Consisting of the transcript (Tr.), Government exhibits 1-10, and Applicant exhibits A-B.1
DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February2
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG)
effective within the DoD on 1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
XXXXXX, Xxxxx Xxx )       ISCR Case No. 10-09576
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: David F. Hayes, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  Applicant’s clearance is granted.1
On 27 September 2011 the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under
Guideline  H, Drug Involvement and Guideline E, Personal Conduct.  Applicant timely2
answered, requesting a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 8 December 2011,
and I convened a hearing 12 January 2012. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 22
January 2012.
W hich is, for all practical purposes, a duplicate of SOR 1.h.3
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations, except for SOR 1.e.  She is a 40-year-3
old systems integrator employed by a defense contractor since January 2011. She
seeks to retain the clearance she was issued in May 2002. Applicant is the divorced
mother of two daughters, who by her own account married too young because she was
pregnant with their first child, grew apart from her spouse over time, and divorced him
after 10 years of marriage in August 1999. However, they both remain very involved in
raising their daughters, the oldest of whom is now in college. Applicant received an
associate’s degree in information technology, and is working on her baccalaureate
degree.
After Applicant and her spouse divorced in August 1999, he filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy protection to escape his share of the liability for their joint debt. Applicant
was unable to pay the debts on her own, and on the advice of counsel, filed for Chapter
7 bankruptcy protection herself in October 2000. She was discharged of about $15,000
in debt in January 2001 (SOR 2.h). Applicant’s finances were fine until December 2008,
when she filed a second Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. This was the culmination of a
number of events beginning in 2006. Her debts were discharged in March 2009 (SOR
2.g).
In 2006, Applicant bought a house some distance from her work to try to provide
her daughters with a better quality of life than she thought they had living in a
townhouse closer to work. She moved far enough away from work so she could afford a
suitable house with a suitable yard. She did not really think about the commuting costs,
either in expense or commuting time. Indeed, in October 2006, she was fined $125 for a
misdemeanor reckless driving arrest in August 2006 (SOR 2.f), for speeding between
home and work. In addition, she had the automobile accident described below.
Eventually, Applicant and her daughters moved back to a townhouse closer to work.
Applicant rented her house for a while, and then tried to sell it, but was unable to do so
with the housing market collapse. The house was foreclosed upon. Applicant was
worried that the lender might pursue any deficiency after the foreclosure sale. By
December 2008, Applicant was well into what would be more than a year’s
unemployment after resigning her job in March 2008, and had unpaid medical bills, as
well as the remaining balance on a leased automobile that she could no longer afford.
Applicant completed the required financial counseling before her December 2008
filing. Since her January 2009 discharge, Applicant has nearly $3,000 positive monthly
cash flow (AE B; Tr. 55). She has one credit card with a $1,000 limit, a car payment,
and payments on her student loans and her daughter’s student loans. To reduce
expenses so that she and her ex-spouse can pay for their daughter’s college costs,
Applicant and her daughter moved into her ex-spouse’s three-storey house—not without
some friction. Applicant and her daughters live upstairs, her ex-spouse lives in the
basement, and they share the main-floor living areas.
This allegation was cross-alleged as disqualifying conduct under Guideline E (SOR 2.a), but has no additional4
security significance under that guideline, because the conduct alleged is fully cognizable under Guideline H,
where it properly belongs.
3
In November 2010, Applicant and her ex-spouse got into a verbal argument and
she threw a baseball bat at him. Although he was not hurt, their youngest daughter had
been frightened and called 911. The ex-spouse did not want to press charges, but the
police did so anyway. Applicant received probation before judgment in January 2011,
conditioned on a favorable psychiatric examination and completion of an anger
management course, both since accomplished. Applicant was released early from
active probation, but has a year of inactive probation before she can have her record
expunged (SOR 2. b).
In December 2006, Applicant mistakenly sent a classified document via
unclassified email (SOR 2.d). The error occurred because Applicant forgot to switch the
computer from unclassified email to classified email. She had never before worked on a
classified email system before. Applicant and the recipient immediately discovered the
mistake and reported it to her facility security officer. In January 2007, Applicant
received a written reprimand from her supervisor, and the entire division received
additional training from the agency on the importance of ensuring the computer was in
proper mode when sending classified documents.
In August 2006, Applicant was seriously injured in an automobile accident when
she was rear-ended by a car traveling 60 miles per hour while she was stopped in a
traffic tie-up on an interstate highway. Her recovery was extremely painful, and she was
prescribed vicodin and percocet until spring 2007. In spring 2007, Applicant obtained a
prescription painkiller from one of her coworkers, who had extra medication left over
from some recent dental work. Applicant’s physical condition was aggravated in
September 2007, when she fell and hurt her back and pelvis.
From spring 2007 to June 2008, Applicant used vicodin (SOR 1.a) and percocet
(SOR 1.b) without a prescription, and acquired both drugs without a prescription (SOR
1.c)—all while she held a security clearance (SOR 1.d).  From spring 2007 to late fall or4
early winter 2007, Applicant used vicodin and percocet about twice per month, 10-20
mg each time. From about November to December 2007, Applicant used the drugs two-
to-three times per week, 60-80 mg per use. From December 2007 to March 2008,
Applicant used the drugs daily, 60-80 mg per use. Initially, Applicant’s coworker just
gave her the pills. But over the last four months of her regular use, Applicant bought the
coworker lunch or gas in exchange for the pills.
When Applicant’s prescription abuse increased to daily use, and she was coming
to work late or calling in sick, she realized that she had become dependent. In early
2008, Applicant emailed her supervisor that she intended to resign her job because of
her prescription drug abuse. She felt that she had to leave the environment and the
source of her drugs to be able to stop using. Her supervisor gave the coworker 30 days
notice of termination, but told Applicant just to take a few days off and not resign.
The two terms appear to be used interchangeably, albeit by two different medical staffers. Colloquially,5
narcotic appears more a legal term; opiate a medical one. Nevertheless, allegations 1.e and 1.h are essentially
duplicate diagnoses made on the same day.
Although the doctor records Applicant’s self-description of drug dependence/opiate addiction, the doctor’s6
diagnosis is substance abuse.
This allegation was cross-alleged as disqualifying conduct under Guideline E (SOR 2.c), but has no additional7
security significance under that guideline, because the conduct alleged is fully cognizable under Guideline H,
where it properly belongs.
4
However, Applicant was unable to stop abusing prescription drugs in that environment,
and resigned from her job in March 2008.
Also in March 2008, Applicant sought medical help for her addiction. Initially, she
intended only to complain about her ongoing back pain to obtain more painkillers, but
once she got to the emergency room she decided to disclose her addiction and obtain a
referral for outpatient treatment. In the emergency room, her condition was variously
diagnosed as narcotics addiction (SOR 1.e) or opiate addiction (SOR 1.h).  She was5
treated in the emergency room, referred to addiction services to develop a treatment
plan, and prescribed a drug to help her detoxify—to be used as needed for untoward
withdrawal symptoms (GE 3). Two days later, Applicant had a followup appointment
with her doctor to address her opiate dependence.  Her doctor prescribed a different6
drug to help Applicant detoxify. After about two weeks, she was switched to a third drug
because the second drug made her nauseous. This drug made her feel worse than the
withdrawal symptoms, so she discarded the unused pills. Applicant looked into
rehabilitation programs for her substance abuse, but she was unable to find a suitable
outpatient program, and she was unable to afford the inpatient programs because she
was unemployed. She resolved to quit abusing prescription painkillers on her own.
Applicant suffered a couple of relapses between March 2008 and June 2008.
The relapses consisted of using four pills in a day, abstaining for about a month, then
using another four pills in a day. In June 2008, Applicant was returning home after
obtaining these prescription drugs. She had taken these painkillers before leaving for
home, but they took effect much quicker than she expected, and she began to feel tired.
She pulled to the side of the road to stop driving, and fell asleep. She was awakened by
a police officer knocking on her window, and eventually arrested for misdemeanor
public intoxication (SOR 1.f).  She did not contest the citation, but pre-paid an $80 fine,7
because she could not afford a lawyer. This was the last time she used prescription
painkillers without a prescription.
Since June 2008, Applicant has obtained vicodin four times by prescription for
pain management. Each time, the number of pills dispensed was enough to last a day
at the maximum dosage; two days at the minimum dose, with no refills. In June 2009,
she got 12 pills for hip pain (along with a prescription muscle relaxant). In October 2010,
she got another 12 pills for hip pain. In February 2010, she had a hip sprain and got 15
pills. About six weeks later, in March 2010, she got another 12 pills for severe menstrual
This allegation was cross-alleged as disqualifying conduct under Guideline E (SOR 2.e), but has no additional8
security significance under that guideline, because the conduct alleged is fully cognizable under Guideline H,
where it properly belongs. Further, the allegation lacks security significance under Guideline E because the
record clearly reveals that Applicant obtained the painkillers by prescription on only a few occasions, for
legitimate medical reasons, and in amounts consistent with those medical reasons.
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).9
5
cramps.  This was the last time she had any prescriptions for painkillers (Tr. 71).8
Applicant is willing to sign a statement of intent concerning future drug use as
contemplated by the Directive (Tr. 75).
Applicant has extremely favorable references from her supervisor, the agency
program managers for two programs Applicant works on, and a co-worker. All
recommend her for her clearance. None have seen any indication of substance abuse
problems or financial issues (AE A).
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors to be considered in evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative judges must
assess both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the
facts and circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair and impartial
commonsense consideration of the factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). The presence or absence
of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or against an applicant.
However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case can be
measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial
of access to classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence
as a whole, the relevant adjudicative guidelines are Guideline H (Drug Involvement) and
Guideline E (Personal Conduct).
.
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The government
must prove, by something less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted
facts alleged in the SOR. If it does, it establishes a baseline case against granting a
clearance. Applicant must then refute, extenuate, or mitigate the government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.9
¶25 (a) any drug abuse ; (c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture,10
purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; (d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical
professional . . . of drug abuse or drug dependence; (g) any illegal drug abuse after being granted a security
clearance;
¶ 26 (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that11
it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment [Emphasis supplied];
¶ 26 (b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as: (1) disassociation from drug12
using associates and contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; (3) an
appropriate period of abstinence;
¶ 26 (c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness during which these drugs were13
prescribed, and abuse has since ended [Emphasis supplied];
6
Analysis
The Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline H, by
demonstrating Applicant’s extensive prescription drug abuse between spring 2007 and
June 2008, during which time she obtained them without prescription and used them
while holding a clearance.  However, Applicant mitigated the security concerns.10
Without minimizing the security significance of prescription drug abuse, the important
fact is that Applicant was properly prescribed these painkillers to manage her pain after
a very serious car accident in August 2006, and only later segued into abuse and
dependence.
Drug involvement mitigating conditions give substantial support to Applicant. Her
prescription drug abuse was frequent, but was confined to a fairly narrow time period
that ended in June 2008, over 3½ years ago. Department Counsel correctly observes
that Applicant is likely to continue to have residual pain from her automobile accident
and other mishaps, but she demonstrated her willingness to obtain medical intervention
as needed to avoid dependence.  Further, she demonstrated intent to not abuse drugs11
in the future by avoiding abuse for more than three years and abstaining altogether for
more than two years, quitting her job to disassociate herself from her drug provider, and
limiting any additional use to medical necessity, by both frequency and quantity.  She12
has also stated a willingness to sign the statement of intent contemplated by the
Directive. While not as strong an indication of intent as actually signing such a letter, it
nevertheless indicates Applicant’s understanding of the practical consequences should
she return to prescription drug abuse. Finally, her prescription drug abuse followed a
severe injury and prolonged recovery that may not have been fully resolved when
Applicant started using the drugs without a prescription, and the abuse has since
ended.  I conclude Applicant is unlikely to abuse prescription drugs in the future.13
Accordingly, I resolve Guideline H for Applicant.
The Government established a case for disqualification under Guideline E.
However, Applicant mitigated the security concerns. First, SOR 2.a, 2.c, and 2.e, which
simply cross-reference drug allegations under SOR 1, raise no independent security
7
concerns under Guideline E because they are fully addressed under Guideline H.
Applicant’s two chapter 7 bankruptcy discharges (SOR 1.g and 1.h), ordinarily
cognizable under Guideline F, raise no issues of questionable judgment or unreliability.
Instead, choosing bankruptcy in these two instances demonstrates her good judgment.
Applicant’s January 2001 bankruptcy discharge was directly related to her
divorce and her ex-spouse’s decision to escape his share of the responsibility for their
joint debt. It would have been nearly impossible, if not irresponsible to her family
obligations, to have shouldered that indebtedness alone. Her March 2009 bankruptcy
discharge was directly related to what she thought was a sensible decision to improve
her daughters’ living circumstances by buying a house in a market she could afford, but
which turned out not to be a sensible commuting distance to Applicant’s job. By the time
she realized that fact, she found herself unable to sell her house because of the
collapse in the housing market and was unable to rent the house for enough to cover
her mortgage while renting closer to her work. Further, she received financial
counseling as part of her second bankruptcy, took significant action to reduce her living
expenses, and now has significant positive monthly cash flow. Her August 2006 citation
for reckless driving (speeding), for which she paid a fine, raises a minor question of
judgment, and indeed largely highlights the problems with buying a home so far from
her work. Her December 2006, security violation for sending a classified document out
over an unclassified email network, was a routine violation that she self-reported and
was reprimanded for, and which resulted in her company providing additional retraining
to all its employees about the need to ensure the email was correctly switched to the
secure network when sending classified documents. Her December 2010 domestic
violence arrest, for which she received probation before judgment, was indirectly related
to her financial situation because she was renting space in her ex-spouse’s house for
herself and her daughters. Applicant paid her fines, completed her required anger-
management training, and was released from active probation. While this arrest and the
2006 incidents raise security concerns under Guideline E, none of this conduct seems
likely to recur, and does not rise to a level requiring revocation of the clearance
Applicant has otherwise held without incident since May 2002. Accordingly, I resolve
Guideline E for Applicant. Nothing in the whole-person factors of AG &2(a) requires a
different result. Indeed, Applicant’s favorable work and character references
substantiate this result.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline H: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a-h: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a-h: For Applicant
8
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.  
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge