1 
 
 
                                                              
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
            DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
          
             
In the matter of: ) 
)
) ISCR Case No. 10-09670
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Richard A. Stevens, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se 
__________ 
 
Decision 
__________
TUIDER, Robert, Administrative Judge:
Applicant’s statement of reasons (SOR) lists five delinquent debts totaling
$28,383. Applicant made sufficient progress resolving his delinquent debts, and
financial considerations concerns are mitigated. However, he intentionally failed to fully
disclose his arrests on his May 20, 2010 Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) or security clearance application (SF-86), and personal conduct
concerns are not mitigated. Access to classified information is denied.
Statement of the Case 
On May 20, 2010, Applicant submitted an SF-86. (GE 1) On October 11, 2011,
the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued an SOR to Applicant,
pursuant to Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within
Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive),
dated January 2, 1992, as amended; and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) the President
promulgated on December 29, 2005.
 
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The SOR alleged security concerns under Guidelines F (financial considerations)
and E (personal conduct). (Hearing Exhibit (HE) 3) The SOR detailed reasons why
DOHA was unable to find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or
continue a s ecurity clearance for Applicant, and i t recommended that his case be
submitted to an administrative judge for a determination whether his clearance should
be granted, continued, denied, or revoked.
Applicant submitted an unsigned and undated response to the SOR. (HE 4) On
February 15, 2012, Department Counsel was prepared to proceed. On February 16,
2012, the case was assigned to me, and DOHA issued a hearing notice that same day,
setting the hearing for February 29, 2012. (HE 2) A brief hearing was held as
scheduled; however, Applicant was not present for the hearing. Applicant subsequently
advised that he did not attend his hearing because there was a family emergency. (Tr.
8-9)
On March 8, 2012, DOHA issued a hearing notice setting the hearing for March
15, 2012. The hearing was held using video teleconference. (HE 1) At the hearing,
Department Counsel offered six exhibits. (Transcript (Tr.) 10; GE 1-6) Applicant did not
offer any exhibits at his hearing. (Tr. 10, 29-32) I admitted GE 1-6. (Tr. 32) Additionally, I
admitted the SOR, response to the SOR, and the hearing notices. (HE 1-4) On March
15, 2012, and March 26, 2012, I received the hearing transcripts. I held the record open
until March 23, 2012. (Tr. 28-29, 73-74, 83) I received four exhibits after the hearing,
and they were admitted without objection. (AE 1-4)
Procedural Issues 
Department Counsel made a motion to withdraw the allegation in SOR ¶ 2.b, as
a duplication of SOR ¶ 2.d and the allegation in SOR ¶ 2.i, as not proven. (Tr. 14, 19-
20) Applicant did not object, and I granted the Department Counsel’s motions. (Tr. 14,
19-20) Applicant waived his right to 15 days’ notice of the date, time, and place of his
hearing. (Tr. 23-24)
Findings of Fact1 
Applicant did not sign and date the response to the SOR. (HE 4) At the hearing,
Applicant denied each of the SOR allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a to 1.e with explanations.
(Tr. 16-18) He admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 2.a, 2.c, 2.d, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, and he
denied the allegation in SOR ¶ 2.h. (Tr. 18-22; HE 3) His admissions are accepted as
findings of fact. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make
the following additional findings of fact.
 Applicant is a 26-year-old mechanical technician (repairs vehicle body damage),
who has been employed by a defense contractor since January 2011. (Tr. 39-42; GE 1)
In 2003, he graduated from high school. (Tr. 34-35) He has not attended college. (Tr.
1The facts in this decision do not specifically describe employment, names of witnesses or locations
in order to protect Applicant and his family’s privacy. The cited sources contain more specific information.
 
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37) He served in the Army from 2004-2006, including six months in Iraq. (Tr. 38; GE 1)
He worked for a defense contractor in Iraq from February to May 2008, and in Kuwait
from February 2009 to October 2009, performing technical inspections for equipment.
(Tr. 45-47) Applicant has never married, and he h as a t hree-year-old child. (Tr. 42)
Applicant’s mother has served in the U.S. Army for 20 years, and s he is currently
deployed to Afghanistan. (Tr. 35-36) In February 2011, Applicant deployed overseas to
Kuwait for his defense contractor employer, and eventually he deployed to Afghanistan.
(Tr. 40-41) He has never held a security clearance. (Tr. 33-34)
Financial Considerations 
The SOR alleges five delinquent debts totaling $28,383 as follows: 1.a is a
medical collection account, alleging a del inquent debt for $104 (Tr. 50-51); 1.b is a
delinquent debt owed to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) for
$3,328; 1.c is a delinquent debt for $629; 1.d is a collection account resulting from the
purchase of a laptop computer (Tr. 53), alleging a delinquent debt for $8,322; and 1.e is
a collection account from a vehicle (Tr. 54-55), alleging a delinquent debt for $16,000.
(HE 3) He disclosed his delinquent debts in his May 20, 2010 SF-86, his OPM interview,
and at his hearing. His finances were adversely affected by several brief periods of
unemployment.
Applicant said he paid the debt in SOR ¶ 1.a. (Tr. 50-51) He asked for the basis
for the debt to DFAS in SOR ¶ 1.b, and he did not receive a satisfactory explanation
from DFAS. (Tr. 51-52) He disputed his responsibility for the debt to DFAS. (Tr. 51-53)
As a federal debt, DFAS has the means to collect the remainder owed on this debt.
Applicant said he settled and paid the debts in SOR ¶¶ 1.c and 1.d. (Tr. 53-54)
On March 20, 2012, the creditor for the debt in SOR ¶ 1.d for $8,322 wrote that the
account was closed out when a c redit card payment on October 21, 2011 was
processed. (AE 4)
The debt in SOR ¶ 1.e resulted from a vehicle purchased in 2004 an d
repossessed. (Tr. 55-56) On March 20, 2012, the collection agent for the creditor in
SOR ¶ 1.e for $16,000 wrote that the debt was settled. (AE 3)
Applicant began providing approximately $1,000 per month of child support to his
child’s mother in January 2011. (Tr. 43-44) The child support is not court ordered. (Tr.
43)
In sum, Applicant provided proof that he paid his two largest debts for $8,322 and
$16,000. He said he paid two small debts for $104 and $629. He is disputing his DFAS
debt. He has taken reasonable actions to resolve all of his SOR debts.
Personal Conduct 
In 2005 and early 2006, Applicant engaged in a series of minor acts of
misconduct to obtain a discharge from the U.S. Army. (Tr. 56-58, 70; SOR ¶ 2.g) In May
 
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2006, Applicant was discharged for pattern of misconduct, and he received a general
discharge under honorable conditions.
In October 2006, Applicant presented the expired dependent identification card of
his stepbrother to a gate guard on a military installation.2 (Tr. 61-62; GE 2 at 148)
Applicant said he g rabbed the wrong identification car by accident out of the center
console of his vehicle. (Tr. 62) He was arrested, processed, and released. (GE 2 at 148)
The charge was dismissed. (GE 2 at 149) He did not list the arrest on his SF-86
because he “forgot about the incident.” (GE 2 at 149)
In March 2007, the police arrested Applicant for Driving While License
Suspended or Revoked. He was convicted and fined. (SOR ¶ 2.a; GE 2 at 148, 157; GE
3 at 92)
In July 2007, the police arrested Applicant for Failure to Appear in court for a
speeding ticket. The charge was dismissed after he paid a fine for the speeding ticket.
(SOR ¶ 2.c; GE 2 at 153, 155; GE 3 at 92-93)
In July 2007, the police arrested Applicant for Fleeing/Evading Police, Speeding,
and Driving Without a License. (Tr. 59-61; SOR ¶ 2.d; GE 3 at 93) He was found guilty
of Fleeing/Evading and S peeding. (GE 2 at 153, 157) The other charges were
dismissed. He received a fine and 12 months of probation.
In October 2009, the police arrested Applicant and took him to jail for Driving
While License Suspended or Revoked. He was found guilty, and he received a fine for
$2,655, and 12 months of probation. (SOR ¶ 2.e; GE 2 at 155; GE 3 at 93-94)
In June 2010, Applicant checked his criminal history and discovered he had an
outstanding warrant for failure to appear. (GE 2 at 152, 155) He paid $700 in fines to
resolve the issue. Id. Applicant’s traffic fines are paid. (Tr. 74) His driver’s license is not
suspended. (Tr. 74)
2 The SOR did not allege that in 2006 Applicant was arrested for presenting a false identification
card, that in June 2010 he discovered he had a standing arrest warrant for failure to appear, or that he
presented inconsistent statements about why he failed to fully disclose his arrest record on his May 20,
2010 SF-86. In ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 4 ( App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006) the Appeal Board listed five
circumstances in which conduct not alleged in an SOR may be considered stating:
(a) to assess an ap plicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of
extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c) to consider whether an applicant
has demonstrated successful rehabilitation; (d) to decide whether a particular provision of
the Adjudicative Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole person
analysis under Directive Section 6.3.
Id. (citing ISCR Case No. 02-07218 at 3 (App. Bd. Mar. 15, 2004); ISCR Case No. 00-0633 at 3 (App. Bd.
Oct. 24, 2003)). His non-SOR arrest for presenting a false identification card is supporting evidence in
relation to SOR ¶ 2.h (failure to accurately list arrests on his May 20, 2010 SF-86). Consideration of the
other non-SOR allegations is limited to the five reasons listed in the quotation above.
 
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Applicant’s May 20, 2010 SF-86 in Section 22, Your Police Record, asked “For
questions a. and b., respond for the time frame of the last seven years . . . a. Have you
been issued a summons, citation, or ticket to appear in court in a criminal proceeding
against you; . . . and b. Have you been arrested by any police officer, sheriff, marshal,
or any other type of law enforcement officer?” (SOR ¶ 2.h) Applicant responded, “Yes”
and disclosed an arrest in February 2006. (Tr. 66; GE 1 at 47 of 56) He provided the
state and town of the arrest, and he indicated the offense was “failure to pay and appear
in court for traffic violation” and the action taken, “paid fine and penalties.” (GE 1 at 47
of 45) He did not disclose the other arrests described in this section in section 22 of his
SF-86. He did not disclose any additional arrests in the additional comments section of
his SF-86. (GE 1 at 56 of 56) Applicant completed his SF-86, mailed it to his company,
and it was returned two or three times for corrections. (Tr. 64-65) When he responded
to a DOHA interrogatory, he ad mitted one additional arrest. (Tr. 67)3 At his hearing,
Applicant explained why he did not disclose the additional arrests as follows:
I just didn’t recall them, sir. I didn’t recall them all of[f] the top of my head.
And I tried to – when I did my e-QIP originally, the question said, “Have
you ever been arrested,” etc. And I just tried to group them all together,
because they were all the same charge, they were all speeding charges,
so I tried to put one down as a group. I have been arrested for speeding
. . . I was unaware that each one had to be written out. . . . I tried to group
them all together because they were the same type of charges, sir. . .
They were all traffic violations. That’s why I tried to group them under
traffic violations. (Tr. 68-69)
In sum, Applicant was arrested five times from October 2006 to October 2009.
He only disclosed one arrest on hi s March 20, 2010 SF-86. He did not provide
consistent explanations for failing to disclose an accurate arrest record.
Policies
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,
emphasizing that, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy 
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the
authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id.
at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.
3On July 9, 2010, Applicant told an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) investigator as part
of his personal subject interview (PSI) that he did not list more arrests “because they were for petty stuff
that most of them were for a failure to appear in court for previous speeding tickets. . . . [, and he] has a
spotty and unreliable memory.” (GE 2 at 157) On August 29, 2011, he affirmed the accuracy of his OPM
PSI. (GE 2 at 158)
 
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Eligibility for a s ecurity clearance is predicated upon meeting the criteria
contained in the adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not inflexible rules
of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are
applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Adverse
clearance decisions are made “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be
a determination as to the loyalty of the [a]pplicant concerned.” See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.
See also Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), § 3. Thus, nothing in this decision
should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on
any express or implied determination as to applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism.
It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines
presume a n exus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).
Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue [his or her] security
clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). The burden of
disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No.
02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err,
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).
 
Analysis 
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all
appropriate legal precepts, factors, and conditions, I conclude the relevant security
concerns are under Guidelines F (financial considerations) and E (personal conduct).
 
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Financial Considerations 
AG ¶ 18 articulates the security concern relating to financial problems:
Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and r egulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate
funds.
AG ¶ 19 provides two disqualifying conditions that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying in this case: “(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;” and
“(c) a hi story of not meeting financial obligations.” In ISCR Case No. 08-12184 at 7
(App. Bd. Jan. 7, 2010), the Appeal Board explained:
It is well-settled that adverse information from a credit report can normally
meet the substantial evidence standard and the government’s obligations
under [Directive] ¶ E3.1.14 for pertinent allegations. At that point, the
burden shifts to applicant to establish either that [he or] she is not
responsible for the debt or that matters in mitigation apply.
(internal citation omitted). Applicant’s history of delinquent debt is documented in his
SF-86, credit reports, his OPM interview, and his hearing record. Applicant’s SOR
alleges five delinquent debts totaling $28,383. The Government established the
disqualifying conditions in AG ¶¶ 19(a) and 19(c), requiring additional inquiry about the
possible applicability of mitigating conditions.
Five mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 20 are potentially applicable:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on t he individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment;
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely
beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a b usiness
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a deat h, divorce or
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is
under control;
(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or
otherwise resolve debts; and
 
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(e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the
past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides
evidence of actions to resolve the issue.
Applicant’s conduct in resolving his debts warrants application of AG ¶¶ 2 0(b)
and 20(d).4 Applicant’s financial situation was damaged by his unemployment. He
provided proof that he paid his two largest debts for $8,322 and $16,000. His statement
without receipts that he paid two small debts for $104 and $629 is accepted as
accurate. He showed some good faith when he admitted responsibility for some of his
SOR debts on his SF-86, to the OPM investigator, and at his hearing.
Applicant disputes his responsibility for the DFAS debt, and AG ¶ 20(e) applies to
the debt in SOR ¶ 1.b. He has taken reasonable actions to resolve all of his SOR debts.
He maintained contact with some of his SOR creditors, and he attempted to negotiate
some payment plans.5 There is sufficient evidence that his financial problem is being
resolved and is under control. His recent track record of voluntary payments to his SOR
creditors support a conclusion that he will pay his debt to DFAS, if his dispute is
unsuccessful and resolve his debts as they arise.
Personal Conduct 
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and r egulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
4The Appeal Board has previously explained what constitutes a “good faith” effort to repay
overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts:
In order to qualify for application of [the “good faith” mitigating condition], an applicant
must present evidence showing either a good -faith effort to repay overdue creditors or
some other good-faith action aimed at resolving the applicant’s debts. The Directive does
not define the term “good-faith.” However, the Board has indicated that the concept of
good-faith “requires a showing that a person acts in a way that shows reasonableness,
prudence, honesty, and adherence to duty or obligation.” Accordingly, an applicant must
do more than merely show that he or she relied on a legally available option (such as
bankruptcy) in order to claim the benefit of [the “good faith” mitigating condition].
(internal citation and footnote omitted) ISCR Case No. 02-30304 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 20, 2004) (quoting
ISCR Case No. 99-9020 at 5-6 (App. Bd. June 4, 2001)).
5“Even if Applicant’s financial difficulties initially arose, in whole or in part, due to circumstances
outside his [or her] control, the Judge could still consider whether Applicant has since acted in a
reasonable manner when dealing with those financial difficulties.” ISCR Case No. 05-11366 at 4 n.9 (App.
Bd. Jan. 12, 2007) (citing ISCR Case No. 99-0462 at 4 (App. Bd. May 25, 2000); ISCR Case No. 99-0012
at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 1, 1999); ISCR Case No. 03-13096 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 29, 2005)). A component is
whether he or she maintained contact with creditors and attempted to negotiate partial payments to keep
debts current.
 
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classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes five conditions that could raise a security concern in this case:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative;
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information;
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse
determination, but which, when combined with all available information
supports a w hole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply
with rules and r egulations, or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes
but is not limited to consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or unreliable
behavior . . . ; and (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations . . . ; and
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing . . . .
AG ¶ 16(c) does not apply. Applicant’s falsification of his March 20, 2010 SF-86
is specifically covered under the personal conduct guideline. His falsification is sufficient
by itself under Guideline E for an adverse determination.
AG ¶¶ 16(a), 16(d), and 16(e) apply. Applicant was arrested five times from
October 2006 to October 2009. His pattern of minor criminal conduct would not be
sufficient to warrant denial of his security clearance alone. However, in combination with
his intentional disclosure of only one arrest on his March 20, 2010 SF-86, there is
 
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sufficient evidence to establish AG ¶¶ 16(a), 16(b), and 16(d). Applicant’s five arrests
and falsification of his March 20, 2010 SF-86 create a vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress, because he engaged in activities which, if known, adversely
affect his personal, professional, and community standing.
AG ¶ 17 provides seven conditions that could mitigate security concerns
including:
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was
caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of
authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual
specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made
aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the
individual cooperated fully and truthfully;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules
and regulations.
None of the mitigating conditions apply. Applicant was arrested five times from
October 2006 to October 2009. He only disclosed one arrest on his March 20, 2010 SF-
86. He did not provide consistent explanations for failing to disclose an accurate arrest
record. On July 9, 2010, he told an OPM investigator as part of his PSI that he did not
list more arrests “because they were for petty stuff[,] most of them were for a failure to
appear in court for previous speeding tickets. . . . [ , and he] has a spotty and unreliable
memory.” (GE 2 at 157) At his hearing, he said he di d not remember the arrests.
Alternatively, he said he tried to group them together as “speeding charges” because
 
11
they were all traffic offenses; however, none of his arrests were for speeding. The five
arrests were for presenting a false identification card, driving without a valid license or
driving with a suspended license (three times), failing to appear in court, and fleeing the
police. He also claimed that he thought he did not have to list all offenses; however,
elsewhere on his SF-86, he listed multiple delinquent debts.
No one misled him into thinking complete information about his arrests should
not be reported on his SF-86. The questions are clear; he is intelligent; and he
understood that full negative arrest information was reportable. His explanation for
failing to fully report all of his arrests is not credible. His false statement on his March
20, 2010 SF-86 is serious and relatively recent. Personal conduct concerns are not
mitigated.  
Whole-Person Concept 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider
the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and r ecency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments
under Guidelines F and E in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a)
were addressed under those two guidelines, but some warrant additional comment.
There are some facts supporting mitigation of security concerns under the whole-
person concept; however, they are insufficient to fully mitigate security concerns. There
is no d erogatory information concerning illegal drug possession or use, or alcohol-
related incidents. He is loyal to the United States. He is a 26-year-old mechanical
technician, who has been employed by a defense contractor since January 2011. He is
a high school graduate. He worked for other defense contractors in Iraq from February
to May 2008, and in Kuwait from February 2009 to October 2009, performing technical
inspections for equipment. In February 2011, Applicant deployed overseas to Kuwait for
a defense contractor, and ev entually he depl oyed to Afghanistan. He is sufficiently
intelligent and mature to understand and comply with security requirements. His
finances were adversely affected by relatively brief periods of unemployment. He
understands what he must do to establish his financial responsibility. He is paying child
 
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support for his three-year-old child. He paid four SOR debts, and he will pay his
remaining SOR debt should his ongoing dispute with DFAS be unsuccessful.
The personal conduct evidence tending to support denial of Applicant’s clearance
is more significant than the factors weighing towards approval of his clearance at this
time. Applicant was arrested five times from October 2006 to October 2009. He only
disclosed one arrest on his March 20, 2010 SF-86. The five arrests were for presenting
a false identification card, driving without a valid license or driving with a s uspended
license (three times), failing to appear in court, and fleeing the police. He did not provide
a credible explanation for failing to disclose all of his arrests on his March 20, 2010 SF-
86. Applicant’s intentional failure to disclose derogatory arrest information on his March
20, 2010 SF-86 is recent, serious, and not mitigated.
I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518 ( 1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and t he AGs, to the facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude Applicant has fully
mitigated the financial consideration security concerns; however, personal conduct
security concerns are not mitigated.
 
Formal Findings 
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a to 1.e: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant (Withdrawn)
Subparagraphs 2.c to 2.h: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.i: For Applicant (Withdrawn)
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a s ecurity
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
____________________________
Robert Tuider
Administrative Judge