to South Korea, and she remained in Russia until 
he was able to secure the appropriate documents for her to move to South Korea. He 
returned to Russia with the appropriate documents for her to submit to the consulate in 
Russia. She did not return to South Korea with Applicant at this time. After all the 
requirements were met, she moved to South Korea on July 24, 2005. Applicant applied 
for her to have access to the military base as his spouse, and his request was granted.9 
 
 Applicant traveled to Russia in 2006 with his wife, so she could visit her family 
and he could plan a motorcycle trip for a later date in Russia with others. They returned 
to Russia in May or June 2006, for the motorcycle trip. They both took the trip, along 
7 Tr. 60-63, 112, 119-124, 152-155; 176-178. 
 
8 Tr. 89-91, 112-115, 173. 
 
9 Tr. 57, 63-68, 92-95. 
 
 
4 
 
 
                                                          
with eight other people. It was a five-day trip. Applicant obtained approval from his 
security manager prior to taking the trip.10  
 
 In 2007, Applicant took another motorcycle trip in Russia. Five people 
accompanied him, along with his wife. He obtained approval from his security manager 
prior to taking the trip. While in Russia he and his wife stayed at her apartment.11 
 
 In 2008, as part of his job, Applicant traveled to Russia to participate in a 
planning session for military exercises between Russia and the United States. There 
were approximately 10 to 12 U.S. military and civilian personnel who were on the trip. 
Applicant’s wife did not accompany him. He met with Russian personnel on a daily 
basis. They all worked in similar areas of expertise.12 
 
 Applicant’s wife’s half-sister and her husband are citizens and residents of 
Russia. She and her half-sister have the same mother. Applicant’s wife stays in contact 
with her by telephone, and when she is in Russia they visit each other. She is 61 years 
old and a medical doctor. Applicant had contact with her when he visited Russia in 
2004, at his wedding in 2005, and in 2007, when he was on his motorcycle trip. 
Applicant does not speak Russian and his wife’s relatives do not speak English, so they 
did not communicate verbally. The half-sister’s husband is about 66 or 67 and is retired. 
He was a supervisor at a collective farm. Applicant met him when he was in Russia in 
2004, 2005 and 2007. His wife is in contact with her half sister about once or twice a 
month by telephone.13  
 
 Applicant’s wife’s half-sister has two daughters. One is about 32 years old and is 
a housewife. She is married and has a young child. Her husband served as an officer in 
the Russian Air Force. Applicant stated he was told by his wife that he no longer serves 
in the Air Force and was released due to a reduction in force. The couple has an 
adopted child who is five years old. Applicant stated the only factual information he 
knows about his wife’s family was told to him by his wife. He met the niece and her 
husband at his wedding. The husband is now an auto mechanic. Applicant’s only 
contact with his wife’s niece and husband was in 2005 and 2007. Applicant has not had 
any contact with his wife’s relatives in Russia since 2007. Applicant does not believe his 
wife maintains contact with these relatives be telephone. However, she may see them 
when she is in Russia.14  
 
 Applicant’s wife’s other niece is a housewife, and her husband buys farm 
equipment that is in disrepair, refurbishes it, and resells it. They have two sons, ages 18 
10 Tr. 95-98. 
 
11 Tr. 98-100; AE P. 
 
12 Tr. 100-102; AE Q. 
 
13 Tr. 71-76, 127-128. 
 
14 Tr. 76-81, 85, 128-133. 
 
5 
 
 
                                                          
and 16. The elder son is attending college, and the younger is in high school. Applicant 
has stayed in their home on two trips to Russia. He has visited with them on all of his 
trips to Russia, except the last one when he was on official travel. Applicant’s wife 
communicates by telephone with this niece about once or twice a month.15 
 
 Applicant’s wife traveled to Russia in 2010 to renew her Russian passport. She 
has an active Russian passport. She stayed with her niece for seven weeks and visited 
other family while there. She also visited her family in Russia in 2009 and stayed with 
her family for about six weeks.16  
 
 Applicant’s wife attended technical college in Russia and worked as a restaurant 
manager and in sales. When she travels to Russia she stays with her niece. She has 
visited the United States one time in 2006 to meet Applicant’s family.17  
 
 Applicant’s wife owns an apartment in Russia valued at approximately $100,000. 
She rents the apartment and receives approximately $300 to $350 in rental income. She 
also receives about $200 to $235 as a pension from the Russian government. She 
maintains two bank accounts in Russia where the rental income and pension are 
deposited. Applicant’s net income is approximately $80,000. His wife does not work. 
She does not send money to her family in Russia, but will occasionally send gifts for 
Christmas. Applicant does not own property in the United States. He believes he will 
inherit land in the United States after his 74-year-old mother passes away. He has a 
thrift savings retirement account that he estimated was worth about $150,000.18  
 
 Applicant stated: “My wife current[ly] has an approved petition for her to obtain an 
immigrant visa to move to the United States commonly known as a green card.”19 
Applicant provided a document from the Department of Justice, U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Services: Notice of Approval of Relative Immigration Visa Petition. The 
document states:  
 
Your petition has been approved and is valid for the duration of your 
present relationship to the beneficiary.  
 
Please be advised that approval of the petition confers upon the 
beneficiary an appropriate classification. The approval constitutes no 
assurance that the beneficiary will be found eligible for visa issuance, 
admission to the United States or adjustment to lawful permanent resident 
status. Eligibility for visa issuance is determined only when application 
15 Tr. 81-89; GE 4. 
 
16 Tr. 110-112. 
 
17 Tr. 118, 174-175, 178-179. 
 
18 Tr. 106, 115-118, 144-151, 182-184. 
 
19 Tr. 68.  
 
6 
 
 
                                                          
therefore is made to a consular officer; eligibility for admission or 
adjustment is determined only when application therefore is made to an 
immigration officer. (Emphasis added) 
 
Your petition to classify beneficiary as an immediate relative of a United 
States citizen has been forwarded to the American Consulate [foreign 
location]. This completes all action by the service on the petition.20 
 
The petition was filed on July 8, 2009, and the date of the approval of the petition was 
August 20, 2009. No other supporting documents were provided. Applicant stated that 
he intends for his wife to become a permanent resident of the United States, but 
because they live outside of the United States, she cannot apply at this time. He stated 
she obtained a tourist visa about two months ago. He did not provide the supporting 
documents. He tentatively plans on retiring in about seven years. He does not expect to 
return to Russia, unless he is sent on official duty.21  
 
 Applicant provided copies of performance evaluations showing outstanding or 
exceeding standards ratings.22 I have considered all of the evidence submitted by 
Applicant. Character letters reflect that Applicant is loyal, professional, and a trusted 
friend. He is dedicated to his country and protecting it. He has not been observed or 
exhibited behavior that would question his loyalty, honest, and integrity.23  
 
The Russian Federation24 
 
The Russian Federation is composed of 21 republics. The government consists 
of a strong president, a prime minister, a bicameral legislature and a weak judiciary. It is 
a vast and diverse country with a population of 142 million people. It achieved 
independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991. It is a 
nuclear superpower that continues to develop politically, socially, and economically. 
 
The United States and Russia share certain common strategic interests. Of 
mutual interest to the United States and Russia are counterterrorism and the reduction 
of strategic arsenals. Russia and the United States share a common interest in 
controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
them. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was launched in 1992 to 
provide for the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet 
Union. The CTR program was renewed in 2006 for seven years, until 2013. 
20 AE F. 
 
21 Tr. 68-71, 105-107, 186-187. 
 
22 AE G, H, I, J. 
 
23 AE L, M. N. O, P, R.  
 
24 HE IV-XVI. 
 
7 
 
 
 U.S.-Russian relations have often been strained. Tensions between the United 
States and Russia increased in August 2008, when Russia sent its army across an 
internationally recognized boundary in an attempt to change by force the borders of 
Georgia, a country with a democratically-elected government. Russia’s assault on 
Georgia followed other troubling signs: threats against Poland, including the threat of 
nuclear attack; suspicious poisonings and killings of journalists and those deemed 
“undesirable,” including the President of Ukraine; the apparent use of energy resources 
to apply political pressure against Ukraine, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic; and the 
creation in Russia’s state-controlled media of an “enemy image” of the United States.  
 
The Russian Federation’s intelligence capability is significant and focuses on 
collection of information from the United States. Russia has targeted U.S. technologies 
and has sought to obtain protected information from them through industrial espionage. 
Russian espionage specializes in military technology and gas and oil industry expertise. 
As of 2005, Russia and China were the two most aggressive collectors of sensitive and 
protected U.S. technology and accounted for the majority of such targeting. Russia is a 
leading arms exporter, with major sales of advanced weapons and military-related 
technology to China, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. 
 
In 2010, Russia continued to increase their intelligence gathering efforts and 
intelligence capabilities directed against the United States interests worldwide through 
espionage, technology acquisition, and covert actions. Also in 2010, the United States 
Department of Justice announced arrests of ten alleged secret agents for carrying out 
long-term, deep-covered assignments on behalf of Russia.  
 
The current administration has stressed a new working relationship with Russia 
and it continues to work on a wide range of issues, including cooperation with respect to 
Afghanistan and on other international issues. There has been a long tradition of trade 
and commerce between the two countries.  
 
The threat of terrorism in Russia continues to be significant. Travel in the vicinity 
of Chechnya may be dangerous, despite Russian efforts to suppress the terrorists. Acts 
of terrorism include taking hostages and bombings.  
 
Russia has recognized the legitimacy of international human rights standards, 
but human rights abuses continue. Both Russian federal forces and Chechen rebel 
forces act with impunity while engaging in torture, summary executions, 
disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. There are reports of attacks on and killings of 
journalists, physical abuse by law enforcement officers, extremely harsh and at times 
life-threatening prison conditions and arbitrary detention and politically motivated 
imprisonments. Additional problems include corruption, media suppression, and 
widespread corruption throughout the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and 
law enforcement.  
 
The U.S. Department of State reports allegations that Russian government 
officials and others conduct warrantless searches of residences and other premises and 
 
8 
 
 
electronic surveillance without judicial permission. This surveillance includes Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Federal Security Office monitoring of internet and e-mail traffic.  
Additionally, Russian law enforcement agencies have legal access to the personal 
information of users of telephone and cell phone services.   
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
 
9 
 
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:  
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. I have considered all of them and especially considered the following:  
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion. 
AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(d) require substantial evidence of a “heightened risk.” 
The “heightened risk” required to raise one of these disqualifying conditions is a 
relatively low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk 
inherent in having a family member living under a foreign government or owning 
 
10 
 
 
                                                          
property in a foreign country. The totality of Applicant’s family ties to a foreign country 
as well as each individual family tie must be considered.25  
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States.”26 
 
Furthermore, “even friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the 
United States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national 
security.”27 Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the 
United States, especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. Nevertheless, 
the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights 
record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are 
vulnerability to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is 
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, or the 
country is known to conduct intelligence operations against the U.S. In considering the 
nature of the government, an administrative judge must also consider any terrorist 
activity in the country at issue.28 
 
Applicant’s wife is a citizen of Russia. His wife’s half sister, brother-in-law, two 
nieces and their husbands, and their three children, are citizens and residents of 
Russia. His wife owns an apartment in Russia valued at approximately $100,000. She 
maintains two bank accounts in Russia where rental income is deposited and a pension 
she receives from the Russian government. Her financial interests in Russia are 
substantial. Applicant traveled to Russia in 2004, three times in 2005, twice in 2006, 
once in 2007, and in 2008 he traveled on official business. These facts potentially 
create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion, and also create a potential conflict of interest. Therefore, I find AG ¶¶ 7(a), 
7(b), and 7(d) apply.  
 
I have also analyzed all of the facts and considered all of the mitigating conditions 
for this security concern under AG ¶ 8 and conclude the following are potentially 
applicable: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
25 ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2003. 
 
26 ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
 
27 ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). 
 
28 See generally, ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006) (reversing decision to grant 
clearance where administrative judge did not consider terrorist activity in area where family members 
resided.  
 
11 
 
 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization and interests of the U.S.;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interests in favor of the U.S. interests; and 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation. 
 
 Applicant lives with his wife and his wife maintains a close relationship with some 
of her relatives in Russia. She stays with them when she visits. Her recent visits have 
been six to seven weeks long. The nature of his relationship with his wife and her 
relationship with her relatives is more than casual and is not infrequent. Applicant has 
stayed with his wife’s relatives when he visited Russia on personal travel. I find AG ¶ 
8(c) does not apply because his relationship with his wife and her relatives is more than 
casual. His wife’s relationship with her relatives is more than casual and is not 
infrequent.  
 
Applicant’s wife is a Russian citizen. Although Russia and the United States 
maintain ties and cooperate on an international scale, through commerce and other 
cooperative agreements, Russia is an aggressive collector of sensitive and protected 
U.S. technology and accounted for the majority of such targeting among nations. Russia 
is a leading arms exporter, with major sales of advanced weapons and military-related 
technology to China, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. In addition, as Applicant stated, he 
sometimes works cooperatively with Russia on exercises and traveled there in the past 
as part of his official duties. This puts him in a vulnerable position because he has 
worked directly with the country where his wife is a citizen, has relatives that live there, 
the country is known to be an aggressive collection of sensitive information, has a 
history of committing espionage against the United States, and commits human rights 
violations. Even if Applicant did not work directly with Russia on occasion, the same 
factors are an issue. I cannot find that it is unlikely under the circumstances, that 
Applicant would be placed in a position of having to choose between his wife and her 
relatives, and the interests of the United States. For the same reasons, I find there is a 
conflict of interest because of Applicant’s obligation and commitment to his wife, and her 
obligation and commitment to her relatives in Russia, which is not minimal. She visits 
them and stays in contact with them. Given the significance of the spousal bond, I 
cannot find that Applicant would resolve a conflict of interest against his wife and for the 
United States. Therefore, I find AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(b) do not apply. 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments 
under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were 
addressed under that guideline, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is 
eligible to receive a military pension. He has worked for the federal government and for 
federal contractors for many years and has received good performance evaluations and 
character references. Applicant’s wife is a Russian citizen. She resides with Applicant in 
a different foreign country. Applicant’s wife’s ties to Russia are through her citizenship, 
her family that resides there, and her substantial assets located there. Russia is one of 
the most active collectors of sensitive technology from the United States; it continues to 
commit espionage against the United States embedding spies into local communities; it 
has questionable human rights practices; and there is widespread corruption throughout 
its branches of government and law enforcement. These facts create a heightened risk 
to foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, and coercion. Applicant 
failed to meet his burden of persuasion. I have considered all of these factors. Overall, 
the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts about Applicant’s eligibility 
and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed 
to mitigate the security concerns arising under the guideline for Foreign Influence.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
 
13 
 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.g:   Against Applicant 
   
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
                                                     
_____________________________ 
Carol G. Ricciardello 
Administrative Judge