KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline E
DIGEST: Applicant failed to rebut the presumption that the Judge considered all of the record
evidence.  Neither did he demonstrate that the Judge mis-weighed the record evidence.  Adverse
decision affirmed.
CASE NO: 10-02576.a1
DATE: 08/30/2011
DATE: August 30, 2011
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 10-02576
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On January 6, 2011, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as
amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On June 6, 2011, after the hearing,
Administrative Judge LeRoy F. Forman denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge
mis-weighed the evidence.  Specifically, he argues that the Judge’s decision did not give enough
consideration to the mitigating evidence presented by Applicant, such as his Army service and his
efforts to resolve his financial problems.  He also states that he now wishes to hire a lawyer to
represent him in his case.  Applicant’s presentation  does not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision
is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant was provided with written Prehearing Guidance which informed him that he had
the option of representing himself without an attorney, being represented by a non-attorney personal
representative of his choosing, or being represented by an attorney selected and paid for by himself.
Applicant is free to hire a lawyer at any stage of the proceedings.
A review of the decision indicates that the Judge reasonably considered evidence favorable
to the Applicant including such things as: his 14 years of honorable service in the Army, his history
of serious medical problems that were caused or aggravated by his combat service, his marital
problems, his completion of an on-line financial management course, and his consultation with a
bankruptcy attorney.  Decision at 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8.  A Judge is presumed to have considered all the
evidence in the record.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 09-06691 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Mar. 16, 2011).  There
is nothing in the Applicant’s presentation on appeal or in the decision to rebut the presumption that
the Judge fairly considered all of the evidence including evidence favorable to the Applicant.
 
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of
fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence
outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 10-00278 at 2 (App. Bd. Mar.
18, 2011).
In this case, the Judge reasonably weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant
against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible
application of relevant conditions and factors.  Decision at 5-8.  He found in favor of Applicant with
respect to several of the SOR factual allegations, but reasonably explained why the mitigating
evidence was insufficient to overcome all of the government’s security concerns.  Id.
The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s
unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan       
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody           
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields           
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board