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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-06707
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Allison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Christopher Graham, Esq.
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant failed to mitigate the security concern generated by his relatives who
are citizens and/or residents of Pakistan. Clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case
On April 15, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) explaining why it was not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance. The action was taken
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. Applicant answered the SOR on August
6, 2011, admitting the allegations and requesting a hearing. The case was assigned to
me on August 4, 2011. On August 10, 2011, a notice of hearing was issued scheduling
the case for August 26, 2011. The hearing was held as scheduled. I received two
Applicant destroyed AE A, a national identification card issued by Pakistan, on the record. I did not1
include its remnants in the file.
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Government exhibits marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 and 2. Applicant submitted
three exhibits admitted as Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through C.  1
Ruling of Evidence
At Department Counsel’s request, I took administrative notice of facts about
Pakistan set forth in what I marked as Hearing Exhibits (HE) I through VIII. The
following is a summary.
1. Pakistan is a developing country. Although it is ostensibly a federal republic, the
military continues to have a pervasive influence on the government, and its human
rights record remains poor. (HE I at 9 and HE VII at 1) The Pakistani government
maintains several domestic intelligence services that monitor politicians, political
activists, and journalists. (Id. at 12) 
2. Pakistan’s government does not entirely control its country, and the infrastructure of
significant parts of the country has been devastated by natural disasters over the years.
Ongoing internal tensions, ethnic and religious strife, and general lawlessness prevail in
many parts of the country. (See generally, HE II and HE VII)
3. Pakistan is home to a number of extremist groups, including the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda, that target American and other Western interests, high-level Pakistani
government officials, and members of indigenous minority and religious groups (HE II at
1; HE V at 6) Although Pakistan has made significant gains against these groups over
the past two years, many continue to operate in remote parts of the country with
impunity. (HE V at 6)
4. Pakistan has historically supported the Taliban and considers militant groups to be
important to its efforts to counter India’s military and economic advantages. (HE I at 8-9)
5. In May 2011, U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the 911 attacks and
numerous other terrorist attacks around the world. He had been living in hiding in an
affluent suburb of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, in a home eight times larger than any
homes in the community, reinforced by extraordinary security measures including 12 to
18 foot walls topped with barbed wire and two security gates. (HE VI at 3)
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 33-year-old married man with three children, ages eight, five, and
one. He was born and raised in Pakistan. After graduating from college, he immigrated
to the United States in 2001 to attend graduate school. (GE 2 at 26) He briefly attended
graduate school, then decided to withdraw and focus on mastering the English
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language, gaining practical work experience, and becoming generally more acclimated
to U.S. culture. (Tr. 14)
For the next nine years, Applicant worked for various companies including a
pharmaceutical company, an information technology company, and an insurance
company. He also periodically drove a cab and took some college courses. Since June
2009, Applicant has worked for a government contractor as a database architect. His
duties include maintaining and developing databases. (Tr. 18)
 Applicant has been a naturalized U.S. citizen since April 2009. (GE 2 at 26; Tr.
17) His wife is also originally from Pakistan. She immigrated to the United States in
1999 when she was 15 years old and became a naturalized citizen immediately upon
her parents’ application. (Tr. 37) Applicant and his wife met in the United States, and
traveled to Pakistan in May 2002 for their wedding ceremony. (Tr. 36)
Applicant’s parents emigrated from Pakistan to the United States in September
2010 and moved in with Applicant. (Tr. 22-23) Before emigrating, Applicant’s father
worked as a vice president of a bank. (GE 2 at 27) Now, he is a gas station cashier.
Applicant’s mother never worked outside of the home. (Tr. 45) Recently, she returned to
Pakistan to care for her gravely ill mother (Applicant’s grandmother). She will return to
the U.S. after her mother passes away. (Tr. 23) Both parents have permanent U.S.
residence status and intend to become U.S. citizens. (Tr. 22, 46)
Applicant has one sister. She is a Pakistani citizen who lives with him and is
attending college on a student visa. (Tr. 24) Applicant is sponsoring her to become a
U.S. citizen. (Tr. 24)
Applicant has two brothers. His younger brother is a Pakistani citizen living in the
United Kingdom. He is currently unemployed. Applicant is sponsoring him to become a
U.S. citizen. (GE 2 at 29)
Applicant’s older brother is an officer in the Pakistani army. He has been in their
army since 1994. He spent the majority of his career in an anti-narcotics division that
worked together with U.S., British, and Canadian forces. (Tr. 25) He has received
extensive U.S.-sponsored training. (AE B at 10, 12-14) Over the years, he has received
several awards from U.S. drug-interdiction agencies and joint U.S./Pakistani drug
interdiction agencies. (See generally, AE B at 7-12) For the past few years, he has been
working in a special operations unit directly under the guidance of U.S. troops. (Answer
at 4)
Applicant’s brother who is in the Pakistani Army has a 5-year U.S. visa. (Tr. 50)
He has spent significant periods of time in the United States, typically visiting for two-
month intervals, and staying with Applicant. (GE 2 at 29) Both of Applicant’s brother’s
children were born in the United States. (AE C at 2-3) The oldest child, a 10-year-old
boy, is autistic. In 2010, the child spent nearly an entire school year attending a U.S.
public school. (Tr. 50) It is unclear from the record whether Applicant’s brother lived with
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the child during that time. Applicant’s brother and sister-in-law intend to immigrate to the
United States so that their child can receive quality special education. (Tr. 52) Applicant
and his brother talk about once every two months. (Tr. 52)
Applicant owns his home. He is active in his community, participating in the
neighborhood homeowner’s association and enjoying barbecues with neighbors. (Tr.
32) 
Applicant’s mother-in-law is a citizen and resident to Pakistan. She is a
homemaker. She has never visited the U.S. (GE 2 at 29)  His wife talks to her about
once every other month. Applicant has no contact with her. (Tr. 29) 
Applicant’s parents-in-law are divorced. His father-in-law is a naturalized U.S.
citizen who has been living in the United States since the 1980s. (Id.) 
As of the date of the SOR, Applicant possessed a Pakistani identification card.
He has had this card since 2005. It enables him to travel to Pakistan with his U.S.
passport without a visa. (Tr. 38) Applicant’s father applied for Applicant’s identification
card. (Tr. 20) Applicant cannot recall ever using it for travel to Pakistan. He destroyed
the identification card at the hearing. (Tr. 21)
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
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grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under this guideline, “when an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a
preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United
States” (AG ¶ 9). Here, Applicant’s possession of a Pakistani identification card creates
a general foreign preference security concern under the guideline’s introductory
paragraph (AG ¶ 9). However, none of the disqualifying conditions apply. Although
Applicant was in possession of a Pakistani national identification card when the SOR
was issued, he received it before he became a naturalized U.S. citizen. The potentially
applicable disqualifying guideline, AG ¶ 10(a), is predicated on the “exercise of any
right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship after [italics added] becoming a U.S.
citizen . . .” 
Applicant destroyed the Pakistani identification card at the hearing. Absent any
other indicators of foreign preference, I resolve this guideline in his favor.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
an individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interests.”  (AG
¶ 6)  Pakistan is a haven for extremist, anti-American groups, including Al Qaeda, which
masterminded the 911 attack. Consequently, Applicant’s Pakistani relatives who are
Pakistani citizens generate concerns under AG ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family
member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of
or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, or coercion.”
Applicant is a successful person who immigrated to the United States 10 years
ago, mastered the English language, and has successfully nurtured a career as a
database architect. He is a homeowner who is comfortably integrated into U.S. culture.
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The depths of his ties to the United States, however, cannot overcome the security
concern generated by his Pakistani relatives, particularly his brother who is a major in
the Pakistani army. Neither AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships with foreign
persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of
those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,” nor AG ¶ 8(b), “there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest,” apply.
Applicant is close to all of his immediate family members. Although he has little
or no contact with his mother-in-law, he remains vulnerable to coercion through her
relationship with his wife. AG ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is
so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation,” does not apply.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the Administrative Judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation
is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.
Applicant’s longstanding ties to the U.S. are outweighed by his relationship with
his Pakistani relatives. Upon evaluating this case in the context of the whole-person
concept, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns. Clearance is
denied.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
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Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a-2.e: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge