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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 10-01732 
  )   
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Jeff Nagel, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Brian Cruz, Esq. 
 
 
March 22, 2012 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant is a 59-year-old employee of a defense contractor. The Government 
raised concerns over his contacts in a foreign nation including his father, sister, aunt, 
uncle, cousins, college friend, and property he owns abroad. However, his long and 
intricate connections with the United States indicate he would resolve the conflict in 
favor of the United States. Applicant mitigated the Government’s Foreign Influence 
concerns. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On September 24, 2009, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaires for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On August 12, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing 
security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The action was taken under 
Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense 
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as 
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective September 1, 2006.  
 
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Applicant answered the SOR (Answer) on September 7, 2011, and requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to another 
administrative judge on October 25, 2011, and on that same day the assigned judge 
scheduled the case for hearing on November 17, 2011. Applicant requested a 
continuance and it was granted based upon good cause. The case was reassigned to 
me on November 1, 2011. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on November 7, 2011, 
scheduling the hearing for December 20, 2011. Applicant’s counsel submitted an 
additional continuance request. On December 7, 2011, the case was rescheduled for 
hearing on January 23, 2012, and the hearing was convened as scheduled. The 
Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3, which were admitted without objection. 
The Applicant offered Exhibits (AE) A through Y, which were admitted without objection. 
Applicant testified on his own behalf. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) 
on February 6, 2012.  
 
Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of relevant facts 
about a foreign nation (FN) involved in this matter. The request and the documents 
attached as enclosures were not admitted in evidence but are attached to the record as 
HE I. I took administrative notice of all facts as set out in the request by Department 
Counsel.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant is a 59-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He was born in FN. 
He attended an English-speaking school in FN and spoke English in his home with his 
family. In 1971, at age 19, Applicant came to the United States on a student visa. He 
attended an American university and graduated with a bachelor’s degree. He chose to 
remain in the United States and become a U.S. citizen because he was comfortable 
living in a country that was open and receptive to immigrants and the conditions in FN 
were deteriorating. (GE 1; Tr. 26-30, 103.) 
 
 Applicant has been married for the past 29 years to an American born, U.S. 
citizen. He has two adult children, a daughter and a son. Applicant’s daughter only 
speaks English, although his son knows a little bit of French, in addition to English. (GE 
1; Tr. 54-57.) 
 
 Applicant currently works for a government contractor in a high-level position. He 
has worked as a government contractor for over 30 years. He has held a security 
clearance for over 27 years, without incident. In the early days of his employment as a 
government contractor, he spent a lot of time living abroad, because the programs he 
worked on required it. Applicant testified that 98% of his work involves the United States 
military. He started to commute from the United States abroad in 2003. His work 
requires him to be out of the country full time, but his immediate family is firmly planted 
in the United States and does not care to live overseas. Applicant finds that spending 
time abroad is not pleasant for him. He views himself as only an American. He is 
 
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committed to the United States, its principles, its freedom, and its way of life. America is 
home for Applicant. (GE 1; Tr. 31-35, 110.) 
 
In the early 2000s, Applicant and his family were living overseas while he was 
working on a U. S. Government-based project. A terrorist attack occurred a short 
distance from his home. One of his children suffers permanent impairment as a result of 
the attack and a number of neighbors were killed. Despite this incident, Applicant has 
continually returned to the same area for business purposes. Applicant testified that he 
is willing to sacrifice his life in case his country needs it, and he has pledged to defend 
the United States against any enemy. (AE A; AE E; AE W; Tr. 106-110.)  
 
During his time abroad, he made a number of real estate investments. He 
purchased a condo in FN when he worked there, but it has since been sold (SOR 
allegation 1.h). He also has signed over his share of his family’s home in FN to his 
sister. He does not stand to inherit any property in FN. He does own a plot of 
undeveloped land in FN with an estimated value of less than $20,000 (SOR allegation 
1.i). He also owns a condominium (SOR allegation 1.g) that is under construction in 
another foreign nation (FN2).  He bought it in approximately 2008, as an investment, 
when real estate in FN2 was booming. However, the economy declined and 
construction on the tower stopped. The property remains incomplete. The purchase 
price for this property four years ago was approximately $100,000. A colleague of 
Applicant’s indicated in his statement that FN2, “was the location which showed the 
greatest potential return on investment in real estate,” at that time and that in their line 
of work, it was reasonable for Applicant to make such a purchase. (AE F; AE L; GE 2; 
GE 3; Tr. 94-100.) 
 
Applicant estimated that less than 10% of his total real estate investments are 
abroad. He offered documentation to show that he has a number of real estate 
investments in the United States, including a rental property with three residential units, 
and a residence currently worth over $2.2 million. Applicant’s documented total net 
worth is estimated at between $5 million to $5.5 million. (AE L through AE V; Tr. 100-
101.) 
 
Prior to traveling out of the United States, Applicant goes through a number of 
security measures. He must obtain several licenses from the U.S. Government. The 
Government specifically approves several stages of his interactions with foreign 
governments. He notifies his office of any personal side trips that he conducts; including 
each time he has visited his family in FN. The government contractor gives him an 
approval letter indicating whether he can go or not. He is required to get the security 
department’s approval for all hotels and venues. Applicant has dutifully adhered to all of 
these security and licensing requirements throughout his career with the government 
contractor. (AE A; AE B; AE C; AE D; Tr. 44-45.) 
 
  Applicant has two brothers and one sister. All of his siblings are U.S. citizens 
and reside in the United States. Applicant resides in the same state as his two brothers 
and is close to them and their children. However, Applicant has one sister who is 
currently residing part of each year in FN, in order to care for their elderly father. 
 
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Applicant is very close with his mother-in-law, sister-in-law, and cousin, all of whom live 
in the United States and are U.S. citizens. (GE 1; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 52-54.) 
 
 Applicant’s father is a citizen and resident of FN (SOR allegation 1.a). 
Applicant’s father joined the city police force when he was young and had a successful 
career as a police officer. He rose through the ranks of the police force and eventually 
attained a senior level position. He retired in 1980. He maintains no government 
contacts. After his retirement, he became a farmer. Approximately 15 years ago, he 
retired from farming. Applicant sent money to his parents, through his sister, when his 
mother was alive (SOR allegation 1.j). However, he stopped sending money recently 
because his father does not need his support. Applicant’s father receives a minimal 
pension from his police work, but Applicant testified the pension was worth 
approximately $75 per month, and could not even purchase a single dose of medication 
with that amount. Applicant’s father is now frail and weak. Applicant last saw his father 
two weeks prior to the hearing. Applicant had been traveling in FN as part of his official 
duties and made a trip to see his father when he heard he was ill. At that time, his father 
could not get out of bed. Applicant does not speak to his father by phone because his 
father is hard of hearing. (GE 1; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 62-69.) 
 
Applicant’s has one sister who travels between the United States and FN in order 
to care for Applicant’s father (SOR allegation 1.b). She is a U.S. citizen and is married 
to a U.S. citizen. Their children are U.S. citizens and reside in the United States. She 
intends to return to the United States permanently after their father passes away. She 
owns a home in one U.S. state and an apartment in another U. S. state. Applicant does 
not communicate with his sister via email. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 71-74.) 
 
Applicant has an aunt that is a citizen and resident of FN (SOR allegation 1.c). 
She is a 78-year-old widow and has no children. She is supported by renting out part of 
her home. Applicant provides her no financial support. He only talks to her when he 
sees her, which occurs approximately once every six months. He has no email or phone 
communications with his aunt. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 78-81.) 
 
Applicant has one uncle who is a citizen and resident of FN (SOR allegation 1.d). 
He is a retired private attorney and is not in good health. Applicant only communicates 
with this uncle when he sees him in person, but testified that he is not close with this 
uncle. He last saw him in August 2010 at Applicant’s mother’s funeral. (GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 
81-85.) 
 
Applicant testified that he has three cousins that are citizens and residents of FN 
(SOR allegation 1.e). They all are the sons of his father’s eldest brother. The first is a 
retired food inspector. Applicant is not in contact with this cousin. Applicant last saw this 
cousin at his mother’s funeral. Applicant is also not in contact with his second cousin, 
who he has not seen or spoken to in 20 to 25 years. The final cousin is the head of a 
transportation company in FN. This cousin was present at Applicant’s mother’s funeral. 
He has seen this cousin professionally as part of Applicant’s work duties. (GE 2; GE 3; 
Tr. 85-89.) 
 
 
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Applicant’s college friend is now a senior government official with for FN (SOR 
allegation 1.f). They were social friends during college, but after college they did not 
keep in touch. They made contact again in a professional setting, as part of Applicant’s 
job duties 10 to 15 years after college. Applicant has seen the senior government official 
for FN four to five times since college, purely for business reasons. He would have met 
with him as part of his duties whether or not they knew each other in college. He has 
met with other senior government officials of other foreign nations as part of his official 
duties, as well. (AE B; Tr. 89-92.)  
 
Applicant is highly respected by a number of influential government contractors 
and leaders. The Chief Executive Officer of his company and Applicant’s supervisor, 
indicated: 
 
[Applicant] closely adheres to company and U.S. Government rules and 
policies. I have never known [Applicant] to willingly deviate from 
established policies. [Applicant] goes to great lengths to obtain approvals 
when needed. There are instances where he has inquired as to the correct 
procedure or policy for him to perform his job. Examples include: (1) the 
approval process for customer gratuities; (2) travel policies where 
[Applicant] needed to take emergency leave to attend to family illness; (3) 
procedures for reporting a project’s status up through company 
management; (4) procedures for sharing information with potential foreign 
national companies and partners; and (5) obtaining approvals for material 
to be presented to foreign national customers. (AE A.) 
 
 A high level executive at the government contractor who is a retired officer and 
has known Applicant professionally for four years indicated, “[Applicant] is one of 
[government contractor’s] best employees from both a technical and interpersonal 
aspect. His understanding of . . . systems to non-technical personnel makes him one of 
our strongest assets in our overseas business development efforts.” In a long 
declaration, espousing the virtues of Applicant, he indicated: 
 
The government should not be concerned with [Applicant’s] various family 
members being residents and citizens of [FN]. As I mentioned, [Applicant] 
has a strong record of following [government contractor’s] processes and 
in my opinion is a loyal American citizen. Should any of his family 
members become the target of any undue influence, I trust [Applicant] to 
do what is right for both [the government contractor] and the United 
States. (AE B.) 
 
 A retired military officer, who has worked with Applicant over the past seven 
years, also indicated Applicant is a man of high integrity. He wrote: 
 
Over the 7 past years I have personally known [Applicant], he has 
supported me on multiple international trips to discuss . . . systems. 
Throughout this period, [Applicant] consistently protected technical 
 
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information in an exemplary manner, often in the face of insistent 
customers unaware of the restrictions or limits . . . While doing so, 
[Applicant] remained polite yet firm, cooperative but firm in his 
presentation of material and data within the provisions of our licensed 
authority. (AE C.) 
 
 Applicant’s facility security officer (FSO) also wrote a letter on his behalf. The 
FSO indicated she has known Applicant for 20 years. During that time, Applicant 
showed “a strong commitment for adhering to the National Industrial Security Program.” 
In addition, she verified that Applicant is briefed annually on foreign travel, threat 
awareness, defensive security, security classifications, reporting requirements, IT 
Information Security Awareness and U. S. Export Controls. A record of Applicant’s 
completion of recent security training and other related courses was presented into 
evidence. (AE G; AE K.) 
 
 Other references also attested to Applicant’s loyalty, excellent judgment, and 
good character. All know Applicant to strictly adhere to all company and government 
policies. One co-worker indicated that “While abroad, [Applicant] usually only socializes 
with [government contractor] employees. When [Applicant] and I were traveling we 
usually had very little free time. When we did manage to go out, however, [Applicant] 
spent most of his time with me and other employees shopping.”  
 
Applicant has received a number of certificates and awards for his performance. 
His performance evaluations reflect he “exceeds requirements.” (AE E; AE I; AE J.)  
 
 FN has extensive terrorist networks operating within its borders, as detailed in 
HE I. Extremists, foreign insurgents, and militants have exerted a hold over certain 
regions in FN and use FN as a sanctuary. Attacks against both civilian and military 
targets have occurred across FN. The U.S. Department of State has identified a number 
of terrorist organizations still operating within the borders of FN, despite increased 
efforts by FN security forces. Identified terrorist organizations have operated in areas of 
FN to organize, train, and plan attacks against the United States and its allies in other 
nations. FN has demonstrated determination and persistence in combating militants it 
perceives to be dangerous to FN’s interests, particularly those involved in attacks in 
settled areas, but it still considers some militant groups to be important to its efforts to 
counter neighboring nation’s military and economic advantages. The Department of 
State warns U.S. citizens of the risks of traveling to FN in light of the threat of terrorist 
activity. Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness and capability to attack targets 
where Americans are known to congregate or visit in FN. Suicide bombings and attacks 
occur throughout FN on a regular basis. Also, several American citizens throughout FN 
have been kidnapped. (HE I.) 
 
Further, the human rights situation in FN remains poor. Major problems include 
extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances. Additional problems include poor 
prison conditions, arbitrary arrests, widespread government corruption, rape, honor 
crimes, and widespread trafficking in persons. The government of FN also maintains 
several domestic intelligence services that monitored politicians, political activities, 
 
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suspected terrorists, and the media. Credible reports indicate that authorities routinely 
used wire taps and intercepted and opened mail without requisite court approval, as 
well as monitoring mobile phones and electronic correspondence. (HE I.) 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, administrative judges apply the guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel.” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
 A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 The security concern for the Foreign Influence guideline is set out in AG ¶ 6: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
 The guideline notes nine conditions that could raise security concerns under AG 
¶ 7. Three are potentially applicable in this case: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
creates a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation. 
 
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(e) require substantial evidence of a “heightened risk.” The 
“heightened risk” required to raise one of these disqualifying conditions is a relatively 
low standard. “Heightened risk” denotes a risk greater than the normal risk inherent in 
having a family member living under a foreign government. The nature of a nation’s 
government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights record are 
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to 
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater 
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated 
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence 
operations against the United States. In considering the nature of the government, an 
administrative judge must also consider any terrorist activity in the country at issue. 
 
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(See generally ISCR Case No. 02-26130 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2006) (reversing 
decision to grant clearance where administrative judge did not consider terrorist activity 
in area where family members resided).) The Government introduced sufficient 
information with respect to FN to find a heightened risk present. FN has terrorists 
operating within its borders, it has a history of violating human rights, and it conducts 
surveillance on its own citizens and foreigners within its country. The Government failed 
to introduce any documentation establishing a heightened risk associated with FN2. 
 
The Government raised concerns over Applicant’s contacts in FN including his 
father, sister, aunt, uncle, cousins, and college friend. The totality of an applicant’s 
family ties to a foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be considered 
in light of the heightened risk identified. (ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App. Bd. 
Sep.22, 2003).) Disqualifying condition AG ¶ 7(a) applies. 
 
Applicant’s connections to FN, and persons within FN, could potentially create a 
conflict between Applicant’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and 
his desire to help persons in FN or FN itself. Therefore, disqualifying condition AG ¶ 7(b) 
also applies. 
 
The Government also raised concerns with respect to the property interests 
Applicant owns in FN and FN2.  Applicant has about $20,000 invested in FN. He 
invested an additional $200,000 in FN2. Applicant’s investment in FN2 does not raise a 
concern because no heightened risk was established in FN2. Further, considering his 
assets total over $5 million, including those in the United States, his investment in both 
FN and FN2 are not substantial within the meaning of AG ¶ 7(e). AG ¶ 7(e) is not 
disqualifying. 
 
 AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all 
of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which 
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in 
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a 
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, 
group, organization and the interests of the U.S.;  
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interests in favor of the U.S. interests;  
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; and 
 
 
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(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or 
are approved by the cognizant security authority; 
 
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the 
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are 
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is 
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the 
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of 
the U.S.” AG ¶ 8(a). The threat of terrorism and potential for coercion against 
Applicant’s father and sister in FN preclude application of this mitigating condition. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is 
no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the 
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such 
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be 
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” AG ¶ 8(b). 
Applicant has worked for his current employer for more than 30 years, and owns a 
home in the United States. Since 1993, he chose to commute out of the United States 
instead of live abroad, even though his work demands constant travel abroad. His net 
worth is over $5 million and 90% of his investments are located in the United States. His 
children and wife are U.S. citizens. All of his in-laws are United States citizens and 
reside in the United States. Most of his extended family including his two brothers are 
citizens and residents of the United States. Further, his dedication to the United States 
and his company’s mission has been tried and tested. He has acted honorably in 
carrying out the mission of his work in the face of continuously present threats. The 
Appeal Board has long recognized that: 
 
Where the applicant has established by credible, independent evidence 
that his compliance with security procedures and regulations occurred in 
the context of dangerous, high-risk circumstances in which the applicant 
had made a significant contribution to the national security. The presence 
of such circumstances can give credibility to an applicant’s assertion that 
he can be relied upon to recognize, resist, and report a foreign power’s 
attempts at coercion or exploitation.1 
 
Despite great risks to himself and family members, Applicant continues to serve 
the United States abroad.  He spoke passionately, sincerely, and credibly at the hearing 
about his love for the United States. He closely adheres to United States Government 
rules and policies and is extraordinarily well regarded by high level executives at his 
company that know him best. Even though he has family members and property in FN, I 
am satisfied that he will resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States. 
Accordingly, I conclude that this mitigating condition is established. 
 
Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated by showing that 
contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is 
                                                          
1 ISCR Case 05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. November 14, 2006.) 
 
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little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that contacts with an immediate family member in a foreign 
country are not casual. (ISCR Case No. 00-0484 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2002).) 
Applicant has frequent contact with his father and sister. He provided monetary support 
through his sister for his parents while his mother was alive. He sees his father, and 
sister who cares for him, frequently. This mitigating condition is not established with 
respect to his father and sister. However, I am satisfied that he would resolve the 
conflict in favor of the United States, for the reasons set out in the above discussion of 
AG ¶ 8(b). His contact with his aunt, uncle, cousins, and college friend are infrequent 
and casual. He only speaks to his aunt and uncle when he happens to see them in 
person. He makes no effort to communicate with them outside of instances where he 
happens to be in the same place at the same time. He last saw and communicated with 
two of his cousins in 2010. The third cousin, he has not seen or communicated with in 
20 to 25 years. He has only seen his college friend four-to-five times since college, and 
those meeting were purely professional. AG ¶ 8(c) applies with respect to aunt, uncle, 
cousins, and college friend.  
 
In addition, any contacts with his college friend were purely for official United 
States Government business. Each contact was approved by Applicant’s company’s 
security office and through the United States Government. References for Applicant 
indicated that he strictly adhered to all regulations and rules with respect to all business 
contacts. AG ¶ 8(d) applies with respect to Applicant’s college friend. 
  
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments 
under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were 
addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.  
 
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Applicant has personal ties to FN because his father and sister are present in FN 
and he also has a small piece of unimproved property in FN worth less than $20,000. All 
of his other ties to FN are either part of his official duties, or are casual and infrequent. 
On the other hand, Applicant has strong ties to the United States. His wife and children 
choose to reside in the United States. Applicant chooses to commute from the United 
States to his duties overseas. Applicant has a large amount of wealth invested in the 
United States. He has a large extended family in the United States. Further, Applicant 
has shown his devotion to the missions of the United States and his company. He 
diligently follows security rules and regulations. He is willing to put his life on the line to 
defend the United States.  
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant has mitigated the Foreign Influence security concerns.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.d:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.e:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.f:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.g:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.h:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.i:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.j:    For Applicant 
 
   
 
13 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to continue Applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
Jennifer I. Goldstein 
Administrative Judge