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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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--------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 10-00824
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Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
April 25, 2012
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Decision
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MOGUL, Martin H., Administrative Judge:
On September 29, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline
B for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG), effective after September 1, 2006. 
 
On October 11, 2011, Applicant replied to the SOR (RSOR) in writing, and he
requested a decision based on a hearing before an Administrative Judge. I received the
case assignment on January 24, 2012. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on February
16, 2012, and the hearing was convened on March 6, 2012. At the hearing, the
Government offered Exhibits 1 through 6, which were received without objection.
Applicant testified on his own behalf and submitted Exhibits A, through F, which were
also admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr) on
March 15, 2012. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and the testimony of
Applicant, eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
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Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to the Russian Federation (Russia).  The request and the attached documents
were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 6. The facts administratively noticed are set out
in the Findings of Fact, below. 
                                            Findings of Fact
In his RSOR, Applicant admitted SOR allegations 1.b., e., f., g., h., i., and j., and
he denied 1.a., c., and d. The admitted allegations are incorporated herein as findings of
fact. 
After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, including
Applicant's RSOR, the admitted documents, and the testimony of Applicant, and upon
due consideration of that evidence, I make the following additional findings of fact: 
Applicant is 52 years old. He has been married to his current wife from 1990 to
the present, and he was previously married from 1984 to 1986. Applicant has one son
from each marriage. 
Applicant was born in the former Soviet Union in 1959 and moved to the United
States in 1997. A month later his wife and five year old son came to the United States.
He has been a United States resident since then. He has not traveled outside the
United States since 2003.  Applicant became a naturalized United States citizen in
2005. Applicant’s son from his first marriage came to live in the United States in 2008.
He received a Masters of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering. Applicant is
employed by a defense contractor, and he seeks a DoD security clearance in
connection with his employment in the defense sector.
(Guideline B - Foreign Influence) 
The SOR lists 10 allegations regarding Foreign Influence, 1.a. through 1.j., under
Adjudicative Guideline B, which will be reviewed in the same order as they were listed
on the SOR:
 
1.a. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s spouse is a dual citizen of Russia
and the United States, and that she resides with Applicant in Russia. She previously
worked at the Russian Nuclear Facility (RNF) from May 1998 until August 1997.
Applicant denied this allegation in his RSOR. At the hearing, Applicant testified that his
spouse and he have resided only in the United States since 1997. (Tr at 40-41.) Based
on Applicant’s testimony, this allegation was amended to show that Applicant and his
spouse reside in the United States, not Russia. Applicant did admit in his RSOR and by
way of testimony that his wife had worked at the RNF. (Tr at 41-42.) 
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1.b. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant has one son, who is a citizen of
Russia and resides in the United States. He previously worked at the RNF. Applicant
testified that his son was a student and worked for two months as an intern for the RNF.
(Tr at 42.) In his RSOR, Applicant wrote that his son has worked in the United States for
more than three years, and he plans to apply to be a United States citizen when he is
eligible. 
1.c. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of
Russia. She previously worked at the RNF. Applicant testified that his mother died in
2011. (Tr at 42.)
1.d. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s father is a citizen and resident of
Russia. He previously worked at the RNF. He held a Russian Government security
clearance. Applicant testified that his father has been retired since 2006, but he had
been an Electrical Engineer and manager at the facility. Applicant speaks to him by
phone approximately two times a month. (Tr at 44-45.) 
1.e. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s sister and bother-in-law are citizens
and residents of Russia. They previously worked at the RNF. Applicant testified that his
sister only worked at the RNF for “a couple of years” and for all the rest of her life she
has been and is currently a housewife. His brother had also worked at the RFNC for a
few years, but then worked at a bookstore. Applicant does not know by whom his
brother is currently employed. Applicant testified that he has not spoken to his sister or
her husband since 2009, because of a falling out he had with them. (Tr at 45-47.) 
1.f. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s ex-wife is a citizen and resident of
Russia. She previously worked at the RNF. Applicant testified that his ex-wife had
worked at the RNF for approximately 20 years as a secretary, but she is now retired. He
has not spoken to her for several years, since their son came to the United States in
approximately 2006. (Tr at 47-50.) A character letter from Applicant’s son indicated that
he actually came to the United States in 2008. (Exhibit E.) 
1.g. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s Friend A is a citizen and resident of
Russia. She currently works at the RFNC. Applicant testified that Friend A works for the
RNF as a Chemical Engineer. He last spoke to her in 2010, just to socialize and to talk
about their children. She has been a friend since they went to grade school together. (Tr
at 50-51.) 
1.h. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s Friend B is a citizen and resident of
Russia. Applicant testified that Friend B is also a long term friend that he has known
since grade school. She is employed as a hotel administrator. He last spoke to her
sometime in 2011. They speak a few times a year just to socialize. (Tr at 51-53.) 
1.i. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s Friend C is a citizen and resident of
Russia. Applicant testified that this is a friend with whom he worked in the United
States, but the friend became unemployed and returned to Russia. Applicant’s contact
with Friend C is infrequent. (Tr at 53-55.) 
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1.j. It is alleged in the SOR that from March 1983 until July 1997, Applicant
worked at the RNF, and he held a Russian Government security clearance. Applicant
left this position and left Russia without giving notice and without receiving permission
from the Russia Government. In his RSOR, Applicant wrote that he and his family
received immigration visas from the United States, and he did not inform the Russian
Government, because he was afraid the Government would  not allow them to leave.
Applicant testified that he received the advice to leave Russia without giving notice to
the Russian Government at the American Embassy. He explained that while employed
at the RNF, he designed certain mechanisms, but since this was more than 15 years
ago, all of his information would be out of date. (Tr at 55-57.) 
Applicant testified that his Russian passport expired in 2005, and he has not
used it since he became a Unites States citizen. He surrendered the expired Russian
passport to the Security Officer of his current employer. Applicant lives in the house he
purchased in 2003 with his wife and the son from his current marriage. He believes the
value of the house is approximately $510,000. (Tr at 57-60.) Applicant indicated that he
would be willing to renounce his Russian citizenship, although he has heard from others
that it is a difficult thing to do. Applicant made it clear he has no reason to maintain his
Russian citizenship. (Tr at 78-79.)  
Mitigation
Applicant submitted three Performance Reviews for his last three years of
employment. In all three, his Overall Performance Rating was “Meets Job
Requirements.” (Exhibit A.) He also submitted five positive character letters from his
wife, his sons, and his friends. (Exhibits B through F.)  His friend described Applicant as,
“someone who has an excellent character, is a loving dad, is an honest and upstanding
citizen, a good friend with a high level of intelligence and commitment to succeed
against any odds.” Applicant’s older son wrote, “From the best of my knowledge my
father does not have any contacts with Russian or any other foreign government. He
also does not have any financial or business interests in Russia. I know he believes in
democratic and open society, he is honest and dedicated to United States.”
Current Status of Russia
I take administrative notice of the following facts regarding Russia: Russia is a
federation comprised of 21 republics. The Government has a centralized political
system, with power concentrated in the presidency, and the office of the prime minister,
a weak multiparty political system, and a ruling-party dominated bicameral legislature.
Russia is a nuclear superpower and a vast and diverse nation that continues to develop
politically, socially, and economically. 
Tensions between the United States and Russia have increased on a number of
issues that have contributed to ever-growing discord in U.S.-Russian relations. Russia
has an active ongoing intelligence collection program targeting the United States.
Russian espionage specializes in military technology and gas and oil industry technical
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expertise. Russia has provided various military and missile technologies to other
countries of security concern. Finally, Russia’s human rights record remains uneven
and poor in some areas. 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c),
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
“whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a
decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
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applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding Foreign Influence: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this
Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to
target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is
associated with a risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Those that could be applicable in this case include the following: AG ¶ 7
(a) “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion.” Applicant’s relatives and friends who are citizens and residents of Russia
makes AG ¶ 7(a) a concern to the Government. I find that AG ¶ 7(b) “connections to a
foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest
between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information . . . and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that
information,” is also applicable in this case.
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I find that AG ¶
8(b) “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the
individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest,” is applicable to this Applicant and controlling for the following reasons:  
Applicant moved to the United States in 1997, and has been a United States
resident since then. He became a naturalized United States citizen in 2005. Applicant’s
wife and two sons reside in the United States. His wife and younger son are United
States citizens, and his older son plans to  apply for U.S. citizenship when available. 
Applicant’s mother is deceased, and his father is long retired and not involved
with the Russian Government in any way. His contacts with the other Russian citizens
on the SOR have been casual and infrequent. Applicant owns a home in the United
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States valued at $510,000, and he has no assets outside of the country. While
Guideline C concerns were not alleged, Applicant has shown his preference for the
United States by turning over his lapsed Russian passport, and not using it once he
became a United States citizen. He also has indicated his willingness to renounce his
Russian citizenship, although it is not clear whether or not he is considered to be a dual
citizen by Russia. Based on all of these reasons, I conclude Guideline B for Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2 (c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
  
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Based on all of the reasons cited
above as to why mitigating condition AG ¶ 8(b) applies, considered together with the
positive character letter on behalf of Applicant, I find that the record evidence leaves me
with no significant questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a
security clearance under the whole-person concept. For all these reasons, I conclude
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.j.: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
Martin H. Mogul
Administrative Judge