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.                                                              
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ICSR Case No. 10-05493 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Richard T. Stevens, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Mariea Salhi, Personal Representative 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
CREAN, THOMAS M., Administrative Judge: 
 
 Based on a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access 
to classified information is granted. Applicant mitigated security concerns for foreign 
influence. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) on September 29, 2008, for his employment as an interpreter/role player with a 
defense contractor. After an investigation conducted by the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued 
interrogatories to Applicant to clarify or augment potentially disqualifying information in 
his background. After reviewing the results of the background investigation and 
Applicant's response to the interrogatories, DOHA could not make the preliminary 
affirmative findings required to issue a security clearance. DOHA issued a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR), dated November 17, 2010, to Applicant detailing security concerns for 
foreign influence under Guideline B. The action was taken under Executive Order 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and 
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the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the Department of Defense on September 
1, 2006. Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on January 25, 2011. 
 
 Applicant answered the SOR on January 25, 2011. He admitted the factual 
allegation under Guideline B, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. 
Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on April 19, 2011, and the case was 
assigned to me on May 19, 2011. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on June 9, 2011, 
for a hearing on June 21, 2011. I convened the hearing as scheduled. The Government 
offered three exhibits, which I marked and admitted into the record without objection as 
Government Exhibits (Gov. Ex.) 1 through 3. Applicant testified on his behalf. Applicant 
offered one document that I marked and admitted to the record without objection as 
Applicant Exhibit (App. Ex.) A. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on 
June 28, 2011.  
 
Procedural Issues 
 
 Department Counsel requested that administrative notice be taken of certain 
facts concerning Iraq (Hearing Exhibit I). I have considered the request and the 
documents provided by Department Counsel. Administrative notice is taken of the facts 
pertaining to Iraq as noted below in the Findings of Fact. 
 
 Applicant received the Notice of Hearing on or about June 15, 2011. He 
discussed the hearing date with Department Counsel on May 3, 2011. Applicant is 
entitled to 15 days advance notice of a hearing. (Directive E3.1.8.) Applicant was ready 
to proceed at the hearing on June 21, 2011, and he had sufficient time to prepare. He 
waived the 15-day notice requirement. (Tr. 5-7) 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following essential findings of fact. Applicant admitted the SOR factual allegation.  
 
 Applicant is 43 years old and employed by a defense contractor as an 
interpreter/role player in support of training for United States forces. He was born and 
raised in the Kurdish area of Iraq. His parents and one sibling are deceased. He has 
three brothers and two sisters that are citizens of Iraq residing in the Kurdish area of 
Iraq. He has three other brothers who left Iraq and are residents of European countries. 
Applicant came to the United States as a refugee in 1992, and became a United States 
citizen in 2004. He is married with two children. His wife was born in the Kurdish area of 
Iraq and immigrated with her family to the United States in 1992. She became a United 
States citizen in 2004. Applicant has served as an interpreter/role player in the 
continental United States since 2008 supporting the training of United States military 
personnel. He submitted an application for a security clearance to continue to serve as 
a trainer of United States military personnel. (Tr. 10-13, 17-18, 21-22; Gov. Ex. 1, e-
QIP, dated October 3, 2008) 
 
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 Applicant and his family were native Kurdish people who lived in the northern 
region of Iraq. When Applicant was 18 years old in 1985, he was not in school so he 
was required by Iraqi law to enter the Iraqi armed forces. He was forced to serve 
because his family would have been tortured or killed if he did not serve. He served for 
about two months completing some part of basic training when he decided to desert. He 
went back to his home area and lived in his old neighborhood. If Applicant had been 
located and identified as a deserter, he would have been killed by the Iraqi authorities. 
He found employment at night in a bakery and developed an Egyptian accent to elude 
authorities. His neighbors could be tortured by the Iraqi Government if he was found in 
the area. There was pressure from his neighbors to return to the Iraqi military. Saddam 
Hussein issued an amnesty for deserters to return to the military. He returned to the 
Army 1990. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Applicant did not want to fight for Iraq 
so he deserted again in 1990 and crossed the border into Saudi Arabia. His family 
initially did not know that he was alive and believed that he died in Kuwait. They even 
had a funeral for him. (Tr. 17-19, 22-25; Gov. Ex. 3, Affidavit, dated August 18, 2009) 
 
 Applicant spent over two years in a refugee camp in Saudi Arabia before coming 
to the United States. After immigrating to the United States as a refugee in 1992, 
Applicant was settled by a church group in the south. He found employment as a cook 
in a resort. He held that position for over four years when he was laid off in a 
restructuring. He then worked at an optical company for over five years until that 
company bankrupted and closed. In 2008, he was hired by a company to be an 
interpreter, role player, and cultural and religious advisor for United States military 
personnel. He has worked at various military locations in the United States. He received 
many certificates of appreciation for his work. (Tr. 30-36; App. Ex. A, Certificates, 
various dates)  
 
 All of Applicant’s siblings in Iraq live in the Kurdish area of Iraq where they were 
born and raised. He contacted them after he immigrated to the United States to tell 
them he was alive. Applicant’s oldest sister is a pharmacist and a citizen and resident of 
Iraq. She is nine years older than Applicant and raised him because his mother was 
sick. She is single and lives with his brother. Another sister is a teacher who is married 
to a teacher. Both are citizens and residents of Iraq. His oldest brother is now disabled 
from a gunshot wound. His wife is a clerk in a store. They are both citizens and 
residents of Iraq. His other two brothers are plumbers. They and their wives are citizens 
and residents of Iraq. He talks to his siblings very infrequently. He may call them on 
religious holidays about once a year. He has not spoken to them in over two years. (Tr. 
25-29, 38-40) 
 
 Applicant only returned to Iraq one time since he left in 1990. He returned in 
1996 when his father died. His sister notified him that his father was sick and wanted to 
see him before he died. Applicant and his wife flew to Turkey using their United States 
green cards. It took them over 20 days to enter the Kurdish are of Iraq by land. He was 
not concerned about entering the Kurdish area because the Kurds were autonomous 
and in charge. He and his wife did not have to be concerned about being confronted by 
the Hussein Government. (Tr. 29-31, 36-38) 
 
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Iraq is a country about the size of California with a population of approximately 
30 million. Iraq received independence from British administration in 1932. It was ruled 
by dictatorships under the Ba’ath party since 1958. From July 1979 until March 2003, 
Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. The Kurdish region of Iraq is in 
northern Iraq and also extends into Turkey, Iran and Syria. In this area, the Kurds form 
a prominent majority population, and Kurdish culture, language, and national identity 
have been historically based. The Iraqi Kurds gained autonomy in a 1970 agreement 
with the Iraqi government and its status was re-confirmed as an autonomous entity 
within the federal Iraqi republic in 2005. Today the Kurds are approximately 17% of the 
Iraqi population, but are the majority in the north provinces of Iraq. While most Kurds 
are Sunni Muslins, they differ from other Arabs in language and custom. 
 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. A United States-led coalition expelled Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait in February 1991. After the war, the Kurds in the north and the Shi’a 
Muslims in the south rebelled against the Hussein government. These rebellions were 
brutally and quickly crushed by the Hussein government. To protect the population, the 
United States, United Kingdom, and France enforced a no-fly zone in the north and 
south of Iraq to protect the people. The “safe haven” established by the United Nations 
Security Council assisted the Kurds to survive. The Hussein government under a United 
Nations resolution was to surrender their weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The 
Hussein regime refused to comply with United Nations mandates. In March and April 
2003, a United States-led coalition removed the Ba’ath party, leading to the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein. When the coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, the Kurdish people 
welcomed the troops with celebrations and dancing in the streets. Since then, the Kurds 
have controlled the area of Kirkuk and Mosel.  
 
In March 2006, Iraq’s new government took office after being freely elected by 
the Iraqi people. The Kurdish area remained autonomous and did not participate in the 
formation of the new Iraqi government. Terrorism committed by illegally armed groups 
receiving weapons and training from Iran continues to endanger the security and 
stability of Iraq. Foreign terrorists continue to flow into Iraq, predominantly through 
Syria. Al-Qaeda in Iraq still possesses the means to launch high-profile attacks against 
Iraqi civilians and infrastructure. However, the Kurdish area is relatively safe and has 
not experienced terrorist attacks. The U. S. Department of State still warns its citizens of 
the inherent dangers of travel in Iraq and recommends against all but essential travel. 
Despite Iraqi security forces’ efforts, numerous insurgent groups remain active 
throughout Iraq. Attacks against military and civilian targets continue including the 
international zone and northern Iraq. Attacks include improvised explosive devices, 
mortars, rockets, and shooting. Such attacks may occur at any time. There are 
substantiated reports of human rights abuses including arbitrary deprivation of life, 
disappearances, torture, and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and 
punishment. The government’s effectiveness in adhering to the rule of law is hampered 
by violence. Treatment of detainees under government authority has generally been 
poor. The judiciary is weak and not independent.  
 
 
Policy 
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When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Analysis 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. 
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which 
the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including but not limited to, such 
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consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6)  
 
 Applicant left Iraq in 1990 as a military deserter rather than serve in the Saddam 
Hussein army against coalition forces. He was settled in the United States by a religious 
group. He has three brothers and two sisters who are citizens and residents of the 
Kurdish region of Iraq. Applicant returned to Iraq only once in 1996 for his father’s 
funeral. Since he left Iraq, he has only seen his siblings that one time. He talks to them 
occasionally by phone, usually on religious holidays. The last contact with his siblings 
was over two years ago. No matter how limited and infrequent, contacts and 
relationships in Iraq are a security concern and raise Foreign Influence Disqualifying 
Conditions AG ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if 
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, 
pressure, or coercion), and AG ¶ 7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group, 
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the 
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information). 
 
 The mere existence of foreign relationships and contacts is not sufficient to raise 
the above disqualifying conditions. The nature of Applicant’s contacts and relationships 
must be examined to determine whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. “Heightened” is a relative 
term denoting increased risk compared to some normally existing risk that can be 
inherent anytime there are foreign contacts and relationships. One factor that heightens 
the risk in Applicant's case is the conditions in Iraq caused by an insurgency, violence, 
terrorism, and an unstable government.   
 
 Applicant raised facts to mitigate the security concerns arising from the contacts 
with his family members in Iraq. I have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating 
Conditions (FI MC) AG ¶ 8(a) (The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the 
country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, 
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.); AG ¶ 8(b) (There is no 
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the 
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such 
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be 
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest); and AG ¶ 8(c) 
(Contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is 
little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation). 
 
 Applicant’s siblings in Iraq place a heavy burden on Applicant in mitigating the 
disqualifying conditions and the security concerns. Applicant has had little contact with 
his siblings since he fled Iraq in 1990. He only saw them once in 1996 for his father’s 
funeral. He has infrequent telephone conversations with them usually only on religious 
holidays. His last contact with them was over two years ago. While the contacts are 
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minimal, the mere existence of the contacts under the circumstances must be 
considered close and not casual.   
 
 Applicant fled Iraq rather than serve in the Iraqi army fighting against coalition 
forces for Saddam Hussein. He has five siblings still living in the Kurdish area of Iraq 
that he has seen only once in over 20 years and talks to infrequently by telephone. He 
has no allegiance or sense of loyalty to the government of Iraq. He is an ethnic Kurd. 
The Kurds are autonomous from the Iraqi government. The Kurds have rebelled against 
Iraq and have worked with and been faithful to the United States-led coalition forces. He 
has a sense of loyalty to his Kurdish culture but not to the government of Iraq. He came 
to the United States as a refugee and developed such a profound sense of obligation to 
the United States that he has served as a trainer of United States military personnel for 
almost four years. He has received certificates of appreciation for his work with the 
armed forces. He is seeking a security clearance to continue his work as a trainer.  
 
 Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United 
States because of this strong sense of loyalty to the United States. Applicant’s family 
members in Iraq will not place him in a position to choose between them and the 
interests of the United States. In balancing all of the factors mentioned and considered 
above, I am satisfied Applicant’s loyalty to the United States, the circumstances of his 
departure from Iraq, his feelings against the Iraqi Government, and the minimal contact 
with his family in Iraq are such that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest 
in favor of the United States interest. Accordingly, AG ¶ 8(a) and AG ¶ 8(b) apply. 
Applicant has met his heavy burden to show that his family members in Iraq do not 
cause a security concern. I conclude Applicant has mitigated security concerns for 
foreign influence.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for access to 
sensitive information must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
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I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I carefully considered all of the 
circumstances discussed above in regard to disqualifying and mitigating conditions as 
well as the following factors in light of the whole-person concept. I considered that 
Applicant fled Iraq rather than serve in the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein against 
coalition forces. He became a United States citizen and a productive member of our 
society. He has served for almost four years training military personnel. The military 
members he worked with have praised him for his work with them. He has minimal 
contacts with his limited family in Iraq. The whole-person concept requires consideration 
of all available information about Applicant, not a single item in isolation, to reach a 
determination concerning Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
Applicant’s family members in Iraq might be sufficient to raise security concerns for 
Applicant’s potential vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. Applicant has 
established his strong connection and loyalties to the United States by his willingness to 
serve as a trainer with United States forces. He established he has no loyalty or 
allegiance to Iraq. He fled that country as a refugee rather than serve a dictator and 
tyrant under threat of death. Applicant's strong loyalty and allegiance to the United 
States, his strong feelings against the Iraqi government, and his lack of allegiance to 
Iraq counters any contacts and relationships he has with his family members in Iraq.  
 
Overall, on balance, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts 
about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for access to classified information. For all 
these reasons, I conclude Applicant has met the heavy burden of mitigating all potential 
security concerns arising from his family members in Iraq. Applicant mitigated the 
security concerns for foreign influence, and is granted access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
   Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for access to 
classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge