KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The record discloses no basis to conclude that Applicant was denied the rights due him
under the Directive or that he had not been advised of those rights.  The record supports the
Judge’s conclusion that the disqualifying conduct under Guideline F was not mitigated.  Adverse
decision affirmed.
CASENO: 10-02170.a1
DATE: 02/06/2012
DATE: February 6, 2012
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 10-02170
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On April 27, 2011 DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On October 6, 2011, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Jennifer I.
Goldstein denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant
to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raises the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  For the following reasons, the Board affirms the Judge’s unfavorable
security clearance decision. 
The Judge made the following findings of fact:  Applicant is 44 years old, is unmarried and
has no children.  Applicant is indebted to two creditors in the approximate amount of $45,041.  The
first debt was listed as a credit card account totaling $32,345, and the second was a credit card
account totaling $12,696.  Applicant attributes his recent financial problems to a series of events
beyond his control.  In 2001 Applicant purchased a home for $200,000.  He was able to afford the
payments with the income from an insurance business and through selling pharmaceuticals.  In 2005,
Applicant refinanced the home and borrowed $265,000 with a three-year adjustable-rate mortgage.
In 2008, the mortgage on his house adjusted upward from monthly payments of $1,441 per month
to payments of $2,258 per month.  At the same time, the patent on the pharmaceuticals he was
selling expired and they became available over-the-counter.  His insurance business also declined
due to the economy.  As a result of these two events, his income declined from approximately
$80,000 to $20,000 per year.  Applicant attempted to meet his mortgage obligations, including using
his credit cards to make mortgage payments and pay for living expenses.  Eventually, however, he
defaulted on his mortgage.  After his home was foreclosed upon in 2009, Applicant worked
diligently to repair his credit.  He hired a law firm to represent him in negotiations with his
outstanding creditors.  Although one of Applicant’s debts not listed in the SOR was settled, the law
firm failed to reach a settlement with the two listed credit card debts.  Applicant hired a second law
firm to settle the two debts.  With the aid of the second law firm, Applicant got one creditor to agree
to accept payments on the debt.  An e-mail indicated that Applicant made the first payment of $915
on August 17, 2011, and that he wished to make monthly payments on the 11th of each month until
the agreement was satisfied.  The second law firm contested the second debt, as the statute of
limitations had passed, and there were other discrepancies.  However, the second law firm later
verified that the debt was still delinquent.  In a post-hearing submission, Applicant provided
evidence of an offer to settle this debt for 12 monthly payments of $267 for a total payoff of $3,200.
There is no indication whether the creditor accepted this payment offer.  Applicant currently lives
within his means.  He has a positive monthly remainder after his monthly expenses are met.  He has
$4,000 in cash saved toward settling his debts.  He testified he had another $10,000 in assets that
he could liquidate to repay his debts.  He has received financial counseling from his church.
The Judge reached the following conclusions: Applicant was unable to satisfy his two
delinquent credit cards totaling $45,041.  Applicant’s financial indebtedness was caused by his
decision to satisfy his mortgage through the use of his credit cards.  While he could not control the
downturn in his insurance business, he could have anticipated the expiration of the pharmaceutical
patent.  It was his choice to refinance his home at an adjustable interest rate and then to use his credit
cards to continue to pay his mortgage.  These choices indicate Applicant did not use good judgment
with respect to his finances.  Applicant has not established that he acted reasonably under the
circumstances.  He only recently established a payment plan with the first credit card creditor and
has no repayment plan with the second.  There is little indication that the counseling from his church
or the assistance of the two law firms had a significant impact on the delinquent accounts.  Applicant
had several offers to negotiate from his creditors, but he failed, until recently, to make any payments,
despite his savings and assets.  He failed to establish a track record of acting responsibly with
respect to his finances.  None of the mitigating conditions apply.
As a preliminary matter, Applicant asserts that he did not have legal representation at the
hearing or at the time of appeal, and if given the opportunity, he would like to have this option.  He
indicates that the did not have the money to hire a lawyer in regards to his clearance, and also states
that at the time of the hearing he was instantly overwhelmed and felt he wasn’t able to articulate his
case in the way a prepared professional could.
An applicant’s right to be represented by counsel (or personal representative) of his choice
is not absolute, and an applicant may waive it, for example, by failing to take reasonable steps to
exercise it.  See ISCR Case No. 98-0619 at 4 (App. Bd. Sep. 10, 1999).  After reviewing the record,
the Board notes the following: (1) Applicant was sent Prehearing Guidance which notes in numbered
paragraph 1 “. . . The Applicant has the option of appearing by himself or herself without an
attorney, or being represented by an attorney selected and paid for by Applicant, or by being
represented by a Personal Representative such as a friend, family member, or union representative”;
and (2) the hearing transcript reveals that, prior to receiving any evidence, the Judge asked Applicant
if  he was aware of his right to hire an attorney or have a personal representative present, and then
specifically asked Applicant if he had chosen to represent himself.  The Judge then asked Applicant
if he was ready to proceed, and Applicant indicated that he was.  At no time during the hearing did
Applicant express any second thoughts about proceeding without representation.  The record
discloses no basis to conclude that Applicant was denied the rights due him under the Directive or
that he had not been adequately advised of those rights.  See ISCR Case No. 03-25024 at 2 (App.
Bd. Feb. 8, 2007).  There is no basis to remand the case to allow Applicant an opportunity to obtain
representation.  
   Applicant argues that the Judge’s conclusion that his case was not mitigated was erroneous
and that the evidence showed that he displayed constant and consistent effort to satisfy his creditors
and that he exercised due diligence.  Applicant has failed to establish error on the part of the Judge.
 As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the
favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-
10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the
evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to
demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the seriousness
of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant conditions and
factors.  She adequately discussed why the disqualifying conduct established under Guideline F  was
not mitigated. 
The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).  After reviewing the record, the Board
concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for
her decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore,
the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan 
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett      
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin        
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board