KEYWORD: Guideline I
DIGEST: The Judge’s conclusion that the record raises unresolved questions and doubts about
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance is sustainable.  Applicant’s
assertions that DOHA did not properly inform her of procedures after the clinical psychologist
submitted her report were unfounded. Adverse decision affirmed.
CASE NO: 08-08721.a1
DATE: 10/20/2011
DATE: October 20, 2011
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-08721
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Braden M. Murphy, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On November 1, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline I (Psychological Conditions)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Department
Counsel requested a hearing.  On July 29, 2011, after the hearing,  Administrative Judge Claude R.
Heiny denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant  appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raises the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse security
clearance decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  For the following reasons, the Board
affirms the Judge’s unfavorable decision. 
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant is 54 years old.  In
September 2005, Applicant informed her company’s security office that she believed she was being
stalked 24 hours a day, seven days a week by persons unknown.  In December 2005 she went to the
police, because she was being stalked in various locations.  Neither company officials nor the police
department told Applicant they were unable to substantiate her concerns.  She never returned to the
police and she never talked further with company officials after relating her initial concerns.  On
various other occasions between 2005 and 2010, Applicant states that she was followed home or to
other locations by vehicles, that other vehicles stalked her or drove aggressively toward her on the
highways.  After one incident where the police did not perceive a problem, Applicant stated that she
did not feel she was being taken seriously and that no one believed her suspicions.  In 2007,
Applicant filed a hostile environment complaint with her company’s ethics office.  She reported
several incidents with three men whom she claimed were behaving in a hostile manner toward her.
An investigation determined there was no problem with the men.
In July 2010, Applicant was evaluated by a clinical psychologist.  Tests and an interview
were conducted.  The evaluation included the observation that Applicant denied any unusual
thinking except the feeling that she was being followed.  The psychologist also reported that
Applicant engaged in a lengthy discussion about various individuals following her for a number of
years in a number of situations.  Applicant could not be dissuaded by any logical arguments to the
contrary.  The diagnostic impression was 294.9 Cognitive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (NOS),
and 297.1 Delusional Disorder NOS.  A Global Assessment of Functioning was rated “50” which
indicates serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.  The psychologist
concluded that Applicant’s neuropsychological status appeared impaired, and that her delusions
could be quite severe at times and appeared to account for some flaws in her thinking and interaction
with others.  The psychologist stated that “unfortunately, it is not known at this time whether her
judgment and reliability in the future can be ascertained or fully determined without further medical
and neuropsychological evaluation.”  
The evaluation recommended Applicant see a neurologist.  She did so in November 2010.
She had an MRI which revealed no problems.  She told the neurologist her physician had
recommended she see a neurologist.  She never gave the neurologist a copy of the psychologist’s
findings and recommendations.  She saw the neurologist again the day before the hearing.  Applicant
stated the neurologist could give a full report.  Applicant was given two weeks to provide any
additional information, to include a report of the neurologist’s findings.  No information was
received.  Applicant never considered obtaining a second opinion as to her mental state.  Although
concerned about the psychologist’s letter, Applicant did not have a problem with the
recommendation.
The Judge reached the following conclusions:  Since at least 2005, Applicant believes she
has been stalked 24 hours a day, seven days a week by persons unknown.  She could not be
dissuaded by any logical arguments to the contrary.  The clinical psychologist found Applicant’s
neuropsychological status was impaired, and it is unknown whether Applicant’s future judgment and
reliability could be ascertained or fully be determined without further medical and
neuropsychological evaluation.  Even though she was aware the clinical psychologist believed she
was delusional, she never considered obtaining a second opinion as to her mental state.  Applicant
meets none of the mitigating factors.  There is no favorable prognosis.  There is no recent opinion
that the condition is under control, is cured, is in remission or has a low probability of recurrence.
There is no indication the condition was temporary and that it has been resolved.  The record raises
unresolved questions and doubts about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.
Applicant asserts that the Judge committed numerous factual errors, and also takes issue with
some of the written statements made by the clinical psychologist that were entered into evidence.
Applicant argues that the Judge used past-tense terms “suffered from” and “had” when referring to
her condition, thus indicating that it was a one-time, past event and not a current cause for concern.
Applicant also states that she “expected more consideration to be given [by the Judge] for the whole-
person concept.”  Applicant also raised a matter of procedure.  She indicated that she was not
properly informed of the procedures, or what was expected of her, after her receipt of the clinical
psychologist’s report.  Applicant’s assertions do not establish error on the part of the Judge.  
Applicant claims the Judge erred in making numerous detailed findings of fact.  Many of
Applicant’s claims in this area are difficult to understand and she does not relate how the errors are
prejudicial to her case.  There is no presumption of error below.  The burden is on the appealing
party to establish harmful error on the part of the Judge.  To the extent that the Board cannot
understand Applicant’s assertions of fact-finding error, or cannot determine how the errors undercut
the Judge’s conclusions in the case, the Applicant has not met her burden.  In those instances where
the Board can ascertain the claims of fact-finding error and the alleged consequences of those
claims,  we note that most of the assertions of error involve minor date discrepancies and minute
details surrounding various episodes of perceived stalking, perceived hostility, and interactions
between Applicant and the clinical psychologist.  After a review of the record and the Judge’s
decision, the Board concludes that any factual errors made by the Judge were harmless in nature.
Applicant contests the factual accuracy of assertions made in several of the documents
admitted into evidence, primarily the clinical psychologist’s report.  A party’s disagreement with
the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the
evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions
in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at
3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).  Here, Applicant is merely repeating arguments concerning the nature
of the evidence that were made below, rather than making claims of error on the part of the Judge.
Applicant notes that the Judge used the past tense in several instances when referring to her
diagnosed condition (“had” as opposed to “has” and “suffered from” as opposed to “suffers from”).
She claims this supports her assertion that the condition was a one-time, past event that is no longer
of security significance.  The Board does not review sentences or passages in a Judge’s decision in
1As pointed out by Department Counsel, Applicant was appropriately provided with specific, post-examination
recommendations from the DOD clinical psychologist that were medically based.  Also, the Judge left the record open
for two weeks post-hearing to allow Applicant to submit purported matters in mitigation from a neurologist she was
seeing at the recommendation of the clinical psychologist.  No additional matters were submitted by Applicant.   
isolation, but rather will look to the whole of the Judge’s decision to determine the meaning of a
particular portion of that decision.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-33144 at 6 (App. Bd. Sep. 7, 2004).
After a review of the Judge’s whole decision, it is clear that the Judge found that Applicant’s
condition is ongoing and there are no current prospects for addressing it.  These findings are
reasonably supported by the record evidence.  Applicant has not established error.      
Applicant states that she “expected more” from the Judge’s whole-person analysis, but does
not elaborate.  After a review of the Judge’s decision, the Board is satisfied that he gave appropriate
consideration to the various “whole-person” factors and the framework for analysis contained
therein.
Applicant raises some arguments relating to procedure, stating that DOHA did not properly
inform her of procedures or what was expected of her after the clinical psychologist submitted her
report, and that she expected “something different” from DOHA–although she does not clearly
indicate what.  Although not a model of clarity, other comments by Applicant in this portion of her
brief seem to indicate that she is commenting on a lack of direction on the part of DOHA regarding
what to do medically after the submission of the psychologist’s report.  DOHA adjudicates security
clearance eligibility.  Notwithstanding the fact that the clinical psychologist conducted her
evaluation of Applicant’s mental condition at the request of the Department of Defense, DOHA
would not be in a position to get involved in any post-report medical treatment of Applicant, nor
could it properly comment upon, or interject itself into, the ongoing treatment or recommendations
of medical personnel.  Thus, DOHA breached no duty to Applicant regarding instructions as to her
ongoing medical care.  Applicant has not established that her due process rights were violated.1
   In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant
conditions and factors.  He discussed the applicability of the mitigating factors listed under
Guideline I, and indicated why the mitigating conditions did not apply.  Critical to the Judge’s
ultimate determination in this case was his conclusions that, at the time of the hearing, nothing
meaningful was being done to address Applicant’s diagnosed condition.  This led to the Judge’s
conclusion that there were significant doubts about her eligibility and suitability for a security
clearance.  These conclusions are reasonably supported by the record evidence.
The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).  After reviewing the record, the Board
concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for
his decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general
standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the
Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett      
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin        
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields     
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
/2011