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 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
In the matter of: )
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 10-05755 
  )   
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances 
For Government: Alison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se
December 1, 2011 
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Decision 
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GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
Applicant has mitigated the Foreign Influence security concerns raised by his 
relatives in Iraq, Malaysia, and Tunisia and his property in Iraq. Eligibility for access to 
classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
On October 14, 2010, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) 
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective after September 1, 2006.
Applicant answered the SOR on October 27, 2010, and elected to have the case 
decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the 
Government’s written case on May 27, 2011. A complete copy of the file of relevant 
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material (FORM) was received by Applicant on July 16, 2011, which included nine 
exhibits (GE), marked GE 1 through GE 9 and administrative notice materials on Iraq, 
Tunisia, and Malaysia. Applicant was afforded a 30-day opportunity to file objections 
and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns. By August 
15, 2011, Applicant had not responded. The case was assigned to me on October 5, 
2011.
Findings of Fact
 Applicant is a 52-year-old employee of a government contractor. He was born in 
Iraq and immigrated to the United States over 30 years ago. He became a U.S. citizen 
in 1986. He attended college in the United States. and earned an associate’s degree in 
2001. He was hired as a linguist in 2004 and served in Iraq through 2009, when he was 
laid off pending the outcome of this security clearance adjudication. He is married and 
has five children, who are all citizens of the United States and reside in the United 
States. (GE 4; GE 5; GE 9.) 
 Applicant’s parents are both deceased. Applicant had seven siblings, including 
two brothers and five sisters. They are as follows. (GE 5; GE 9.) 
 Applicant’s youngest brother was captured and held captive by Iraqi militia in 
September 2006 due to his affiliation with the U.S. forces. Ultimately, his brother was 
executed. Applicant explained, “During the security decline [in Iraq]; my brother (God 
bless his soul) worked in support of the U.S. troops in Iraq from 2003 until his death in 
2006. His family, his wife and three kids have applied for the refugee program to come 
to the U.S.” His brother’s wife and children currently reside in Baghdad in a home 
formerly owned by Applicant’s father. When Applicant’s father passed on, each of his 
children inherited shares of the home. Applicant’s share was worth approximately 
$50,000. Applicant donated his share of the house in Baghdad to his deceased 
brother’s wife and children. (GEs 4-9.) 
 Applicant’s oldest brother is a citizen of Iraq, residing in the United States. He 
immigrated with his family to the United States as part of the Iraqi refugee program. 
Before immigrating to the United States, Applicant’s brother worked as a U.S. 
government contractor in Iraq. His wife, Applicant’s sister-in-law, was employed from 
1996 to 2002 as a draftsperson with the government of Iraq. (GE 6; GE 9.) 
 Two of Applicant’s sisters reside in Iraq. One is a homemaker and is married to a 
lawyer. The other is an art teacher who is married to another art teacher. Applicant had 
no contact with either of his sisters in Iraq from September 2006 through 2008. He did 
not contact his sisters during that period because he feared the militia may have wire-
tapped their phone lines and did not want to place them or their families in jeopardy. He 
now calls them, “once in a while.” (GE 6; GE 9.) 
 Of Applicant’s three remaining sisters: one sister is an Iraqi citizen, who resides 
in Malaysia; one is a citizen of Iraq residing in England; and one is a citizen of Iraq 
residing in the United States. All fled with their husbands to escape persecution under 
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Saddam Hussein and the subsequent violence in Iraq. The sister in Malaysia has 
refugee status there and Applicant has applied to bring her to the United States. (GE 4; 
GE 6; GE 9.) 
 Applicant has a cousin who is a citizen and resident in Iraq. He also has a friend 
who he was once close to, who is a citizen and resident in Iraq. Applicant has not 
spoken to either his cousin or friend, “for more than a year.” (GE 4.) 
 Applicant’s wife was born in Tunisia and is a naturalized U.S. citizen. She 
maintains dual citizenship with Tunisia. Her parents, Applicant’s mother-in-law and 
father-in-law, were both citizens and residents of Tunisia at the time of Applicant’s 
security interview. However, Applicant’s father-in-law passed away in August 2009. His 
mother-in-law now resides in the United States with one of her daughters. (GE 4; GE 6; 
GE 9.) 
Iraq
 In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition removed Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime 
from power. In March 2006, Iraq’s new government took office after being freely elected 
by the Iraqi people. However, terrorism committed by illegal armed groups receiving 
weapons and training from Iran continues to endanger the security and stability of Iraq. 
Foreign terrorists from North Africa and other Middle Eastern countries continue to flow 
into Iraq, predominantly through Syria. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) still possesses the means 
to launch high-profile attacks against Iraqi civilians and infrastructure. As a result, the 
Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens of the dangers inherent in traveling 
to Iraq and recommends against all but essential travel to the country given the 
dangerous security situation. Despite Iraqi Security Forces’ efforts, numerous insurgent 
groups remain active throughout Iraq. In addition, sectarian violence often occurs in 
Iraq. U.S. citizens in Iraq are at risk for kidnappings, with the most recent kidnapping of 
an American citizen reported in January 2010. Hostages are often killed.
Malaysia 
 The Department of State remains concerned about the possibility of terrorist 
attacks against U.S. citizens in Southeast Asia. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which has been 
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. Government, has a known 
presence in Malaysia and is linked to al-Qaeda. Another Foreign Terrorist Organization, 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), has kidnapped U.S. citizens in parts of Malaysia and retains 
capability to conduct operations in those regions. The group currently engages in 
kidnappings for ransom, bombings, assassinations, and extortion, and has ties to JI.
Tunisia
 In January 2011 the President of Tunisia fled the country after wide-spread 
protests. Tunisia then experienced a period of instability. Presidential elections were 
expected.
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Tunisia has open borders with its neighbors Algeria and Libya. Al-Qaida in the 
Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization by the U.S. Government, in present in North Africa. AQIM claimed 
responsibility for the kidnapping of two Austrian tourists on the Algerian-Tunisian border 
in 2008.
American citizens of Tunisian origin are expected to enter and exit Tunisia on 
their Tunisian passports. If a Tunisian-American succeeds in entering using a U.S. 
passport, he or she will still have to present a Tunisian passport to exit the country. 
Policies
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
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permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 The security concern for the Foreign Influence guideline is set out in AG ¶ 7: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 The guideline notes nine conditions that could raise security concerns under AG 
¶ 7. Four are potentially applicable in this case: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, or government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;  
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation. 
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 Applicant’s family members and friends are citizens of and/or reside in several 
foreign nations. Of Applicant’s six surviving siblings, two are U.S. residents, but still 
possess Iraqi citizenship, two are citizens of and reside in Iraq, one is an Iraqi citizen 
residing in Malaysia, and one is an Iraqi citizen residing in England. Applicant also has a 
mother-in-law who possesses Tunisian citizenship, although she resides in the U.S. 
Applicant’s father-in-law is now deceased. He has a cousin, and a friend, which also are 
citizens of and reside in Iraq. He inherited a share of his father’s house in Iraq.
The mere possession of close ties and property in a foreign country is not, as a 
matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, even if only one relative lives in 
a foreign country and an applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is 
sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in the 
compromise of classified information. A conflict of interest or a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion must be established.
In the instant case, there are heightened risks and potential conflicts of interest 
that could cause possible inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion of 
Applicant’s relatives or friends who are citizens of or reside in Iraq, Malaysia, and 
Tunisia. Each of these nations has active terrorist cells operating within or close to its 
borders. Kidnappings have been reported in each of these nations. The above 
disqualifying conditions apply.
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8, including: 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these people are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.; and 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. 
With respect to Applicant’s brother, sister, and mother-in-law, who now all reside 
in the United States, it is unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position of having to 
choose between the interests of a these relatives and the interests of the United States. 
The heightened risk relating to their citizenship is mitigated by their residency in the 
United States and their affiliations here. AG ¶ 8(a) applies to his relatives now in the 
United States. 
Applicant has experienced firsthand the conflict of having a relative kidnapped 
and held hostage in Iraq. His youngest brother, who was working for the United States 
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in Iraq, was taken hostage in 2006 and subsequently murdered by Iraqi militiamen. 
During this time, Applicant was working for the United States in Iraq, as an interpreter. 
Applicant’s deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States drove 
Applicant to continue his work with the United States, despite the known risks and the 
death of his brother. He has been a U.S. citizen since 1986. All of Applicant’s five 
children were born and raised in the United States. He no longer owns a share in his 
father’s home, after donating it to his deceased brother’s family. He still is in contact 
with his sisters, cousin, and friend in Iraq and his sister in Malaysia, but those contacts 
do not create a concern, given his loyalties and record of service from 2004 to 2009 in 
Iraq on behalf of the United States.1 Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest. AG ¶ 8(b) applies. 
Whole-Person Concept 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments 
under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were 
addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant’s 
foreign contacts are mitigated by Applicant’s actions. He has lost his youngest brother 
to Iraqi insurgents, yet he still has remained loyal to the United States and wishes to 
serve his country overseas.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions and doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant has mitigated the Foreign Influence security concern.
                                                          
1 ISCR Case No. 04-12363 (App. Bd. Jul. 14, 2006); ISCR Case No. 07-00034 (App. Bd. Feb. 5, 2008). 
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Formal Findings 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraph 1.a.:   For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:   For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c.:   For Applicant  
Subparagraph 1.d.:   For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.e.:   For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.f.:   For Applicant 
Conclusion
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge