1
 
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-02252
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Braden M. Murphy, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: W. Jamiel Allen, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
Applicant signed an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) on November 2, 2010. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on September 14, 2011, detailing
security concerns under Guideline H, drug involvement, and Guideline E, personal
conduct. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines For
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG) implemented on
September 1, 2006. 
 
W hen  SOR allegations are controverted, the Government bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient1
to prove controverted allegations. Directive, ¶ E3.1.14. “That burden has two components. First, the
Government must establish by substantial evidence that the facts and events alleged in the SOR indeed took
place. Second, the Government must establish a nexus between the existence of the established facts and
events and a legitimate security concern.” See ISCR Case No. 07-18525 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2009),
(concurring and dissenting, in part) (citations omitted). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection
between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See
ISCR Case No. 08-06605 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 4, 2010); ISCR Case No. 08-07290 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 17,
2009).
GE 2; AE A; Tr. 40-41, 43, 52.2
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Applicant received the SOR on September 29, 2011. Applicant retained counsel
and answered the SOR on November 22, 2011. She requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. DOHA received the request, and Department Counsel was
prepared to proceed on December 1, 2011. I received the case assignment on
December 12, 2011. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on December 30, 2011, and I
convened the hearing as scheduled on January 24, 2012. The Government offered
exhibits marked as GE 1 through GE 3, which were received and admitted into evidence
without objection. Applicant and one witness testified. She submitted exhibits marked as
AE A through AE K, which were received and admitted into evidence without objection.
DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on February 2, 2012. I held the record open
until February 14, 2012, for Applicant to submit additional matters. Applicant timely
submitted AE L and AE M, which were admitted without objection. The record closed on
February 14, 2012.
Findings of Fact
In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegation in ¶ 1.c of the
SOR. Applicant admitted in part and denied in part the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a and
1.b of the SOR. Her admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. She denied
the factual allegation in ¶ 2.a of the SOR.  She also provided additional information to1
support her request for eligibility for a security clearance. After a complete and thorough
review of the evidence of record, I make the following additional findings of fact.  
Applicant, who is 27 years old, works as a mechanical engineer for a Department
of Defense contractor. She began her employment in the summer of 2004, as an intern.
At the end of the summer in 2004 and 2005, in lieu of resigning, she took a leave of
absence from her job. At the end of the summer in 2006, she continued to work part-
time during the school year. In July 2007, she began working full-time for her employer.2
Applicant’s supervisor describes her as a dedicated, hard working individual, with
initiative. She is honest, trustworthy, a person of integrity, and a team player. He
completely trusts her. She is the alternate security custodian for his team’s secret
cabinet, which requires her to ensure that all their classified documents are properly
marked for security audits and that their cabinet is secured at night. She has received
awards for her outstanding job performance and for her team performance and
AE B - AE H; AE J; Tr. 49-50.3
Tr. 42-43, 51, 57-58, 66.4
GE 1; Tr. 42-43, 55-58.5
GE 2; Tr. 45-48, 57-60.6
GE 3; AE L; Tr. 51, 66.7
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achievement. Her performance appraisals reflect consistent outstanding performance
every year.  3
As a high school student and freshman college student, Applicant occasionally
smoked marijuana with friends. She stopped smoking marijuana around October 2002
because her boyfriend did not approve. After an eight-month break, she again
occasionally smoked marijuana with her girlfriends. She last smoked marijuana in
December 2003. She has no intent to smoke marijuana in the future, as she does not
like it.4
Applicant’s employer asked her to complete a security clearance application (SF-
86) shortly after she began her summer internship in 2004. She listed marijuana use
between August 2000 and October 2002 and estimated she smoked it about 15 times.
After completing her SF-86, she took a drug test and passed. Sometime during the
summer of 2004, she learned that her employer had a policy against drug use. DOD
granted Applicant a security clearance in 2005.  5
Between the summer of 2006 and early 2007, Applicant used cocaine on four
occasions, and she used Vicodin without a prescription. Two friends provided her with
the Vicodin and the cocaine. She has not used either drug since this time. Her
explanation for using these drugs is that she was young and depressed. She further
explained that she was unsure of her life and its direction at this time. She listed this
drug use and her 2003 marijuana use on her 2010 e-QIP, which is all of her drug use
after 2004. She acknowledges that her decision to use cocaine was not a good
decision.6
Applicant signed a statement of intent not to use illegal or nonprescription drugs
in the future. She swore that she is not currently using drugs and agreed to an
automatic revocation of her clearance if she did. In her response to interrogatories,
Applicant stated that she stopped using illegal drugs because their use was destructive
and irresponsible behavior, which hurt her, her family and her future. She declined to
excuse her conduct, which she related to youth, immaturity, confusion, and depression.
She indicated that she learned from her conduct and that she has a better
understanding of herself, a fact she reiterated in her testimony.7
Applicant has never been arrested for illegal drug use. She has never received
drug counseling nor has she attended narcotics anonymous. In early January 2012,
AE I; AEK ; AE M; Tr. 64-66.8
Tr. 28-37.9
Tr. 60-61.10
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Applicant, on her initiative, sought a drug evaluation from a qualified drug counselor.
She met with the counselor twice and took the Substance Abuse Screening Inventory
(SASI). Based on their meetings and the test results, the counselor opined that she did
not have a substance abuse disorder as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR). The counselor also recommended her for a
security clearance. A counselor in 2010 stated that Applicant did not have a condition
that would impair her judgment, reliability, or ability to protect classified information. This
counselor indicated that Applicant had a “good prognosis” without further explanation.8
Applicant’s long-time boyfriend testified. He and Applicant have known each
other since college and have dated for the last six or seven years. He describes
Applicant as an organized person, who reacts positively to stress. He characterizes
Applicant as the most trustworthy person he knows. She has never failed him or others.
She plays by the rules. He highly respects her. He is aware of her past drug use, which
he relates to a low point in her life. Drug use is not characteristic of her normal behavior.
He has not seen her use drugs or currently associate with drug users. He describes her
friends as “good girls”. Her integrity is her best quality, and her honesty is the reason for
the hearing. When she realized in college that she had an emotional problem, she
sought professional help, started exercising, and began working on hobbies. She is
more mature.9
She still has contact with the two friends with whom she used drugs. Her two
friends no longer use any drugs. One is married with two step-children and working full-
time. The other works as a teacher one thousand miles from Applicant’s home.10
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
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reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline H, Drug Involvement
AG ¶ 24 expresses the security concern pertaining to drug involvement:
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions
about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may
impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person's ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and
include: (1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified
and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g.,
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marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and
hallucinogens), and (2) inhalants and other similar substances;
(b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a
manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
AG ¶ 25 describes the disqualifying conditions that could raise security concerns.
I have considered all the conditions, and the following are potentially applicable:
(a) any drug abuse (see above definition); 
(c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture,
purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia;
(d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician,
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
(e) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical
social worker who, is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment
program; and
(g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance.
Applicant smoked marijuana occasionally as a high school student and during
her first two years of college. In 2006, she used cocaine four times and Vicodin without
a prescription, after being granted a security clearance in 2005. To use these drugs, she
had to possess them. Applicant has never been diagnosed as a drug abuser or drug
dependent. Thus, AG ¶¶ 25(d) and 25(e) are not applicable in this case. AG ¶¶ 25(a),
25(c), and 25(g) are applicable under the facts of this case.
AG ¶ 26 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I have
considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 26(a) through 26(d), and the following are potentially
applicable:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
and
(b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as: 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; 
(3) an appropriate period of abstinence; and,
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(4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of
clearance for any violation.
Applicant last smoked marijuana more than eight years ago. Her use of cocaine
and Vicodin without a prescription occurred more than five years ago. All of her drug
use took place while a high school or college student and ceased before she completed
college. She used drugs with two specific friends with whom she still has contact. These
friends are no longer involved with drugs, and one friend lives more than 1000 miles
from Applicant, which limits their ability to spend time together.
Applicant submitted a signed sworn statement, indicating that she was not
currently using any illegal drugs, that she had no intent to use illegal drugs in the future,
and that she agreed to the immediate revocation of her security clearance if she did.
Her recent drug use evaluation by a qualified professional supports the fact that she is
not drug dependent. 
As an immature college student, she experimented with cocaine and Vicodin
without a prescription while she held a security clearance. Her decision and conduct
violated the trust of her employer and the Government and raised questions about her
reliability to follow rules. In the last five years, she has worked hard to change her
behavior and has done so successfully. While still in college, she realized that she was
depressed and making poor decisions, especially about her drug use. She sought help
for her depression and lack of goals about her future. She started exercising and
working with her hobbies, which are alternative methods to drugs for handling stress
and emotional issues. Her employer trusts her as does the person closest to her, her
boyfriend. She is a highly skilled engineer and well-respected at work for her skills. She
handles classified information without incident. In weighing her current behavior and her
efforts for the last five years to correct poor decisions about drugs in 2006 against her
violation of the trust of the Government, I find the weight of the evidence supports a
finding that she has mitigated the Government’s security concerns under Guideline H
about her past conduct.
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
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(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse
determination, but which, when combined with all available information
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes
but is not limited to consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information,
unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other
government protected information:
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the
workplace; 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and,
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other
employer's time or resources.
and,
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity. 
Applicant experimented with cocaine and Vicodin without a prescription as a
college student and while she held a security clearance. She used these drugs with two
girlfriends during a time of depression and lack of direction in her life. Her conduct
violates the rules of the Government and her employer about the use of illegal drugs,
particularly when holding a security clearance. Possession of illegal drugs is criminal
activity. The Government established its case under AG ¶¶ 16(d)(3) and 16(g).
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I have
considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 17(a) through 17(g), and the following are potentially
applicable:
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress; and,
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(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules
and regulations.
Applicant has been forthright about her conduct with drug use as a college
student. By early 2007, she recognized that she had an emotional problem and that
drugs were an inappropriate means to resolve her problem. She sought professional
help, and worked on changing her techniques for managing her emotional issues. She
turned to positive behavior changes, such as exercising and hobbies, to improve her
emotional health and to reduce stress. She has a good emotional support system with
her family, her boyfriend, and her friends, which eliminates her need to resort to drug
use. While she still has contact with the two friends with whom she used drugs in
college, one lives 1,000 miles from her. Her life and her friends’ lives no longer involve
drugs, but are directed towards their careers or family. After reviewing all the evidence
of record, I find that Applicant has changed her attitude and behavior about drug use.
Thus, she has mitigated the Government’s security concerns under Guideline E. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
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The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole-person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of denial. In
reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. As a high
school student and for her first two years of college, Applicant smoked marijuana
occasionally. During her last year of college and at an emotional low point, she
experimented with cocaine and Vicodin with two friends. She recognized that she had
an emotional problem and sought professional help. With professional help, she
changed her attitude, behavior, and conduct towards drug use. Drugs are no longer a
part of her life and she does not intend for drugs to be a part of her life in the future.
While still in college, she recognized that using illegal drugs was destructive and
irresponsible behavior, which hurt her, her family and her future. She does not make
any excuses for her conduct. Her 2006 decision to use cocaine and Vicodin while
holding a security clearance showed poor judgment and betrayed the Government’s
trust. She acknowledged her conduct on her SF-86, which indicates her honesty, and
she accepted responsibility for her poor judgment. Her life is completely different now.
Her family, her boyfriend, and her career are paramount, and illegal drugs have no
place in her life. She complies with her workplace rules and is trusted with duties tied to
the office security cabinet. In reviewing all the evidence of record, there is almost no
likelihood she will ever use illegal drugs in the future because she has recognized the
negative impact of such drug use. There is no security concern that she will be involved
with illegal drugs. She could not be pressured or coerced to disclose classified
information based on her conduct in 2006 because she has been open and honest
about it.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from her drug involvement
under Guidelines H and E.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline H: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge