1
                                                                     
                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-00579
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Alison O’Connell, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant is a dual U.S. and Liberian citizen. He recently renewed his Liberian
passport, and is unwilling to destroy it because he wants to be able to demonstrate that
citizenship in connection with administering the estate of his mother who is a resident
citizen there. He surrendered possession to his security officer, but recovered it when
he was laid off. His cousin, who was raised by his mother, is a high-ranking official in
the Liberian government. The evidence is insufficient to mitigate resulting security
concerns. Based upon a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, eligibility for
access to classified information is denied. 
Statement of the Case
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on August 24, 2010. On May
6, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guidelines C (Foreign
Preference), and B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
GE 1; HE II. See ISCR Case No. 05-04831 (App. Bd. Nov. 29, 2006.)1
GE 2.2
Tr. 63-64.3
2
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information,
effective within the Department of Defense after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on May 16, 2011. He answered the
SOR in writing (AR) on June 4, 2011, and requested a hearing before an administrative
judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on July 22, 2011, and the case
was assigned to me on August 1, 2011. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on August 3,
2011, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on September 13, 2011. The
Government offered exhibits (GE) 1 and 2, which were admitted without objection.
Department Counsel also requested administrative notice of certain facts concerning
Liberia as set forth in Hearing Exhibit (HE) I, and supported by Government publications
submitted as Administrative Notice (AN) exhibits I through IV. After some discussion,
Applicant agreed to the truth of these facts, of which I took administrative notice.
Pertinent facts are set forth below. Applicant offered exhibits (AE) A through D, which
were also admitted without objection, and testified on his own behalf. I granted
Applicant’s request to leave the record open until September 27, 2011, for submission
of additional evidence. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on September
22, 2011. Applicant timely submitted additional evidence, which was marked AE E and
AE F, and admitted without objection. Department Counsel’s motion to request
consideration of this evidence and my ruling admitting it are marked HE II.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 51-year-old former employee of a defense contractor, where he
began working in May 2010, and was laid off when funding for his project ended on
September 23, 2011. In an e-mail dated September 26, 2011, Applicant expressed his
desire to continue the process of determining his eligibility for a security clearance for
purposes of future employment. Pursuant to Directive ¶ 4.4, the determination of his
eligibility will continue because his hearing commenced (and was completed) on
September 13, 2011, before the date his employment ended.  In his response to the1
SOR, Applicant denied SOR ¶ 1.a, and admitted SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b, with some
explanations. Applicant’s admissions, including his statements in response to DOHA
interrogatories,  are incorporated in the following findings.2
Applicant was born in Liberia. He attended a boarding school in Lebanon, where
his father was born and raised, from ages 5 to 16. After graduating early from high
school, he returned to Liberia to help work in his father’s pharmacy and bakery
business.  His father immigrated to the United States in the late 1970s, and became a3
naturalized citizen. Applicant and his sister came to the United States in August 1979 to
live with him. Applicant attended college from January 1980 to December 1984, and
graduated with a bachelor’s degree. He married his first wife in January 1985, and they
GE 1; AE C; AE D; Tr. 6-7, 33-37, 63-64.4
AR; GE 2; AE A; AE E; AE F; Tr. 31-32, 37-44, 52-56, 87-88.5
GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 35, 47-48, 56-60, 65-66, 90. 6
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divorced in January 1988 with no children. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen
on January 9, 1996. He also started graduate school that month, and earned a master’s
degree in applied mathematics and computer science in January 1998. He married his
current wife in September 2000, and they have two children ages 12 and 10. Applicant
has never served in the military of any country, and never held a security clearance.4
During a visit to his mother’s home in Liberia in 2010, Applicant renewed his
Liberian passport. He wants to keep a valid Liberian passport for three reasons. First, it
serves as his birth certificate since no other Liberian document exists to verify his birth
there. Second, he wants to use it to prove his Liberian citizenship to ease his dealings
with the authorities when he goes to Liberia to resolve the distribution of his elderly
mother’s estate. Third, he hopes to be able to retire in Liberia after his children are
raised, if circumstances permit. Applicant has used his U.S. passport for all travel
outside the country since he became a U.S. citizen. He has not used his current
Liberian passport. He is unwilling to destroy the passport, but after learning that he
could surrender the passport to his facility security officer instead he did so. This
surrender occurred on September 15, 2011. As noted above, Applicant was laid off on
September 23, 2011. He then requested and received possession of his Liberian
passport, which remains in his possession.5
Applicant’s wife and two children are natural-born citizens of the United States.
Applicant’s mother and father divorced when he was four years old. His father and his
stepfather, who was French, are deceased. His stepmother was born in Lebanon, and is
a naturalized U.S. citizen who resides here. He has a close relationship with his mother,
who is a Liberian citizen. She is retired, after working as a teacher in Liberian public
schools, but receives only a pension from her second husband’s former employer and
financial assistance from her children. Until October 2009, his mother lived primarily in
France to be near Applicant’s half-brother and half-sister. She has U.S. permanent
resident status, and would spend three to six months per year here and the remainder
in France. She was last in the U.S. in October 2009, when she moved back to Liberia to
remodel the beachfront home that she owns there. Since then she has made a couple
short visits to France to obtain prescription medicines. She planned to return to the U.S.
during October 2011, to visit Applicant for four weeks, unless her lengthy absence
causes problems with reentry as a permanent resident. She then planned to go to
France for surgery, and to remain there with her other children while recuperating.
Following that, she intends to return to and reside in Liberia.     6
Applicant has at least monthly telephone contact with his mother, and provides
her around $1,500 to $2,000 per year in financial assistance. In describing their
relationship, Applicant testified, “she’s an 80-year-old woman. She will not take no for
an answer if I tell her ‘I don’t want to help you financially.’ I do help her financially.”
GE 2; Tr. 43-51, 60.7
AR; GE 2; Tr. 60-65. Applicant’s cousin’s position is correctly described in the SOR, but only generically8
described herein to avoid disclosure of the specific identities of those involved. 
AE F.9
Tr. 45-46.10
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During February and March 2010, he went to Liberia for about five weeks to assess the
situation there and help his mother to remodel her house. He spent $8,000 toward a
new roof for her. While there, he stayed with a boyhood friend with whom he attended
boarding school. Applicant attempted to buy the house from his mother, but they could
not agree on a price. He feels that the value of the house has been severely reduced by
the political unrest and instability in Liberia, although the situation has improved since
the end of their recent civil war. All of Applicant’s financial assets are in the U.S.7
Applicant’s cousin serves as a very high ranking Liberian diplomatic official. He
has served in his current position for at least 15 years, before which he performed
similar duties in two other major western countries. He is the son of Applicant’s mother’s
sister, who died when he was about ten years old. He was then raised by Applicant’s
mother in Liberia, while Applicant was attending boarding schools in Lebanon.
Applicant’s mother has a very close relationship with him, and considers him to be
another son. Applicant has infrequent contact with him, once or twice per year, and
does not consider him to be a brother. When Applicant returned to Liberia from boarding
school, his cousin was in college and no longer lived with Applicant’s mother.  8
Three close friends who have known Applicant for a number of years wrote
letters describing his outstanding character, integrity, trustworthiness, and dedication to
his family.  Applicant provided no other evidence concerning the nature of his duties,9
responsibility for protecting sensitive information, or work performance. 
I take administrative notice of the facts concerning Liberia that are set forth in HE
I, and they are incorporated herein by reference. Of particular significance are the facts
that the government elected in 2005 has made progress toward restoring security and
stability in the country following a period of instability, conflict, and civil war from 1990 to
2003. Liberia still experiences a high rate of crime and rampant corruption throughout
government. Liberia is also on the State Department’s Tier 2 Watch List for human
trafficking. Applicant testified: 
When I was there the situation is so explosive, especially now with the
election coming in October, that people are really getting out of the
country more than staying there. So the value of property is really not
worth anything. . . . Liberia the last five years has become more stable, but
stable to a Liberian is different than stable to an American or somebody
like me that’s been living here. There’s a big difference in stability. . . .
What I saw was not even close to stable.10
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Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
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Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under AG ¶ 9 security concerns involving foreign preference arise because,
“[w]hen an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country
over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying under this guideline:
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country;
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social
welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country;
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship
requirements;
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business
interests in another country;
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country;
(7) voting in a foreign election;
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an
American citizen;
(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as
to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in conflict with the national security interest; and
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than
the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United
States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship.
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The evidence in this case established the foreign preference DCs set forth in AG
¶¶ 10(a)(1), 10(a)(5), and 10(b). Applicant’s possession and renewal of a current
Liberian passport, after becoming a U.S. citizen in 1996, were affirmatively intended to
obtain and facilitate recognition of his continuing Liberian citizenship by that government
during his anticipated future travels there to resolve his mother’s estate, in which he
hopes to share, and potentially to live there in retirement.  
AG ¶ 11 provides conditions that could mitigate foreign preference security
concerns:
(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a
foreign country;
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship
occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the
individual was a minor;
(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security
authority;
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated; and,
(f) the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States
Government.
 
Applicant failed to establish mitigation under AG ¶¶ 11(a) or (b). Although his
dual citizenship is based on his birth in Liberia and his mother’s citizenship there, he has
taken active measures after obtaining U.S. citizenship in 1996 to reaffirm and maintain
his Liberian citizenship. His expressed refusal and unwillingness to renounce that
citizenship or destroy his Liberian passport if required to obtain a U.S. security
clearance was unequivocal. He did, however, express and act on his willingness to
surrender his Liberian passport to the cognizant security authority. Upon termination of
his employment, however, he resumed possession of that passport. Accordingly,
mitigation under AG ¶ 11(e) is limited at present. That MC calls for actual surrender or
destruction, not mere willingness to do so as AG ¶ 11(b) requires, and he is not willing
to renounce dual citizenship. No evidence supports application of the other MCs.  
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
Tr. 75.11
“a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or12
foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation”
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induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel correctly argued that the evidence in this case raised
security concerns under two Foreign Influence DCs:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.  11
Applicant has close and strong family ties with his mother, who has moved back
to reside in Liberia where she is a citizen. She is also very close to Applicant’s cousin,
who she raised and considers to be another son. This cousin is a longstanding, high-
ranking official in the Liberian government, whose duties involve furthering the interests
of his country and its citizens. While Liberia is not a nation that is hostile toward the
United States, or high on the list of nations engaged in active intelligence gathering, the
government there suffers from rampant corruption and Applicant testified to its ongoing
instability. The nature and position of Applicant’s family connections there have
substantial potential to generate conflicts of interest and heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b). 
These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising the
aforementioned Foreign Influence DCs. Applicant’s close and significant relationships
and connections with Liberia shift the burden to him to prove mitigation under applicable
Appeal Board precedent. Department Counsel did not argue that the evidence raised
concerns under AG ¶ 7(e),  and I find that Applicant’s potential future interest in his12
mother’s property there is not substantial enough to do so. 
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AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a) and (b) security concerns are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Applicant did not demonstrate that it is unlikely that he could be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual or government
and those of the United States due to his close and ongoing family ties in Liberia and
his cousin’s high-ranking position in their government. He is not particularly close to his
cousin but his mother is, and Applicant admittedly is unable to deny his mother’s
requests for substantial amounts of money and other assistance. He offered insufficient
evidence that his family’s situation would make it unlikely that they could be subjected to
foreign inducement, manipulation or duress, or that his relationships and loyalties in the
U.S. are so deep and longstanding that they would outweigh his family obligations.
Under such circumstances, he would be forced to choose between their interests and
those of the U.S. Accordingly, he failed to establish the mitigating conditions set forth in
AG ¶¶ 8 (a), (b), or (c).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
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for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Security concerns in this case
do not involve any personal misconduct, dishonesty, irresponsibility, or disloyal activity
by Applicant. The primary whole-person issues of concern under these circumstances
are his completely understandable and appropriate relationships with his mother, a
resident citizen of Liberia, and his cousin, a high-ranking official of Liberia’s government.
It would be unrealistic to conclude that he has no ongoing obligations and loyalties
toward his family members there, and all evidence is to the contrary. Due to his desire
to participate substantially in the ultimate resolution of his mother’s estate, and
potentially return and live in Liberia when he retires, he is unwilling either to renounce
his Liberian citizenship or destroy his Liberian passport. He was willing to temporarily
surrender that passport, but presently retains possession of it since he was laid off.
These considerations raise the realistic and substantial potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress, given the corruption and instability in Liberia, and are likely to
continue. (AG ¶¶ 2 (8) and (9).) Although his immediate family and all financial assets
are in the United States, Applicant offered insufficient evidence of professional, social,
or financial ties to the United States to weigh in favor of a whole-person finding of
exceptional allegiance to United States interests.
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He did not meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign preference and foreign influence
considerations.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge