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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Redacted] )  ISCR Case No. 10-03488 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: David F. Hayes, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines G (Alcohol Consumption) 
and E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on December 28, 2009. On 
March 22, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent him a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny his 
application, citing security concerns under Guidelines G and E. DOHA acted under 
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial 
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended 
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the Department of 
Defense on September 1, 2006.  
 
 Applicant received the SOR on March 28, 2011; answered it on April 9, 2011; 
and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA received the request on 
April 13, 2011. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on May 12, 2011, and the 
 
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case was assigned to me on May 20, 2011. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on June 
3, 2011, scheduling the hearing for June 10, 2011. I convened the hearing as 
scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 3 were admitted in evidence without 
objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through C, which 
were admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on June 20, 2011. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 2.a, 
and 2.b. He denied SOR ¶¶ 1.b, 1.c, and 2.c. His admissions in his answer and at the 
hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 42-year-old senior research associate at a U.S. university. He has 
held this position since March 2008. He obtained a PhD in education and psychology in 
August 1998, and he worked as a research scientist at another university from 
September 1998 until he assumed his current position. He married in January 1990. He 
and his wife have two children, ages 16 and 12. He received a security clearance in 
March 2006. 
 
 Applicant applied for eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information 
(SCI) in October 2007. (GX 3 at 7.) He underwent five polygraph examinations between 
October 2007 and June 2008. (GX 3 at 6, 37-38.) During the polygraph examinations 
and related interviews, he admitted consuming alcohol, at times to excess and to the 
point of intoxication and occasional blackouts from about 1985 until January 2010. He 
admitted using alcohol to self-medicate for anxiety and stress. He admitted marital 
discord due his wife’s disapproval of his excessive alcohol use. (GX 3 at 19-20, 32, 39-
40.)  
 
Applicant also admitted that he downloaded adult pornography onto university 
computers while working in his previous position in 1998 and 1999, and that he 
continued to view adult pornography about two times a week. As of the date of a 
psychological evaluation in July 2009, he still had pornographic images on his personal 
computer. (GX 3 at 17, 21, 39.)  
 
Applicant admitted using the services of prostitutes on two occasions while 
traveling in a foreign country in April 2004, and he admitted concealing his conduct from 
his wife. (GX 3 at 20-21.) Applicant disclosed his use of prostitutes to his wife about a 
week before the hearing, and he submitted a statement from her verifying his 
disclosure. (Tr. 52; AX C.) 
 
 Applicant also admitted two flirtatious episodes with female colleagues that did 
not develop into romantic or sexual relationships. He admitted an unlawful entry into 
university facilities and marijuana use while an undergraduate student. He admitted that 
in 2002 he purchased an over-the-counter stimulant from an online pharmacy in 
Canada that required a prescription in the United States. He used four or five of the 
eight pills and threw away the rest. He admitted that in October 2008 he used a 
 
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prescription pain reliever that had been prescribed for his son, but he threw the rest of 
the medication away because he realized that he “should not be taking it.” (GX 3 at 13, 
17, 18, 22, 31, 39.) 
 
 Applicant found the polygraph experience frustrating, because he believed it 
indicated deception when he was being truthful. Applicant testified that he underwent 
five polygraphs and “passed” only the fifth. After his third polygraph examination in early 
March 2008, Applicant searched the Internet for instrumentation to test his physiological 
reactions to questioning. He purchased a video game that included a glove with finger 
slots for electrodermal response and cardio response. The game involved intentionally 
raising and lowering his physiological responses while performing tasks on the screen. 
(Tr. 55-57.)  
 
 Applicant disclosed his use of the game during his fifth and last polygraph 
examination in late March 2008. He testified that the game is not marketed as a 
polygraph countermeasure, but as a relaxation and meditation system in a game format. 
(Tr. 96.) According to the polygraph examiner’s report concerning the fifth polygraph, 
Applicant admitted composing questions based on what he had been asked during 
previous polygraph examinations, reading and answering the questions, and then 
checking his physiological reactions on the screen. The report states that he practiced 
the questions and answers about ten times until he showed no response to them. (Tr. 
56; GX 3 at 28-29.) The report states that Applicant ended the fifth polygraph 
examination when he “went into an angry fit,” attempted to remove the instrumentation, 
threw some of the equipment to the ground, called the machine names, and told the 
examiner that he had not done his homework and gave the test too much weight. (GX 3 
at 29.)  
 
 In November 2008, Applicant told a security investigator that he believed he had 
problems with the polygraph examinations because of nervousness and problems with 
questions about illegal drug use. He told the investigator he tended to think about his 
excessive alcohol use when he was asked about illegal drug use. He used the game to 
learn techniques to help him relax and focus on the questions, and he believed it was 
helpful. However, he decided to stop using the game because it “caused too many 
problems” during his last polygraph. (GX 3 at 33.) 
 
At the hearing, Applicant testified that the examiner in his last polygraph was very 
inexperienced and did not know how to respond to his admission that he had practiced 
with the biofeedback game. (Tr. 60.) He denied ending the examination in an “angry fit.” 
He admitted removing some of the equipment, but he denied throwing it to the ground. 
He admitted using the game to ask himself anxiety-provoking questions, such as 
questions about his alcohol consumption and personal relationships. He did not practice 
giving deceptive answers, but he reviewed his psychological responses to truthful 
answers. He denied admitting that he practiced until he showed no response to the 
questions. (Tr. 61-63.) 
 
 
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Applicant testified that he is a psychology researcher who studies human-
computer interactions, and he is familiar with the concepts underlying polygraph 
examinations. He testified that he knew he probably would be asked to take a polygraph 
when he accepted his current position in March 2006, and so he avoided any research 
into polygraph countermeasures, even though he works with colleagues who are 
experts in polygraph examinations and countermeasures. His reasons for avoiding such 
research were partly ethical and partly because he thought that such research “would 
only screw [him] up” when he took a polygraph examination. (Tr. 53-55.) He admitted 
that he knew he was in “somewhat dangerous territory” when he bought and used the 
game, because he realized he was trying to better control his responses to questions. 
(Tr. 57.) 
 
 While Applicant was in graduate school in 1996-1998, he sought mental health 
services for symptoms of depression including sadness, difficulty in concentrating, 
feelings of hopelessness, lack of energy, and some suicidal ideation. He received 
counseling as well as prescription medications for depression. (GX 3 at 41-42.) He 
continued his medication until March 2006, when he assumed his current position. At 
that time, his physician agreed to continue prescribing his medication on the condition 
that he obtain periodic psychological counseling. He saw a psychologist three times in 
2008 and 2009, and he consulted with a psychiatrist in February and June 2009. (GX 3 
at 41-42.)  
 
 In April 2009, Applicant was referred for psychological examination in connection 
with his application for SCI eligibility, to determine if he had a psychiatric, drug-related, 
or alcohol-related condition that would be likely to impair his judgment, reliability, or 
ability to protect classified information. During this evaluation, Applicant disclosed his 
history of alcohol consumption in detail, and he admitted that he had driven while 
intoxicated about six times, most recently in November 2008. He also admitted that he 
was under the influence of alcohol at work three or four times in 2004-2005. He 
admitted having alcohol-related blackouts on two occasions. A psychologist concluded 
that Applicant met the criteria for diagnoses of alcohol dependence and dysthymic 
disorder. He concluded that the risk of behavior indicative of poor judgment, impulsivity, 
or irresponsibility was high. He recommended that Applicant abstain from alcohol. (GX 3 
at 40-44.) 
 
 In August 2009, Applicant was informed that his application for SCI eligibility was 
denied. The denial was based on evidence of excessive alcohol consumption. The 
decision did not refer to his history of depression, viewing pornography, extramarital 
sex, or an attempt to use countermeasures during a polygraph examination. (GX 3 at 
12.) He did not appeal the decision.1 His collateral clearance was suspended on 
February 4, 2011. (Tr. 42.) 
 
                                                          
1  The Directive ¶ E3.1.37, prohibiting reapplication for a clearance within one year of having a clearance 
denied or revoked does not apply to this case. The prohibition is triggered only when the denial or 
revocation is by DOHA. Applicant’s SCI eligibility was denied by another government agency. 
 
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 When Applicant’s security clearance was suspended, he met with his 
supervisors, explained what had happened, told them the steps he was taking to control 
his alcohol consumption. His supervisor referred him to the facility security officer for 
advice. The facility security officer told him that abstinence was a good start, but he 
would have a better case for reinstatement of his clearance if he attended substance 
abuse counseling. (Tr. 43.)  
 
Applicant obtained counseling from February through July 2010. He was 
evaluated by a psychiatrist, who prescribed medication and psychotherapy. A licensed 
clinical professional counselor concluded that Applicant did not meet the criteria for 
alcohol-related disorders, but his symptoms met the criteria for a diagnosis of an 
adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. She commented 
favorably on Applicant’s improvement in understanding the stressors that affected his 
use of alcohol as he progressed through the counseling program. She concluded that 
therapeutic gains after eight counseling sessions warranted giving him the choice to 
continue or discontinue therapy. Applicant elected to discontinue. (AX B.)  
 
Applicant has been consulting with a psychiatrist regularly since early 2010. In 
June 2011, his psychiatrist diagnosed him as having generalized anxiety disorder in 
remission and alcohol abuse “in full sustained remission.” He describes Applicant as 
“remarkably stable (and sober) since [he] started treatment.” (AX A.) Applicant takes 
prescribed medications for depression and obtains counseling about every three 
months. (GX 2 at 4.) 
 
 At the hearing, Applicant testified that the denial of SCI eligibility was a “wake-up 
call.” In September 2009, he began keeping a calendar in which he recorded every 
drink he consumed. He consumed alcohol nine times in October, seven times in 
November, five times in December, and five times in January. He consumed alcohol for 
the last time on January 22, 2010, when he consumed a glass of wine to celebrate his 
21st wedding anniversary. (Tr. 40-41.) He is committed to remaining alcohol-free. He 
testified:  
 
Quitting drinking was one of the best things I ever did for my health, for my 
marriage, for my own self esteem. At this time I can’t imagine going back 
to the habits that I used to have. Regardless of what happens with my 
security clearance, I’m committed to continuing the behavior and mood 
management practices that I’ve learned and staying away from alcohol for 
good. 
 
(Tr. 47-48.) 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
 
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individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 
 
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01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption 
 
 SOR ¶ 1.a alleges that Applicant consumed alcohol, at times to excess and to 
the point of intoxication and occasional blackouts, from about 1985 to “at least” January 
2010. SOR ¶ 1.b alleges that another agency referred Applicant for evaluation by a 
psychologist in July 2009, who concluded that he was alcohol dependent, but that 
Applicant continued to consume alcohol, notwithstanding the psychologist’s 
recommendation of abstinence and warning about the potential adverse reaction with 
prescribed medications. SOR ¶ 1.c alleges that Applicant’s excessive use of alcohol 
caused his facility security officer to recommend substance abuse counseling, which 
Applicant attended from February 2010 to July 2010. 
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 21 as follows: “Excessive 
alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure 
to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability and 
trustworthiness.” The disqualifying conditions under this guideline are: 
 
AG ¶ 22(a): alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving 
while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the 
peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual 
is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent; 
 
AG ¶ 22(b): alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or 
duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job, 
regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or 
alcohol dependent; 
 
AG ¶ 22(c): habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of 
impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as 
an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent; 
AG ¶ 22(d): diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., 
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol 
dependence; 
AG ¶ 22(e): evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a 
licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized 
alcohol treatment program; 
AG ¶ 22(f) relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and 
completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program; and 
 
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AG ¶ 22(g): failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education, 
evaluation, treatment, or abstinence. 
 AG ¶ 22(a) is established by Applicant’s admission that he drove while 
intoxicated about six times, even though he was never arrested for drunk driving. AG ¶ 
22(b) is established by his admission that he was under the influence of alcohol at work 
three or four times. AG ¶ 22(c) is established by Applicant’s admission that he regularly 
drank to the point of intoxication and occasionally experienced blackouts. AG ¶ 22(d) is 
established by the evaluations of a psychologist in April 2009 and his psychiatrist in 
June 2011.  
 
 AG ¶ 22(e) is not established because the record does not reflect a diagnosis by 
the licensed clinical counselor who evaluated and counseled him during February 
through July 2010. AG ¶ 22(f) is not established because there is no evidence that he 
completed an alcohol rehabilitation program prior to the program in February-July 2010, 
and no evidence that he relapsed after his completion of the substance abuse program 
in July 2010. AG ¶ 22(f) is not established because there is no evidence of any court 
orders mandating alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated if “so much time has 
passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 23(a). Applicant’s excessive 
drinking was frequent and did not happen under unusual circumstances making it 
unlikely to recur. The focus in this case is on the first prong of this mitigating condition 
(“so much time has passed”), which requires a determination whether his excessive 
drinking was recent. There are no bright line rules for determining when conduct is 
recent. The determination must be based on a careful evaluation of the totality of the 
evidence. If the evidence shows Aa significant period of time has passed without any 
evidence of misconduct,@ then an administrative judge must determine whether that 
period of time demonstrates Achanged circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a 
finding of reform or rehabilitation.@ ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 
2004). 
 
Eighteen months of total abstinence is a “significant period of time.” This period 
of sobriety followed the “wake-up call” when Applicant was denied eligibility for SCI 
access. He acknowledged his problem, monitored his alcohol consumption for a few 
months, and decided stop drinking. He is controlling his depression with counseling and 
medication. He maintains a regular relationship with his psychiatrist, who has 
determined that his alcohol problems are “in full sustained remission.” Applicant has 
discovered that abstinence has improved his health, his marriage, and his self-esteem. 
He is committed to maintaining sobriety. I conclude that AG ¶ 23(a) is established. 
 
Security concerns also may be mitigated if “the individual acknowledges his or 
her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to 
overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol 
 
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dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser).” AG ¶ 23(b). For the reasons in 
the above discussion of AG ¶ 23(a), I conclude that this mitigating condition is 
established. 
Security concerns may be mitigated if “the individual is a current employee who 
is participating in a counseling or treatment program, has no history of previous 
treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress. AG ¶ 23(c). This mitigating 
condition is not fully established because Applicant is not currently participating in a 
“program.” However, he is a “current employee” and has completed a counseling 
program. He is under the continuing care of a psychiatrist, who describes him as 
“remarkably stable.”  
Finally, security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated under AG ¶ 
23(d) if:  
 
[T]he individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient 
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has 
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or 
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as 
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar 
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified 
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff 
member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.  
 
This mitigating condition is partially established. Applicant completed his 
substance abuse counseling in July 2010. No aftercare was prescribed or 
recommended. He does not participate in Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar 
organization, but he consults regularly with his psychiatrist. His psychiatrist did not 
provide a formal prognosis, but he provided a favorable diagnosis. 
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
 SOR ¶ 2.a alleges that Applicant downloaded pornography onto university 
computers from 1998 to “at least” 1999. SOR ¶ 2.a alleges that he utilized the services 
of prostitutes in a foreign country on two occasions in 2004 and concealed it from his 
wife. SOR ¶ 2.c alleges that he prepared for a polygraph examination by purchasing an 
instrument to measure electrodermal and cardio responses and practiced taking the 
examination on ten occasions until he could answer the questions with no physiological 
response.  
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15:  
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
 
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and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.  
The relevant disqualifying conditions under this guideline are: 
AG ¶ 16(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information 
concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, 
competent medical authority, or other official government representative; 
AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue 
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other 
single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a 
whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information; 
AG ¶ 16(d): credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered 
under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an 
adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available 
information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable 
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to 
comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that 
the person may not properly safeguard protected information. This 
includes but is not limited to consideration of . . . a pattern of dishonesty or 
rule violations; and  
AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's 
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the 
person's personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in 
another country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or 
that is legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve 
as a basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or 
intelligence service or other group.  
 Applicant admitted the allegations under SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b, but he presented 
proof that he had informed his wife of his activities with prostitutes. Even with his 
disclosures to his wife, however, the conduct under those two subparagraphs is 
sufficient to establish AG ¶¶ 16(c), (d), and (e). 
 
 Applicant partially denied the allegation in SOR ¶ 2.c. The gist of this allegation is 
that Applicant attempted to use countermeasures to conceal deceptive answers during 
a polygraph examination. He admitted purchasing the equipment and using it to practice 
for his polygraph examination, but he denied using previously asked questions and 
denied practicing his answers until he showed no psychological response. If true, the 
 
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alleged conduct would fall under the language in AG ¶ 15 regarding “any other failure to 
cooperate with the security clearance process,” and would be sufficient to raise the 
disqualifying condition in AG ¶ 16(b).  
 
 The unfavorable decision by another governmental agency on Applicant’s SCI 
eligibility relied on the same evidence as was presented by Department Counsel 
regarding Applicant’s alleged attempt to use polygraph countermeasures. However, the 
other agency’s decision to deny SCI eligibility did not mention any failure to cooperate 
with or obstruct the security clearance process. Instead, the denial decision was based 
solely on concerns about alcohol consumption. While the other agency’s factual 
determinations are not binding on me, I have considered them in making my 
independent findings of fact. 
 
 I found Applicant’s explanation for his purchase and use of the biofeedback 
equipment plausible and credible. If he intended to prevent the polygraph from 
indicating deception, he would not have disclosed his purchase and use of the 
equipment to the polygraph examiner. His disclosure of his purchase and use of the 
equipment and the volume of derogatory information he voluntarily disclosed during five 
polygraph examinations and related interviews suggests candor, not deception. I 
conclude that the potentially disqualifying condition on which SOR ¶ 2.c is predicated is 
not established by substantial evidence, and I resolve SOR ¶ 2.c in favor of Applicant. 
 
 However, I conclude that the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b are supported by 
substantial evidence sufficient to establish the disqualifying conditions in AG ¶ 16(c), 
(d), and (e). Thus, the burden shifted to Applicant to refute, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate the facts. 
 
 The following mitigating conditions are relevant: 
 
AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the 
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the 
individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained 
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to 
alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused 
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such 
behavior is unlikely to recur; and 
 
AG ¶ 17(e): the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. 
 
I conclude that all three mitigating conditions are established. The conduct in 
SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b happened long ago. The activities with prostitutes occurred during 
a single overseas trip and have not recurred. Applicant has received counseling for his 
 
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anxiety, depression, and alcohol use, and he has disclosed his activities with prostitutes 
to his wife. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my 
comments under Guidelines G and E in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors 
in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional 
comment. 
 
 Applicant is intelligent, well-educated, and articulate. He held a security 
clearance and worked with classified material from March 2006 until February 2011, 
apparently without incident. He was sincere, contrite, candid, and credible at the 
hearing. He volunteered all of the derogatory information in his background 
investigation. He has struggled with anxiety and depression for most of his adult life, 
and for many years he misused alcohol to self-medicate. He appears to have turned the 
corner shortly after his SCI eligibility was denied. He is committed to maintaining an 
alcohol-free lifestyle, and he has reinforced his commitment with psychiatric counseling 
and prescription medications.  
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines G and 
E, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on alcohol consumption and 
personal conduct. Accordingly, I conclude has carried his burden of showing that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to continue his eligibility for access to 
classified information. 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption): FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.c:    For Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct):  FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a-2.c:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to continue 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is granted. 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge