Consisting of the FORM, Items 1-9. 1
DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February2
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the Adjudicative Guidelines (AG)
effective within the DoD on 1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
XXXXXXX, Xxxxxxx Xxxxx )       ISCR Case No. 10-10243
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  Applicant’s clearance is granted.1
On 5 May 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) sent
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns under Guideline F,
Financial Considerations.  Applicant timely answered the SOR, requesting a decision2
without hearing. The record in this case closed 25 November 2011, the day Applicant’s
response to the Government’s File of Relevant Material (FORM) was due. He submitted
no response. DOHA assigned the case to me 3 January 2012. 
 
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant denied the SOR allegations, except for SOR 1.c, 1.d, and 1.h. He is a
55-year-old security officer employed by a Government contractor since February 2009.
He seeks to retain the security clearance he was issued in May 2009.
Another Government agency (AGA) suspended Applicant’s program access in
July 2010 (SOR 1.h) for the personal conduct cited in SOR 1.a-1.g (Item 9). Chief
among the stated concerns was AGA’s conclusion that Applicant deliberately falsified
clearance applications in April and August 2009 by failing to disclose, as required, that
he had been arrested 10-15 times between 1975 and 1988 for drunk and disorderly and
had been arrested in May 1990 on a drug charge that was later nolle prossed.
AGA’s other stated reasons for suspending Applicant’s program access,
appropriated by DOHA as a basis for revoking his clearance, are the alcohol and drug
arrests themselves, quitting jobs in February 2004 (SOR 1.e) and mid-2008 (SOR 1.g),
and being fired from a job in February 2006 (SOR 1.f). 
In January 2004, Applicant was allegedly rude to another security officer who
used racial epithets to describe other fellow security officers. Applicant was reassigned
to another location, effectively a demotion and reduction in pay. He did not report to the
new work location, effectively quitting without notice. In February 2006, Applicant had a
disagreement with his boss (and company owner) about the number of hours he was
being required to work and not receiving his paycheck on time. The boss fired him. In
September 2008, he quit his job after giving notice to his employer (Item 7).
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guideline is Guideline E (Personal Conduct).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does,
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
¶ 16.(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security4
questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, . . . [or] determine
security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness. . .;
¶ 16.© credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse5
determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness
to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly
safeguard protected information;
3
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.3
Analysis
The Government failed to establish a case for disqualification under Guideline E.
The most serious of the allegations is that Applicant falsified two clearance applications
in 2009 when he failed to disclose 10-15 alcohol-related arrests, the most recent of
which was 21 years ago at the time, and a May 1999 marijuana possession arrest, 19
years ago at the time, that was later nolle prossed. Notwithstanding that the pertinent
question asks for any past drug or alcohol arrests without time limitation, the information
allegedly falsified must still be both relevant and material.  Twenty-year-old drug and4
alcohol arrests might be relevant and material if the aged conduct was more serious or
if there had been more recent drug and alcohol arrests to constitute a pattern, but
neither of those circumstances are present here. Further, Applicant stated that he
misread the question, effectively vitiating the necessary intent to falsify.
The next most serious allegations are the 20-year old drug and alcohol arrests
themselves. Nevertheless, those arrests are dated, and—without being more serious or
connected to more recent and relevant drug or alcohol incidents—lack enough security
significance to warrant revocation of Applicant’s clearance. Nor does the addition of
three putatively adverse employment terminations persuade me that Applicant lacks the
requisite judgment for access to classified information.  Quitting a job or being fired from5
a job under contentious circumstances has no security significance unless those
circumstances amount to employee misconduct. Applicant’s version of events, which I
find credible, does not substantiate misconduct. And while I am aware of alternate
plausible characterizations, I am not bound by those characterizations in making a
decision, and I conclude that those characterizations are not reasonable based on a
reading of the entire record.
4
Regarding the allegation in SOR 1.h, I specifically give little weight to the facts or
characterizations of AGA in revoking Applicant’s access. While AGA is free to make its
own conclusions, the fact remains that the agency decisional document is an advocacy
document based, not on any irrefutable recording of Applicant’s statements (i.e. sworn
statement) but on a polygrapher’s (if not others) distillation of what Applicant said,
colored by his perception of what the polygraph charts meant. Put another way, not
every twitch under a polygrapher’s gaze reveals nefarious intent. But a polygrapher has
no incentive to conclude benign intent, and a decisional document concluding nefarious
intent requires no marshaling of facts consistent with benign intent. Further, none of the
employment records that might provide a more first-hand record of the employer’s
version of events have been provided. Finally, the allegations of SOR 1.h raise no
independent security concerns for me to resolve. I resolve Guideline E for Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a-h: For Applicant
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.   
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge