1 This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, DoD Directive 5220.6, dated January 2, 1992,
as amended (Directive), and adjudicative guidelines which became effective within the Department of Defense
for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.
2 Applicant misnumbered subparagraph 1.h as a second subparagraph 1.g in his response.
                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                              
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 09-06037
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Stephanie Hess, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
                                                              
______________
Decision
______________
LAZZARO, Henry, Administrative Judge
Applicant committed three alcohol-related driving offenses between 1998 and 2007.
He has not satisfied any of the delinquent debts alleged in the Statement of Reasons
(SOR). Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns that exist due to his alcohol
consumption that has resulted in multiple arrests and convictions and his ongoing financial
problems. Clearance is denied. 
On October 5, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
an SOR to Applicant stating it was unable to find it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.1 The SOR alleges security
concerns under Guideline F (financial considerations) and Guideline G (alcohol
consumption). Applicant submitted a response to the SOR that was received by DOHA on
December 7, 2010. He admitted all SOR allegations, except those contained in
subparagraphs 1.c, 1.d, and 1.h,2 and he requested a hearing.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
3 Applicant waived on the record any technical defect that may be deemed to exist due to the
amended notice of hearing being issued less than 15 days prior to the hearing. (Tr. p. 17)
2
The case was assigned to me on March 10, 2011. A notice of hearing was issued
on April 19, 2011, scheduling the hearing for May 5, 2011. An amended notice of hearing
was issued on April 21, 2011, changing the location of the hearing but not the date or time
of the hearing.3 The hearing was conducted as scheduled. The Government submitted six
documents that were marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1-6 and admitted into the
record without objection. Applicant testified and submitted six documents that were marked
as Applicant’s Exhibit (AE) 1-6 and admitted into the record without objection. The
transcript was received on May 13, 2011.     
Findings of Fact
Applicant’s admissions to the SOR allegations are incorporated herein. In addition,
after a thorough review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I make the following
findings of fact:
Applicant is a 48-year-old man who has been employed as a systems administrator
by defense contractors since August 2007. Applicant has been working at the same job,
but there has been a change of contractors by whom he is employed. As a result of the
change of employers, Applicant’s salary has decreased approximately $600 per month. 
Applicant has never been married. He served on active duty in the Air Force from
January 1986 until May 2006, when he retired at the rank of technical sergeant. Applicant
was awarded a bachelor of science degree in computer information systems in July 2006.
Applicant obtained employment as a computer technician in July 2006, but he
voluntarily quit that job in September 2006, because he “was not happy with the job, and
distant [sic] was too far.” (GE 1, p.18) Applicant did not have replacement employment
when he opted to quit his job, and he remained unemployed until March 2007, when he
began working as a cashier in a retail store. He continued working as a cashier until he was
hired for his present employment. 
SOR subparagraph 1.a alleges a delinquent credit card debt owed in the amount of
$6,545. Applicant testified he went to mediation on this debt and entered into an agreement
to make payments of $200 per month. However, he claims the creditor never sent him
information about where to send payments, and, instead, he received notice that a default
judgment was entered against him. He has done nothing to resolve the default judgment.
(Tr. p. 33-36)
Applicant claims he made one payment on the $760 debt owed to the university that
is alleged in SOR subparagraph 1.b the day before the hearing, and that he entered into
an agreement to make payments of $110 every two weeks until the debt is satisfied. He did
not submit any documentation to verify those assertions. Applicant has not made any
payment on the $743 cellular phone debt alleged in SOR subparagraph 1.c because he
believes it is an unfair charge. The $224 debt alleged in SOR subparagraph 1.d is based
3
on unreturned cable equipment Applicant retained after he moved from a former residence.
He still has the equipment and he has not made any arrangement to either return the
equipment or pay the debt. 
The $448 debt alleged in SOR subparagraph 1.e arose from unpaid charges for a
security system Applicant had in his former residence. He has done nothing to satisfy this
debt. The credit card debts alleged in SOR subparagraphs 1.f and 1.g are owed in the
combined amount of $13,730. Applicant has not taken any action to resolve these debts.
The $137 debt alleged in SOR subparagraph 1.h is based on a municipal charge for gas
service provided to Applicant’s former residence. He claims this debt has been satisfied,
but he did not submit any documentation in support of that assertion. Applicant submitted
verification that he has satisfied a judgment that was entered against him in August 2008,
in the amount of $9,765.70, that is not alleged in the SOR. (AE 2)
Applicant attributes his delinquent debts to unemployment he experienced after he
retired from the Air Force and after he quit his job, and to unexpected expenses he has
incurred for such things as automobile repairs. (see: AE 3 and AE 4) However, he provided
a statement in August 2002, in connection with an earlier security clearance investigation,
in which he acknowledged having numerous delinquent debts and having retained the the
services of a debt consolidation company to satisfy some of his creditors. 
Applicant testified he has about $1,100 in disposable income each month after he
pays all his recurring monthly expenses that he deposits in his checking account and does
not apply to his delinquent debt because “it’s kind of like a rainy day kind of thing.” (Tr. p.
42) He then went on to testify that after he paid his mortgage that month he would have
about $600 to $1,000 left in his checking account. (Tr. p. 43) He submitted a budget he
prepared in which he lists his monthly disposable income at $926. (AE 1)
Applicant was punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Article
15 for the offense of operating a vehicle while drunk. This offense occurred on August 2,
1998, while Applicant was stationed in a foreign country, as he attempted to drive onto a
military base while intoxicated. He was sentenced to a suspended reduction in rank,
forfeiture of $700 pay per month for two months, and 30 days extra duty. 
Applicant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI) in March
2003. He entered a plea of nolo contendere to the DUI charge on June 20, 2003, and he
was sentenced to 12 months probation, fined $250, assessed court costs in the amount
of $283.50, and he was ordered to perform 50 hours community service and attend DUI
school. Additionally, Applicant’s drivers license was suspended for six months, and his car
was impounded for ten days. He completed all conditions of his probation and it was
terminated on August 2, 2004.
Applicant was charged with DUI and Damage to Property on March 22, 2007. He
entered a plea of nolo contendere to an amended charge of Reckless Driving on March 9,
2009, and he was sentenced to 12 months probation, fines and costs of $500 or community
service work, make restitution in an amount that was to be determined, and he was ordered
to attend repeat offender DUI school, a drunk driver victim impact panel, submit to random
breath/urine testing, and not to be in bars or places where alcohol was the primary source
4 The document he submitted does not contain the year the meetings were attended, but appears to
coincide with the group session he completed on November 4, 2009.
5 ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at p. 2.
6 ISCR Case No. 97-0016 (December 31, 1997) at p. 3; Directive, Enclosure 3, Item E3.1.14. 
7 Department of the Navy v. Egan 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).
8 ISCR Case No. 01-20700 (December 19, 2002) at p. 3 (citations omitted).
4
of business for the first 90 days of his probation. Applicant completed all conditions of his
probation and it was terminated on March 11, 2010.
Applicant completed a Level I substance abuse and driving education program on
July 30, 2003. He completed a 21 hour Level II substance abuse course and evaluation on
August 27, 2007. He completed a substance abuse II group class on November 4, 2009.
Applicant submitted verification that he attended six alcoholics anonymous (AA) meetings,
presumably between October 6 and November 3, 2009.4 (GE 2)
In response to interrogatories that were sent to him, Applicant admitted that he
continues to consume alcohol, but denied he drinks to the point of intoxication. He also
claimed that he was participating in AA meetings, but asserted that he intended to continue
drinking alcoholic beverages in the future. He stated that AA taught him that he is not
dependent on alcohol and gave him a glimpse of where he could be if he allowed alcohol
to take over his life. He reported that he drinks beer and wine socially, with the frequency
of his use consisting of consuming three beers occasionally and on weekends. He averred
that he does not drive even after only have one alcoholic beverage. 
           
POLICIES
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines to consider when evaluating a
person’s eligibility to hold a security clearance. Chief among them are the disqualifying
conditions and mitigating conditions for each applicable guideline. Each clearance decision
must be a fair and impartial decision based upon the relevant and material facts and
circumstances, the whole-person concept, and the factors listed in ¶ 6.3.1 through ¶ 6.3.6
of the Directive. Although the presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or
against clearance is not outcome determinative, the adjudicative guidelines should be
followed whenever a case can be measured against this policy guidance. Considering the
evidence as a whole, Guideline F (financial considerations) and Guideline G (alcohol
consumption), with their disqualifying and mitigating conditions, are most relevant in this
case. 
  
The sole purpose of a security clearance decision is to decide if it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an
applicant.5 The Government has the burden of proving controverted facts.6 The burden of
proof in a security clearance case is something less than a preponderance of evidence,7
although the Government is required to present substantial evidence to meet its burden of
proof.8 “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the
9 ISCR Case No. 98-0761 (December 27, 1999) at p. 2.
10 ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at pp. 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, Item E3.1.15.
11 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 (January 27, 1995) at pp. 7-8; Directive, Enclosure 3, Item E3.1.15.
12 Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.
13 Id. at 531.
14 Egan, Executive Order 10865, and the Directive.
5
evidence.”9 Once the Government has met its burden, the burden shifts to an applicant to
present evidence of refutation, extenuation, or mitigation to overcome the case against
him.10 Additionally, an applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable
clearance decision.11
No one has a right to a security clearance12 and “the clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”13  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to
classified information must be resolved in favor of protecting national security.14     
Analysis
Guideline F, Financial Considerations
Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial
obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by
rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. An individual who is financially
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. . . .
(Adjudicative Guideline [AG] 18)
The SOR alleges over $22,000 in delinquent debt. Applicant acknowledged that he
is responsible for the debt and that he has done nothing to satisfy the overwhelming
majority of that debt. He claims he has satisfied one small debt and entered into a
repayment plan with another creditor to satisfy a relatively small debt. However, he failed
to submit any proof in support of those assertions, although he did submit verification that
he satisfied a judgment that was not alleged in the SOR. Disqualifying Conditions (DC)
19(a): inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; and DC 19(c): a history of not meeting
financial obligations apply.
Applicant attributes his delinquent debts to unexpected expenses he incurred and
periods of unemployment he experienced following his retirement from the Air Force and
after he voluntarily quit the job he acquired after completing college. Applicant’s retirement
was foreseeable and an event he could have planned for by: accumulating sufficient
savings before he retired to carry him over until he found replacement employment; or by
actually acquiring replacement employment before he retired; or by delaying his retirement
until he did have replacement employment available. In fact, Applicant acquired
6
replacement employment a mere two months after he retired, which he voluntarily quit
without having other employment in place.  
Applicant’s failure to act responsibly was the chief cause of the two periods of
unemployment he experienced. Accordingly, Mitigating Condition (MC) 20(b): the
conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control
(e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a
death, divorce or separation) and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances
does not apply.  
As disclosed in the statement he provided in August 2002, Applicant accumulated
substantial debt while he was on active duty in the Air Force. He did not have any
dependents at that time and he does not have any at present. Applicant has been gainfully
employed consistently since March 2007. He has been continuously employed by
government contractors since August 2007. He testified he has about $1,100 in disposable
income each month, and he submitted a budget in which he reports disposable income in
the amount of $926. Despite having funds available to make substantial payments toward
his debt, Applicant has made no effort to satisfy the overwhelming majority of his delinquent
debts. He has not obtained any recent credit counseling and there is no indication his
financial problems are going to be resolved within the foreseeable future.
As a result of the above, I conclude Mitigating Condition (MC) 20(a): the behavior
happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment; MC 20(c): the person has received or is receiving
counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being
resolved or is under control; and MC 20(d): the individual initiated a good-faith effort to
repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts do not apply. The remaining mitigating
conditions have no applicability to the facts of this case.  
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption
Paragraph 21: Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of
questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness. (Adjudicative Guideline [AG] 21)
Applicant was punished under UCMJ Article 15 in 1998, for driving drunk while he
was stationed in a foreign country. He was convicted of DUI in 2003, and of a reduced
charge of Reckless Driving that was based on his arrest for DUI and Damage to Property.
DC 22(a): alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the
influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of
concern, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol
dependent applies. 
Applicant has received two sentences of probation that included mandatory
attendance at alcohol awareness classes. He completed those classes in 2003 and 2009,
and a third class in 2007. He submitted proof he attended six AA meetings, and he averred
in his response to interrogatories he was attending AA meetings. Despite having committed
7
repeated alcohol-related criminal offenses and being ordered to attend classes and
meetings that were designed to make him aware of the risk of a person with his history of
alcohol-related offenses continuing to consume alcohol, he continues to consume alcohol.
Applicant’s most recent offense occurred over four years ago, but he did not
complete his term of probation for that offense until just over one year ago. Considering his
three alcohol-related offenses occurred over the period of about nine years, and each
offense occurred about three to four years after the previous offense, I conclude insufficient
time has elapsed since Applicant’s last alcohol-related offense to find, based on his
continued consumption of alcohol, that he has mitigated the alcohol consumption security
concern. Accordingly, MC 23(a): so much time has passed, or the behavior was so
infrequent, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or
does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment
does not apply. 
While there is no evidence to suggest that Applicant has been diagnosed as alcohol
dependent or as an alcohol abuser, his continued consumption of alcohol following three
alcohol-related driving offenses, including one that clearly involved damage to another
person’s property, creates a continuing security concern. He asserts that AA taught him
that he is not dependent on alcohol and it gave him a glimpse of where he could end up if
he allowed alcohol to take over his life. Despite those assertions, he continues to consume
alcohol despite the harm it has caused to him through his convictions and to the person
whose property he damaged in the last offense he committed. Therefore, I conclude that
MC 23(b): the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse,
provides evidence of actions taken to overcome the problem, and has established a pattern
of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser) does not
apply. 
Applicant committed his third alcohol-related offense after he attended a substance
abuse and driving education course. Although he only submitted proof he attended six AA
meetings, Applicant claimed, in response to interrogatories, that he is attending AA
meetings. But, he still consumes alcohol. He is not otherwise currently participating in
counseling or a treatment program. He did not submit a favorable prognosis from a medical
professional or licensed clinical social worker. Accordingly, the remaining mitigating
conditions have no applicability to the facts of this case.       
Considering all relevant and material facts and circumstances present in this case,
the whole-person concept, the factors listed in ¶ 6.3.1 through ¶ 6.3.6 of the Directive, and
the applicable disqualifying and mitigating conditions, I find Applicant failed to mitigate the
financial considerations and alcohol consumption security concerns. He has not overcome
the case against him, nor has he satisfied his ultimate burden of persuasion. It is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. Guideline F and
Guideline G are decided against Applicant. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
8
Paragraph 1, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-h: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline G: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a-c: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.
Clearance is denied.
_________________
Henry Lazzaro
Administrative Judge