KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Hearing Office decisions in other cases may be cited as persuasive authority, but they
are not binding legal precedent.  The Judge reasonably explained her conclusion that Applicant
had not mitigated the security concerns in his case.  Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASE NO: 10-03020.a1
DATE: 06/02/2011
DATE: June 2, 2011
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 10-03020
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Alan V. Edmunds, Esq.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On August 17, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On March 23, 2011, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Darlene D. Lokey
Anderson denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because his financial
problems are not recent, they were due to circumstances beyond his control, and the statute of
limitations has run on all his outstanding debts.  His argument does not demonstrate that the Judge’s
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to mitigate those concerns.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating
evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.   As the
trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable
evidence outweighs the unfavorable, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 10-00278 at 2 (App. Bd. Mar.
18, 2011).
In support of his appeal, Applicant cites to other Hearing Office decisions which he believes
are similar to his case and in which the Judge granted the applicant a clearance.  While Hearing
Office decisions in other cases may be cited as persuasive authority, those cases are not binding
legal precedent which a Hearing Office Judge must follow in another situation.  Applicant’s reliance
on other Hearing Office decisions does not demonstrate that the Judge erred in this case.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 09-08417 at 2 (App. Bd. Apr. 4, 2011).
In reaching her adverse decision, the Judge noted that while Applicant’s financial problems
may have started as a result of a job lay-off, they did not continue due to lack of financial ability.
“Since 2008, the Applicant has been employed full time and has been earning well over six figures
annually.  Based upon his testimony, he has sufficient monies left over after his monthly expenses
that he could use to pay his delinquent debts if he wanted to.  Instead he chose not to pay them.”
Decision at 6.  In light of the foregoing, the Judge’s conclusion that Applicant had not mitigated the
Government’s security concerns is not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case
No. 02-32606 at 3-5 (App. Bd. Jan. 21, 2004).
Applicant’s argument regarding his research of debt collection law is not persuasive.  DOHA
proceedings are not aimed at collecting an applicant’s debts.  A security clearance adjudication is
designed to evaluate an applicant’s judgment, reliability and trustworthiness so that a sound decision
is rendered.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 09-02160 at 5 (App. Bd. Jun. 21, 2010).
The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for her decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 158 (1962)).   “The general standard
is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Accordingly, the Judge’s
ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision  is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan           
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett               
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields             
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board