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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 11-06859
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Raashid Williams, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Leslie McAdoo Gordon, Esquire 
                                                                            
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Decision
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MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
On September 30, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) enumerating security concerns
under Guideline H (Drug Involvement) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The action
was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the
DOD on September 1, 2006. 
In a response dated November 14, 2011, Applicant admitted all allegations and
requested a hearing before a DOHA administrative judge. The case was assigned to
me on December 21, 2011. The parties agreed to a hearing date of February 7, 2012, a
notice for which was issued on January 24, 2012. I convened the hearing as scheduled.
Applicant gave testimony and offered 12 documents, which were admitted into
the record without objection as exhibits (Exs.) A-L. Department Counsel offered three
documents, which were admitted as Exs. 1-3 without objection. The transcript (Tr.) of
the proceeding was received on February 16, 2012, and the record was closed. Based
on a thorough review of the testimony, submissions, and exhibits, I find Applicant failed
 Ex. 1 (E-QIP, dated Oct. 5, 2010) at 34 of 35. In response to the question as to how often he used      1
marijuana, Applicant answered “experimented.”
 Tr. 57.      2
 Tr. 67.      3
 Id.  at 2 of 35. Notice is taken that similar language is used in the standard SF86 form, which is used for      4
security clearance applicants.
 Id. Again, similar language is used in the SF86 form.       5
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to meet his burden of mitigating security concerns related to personal conduct and drug
involvement. Clearance is denied.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 27-year-old database sustainment specialist who has worked for
the same defense contractor since July 2010. A gifted athlete, he took time off during
college to play professional-level sports abroad. Applicant returned to the United States
and completed a degree in business administration in 2009. He is single. 
During the end of Applicant’s college studies, he began to experience a “funk” as
to what direction his life was taking. After graduating from college in July 2009,
Applicant began working for his father before starting his current job in July 2010. He
began using marijuana with varying frequency from about October 2009 until December
2009.  He then stopped using marijuana because, “it wasn’t something that I wanted to1
continue to do.”  2
When Applicant initially started his present employment, he was unsure whether
his entry-level job was sufficiently satisfying. He did not know for sure, but he “inferred”
that his employer probably had a policy against illegal drug use.  He completed a3
Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions (SF85P) in electronic form (e-QIP), which was
certified on October 5, 2010. In completing that e-QIP, Applicant was advised in the
instructions section that the purpose of the questionnaire was “to establish that
applicants or incumbents either employed by the Government or working for the
Government under contract, are suitable for the job and/or eligible for a public trust or
sensitive position.”  The paragraph noted as “The Investigative Process,” stated: 4
Background investigations are conducted using your responses on this
form . . . to develop information to show whether you are reliable,
trustworthy, of good conduct and character. . . . In addition to the
questions on this form, inquiry is also made about a person’s
adherence to security requirements, honesty, and integrity, vulnerability
to exploitation or coercion, falsification, misrepresentation, and any
other behavior, activities, or associations that tend to show the person
is not reliable, trustworthy, or loyal.5
 Tr. 68. Applicant conceded that drug use would have been a concern to his employer.      6
 Tr. 28.      7
 Tr. 69.      8
 Ex. 2 (SF86, dated Mar. 9, 2011) at 40 of 44.      9
 Id.      10
 Tr. 36.      11
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In executing the e-QIP, he disclosed his 2009 use of marijuana. He now acknowledges
that the question was asked because, “they wanted for the applicant to be truthful if it
indeed occurred and that it would possibly be prohibitive to security concerns.”6
Although initially unhappy with his early assignments at work, Applicant
persevered. He was granted a Position of Trust/IT3 in about December 2010, although
he did not discover this fact until March 2011.  His anxiety about his future became7
compounded with difficulties in his romantic life. Applicant’s girlfriend had a vision as to
what she wanted to do with her life, while Applicant felt aimless. 
Applicant decided to again use marijuana in October 2010. He continued using
the drug with varying frequency through January 1, 2011. It occurred to him that “it may
be common sense to abstain from the use of marijuana” and he knew that marijuana
was an illegal drug.  Applicant quit using the drug after coming to the realization that he8
needed to quit using drugs to advance his career. He wrote a three-year plan for his life,
noting that he wanted to be better read, live independently, continue his education,
save money for a down payment on a house, and reduce his student loan obligation.   
In March 2011, Applicant was told that his job had been upgraded and that he
needed a security clearance. He completed a SF86 application that was certified on
March 9, 2011. On that form, he again noted his 2009 drug use, explaining that he used
it about 5 times a month between October 2009 and December 2009.  He also9
disclosed that he used the drug from November 2010 through January 2011, explaining
that the use had been “experimental, occasional, approx. 4 times in a month.”10
By this time, Applicant had learned time-management techniques and changed
his priorities. He proceeded to make considerable progress on his three-year plan. He
began regular reading of the classics, reduced his student loan debt by nearly 20
percent, and saved money to put toward a home purchase. He moved out of his
mother’s house and found roommates to share an apartment. He returned to the gym
and took up skiing. Using a database, he began tracking his considerable progress.
Applicant also focused on his job and his career prospects. He completed a
management professional certification program. He replaced any interest in marijuana
with positive goals. Applicant also developed a “dream board,” which helps him
visualize his goals.   11
 Tr. 51. Applicant always used marijuana with the same friend, with the exception of one time when a      12
second friend was involved. Drug use took place generally at Applicant’s home or yard. Applicant does not
believe that either of the individuals with whom he used the marijuana still uses the drug.
 Sees also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      13
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      14
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       Applicant has no interest in using drugs in the future and he has been drug-free
since January 1, 2011. His girlfriend supports his decision stay drug-free. Applicant
signed a statement of intent not to use drugs in the future or risk forfeiture of any
security clearance granted. Because they no longer live near each other, Applicant and
the friend with whom he used marijuana have only occasional contact.  Applicant is12
well-regarded at work and in his community.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations
for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. Under AG ¶ 2(c), this
process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-
person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all reliable information about
the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a13
preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  14
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
 Id.      15
 Id.      16
 AG  ¶ 24.      17
 Id. at ¶ 24(a)(1-2).      18
 Id. at  ¶ 24(b).      19
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extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access15
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.16
Based upon consideration of the evidence, Guideline H (Drug Involvement) and
Guideline E (Personal Conduct) are the most pertinent to this case. Conditions
pertaining to these AGs that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying,
and those which would mitigate such concerns, are discussed below.
Analysis
Guideline H - Drug Involvement
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions about
an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and
because it raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws,
rules, and regulations.  “Drugs” are defined as mood and behavior altering substances17
and include drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended, (e.g., marijuana or cannabis,
depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens) and inhalants and other
substances.  “Drug abuse” is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a18
manner that deviates from approved medical direction.19
Applicant admitted he used marijuana with varying frequency from October 2009
through December 2009, and again from November 2010 through January 1, 2011. His
more recent use of the drug occurred after being granted a Position of Trust/IT3 in
December 2010. Such facts are sufficient to raise Drug Involvement Disqualifying
Condition AG ¶ 25(a) (any drug abuse). Because Applicant’s drug use occurred after he
was granted a public trust position and not a security clearance, however, AG ¶ 25(g)
(any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance) does not technically
 AG ¶ 15.      20
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apply. However, with AG ¶ 25(a) applicable, the burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate
related security concerns.
Applicant’s drug abuse lasted until January 2011, only 13 months ago. During his
period of drug abuse, he used marijuana between four to five times a month.
Applicant’s marijuana use coincided with periods of unhappiness or inner turmoil. Such
periods are unavoidably part of the human condition. Indeed, such pressing times often
test one’s mettle in terms of judgment, resolve, and reliability. They are not so rare that
it can be concluded that similar phases might not recur again in a young man of 28.
Despite a year of self-improvement and maturation, Drug Involvement Mitigating
Condition AG ¶ 26(a) (the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt
on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment) does not apply. 
Applicant moved away from home and sees his former marijuana-using friends
less frequently. However, such facts are only sufficient to raise AG ¶ 26(b)(2) (changing
or avoiding the environment where drugs were used). They do not give rise to AG ¶
26(b)(1) (disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts).
Applicant used marijuana from October 2009 through December 2009, then he
quit using the drug. He again used marijuana from November 2010 through January 1,
2011, before quitting marijuana for a second time. While his break from drug use for
nearly a year is notable, it highlights his inability to permanently quit marijuana the first
time. Although he has made impressive strides toward personal and professional self-
improvement, 13 months of abstinence is insufficient given both the total length of his
period of drug use (October 2009 - January 1, 2011) and the fact he could not sustain
his commitment to quit using drugs in December 2009 for more than 11 months. In light
of these considerations, AG ¶ 26(b)(3) (an appropriate period of abstinence) does not
presently apply.
Finally, Applicant has articulated his intent not to use drugs again. He credibly
gave logical reasons for not revisiting marijuana use. He complemented these
expressions by signing a statement of intent with automatic revocation of clearance for
any future drug-related violations. Therefore, AG ¶ 26(b)(4) (a signed statement of
intent with automatic revocation of clearance for any violation) applies.
Guideline E – Personal Conduct
Security concerns arise from matters of personal conduct because “conduct
involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information.“  In addition, “any failure to20
 Id.      21
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provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process” is of special interest.  21
In this case, Applicant admitted his past drug use. While drug involvement is
sufficiently covered under Guideline H, his drug use after being granted a public trust
position presents judgment concerns not clearly addressed under that guideline. Given
these facts, Personal Conduct Disqualifying Condition AG ¶ 16(d) (credible adverse
information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be
sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all
available information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly
safeguard protected information) applies.
With or without being granted a public trust position or security clearance, the
use of marijuana is illegal. Applicant knew that. While drug use alone is sufficient to
raise serious security concerns, those concerns are heightened when, in doing so, an
applicant violates the public trust bestowed upon him. Although Applicant apparently did
not know he had been granted a public trust position, he did know that he had executed
an e-QIP, he knew the purpose of that form, and he knew or should have known that
illegal drug use was a legitimate concern. Moreover, he inferred that drug use was
prohibited by his employer. Applicant only renewed his commitment to abstinence 13
months ago. In light of the duration of his past drug use, his previous failure to maintain
abstinence from marijuana, and the seriousness of using drugs again after completing
his e-QIP, Personal Conduct Mitigating Condition AG ¶ 17(c) (the offense is so minor,
or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under
such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment) does not apply.
To his credit, however, Applicant has been honest throughout. He self-disclosed
both periods of drug use on his SF85P and SF86. Consequently, AG ¶ 16(e) (the
individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress) applies. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a). Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate
determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall
commonsense judgment based on careful consideration of the guidelines and the
whole-person concept. 
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I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.
Multiple facts speak in Applicant’s favor. He is intelligent, credible, and well-educated.
He is striving to be a well-rounded Renaissance man, making considerable
improvements in his mind, body, and spirit. He is refocused on his work. He has
matured considerably over the past year. Appellant is in a committed relationship. He
has recently demonstrated maturation and true resolve toward his personal goals. 
Applicant suggests that his use of marijuana after being granted a public trust
position, rather than a security clearance, somehow reduces the concerns raised. As
noted, however, both the SF85P and the SF86 instructions address the purpose of the
applications and related investigations in the same language. While the extent of an
applicant’s vetting may differ, the same issues are addressed. Moreover, Applicant
argues that the recency of one’s drug use is a sliding scale which, given his age and
recent accomplishments, should go in his favor. I disagree. Applicant’s strides in the
past year have been highly impressive. However, his drug use is not just the matter of
two brief periods. Given his lapse after committing to quit using drugs, it became one
longer period with an intervening 11 month period of failed abstinence. While that
failure may be attributable to a “funk,” it is unknown how Applicant will react when he
faces future challenges.  
In light of these considerations, I find that a 16 month period of drug use with an
intervening period of 11 months failed abstinence merits a longer period to demonstrate
both a commitment to refrain from marijuana and the ability to do so. More time is
needed to demonstrate Applicant’s ability to balance life’s stressors with his ability to
refrain from drugs. As noted, any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should
be allowed access to classified information must be resolved in favor of protecting such
classified  information. I conclude drug involvement and personal conduct security
concerns remain unmitigated.  Clearance is denied.   
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-b: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge