Consisting of the transcript (Tr.), Government exhibits (GE) 1-16 and Applicant exhibits (AE) A-O.1
DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February2
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG)
effective within the DoD on 1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-06943
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: David F. Hayes, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  Applicant’s clearance is denied.1
On 24 March 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) raising security concerns under Guidelines F,
Financial Considerations and E, Personal Conduct.  Applicant timely answered the2
SOR, requesting a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 3 June 2011, and I
convened a hearing 21 July 2011. DOHA received the transcript 29 July 2011.
 
He was also charged with violating his probation, but the charge was later dismissed (SOR 1.q.)3
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations, except for SOR 1.f—a $252 judgment
that he claimed, without corroboration, to have paid. He is a 46-year-old team lead
employed by a defense contractor since July 2009. From January 2007 to July 2009, he
was unemployed after resigning from his Government employment as a security
specialist. He has not previously held an industrial clearance, but held a clearance from
May 2000 to October 2006 when he was employed as a security specialist by the
Government. He also held a clearance while in the military from November 1990 to
August 1998. He received an honorable discharge (AE F).
Applicant has an extensive history of financial problems dating back to 1996
when he was in the U.S. military. His financial problems have been marked by
numerous delinquent accounts, several administrative actions by employers, and two
crimes.
In May 1996, Applicant was counseled by the military for writing non-sufficient
fund checks (1.m). In August 1996, he was counseled by the military for using his
Government credit card for personal expenses (1.n). Later in August 1996, he was
reprimanded by the military for using his Government credit card for personal expenses
and exceeding his credit limit. His account was temporarily suspended (1.o). 
In November 1998, Applicant was charged with robbery and several other
crimes, and was later convicted in March 1999 of theft, robbery, and second degree
assault. Two of the three offenses of which he was convicted were felonies, as were two
of the three remaining charges, which were nolle prossed. He was sentenced to one
year in jail, suspended, and placed on a year’s probation. He also paid $3,000
restitution and completed 300 hours of community service (1.p).3
After leaving the military in August 1998, Applicant became a civilian employee of
the Government, in November 2005, Applicant was charged with theft of Government
funds when he was caught on closed-circuit television taking cash from the coffee
mess. He was placed in pretrial diversion, completed the requirements of the diversion
program, and the charge was dismissed (1.r). In November 2005, his Government credit
card—which had been used for non-travel-related expenses—was suspended for
nonpayment. The misconduct evidenced in 1.r and 1.s caused his clearance to be
revoked in October 2006 (2.f). The clearance revocation effectively caused his voluntary
resignation from Government employment in January 2007 (AE I).
In an October 2001 clearance application, Applicant deliberately omitted any
reference to the November 1998 felony charges (2.b and 2.c). In May 2002, he falsely
swore a statement about the circumstances of the 1998 charges (2.d). In November
2005, he deliberately misstated the circumstances of the November 2005 criminal
charges to criminal investigators for the Government (2.e).
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).4
3
Besides the misconduct cited above, the SOR alleges, and Government exhibits
confirm, 12 delinquent debts totaling over $24,000; he admits 11 debts totaling nearly
that much. The delinquent accounts consist of eight collection accounts, two judgments
(one of which was being paid by garnishment), one charged-off account, and one 180
days past-due account).
 Applicant attributes his financial problems to his January 2007-July 2009
unemployment. His current employment does not pay enough for him to begin to
address his debts. He had been making nearly $70,000 per year in his Government job.
He made just over $12,000 in 2010 (AE J).
His character references (AE A-E) consider him honest and trustworthy.
However, none of them appears to be aware of the SOR allegations.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guidelines are Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and
Guideline E (Personal Conduct).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does,
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, applicant bears a heavy burden of
persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the Government.4
¶ 19.(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; (c) a history of not meeting financial obligations; . . . (e)5
consistent spending beyond one’s means, which may be indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant
negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis;
¶ 20 (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that6
it is  unlikely to recur . . . 
¶ 20.(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control . . . and7
the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
¶ 20.(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications8
that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
¶ 20.(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.9
¶ 16.(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel10
security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, . . . [or]
determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness. . .;
4
Analysis
The Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline F, and
Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns. Applicant’s debts go back several
years, and he currently lacks the means to address them.5
Applicant meets none of the mitigating factors for financial considerations. His
financial difficulties are both recent and multiple.  Applicant’s January 2007-July 20096
unemployment was effectively the result of his misconduct in November 2005. And
while Applicant characterizes his financial problems as emanating from his
unemployment, the misconduct that got his clearance revoked demonstrated that he
was having financial problems before he lost his clearance and had to resign from his
Government job. His Government credit card was suspended for nonpayment and using
the card for unauthorized purchases—something he had been counseled for while in
the military. He has not acted responsibly in addressing his debts.  He has received no7
credit or financial counseling, nor has he demonstrated that his financial problems are
under control, or that he has a plan to bring them under control.  He has not made a8
good-faith effort to satisfy his debts.  I conclude Guideline F against Applicant.9
The Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline E, and
Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns. Applicants are expected to give full and
frank answers during the clearance process. Although Applicant disclosed that he had
financial problems, he failed to report his 1998 felonies on his October 2001 clearance
application, and provided false and misleading information during subject interviews in
May 2002 and November 2005. This conduct constitutes a deliberate omission or
evasiveness inconsistent with the candor required of applicants.  10
None of the Guideline E mitigating conditions apply. The concealed information
was relevant to a clearance decision. Applicant did not disclose this adverse information
¶ 17(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification11
before being confronted with the facts;
5
until his subject interview, and then he provided misleading information.  Applicant’s11
failure to disclose this information demonstrates a lack of candor required of cleared
personnel, particularly with his background as a Government security specialist. The
Government has an interest in examining all relevant and material adverse information
about an applicant before making a clearance decision. The Government relies on
applicants to truthfully disclose that adverse information in a timely fashion, not when
they perceive disclosure to be prudent or convenient. Further, an applicant’s willingness
to report adverse information about himself provides some indication of his willingness
to report inadvertent security violations or other security concerns in the future,
something the Government relies on to perform damage assessments and limit the
compromise of classified information. Applicant’s conduct suggests he is willing to put
his personal needs ahead of legitimate Government interests. I resolve Guideline E
against Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-s: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-f: Against Applicant
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance denied.
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge