KEYWORD: Guideline G
DIGEST: Hearing Office decisions are not binding precedent.  Applicant failed to mitigate
security concerns arising from 17 years of excessive alcohol consumption, 3 arrests, and
diagnosis of alcohol dependence.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASE NO: 09-08248.a1
DATE: 08/22/2011
DATE: August 22, 2011
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 09-08248
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On October 18, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On June 6, 2011, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Darlene D. Lokey
Anderson denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Applicant seeks reversal of the Judge’s adverse decision arguing that the evidence
demonstrates that Applicant has mitigated the security concerns raised by his excessive use of
alcohol.  In support of his argument, he presents a detailed summary of the evidence presented at
the hearing and cites to several Hearing Office cases in which applicants with ostensibly similar
circumstances received a clearance.  Applicant’s presentation  does not demonstrate that the Judge’s
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
In his brief, Applicant acknowledged that during his research he found that “not a great deal
of cases like [his] are granted clearances” and the cases he cited have significant differences from
his own.  Although Hearing Office decisions may be cited as persuasive authority, they are not
binding legal precedent which must follow in another situation.  Applicant’s reliance on other
Hearing Office decisions does not demonstrate that the Judge erred in this case.  See, e.g., ISCR
Case No. 09-03448 at 2 (App. Bd. May 19, 2011).  “The adjudicative process is the careful weighing
of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.”  Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2 (a).
“Each case must be judged on its own merits . . .” Id at ¶ 2 (b).
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of
fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence
outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 10-00278 at 2 (App. Bd. Mar.
18, 2011).
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant, a 32-year-old engineering technician, had
consumed alcohol, at times in excess and to the point of intoxication, from approximately age 14
to at least March of 2010—a span of approximately 17 years.   He had been arrested for alcohol-
related driving incidents in 1997, 1999, and 2000, and had been evaluated and diagnosed for Alcohol
Dependence in about July 2010.  Decision at 2, 3, and 6.  At the time the case was submitted for
decision, Applicant had “only recently acknowledged his alcohol problem, and [had] only about a
year of sobriety.” Id. at 7.  The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by
Applicant—including his efforts at rehabilitation,  his favorable work performance and letters of
recommendation, and numerous awards and commendations in the Navy—against the length and
seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant
conditions and factors. Id. at 3-7.  She reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was
insufficient to overcome all of the government’s security concerns. Id.
The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett           
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin            
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields           
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board