KEYWORD: Guideline B
DIGEST: Evidence of Applicant’s connections to Russia and Pakistan were significant. 
Additionally, while holding a security clearance, Applicant traveled to Russia to meet women he
had discovered on the internet.  Applicant’s evidence was not sufficient to mitigate the
heightened risk of foreign exploitation.  Favorable decision reversed.
CASE NO: 10-07436.a1
DATE: 10/19/2011
DATE: October 19, 2011
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 10-07436
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Melvin A. Howry, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On October 29, 2010, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On July 27, 2011, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Wilford H. Ross
granted Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Department Counsel appealed pursuant to
Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
1The SOR alleged the following: “a. Your spouse is a citizen of Russia residing in the United States.  b. Your
father-in-law, mother-in-law and step-daughter are citizens and residents of Russia.  c. Your mother, brother, and sister
are citizens and residents of Pakistan. d. You traveled to Russia on approximately ten occasions to meet Russian women
you met on the Internet [in the mid-2000s] while holding a DoD security clearance.  e. You traveled to Pakistan at least
six times [in the mid-2000s].”   
2Compare with Government Exhibit (GE)  2, Interrogatories, which includes a summary of Applicant’s security
clearance interview.  Applicant certified the accuracy of the summary.  At page 3, the summary states that Applicant’s
current wife has weekly telephone contact with her family.  Department Counsel persuasively argues that neither the
record as a whole nor the transcript page cited by the Judge support the finding regarding the frequency of Applicant’s
wife’s contact with her family.  
3The interview summary included in GE 2 states that, in addition to meeting Russian women during his trips,
on one occasion he also met a woman who had traveled from Turkey.  He could not recall her name.  He could not recall
the names of four other of his dates.    
Department Counsel raised the following issues on appeal: whether the Judge’s treatment
of the pertinent mitigating conditions was erroneous and whether the Judge’s whole-person analysis
was erroneous.  Consistent with the following, we reverse the Judge’s decision. 
Facts 
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant is seeking a security
clearance in connection with his employment by a Defense contractor.  He admitted the allegations
in the SOR.1  
Applicant is a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan.  His wife is a Russian citizen who
lives with him in the U.S.  She has submitted her application to become a U.S. citizen.  Applicant’s
wife has a daughter who lives in Russia with the wife’s parents, who are Russian citizens.
Applicant’s wife speaks to her mother occasionally by telephone.2
Applicant traveled to Russia between 2003 and 2005.  He was employed by a Defense
contractor at the time.  He complied with security requirements while making these trips.  The
purpose of the trips was to meet in person Russian women with whom he had developed
relationships over the internet.3 
Applicant has lived in the U.S. since the late 1960s.  He became a U.S. citizen in the late
1970s.  He has held a security clearance since the late 1970s without incident.
Applicant has a sibling who lives in Pakistan and with whom he has no contact.  His
remaining siblings are U.S. citizens living in this country.  Applicant has visited Pakistan six times
between the early and mid-2000s.  The main reason for these trips was to divorce a prior Pakistani
wife and to visit his mother, since deceased.  He also had a brother who lived in that country, but
he also is deceased.  
4See ISCR Case No. 07-17673 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Apr. 2, 2009)(“There is a rational connection between an
applicant’s family ties in a country whose interests are adverse to the United States and the risk that the applicant might
fail to protect and safeguard classified information”).  
5Administrative Notice documents discuss the operations of al-Qa’ida and the Taliban within Pakistan. 
  
Russia has a poor human rights record.  It has a significant intelligence capacity retained
from the Soviet Union and an aggressive industrial espionage and intelligence collection program
targeting the U.S.  It sells technology that can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction.  It
has sold such technology to China, Venezuela, India, and Iran against the wishes of the U.S.4  Russia
has invaded neighboring Georgia and is facing continuing rebellion in Chechnya.  Pakistan is an ally
of the U.S. in the war on terror.  Nevertheless, terrorist organizations operate within its borders.
Pakistan has a poor human rights record.5
Discussion
Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong
presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance.  See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).  After the Government presents
evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those
concerns.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  In rendering a final decision, an “agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for” the decision, “including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United
States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  The standard applicable in security clearance
decisions “is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  “Any doubt
concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor
of the national security.”  Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b).
In deciding whether the Judge's rulings or conclusions are erroneous, the Board will review
the Judge's decision to determine whether: it does not examine relevant evidence; it fails to articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its conclusions, including a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made; it does not consider relevant factors; it reflects a clear error of judgment;
it fails to consider an important aspect of the case; it offers an explanation for the decision that runs
contrary to the record evidence; or it is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a mere difference
of opinion.  See ISCR Case No. 03-22861 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Jun. 2, 2006). 
The security concern under Guideline B is as follows:  
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties . . .  may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.  Adjudication under this guideline can
6“In Foreign Influence cases, the nature of the foreign government involved, the intelligence gathering history
of that government, and the presence of terrorist activity are important considerations that provide context for the other
record evidence and must be brought to bear upon the Judge’s ultimate conclusions in the case.” 
7“One of the [Internet] sites when you went to Russia, somebody got some money from you and then you didn’t
get it back . . . I never met that lady and she just wanted to meet me, you know, and got $200 and that’s it . . . I did not
educate myself about Russia . . . There are people who will pose as woman and get money to meet you and then they
really aren’t a candidate at all[.]” Tr. at 84.  
and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact
or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as
whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain
protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.  Directive,
Enclosure 2 ¶ 6.  
The Directive requires a Judge to evaluate a Guideline B case in light of the geopolitical
situation in the pertinent country as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant.  Department
Counsel cites to documents and evidence in the record which, he contends, are not consistent with
the Judge’s favorable decision.  Although the Judge made findings about the geopolitical conditions
regarding Russia and Pakistan, we note other matters in the Official Notice documents which have
a significant bearing upon the proper outcome of the case.  For example, tensions between the U.S.
and Russia have increased in the past years, resulting in “ever-growing discord.”  Congressional
Research Service, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, January 29,
2010, at 24.  Moreover,
[l]aw enforcement agencies have legal access to telephone, including cellular
company clients’ personal information and require providers to grant the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service 24-hour remote access to their
client databases.  U.S. Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report: Russia,
March 11, 2010, at 12.  
We note the Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated
March 10, 2009, at p. 3, that “Russia remains the most capable cyber-threat to the U.S.”  We also
note the Judge’s findings concerning terrorist activity in Pakistan.  See ISCR Case No. 05-03250 at
4 (App. Bd. Apr. 6, 2007).6  Department Counsel persuasively argues that the Judge did not bring
the full scope of Russia’s and Pakistan’s problematic relationships with the U.S. to bear in his
analysis of Applicant’s security significant conduct.       
 In addition to Official Notice materials concerning Russia and Pakistan, the record contains
evidence of Applicant’s personal circumstances, those regarding his family and those regarding his
own foreign travels.  Department Counsel notes evidence and SOR admissions that Applicant had
traveled to Russia on numerous occasions to meet women he had first discovered through the
Internet, on one occasion being defrauded out of $200.7  This suggests the relative ease with which
Internet itself can become a means of exploitation.  In any event, compare Applicant’s
circumstances with those described in ISCR Case No. 09-06831 (App. Bd. Mar. 8, 2011), in which
8“As a matter of common sense and human experience, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties
of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of the person’s spouse.”
9Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 7(a): “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend,
or other person who is a citizen or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion[.]”  
10Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 7(b): “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information[.]”  
11Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 7(d): “sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless or citizenship
status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion[.]” 
 
the applicant’s security significant conduct included the use of international dating services and
frequent trips to Russia to meet women he had discovered thereby.   
    
Applicant’s personal circumstances, as described in the record, are such as to cast doubt upon
the Judge’s conclusion that Applicant had demonstrated mitigation.  Department Counsel notes that
Applicant traveled to meet the woman who became his sixth, and current, wife on the impression
that she was unmarried, learning otherwise during his visit.  Evidence of foreign travel and of social
interaction with foreign persons may be of limited significance, considered in and of itself.
However, in Applicant’s case, evidence of his meeting foreigners over the internet and engaging in
foreign travel in order to further his relationships with them, all while holding a security clearance,
viewed cumulatively, supports Department Counsel’s argument that Applicant’s personal interests
may conflict with the protection of national security.  Department Counsel also points to evidence
that Applicant’s in-laws reside in Russia, thereby constituting a possible avenue through which he
could be subjected to coercion.  See ISCR Case No. 03-26176 at 5 (App. Bd. Oct. 14, 2005).8
The gravamen of Department Counsel’s appeal argument is that the Judge failed properly
to analyze the record evidence in accordance with the criteria set forth in the Directive.  Given the
Judge’s findings and the evidence cited above, we are persuaded by Department Counsel’s argument
that the Judge erred in his mitigation analysis.  The Judge concluded that three disqualifying
conditions applied to Applicant’s case–7(a),9 7(b),10 and 7(d).11  Department Counsel’s argument
focuses on the extent to which the record as a whole is not sufficient to mitigate the security
concerns addressed by 7(a) and (d).  That is, the Judge concluded that Applicant’s family and
personal connections within Russia and Pakistan, and his sharing living quarters with his Russian
wife, entail a “heightened risk” of foreign exploitation, etc.  Department Counsel argues that
Applicant has not met his burden of persuasion that it is unlikely that he would be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of his foreign connections and the interests of the
U.S.  He contends that the Judge failed adequately to explain his conclusion that Applicant’s ties to
his foreign relatives were relatively minimal.  See, e.g.,  ISCR Case No. 03-26176, supra.
Moreover, although Applicant stated that his contacts with his stepdaughter are not significant, due
to the language barrier, there is nothing in the record to suggest that his wife’s, or his, concern for
12“Q: Now, you had to apply to the Russian Embassy to get a Visa to go there, right?  A: Oh, yeah.  Every time,
and they really are very tight about that.  Q: Okay. So, [they] pretty much know that you’re an American going there?
A: They very much knew from the embassy point of view, but once I landed there, nobody knew.  It’s really the embassy
and official knows about it.”  Tr. at 83.
13Department Counsel asks us to restrict application of Mitigating Condition 8(b) to mitigation of Disqualifying
Condition 7(b).  We do not believe that such a restriction is appropriate.  8(b) states 
there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest[.] Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 8(b).
  Although there is some correspondence to 7(b), the question of conflict of interest touches on several disqualifying
conditions.
her welfare is equally insignificant.  The evidence does not support a conclusion that Applicant has
rebutted the presumption that he has ties of obligation or affection to his foreign in-laws and
stepdaughter.  When these connections are viewed alongside evidence that (1) Applicant’s wife is
a Russian citizen living with him in the U.S. and frequently telephones her family abroad and (2)
he has taken frequent trips to Russia and Pakistan, it is reasonable to believe that these connections
could become “a means through which Applicant might come to the attention”12 of foreign
authorities or organizations bent on acquiring U.S. classified information.  ISCR Case No. 08-03798
at 2 (App. Bd. Jan. 21, 2010).  There is little in the Judge’s conclusory analysis of Applicant’s ties
with the U.S. and abroad to support his ultimate finding that Applicant had mitigated the
“heightened risk” of foreign exploitation which he found to have been raised in this case, either
under the mitigating conditions or through a whole-person analysis.13   
  To sum up, the record contains evidence and admissions of the following: (1) Applicant has
a sibling who is a citizen and resident of Pakistan; (2) while holding a security clearance, he has
traveled to Russia and Pakistan numerous times during the early 2000s; (3) while holding a security
clearance, he has used the Internet to find foreign women and then has traveled to meet them under
circumstances that may conflict with the protection of national security; (4) Applicant’s wife, who
lives with him, is a citizen of Russia; (5) her parents and daughter are citizens and residents of
Russia; (6) Applicant’s wife speaks to her Russian family members by telephone on a weekly basis;
(7) Russia monitors Internet, e-mail, and telephone communications; (8) Russia is an avid collector
of U.S. protected information; (9) Russia and the U.S. are experiencing discord in their relations;
and (10) terrorist organizations, including al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, operate from within Pakistan.
Taken cumulatively, this evidence is not consistent with the Judge’s favorable decision.  The Judge’s
decision runs counter to the weight of the record evidence.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 03-22861,
supra.  Accordingly, the decision is not sustainable.     
Order
The Judge’s favorable security clearance decision is REVERSED.  
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan          
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin                
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board