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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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)       ISCR Case No. 09-00818
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)
Applicant for Security Clearance
Appearances
For Government: Raashid Williams, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
                                                                            
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen, A., Administrative Judge:
On April 12, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns arising under Guideline E
(Personal Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines
(AG) implemented in September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a decision without a hearing.
On June 6, 2011, the Government requested a hearing pursuant to the Directive. DOHA
assigned the case to me on July 7, 2011. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on July 18,
2011, and I convened the hearing on August 16, 2011. Department Counsel offered
three exhibits, which were admitted as Government Exhibits (GE) 1-3. Applicant
testified, presented one witness, and submitted six exhibits (AE), A through F, which
were admitted into the record. DOHA received the transcript on August 24, 2011. Based
on a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
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Findings of Fact
In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegation under
Guideline E (Personal Conduct). Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a defense
contractor. She received her undergraduate degree in May 2004. She has never
married and has no children. Applicant has worked for her current employer since 1988.
She has held a security clearance for almost 26 years. (Tr. 38)
Applicant readily acknowledges that she is in a committed relationship with A.G.,
who has an extensive history of involvement with criminal activities. He has lived with
her in a committed relationship for 24 years. She has known him since 1988. (Tr. 22)
She is aware of his criminal past and his 2005 conviction for possession of crack
cocaine, for which he was imprisoned for eight years. However, she did not know all the
details of all the charges and convictions over the years. 
In July 1998, as part of a security clearance investigation, Applicant told the
Office of Personnel (OPM) interviewers about her relationship with A.G. She
acknowledged that she knew about the bank robbery and his drug problem. Applicant
testified that she did not understand that continuing a relationship with A.G. might
jeopardize her security clearance. She knew about his background. She cared for him
and believed that he would change. She acknowledged that it might not be a good idea
to continue a relationship with A.G. She also thought about leaving him if his behavior
did not change. (Tr. 43) However, she wanted to be a “hero” and savior for him. From
1994 until 2005, A.G. was free of any criminal charges or convictions. (GE 3)
A.G. had been arrested five times before he met Applicant. In 1971 and 1982,
he was convicted of bank robbery. During the relationship, A.G. was in and out of jail
approximately five times. Applicant visited him once a week while he was in jail. While
Applicant and A.G. lived together, his criminal record included a 1988 assault with intent
to maim; a 1989 possession of controlled substance and assault and battery; a 1991
possession of unregistered ammunition with no permit; a 1991 charges of petty larceny,
grand larceny, and burglary; a 1993 breaking and entering; a 1994 possession of
heroin; a 1994 possession of a pistol; and a 2003 grand larceny. (GE 3):
At the hearing, Applicant testified that she has been a faithful employee for 23
years and would never risk her security clearance or destroy all that she has achieved
in her professional life by distributing classified information to her friend. She noted the
relationship with him on all security clearance applications.
She also submitted documentation that shows A.G. has made great strides in a
positive direction to put his criminal activities behind him. After his 2005 arrest and
conviction for possession of crack cocaine, he was confined in prison until 2008. He
completed a residential drug rehabilitation program in 2009. (AE B) A.G. completed the
Drug Offender Workforce Development Program in 2010. (AE D) He completed a
matrix social support program in December 2010. (AE C) She testified that she has
seen a definite change in A.G since the 2005 drug arrest. She attributes this change to
his employment and his drug rehabilitation. He also does not have the same friends.
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(Tr. 57) Applicant was credible describing her current relationship with A.G, which now
involves them in family activities with his sister. (Tr. 57)
At the hearing, Applicant testified that she never saw AG use drugs and that she
did not have drugs in her home. When she first met him, she did not know he had an
extensive drug problem. She later learned he had a heroin addiction. (Tr. 23) She
admitted that she also asked him about property (jewelry) in the house that she thought
might be stolen. She saw an unassembled gun in the home. At the time, he was a
convicted felon and was not allowed to own a gun. Applicant did not report this to
authorities because it was unassembled. (Tr. 31)
A.G. testified at the hearing that he has lived with Applicant since 1988. He
considers her his fiancee, and describes her as a compassionate and loyal person. He
described his full-time employment and his certification in HVAC. He completed the
apprentice course in 2011. (AE A) 
A.G. acknowledged that his criminal behavior began in 1971 when he was
convicted of bank robbery. He admitted all his other convictions and his drug problems
with heroin and cocaine. (Tr. 65) He stated that he never used drugs in Applicant’s
presence. He testified credibly that he is now working hard to do the right thing as a
citizen. He works seven days a week and continues to go to school. He does not
associate with the same friends. He has not used drugs since 2005. He was released
from prison in 2008. He continues with drug counseling and attends meetings. He
meets with his probation officer once a month and is subject to random urinalysis. (Tr.
69) He is also subject to random home visits. His probation ends in 2011. A.G. appears
sincere in his devotion to Applicant and his desire to remain drug free. He has a support
system and has resources to keep him on the right path. 
Applicant’s colleague, who is a lieutenant colonel (retired), and who has known
her for ten years, praises her professionalism and trustworthiness. He has known her in
a professional and a personal capacity. He describes Applicant’s strong work ethic and
loyalty. During her long tenure with the company, she has safeguarded classified
information without incident. Applicant is described a successful leader. (AE E)
Another character reference presented details about Applicant’s efficiency,
competency, and organization. She is described as an honest and well-balanced
person. (AE F)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      1
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      2
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      3
 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive      4
information), and EO 10865 § 7.
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      5
 Id.      6
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Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a1
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  2 3
A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance4
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt5
about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be
resolved in favor of protecting such information.  The decision to deny an individual a6
security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is
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merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect
classified information.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative;
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information;
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse
determination, but which, when combined with all available information
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes
but is not limited to consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information,
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unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other
government protected information;
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the
workplace; 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other
employer's time or resources;
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence
service or other group;
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to
the employer as a condition of employment; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity. 
Applicant has lived with A.G., a person with an extensive criminal history, since
1989. She disclosed this information on her security clearance applications from the
start of her career. She knew of his criminal activities. AG ¶¶ 16(d) and (g) apply.   
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of
authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made
aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the
individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
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(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules
and regulations.
Applicant has held a security clearance for almost 26 years. She has received
high praise from her colleagues. When she completed her security clearance
applications she listed A.G. as the person with whom she lived. Although A.G. had a
criminal history before Applicant met him, he continued his criminal behavior during
their relationship. She acknowledged in 1998 that it might not be a good idea to
continue the relationship with him. However, she believed he would change, and she
cared for him. He had a drug problem, which also contributed to his robbery and theft
charges. Applicant remained faithful to him and visited him in jail. From 1994 until 2005,
A.G. did not have any criminal incidents. However, in 2005, he again was sent to prison
for a drug charge. He served his time, completed a drug rehabilitation program, and is
now working. Although it may have been more prudent to leave the relationship,
Applicant did not. Her strong commitment to A.G. may not be totally understandable,
but is not untrustworthy behavior. She did not associate with any of his friends. She did
not associate with his drug use. She was as loyal and supportive to him as she
apparently has been to her profession. She has a long, unblemished professional and
personal record. A.G. has changed his behavior and is on the right track. I do not have
doubts about Applicant’s reliability or willingness to comply with rules and regulations. I
find that she has mitigated the concerns under personal conduct.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
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rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case as well as the “whole-person”
factors. Applicant has held a security clearance for almost 26 years without incident.
She has excellent recommendations and a stellar career record. She was forthright and
honest in her security investigations from the beginning. She told investigators in 1998
that she was living with A.G. She did not dispute his criminal record, but did not realize
the relationship might jeopardize her security clearance. She discussed the situation
with A.G. and wanted to help him. She did not associate herself with his friends. She
did not know all the specifics of his crimes. She did visit him in jail. She knew about his
addiction to heroin. She at no time believed she had a duty to report him to the
authorities. 
From 1994 until 2005, A.G. had no criminal incidents. He has had one arrest in
16 years. After his 2005 charge and time in prison, he appears to have taken his drug
problem seriously. He has attended drug rehabilitation. He has been drug free since
2005. He is employed. He completes his probation this year. He testified at the hearing
and is aware of the importance of Applicant’s security clearance. He respects her work
and did not involve Applicant in his criminal activities. He knows the value of Applicant’s
security clearance and during the relationship with her he did not engage in criminal
acts in the home. He was sincere in his desire to “do the right things as a citizen.” He
now has resources to keep him on the right path.
Applicant is not vulnerable to any coercion or pressure. She has disclosed the
extent of her relationship over the years. She has had no incidents in 26 years while
holding a security clearance. Applicant has met her burden. She has mitigated the
security concerns under personal conduct. Clearance is granted.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is granted. 
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge