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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Redacted] )  ISCR Case No. 11-00281 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines J (Criminal 
Conduct) and E (Personal Conduct). Eligibility for access to classified information is 
denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on May 17, 2010. On May 
25, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent her a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny her application, 
citing security concerns under Guidelines J and E. DOHA acted under Executive Order 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960); 
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the Department of Defense on September 
1, 2006.  
 
 Applicant received the SOR on June 9, 2011; answered it on June 13, 2011; and 
requested a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA received the request on 
 
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June 16, 2011. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on July 20, 2011, and the 
case was assigned to me on July 25, 2011. Department Counsel amended the SOR on 
July 27, 2011, and Applicant responded to the amendment on August 10, 2011. DOHA 
issued a notice of hearing on August 17, 2011, scheduling it for September 8, 2011. I 
convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 7 were 
admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified, presented the testimony of 
one witness, and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through D, which were admitted 
without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on September 16, 2011. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In her answers to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the allegations, including those 
in the amendment. Her admissions in her answers and at the hearing are incorporated 
in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 30-year-old employee of a federal contractor. She has worked for 
her current employer since January 2010. She joined the U.S. Air Force after graduating 
from high school, and she served on active duty from October 1999 until September 
2008. She obtained an associate’s degree while in the Air Force. She held a security 
clearance during most of her service in the Air Force, and she continued to hold a 
clearance while employed by a federal contractor. (Tr. 9.) 
 
 Applicant received the Air Force Achievement Medal in 2002 and again in 2003. 
(AX B at 1-2.) She was selected as Airman of the Month in August 2002 and Airman of 
the Quarter in July 2003. (AX B at 7-8.)  
 
In November 2003, Applicant received a letter of reprimand for violating a 
regulation prohibiting pellet guns and for insubordination to a security policeman. The 
incident arose when she and several friends were in costumes for a party, and she 
carried the pellet gun as part of her costume. She claimed she did not know that 
possession of pellet guns was prohibited. She and the security policeman were both 
senior airmen (pay grade E-4). She testified that she did not understand that he was in 
a position of superior authority even though they both held the same military rank. 
According to Applicant, the alleged insubordination was based on a remark she made to 
one of her friends, describing what was happening in profane terms. (Tr. 50-51.) She 
testified that “by nature” she will argue if she believes she is right. She admitted arguing 
with the security policeman, saying, “I don’t understand why you are in my face about 
it,” telling him he was wrong, and accusing him of lying. (Tr. 76-78.)  
 
 Notwithstanding the incident involving the pellet gun, Applicant was later 
promoted to staff sergeant. She received her third Air Force Achievement Medal in 
March 2006, and she was selected as Noncommissioned Officer of the Quarter for the 
period from July 1 through September 30, 2006. (AX B at 3-5.) 
 
 Applicant never married, but while in the Air Force she became involved with 
another airman in the same squadron. Applicant became pregnant, and she decided to 
 
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try to establish a family life for their child. They had a daughter in December 2006. They 
bought a home and lived together for about a year and a half. Applicant’s cohabitant 
was physically and emotionally abusive, and their relationship was tumultuous. (Tr. 35.) 
The police were summoned to their home four times prior to August 2007. (Tr. 64.) On 
one occasion during this time, a noncommissioned officer observed Applicant with a 
large bruise on the side of her face. She reported her observation to Applicant’s first 
sergeant, who brushed it off, saying that Applicant and her cohabitant were just a young 
couple trying to work out their problems. (Tr. 56.) 
 
On August 11, 2007, Applicant went to a club, leaving her daughter with her 
cohabitant. When she returned home, they were both gone. She contacted her 
cohabitant, who would not tell her who had their daughter. Her cohabitant came home 
briefly and left again. Applicant followed him in her car, but her cohabitant blocked her 
with his truck. During the ensuing argument, Applicant was punched several times and 
she bumped her cohabitant with her car but did not injure him. (Tr. 37-38, 66-68; GX 2 
at 12.) 
 
Applicant returned home, called her first sergeant, and asked him to come to the 
house, because she believed her cohabitant had a firearm with him. She waited outside 
for her first sergeant, holding two kitchen knives. When her cohabitant returned before 
the first sergeant arrived, she brandished the knives and told her cohabitant to stay 
away. He attempted to punch her, and he kicked her in the abdomen. While he was 
kicking at her, she slashed at him and stabbed him in the leg. She was charged with 
felonious assault and released on her own recognizance. (Tr. 35-37; GX 2 at 7, 12-13.) 
 
 Applicant’s cohabitant was on crutches after the stabbing, and he told coworkers 
in the unit that Applicant was crazy and had tried to kill him. According to a senior 
noncommissioned officer, the relationship between Applicant and her cohabitant was a 
“big joke” among the airmen in the building where they both worked. (Tr. 88.)  
 
On September 18, 2007, Applicant’s cohabitant obtained a civilian protective 
order against her. At about the same time, Applicant was ordered by her military 
superior to have no contact with her cohabitant. (Tr. 39-40; GX 2 at 13.) 
 
 In late October 2007, Applicant’s cohabitant invited her to return to their home, 
telling her that the protective order had been lifted. About two weeks later, they had 
another argument, Applicant left the house, and her cohabitant reported to the police 
that she had violated the protective order. (Tr. 40; GX 2 at 13.) On the following day, her 
cohabitant threatened to kill her, and she decided to terminate the relationship. (Tr. 41.) 
 
 On November 30, 2007, Applicant attempted to attend a farewell party for one of 
her subordinate airmen. Her cohabitant was at the party. She was stopped by a senior 
noncommissioned officer and a captain from the squadron, who informed her that she 
was not permitted to attend the party. She testified that she was emotionally distraught 
and “felt like everything was kind of falling down and crumbling down on [her],” and she 
felt “literally backed into a corner.” (Tr. 43.) She responded by directing vulgar and 
 
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profane language at the captain. On December 21, 2007, she received nonjudicial 
punishment from her squadron commander for disobeying the no-contact order on 
multiple occasions and disrespect to a superior commissioned officer. She was reduced 
from staff sergeant to senior airman and reprimanded. She appealed the punishment, 
and her appeal was denied. (GX 7.) 
 
 In March 2008, Applicant was tried in a civilian court for the stabbing incident in 
August 2007. The charge was reduced to assault and battery, a misdemeanor. She 
pleaded not guilty; but she was convicted and given a suspended sentence to 12 
months in jail, fined $250, and placed on unsupervised probation for two years. (GX 5.) 
Her security clearance was suspended but later reinstated. (Tr. 96-100)  
 
 In July 2008, Applicant was tried in a civilian court for violating the protective 
order. She pleaded not guilty; but she was convicted, sentenced to ten days in jail with 
nine days suspended, and placed on unsupervised probation for one year. (GX 4.) 
 
 In September 2008, Applicant was discharged from the Air Force with a general 
discharge under honorable conditions. (GX 1 at 32-33.) She petitioned the Air Force 
Discharge Review Board to review her case, and her discharge was upgraded to an 
honorable discharge in September 2010. (AX A.) 
 
 Based on a complaint from her former cohabitant, Applicant was charged with 
forgery of a public document in April 2009. Her former cohabitant alleged that she 
forged the signature on a custody visitation order involving their daughter. She denied 
forging any documents. The charges were disposed of by nolle prosequi in June 2009 
after her cohabitant failed to appear in court. (Tr. 78; GX 3.) 
 
 Applicant’s cohabitant initially had sole custody of their daughter, now four years 
old. Applicant recently obtained joint custody. Each parent picks up the child at her 
school on the day they transfer custody. Applicant testified her former cohabitant comes 
to the school before Applicant picks up her daughter and tries to provoke her. She 
recently obtained a protection order against her former cohabitant after he grabbed their 
daughter and shoved Applicant out of the way while they were exchanging custody. (Tr. 
59-63.)  
 
 An Air Force noncommissioned officer, who knew Applicant on active duty and 
who still associates with her, testified that Applicant’s daughter told her that her father 
said that Applicant tried to kill him, that Applicant hates her, and the her father is the 
only person who loves her and will take care of her. (Tr. 92.) Applicant testified that she 
has obtained counseling for her daughter to overcome the effects of her cohabitant’s 
comments. (Tr. 106-07.) 
 
Applicant was unemployed for about a month after her discharge from the Air 
Force. She was recruited by a former military colleague for a position with a federal 
contractor, and she was hired in October 2008. (Tr. 46-47.) Her former colleague and 
 
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she became coworkers, and he submitted a statement describing her as “fast learning, 
ambitious, trustworthy, and dedicated.” (AX C.)  
 
Applicant was fired in August 2009 because of disparities between the hours she 
recorded on her timecard and the hours she actually worked. (GX 6). The disparities 
were discovered during an audit of all timecards, triggered by widespread irregularities 
in reporting time and attendance. All employees with discrepancies on their timecards 
were fired. Applicant testified that the discrepancy occurred when she decided to take a 
day off but neglected to reflect on her time card that she had taken one day of vacation 
time. (Tr. 47.) 
 
Applicant found a new job shortly after being fired, and she worked for two other 
federal contractors until she began her current job. Her current supervisor submitted a 
statement on her behalf, stating that he has been impressed with her work ethic, her 
professionalism, and her ability to solve problems. Her supervisor has received 
compliments from numerous customers about her performance. She has been 
dependable and punctual, and she participates in volunteer activities as well as 
company functions. (AX D.) 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified 
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation 
about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. 
 
 
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Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 
01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct 
 
 The SOR alleges that Applicant was charged with forgery, a felony, in April 2009, 
and the charge was disposed of by nolle prosequi (SOR ¶ 1.a). It also alleges that she 
was charged with violating a protective order, a misdemeanor, in June 2008; was 
convicted; and was sentenced to 10 days in jail (with 9 days suspended), fined, and 
placed on unsupervised probation for 12 months (SOR ¶ 1.b). Finally, it alleges that she 
was charged with felonious assault in August 2007; convicted of assault and battery, a 
misdemeanor; and sentenced to 12 months in jail (suspended), fined, and placed on 
unsupervised probation for two years. The allegations are established by Applicant’s 
admissions, which are corroborated by the documentary evidence presented by 
Department Counsel. 
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 30: “Criminal activity creates 
doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it 
calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and 
regulations.” Disqualifying conditions under this guideline include “a single serious crime 
 
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or multiple lesser offenses” and “allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless 
of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted, or convicted.” AG ¶¶ 
31(a) and (c). Both disqualifying conditions are established by Applicant’s criminal 
record. 
 
Three mitigating conditions under this guideline are relevant:  
 
AG ¶ 32(a): so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior 
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
AG ¶ 32(c): evidence that the person did not commit the offense; and 
AG ¶ 32(d): there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not 
limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, 
remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment 
record, or constructive community involvement. 
The first prong of AG ¶ 32(a) focuses on whether the criminal conduct was 
recent. There are no Abright line@ rules for determining when conduct is Arecent.@ The 
determination must be based on a careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence. See 
ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). If the evidence shows Aa 
significant period of time has passed without any evidence of misconduct,@ then an 
administrative judge must determine whether that period of time demonstrates Achanged 
circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of reform or rehabilitation.@ Id. In 
this regard, the first prong of AG ¶ 32(a) overlaps AG ¶ 32(d). 
 
Applicant’s last arrest was in April 2009 for a forgery of a public document, 
alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a to have occurred in January 2009. The evidence regarding this 
incident is sparse, and it appears to have been an unfounded charge based on a 
vindictive act by her former cohabitant. Accordingly, I have resolved SOR ¶ 1.a for 
Applicant. For the purposes of my analysis, I will treat Applicant’s violation of a 
protective order in October 2007 as her last criminal arrest by civilian authorities.  
 
Applicant’s disobedience and disrespect to a superior commissioned officer in 
November 2007 was not alleged under Guideline J, even though it involved criminal 
conduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I have considered it for the limited 
purpose of determining whether she has demonstrated successful rehabilitation under 
AG ¶ 32(d). See ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006) 
 
 Almost four years have elapsed since Applicant’s disobedience and disrespectful 
conduct. While she was in the Air Force, she probably did not receive the command 
support she deserved regarding the abusive behavior of her cohabitant, but she went 
back to him after the stabbing incident and repeatedly violated a no-contact order. She 
has since terminated her relationship with her former cohabitant, who was a contributing 
 
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cause to much of her misconduct, but he still influences her behavior. He has joint 
custody of their daughter, and he repeatedly contrives opportunities for face-to-face 
meetings with her.  
 
Applicant’s first civilian employment after leaving the Air Force ended with her 
termination for cause two years ago. Her current supervisor has high regard for her, but 
she has been under pressure to retain her clearance for most of the time she has 
worked for him.  
 
Although Applicant is intelligent, capable, and has learned from her past 
experience, she has a long record of insubordination and rules violations. She admitted 
at the hearing that she still is a person who “by nature” does not avoid confrontation if 
she believes she is right.  
 
After considering all the above circumstances, I am not satisfied that the first 
prong of AG ¶ 32(a) is established. The second prong of AG ¶ 32(a) also is not 
established, because her former cohabitant still influences her behavior. I conclude that 
neither AG ¶ 32(a) nor AG ¶ 32(d) are established.  
 
The evidence concerning the alleged forgery of a public document is sparse. I 
am satisfied that the charge was unfounded. Thus, I conclude that AG ¶ 32(c) is 
established for the forgery alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a. 
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
 The SOR cross-alleges the Guideline J conduct in SOR ¶ 2.a. It addition, it 
alleges that Applicant was fired in August 2009 for improper use of a timecard (SOR ¶ 
2.b); involuntarily discharged from the U.S. Air Force in September 2008 for misconduct 
and given a general discharge under honorable conditions (SOR ¶ 2.c); reprimanded in 
November 2008 for illegally possessing a pellet gun and insubordination (SOR ¶ 2.d); 
and given nonjudicial punishment in December 2007 for disrespect to a superior 
commissioned officer and failure to obey an order (SOR ¶ 2.e). These allegations are 
established by Applicant’s admissions, which are corroborated by the documentary 
evidence presented by Department Counsel. 
 The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: “Conduct involving 
questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules 
and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and 
ability to protect classified information. . . .” The relevant disqualifying conditions under 
this guideline are: 
AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue 
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other 
single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a 
whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
 
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regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information; 
AG ¶ 16(d): credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered 
under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an 
adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available 
information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable 
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to 
comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that 
the person may not properly safeguard protected information. This 
includes but is not limited to consideration of . . . a pattern of dishonesty or 
rule violations; and  
AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's 
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress, such as . . . engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the 
person's personal, professional, or community standing.  
 Applicant’s two instances of insubordination, her violation of the no-contact order, 
her conviction of assault and battery, her conviction for violating a protective order, and 
her termination from employment for failing to report her absence from work on her time 
card are sufficient to establish AG ¶ 16(c) and (d). Her insubordination, disobedience, 
and civilian convictions also adversely affected her professional standing in the Air 
Force community, but they did not create vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress because they were matters of public record. Her termination from civilian 
employment was well-known to her former coworkers, but the reason for her termination 
made her vulnerable in subsequent civilian employment. Thus, I conclude that AG ¶ 
16(e) also is established. 
 SOR ¶ 2.c alleges the consequences of Applicant’s arrest for felonious assault 
and conviction of assault and battery, but it does not allege any conduct having 
independent security significance. As such, it duplicates SOR ¶¶ 1.c and 2.a. I will 
resolve it in Applicant’s favor. See ISCR Case No. 03-04704 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2005) 
at 3 (same debt alleged twice). 
 Security concerns raised by personal conduct may be mitigated if “the offense is 
so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened 
under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on 
the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. AG ¶ 17(c). For the 
reasons set out in the above discussion of AG ¶¶ 32(a) and (d), I conclude that this 
mitigating condition is not established.  
 Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated if “the individual 
has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or 
taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that 
caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is 
 
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unlikely to recur.” AG ¶ 17(d). Applicant has acknowledged most of her behavior and 
expressed remorse, but there is no evidence of counseling, and she is still subject to the 
influence of her former cohabitant, the contributing cause of most of the security 
concerns based on personal conduct. She admitted that she did not reflect her time off 
on her timecard, but she attempted to minimize her culpability by testifying that she only 
did it once and that she was swept up with others who had done it repeatedly. I 
conclude that AG ¶ 17(d) is not established. 
 
 Finally, security concerns may be mitigated if “the individual has taken positive 
steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.” AG ¶ 
17(e). For the reasons set out in the above discussion of AG ¶¶ 17(c) and (d), I 
conclude that this mitigating condition is not established.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my 
comments under Guidelines J and E in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors 
in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional 
comment. 
 
 Applicant is an intelligent, talented, articulate young adult. She was candid, 
sincere, and remorseful at the hearing. She entered the Air Force after high school. Her 
ability was recognized early in the Air Force, and she received awards and decorations 
for her service. She stumbled in November 2008, but she appeared to have recovered 
when she was promoted and received her third decoration for outstanding performance 
of duty. She held a security clearance for most of her Air Force service, even after her 
most recent civilian convictions.  
 
 Applicant’s life and her career deteriorated after she began her toxic relationship 
with her cohabitant and the father of her daughter. Because she and her former 
 
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cohabitant share custody of their daughter, she continues to be affected by her former 
cohabitant’s behavior. At the hearing, she reacted emotionally and tearfully when she 
talked about her former cohabitant, demonstrating the emotional impact her former 
cohabitant continues to have on her. (Tr. 39.)  
 
 Applicant’s problem with the timecards can be explained in part by her 
inexperience in the civilian world and the apparently lax atmosphere at her workplace, 
but her long military service should have prepared her to accurately and honestly 
account for absences from work. She was soft-spoken, controlled, and respectful at the 
hearing; but her track record reflects an aspect of her personality that can be volatile, 
irrational, and combative. Her successful appeal to the Air Force Discharge Review 
Board recognized her accomplishments while on active duty, but it did not overturn any 
of her criminal convictions or military disciplinary actions. 
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines J and 
E, evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, and mindful of my 
obligation to decide close cases in favor of national security, I conclude Applicant has 
not mitigated the security concerns based on criminal conduct and personal conduct. 
Accordingly, I conclude she has not carried her burden of showing that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to continue her eligibility for access to classified 
information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline J (Criminal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:     For Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 1.b-1.c:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a-2.b:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.c:     For Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.d:     Against Applicant 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to continue 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge