1
                                                                     
                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-02673
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was born and raised in Pakistan. He obtained permanent U.S.
residence through an immigration amnesty program in the late-eighties and became a
citizen in 2005. He has no assets or close family members in this country. His mother
and sister, who teaches at a Pakistani military college, live in Pakistan. He failed to
mitigate resulting security concerns. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits,
and testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 86) on November 25,
2009. On January 4, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under
Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
effective within the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
GE 1; Tr. 11, 35-37.1
AR.2
GE 2.3
GE 1; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 34-38.4
2
Applicant answered the SOR in writing (AR) on February 7, 2011, and requested
a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed
on March 2, 2011, and the case was assigned to me on March 10, 2011. The case was
reassigned among different judges in August and November 2011 while unsuccessfully
attempting to accommodate Applicant’s travel schedule to and from his overseas work
assignments, or to conduct his hearing via video teleconference. 
The case was reassigned to me on December 1, 2011. DOHA issued a Notice of
Hearing on December 19, 2011, and I convened the hearing, as rescheduled due to
inclement weather, on January 20, 2012. The Government offered exhibits (GE) 1
through 3, which were admitted without objection. The Government also offered hearing
exhibit (HE) I, and administrative notice documents (AN) I through VIII, in support of the
HE I request that I take administrative notice of the facts contained therein concerning
Pakistan. Applicant had no objection to the requested administrative notice. Applicant
offered exhibit (AE) A, which was admitted without objection, and testified on his own
behalf. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on January 30, 2012.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 44-year-old employee of a defense contractor, where he has
worked for more than two years. He has never held a security clearance. He has no
military service, and earned a bachelor’s degree in pre-engineering/physics at a college
in Pakistan during the mid-eighties. He has never married and has no children.  In his1
response to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, and 1.b, and
denied those in SOR ¶¶ 1.c through 1.f.  Applicant’s admissions, including his2
responses to DOHA interrogatories,  are incorporated in the following findings.3
Applicant was born and raised in Pakistan. His father, who passed away in 1993
or 1994, was a superintendent of the Pakistani national police. Applicant’s last visit to
Pakistan was for his father’s funeral. His mother did not work outside their home during
his childhood, but recently taught religious studies to students who stayed in her home.
Applicant paid a smuggler to help him illegally immigrate to the United States after he
completed college during the mid-1980s. He worked in agriculture jobs and drove a taxi.
In 1989, he was granted permanent U.S. residence under the temporary amnesty laws
that were passed. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen on January 24, 2005.  4
Applicant says that he has no savings or assets in either Pakistan or the United
States. He purchased a home in 2006, but it has steadily lost value and is now worth
less than he owes in mortgage debt. He is current on those payments. He also owns a
GE 1; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 36, 60-655
GE 2; Tr. 44-49, 53-54, 59-60.6
GE 1; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 50-52.7
Tr. 70.8
AE A; Tr. 39-44, 54, 70-72. 9
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town car and limousine service company, but other people are managing it for him while
he is working overseas and he said it has no net value.  5
Applicant’s mother is 64 years old and a citizen of Pakistan. She obtained U.S.
permanent resident status in 2007, but did not like living here and moved back to
Pakistan in 2008 where she resided continuously until returning to the United States
with Applicant in late December 2011. He had almost daily telephone contact with her
during that time. Applicant hoped that she would remain at his home with a longtime
friend who also lives there, but said that she would probably return to Pakistan since he
was returning overseas to work and she would be lonely. His mother still owns their
family home in Pakistan. He is unsure how long she will stay there if she goes back.6
Applicant’s sister and brother-in-law are also citizens and residents of Pakistan.
She is his only sibling, and works as a teacher at an elite Pakistani military college. Her
husband is a real estate agent. Except when he is working overseas and
communications are more difficult, Applicant said that he talked to his sister four to eight
times per month by telephone. He talked to his brother-in-law when he would call and
neither his mother nor sister was available, but rarely called for the sole purpose of
talking to him.  Concerning his mother and sister, Applicant testified:7
The family, the family ties, I will keep taking care of my mother, my sister.
Nobody will stop me. That’s my duty. They are all - - she is old and she
needs my help. So this is the time when the sons come to play. She is
with me as long as she stay here. She will stay here forever if she wants
to stay here. She is weak in the eyes and she’s weak on the - - healthwise
but it’s with the doctors - - whatever the doctor recommend, she will do it.8
Applicant’s duties involve working overseas in support of U.S. military forces as a
translator. He originally worked for a U.S. Marine Corps colonel in command of a
combat unit, to facilitate communications with the local population and leaders. In
September 2010 he was severely injured by an Improvised Exploding Device (IED) that
detonated near him. He was evacuated to Germany and then to a hospital in the United
States for spinal surgery. As soon as he was released from the hospital, he attempted
to return to his unit but was ordered to return to the U.S. for three months of
convalescence. He then resumed working overseas, but was assigned to non-combat-
related duties assisting the chief contracting officer at an Army facility to ensure that
contract funds are properly spent on the projects for which they are intended.  9
GE 3; Tr. 54-56.10
GE 3; Tr. 57-58.11
GE 3; Tr. 47, 59-60.12
AE A.13
4
Applicant’s two aunts and uncle who are resident citizens of Pakistan, as alleged
in SOR ¶ 1.c, are his mother’s sisters and brother. The uncle is a doctor, who helps look
after his mother when she is in Pakistan. He communicates a couple times a year with
these relatives, usually in connection with holiday well wishes.10
Applicant also has a cousin who is more of a friend than a close relative. Their
contact has recently been infrequent. This man owns a smoke shop business in the
United States, but maintains his residence in Pakistan and travels back and forth.
Applicant is unsure of his citizenship status.  11
The friend alleged in SOR ¶ 1.f is a U.S. citizen who was born and raised in
Pakistan. At the time of the hearing, he was residing in Applicant’s home in the United
States, and planned to remain there as long as Applicant’s mother remained and
needed assistance.  12
Other than as noted above, Applicant provided no evidence concerning the
quality of his professional performance, or the degree of independent responsibility
involved in his present work. The deployed Army contracting officer for whom he worked
starting in January 2011 provided a letter describing his IED injury and subsequent
return to work after undergoing surgery.  Applicant provided no other evidence from13
any acquaintances, coworkers, supervisors, or family members concerning his
character, or his reputation for trustworthiness, responsibility, or integrity. 
I took administrative notice of the facts set forth in HE I concerning the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, which are incorporated herein by reference. Of particular
significance are the poor human rights situation; the active and hostile presence of Al
Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist groups; and concerns over weapons and nuclear
technology transfers and cooperation with countries including North Korea, Iran, Libya,
and China.   
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
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These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
Tr. 21-22, 67.14
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consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel argued that substantial evidence in this case
established two, and possibly three, of them: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion.14
Pakistan has significant internal anti-western terrorism threats, and a history of
security-related technology proliferation and transfers, contrary to U.S. interests.
Accordingly, connections there have more potential to generate heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶¶ 7(a)
and (d) than would similar connections in many other countries. 
Applicant shared living quarters with his mother during her relatively brief visits to
the United States starting in 2007 and 2011. During her prior and interim periods living
in Pakistan, he had close and frequent contact with her by telephone. He also has
regular and ongoing contact with his sister, who teaches at an elite Pakistani military
college. He honestly expressed his natural and commendable feelings of a deep duty to
look out for his mother’s and sister’s welfare. He has less frequent contacts and more
distant relationships with his brother-in-law, aunts, and uncles who are also resident
citizens of Pakistan. However, through his close and loving relationship with his mother,
he has an entirely legitimate, serious interest in the welfare of her sisters and brother,
as well as his sister’s family.
These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising all three of
the aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s contacts, relationships, and
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connections with Pakistan through his relatives there shift a heavy burden to him to
prove mitigation under applicable Appeal Board precedent. 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a), (b), and (d) security concerns are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Considered in light of the substantial anti-western terrorism threat and history of
security-related technology transfer problems in Pakistan, Applicant did not demonstrate
that it is unlikely he could be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual or government and those of the U.S. due to his family
ties there. Even though he has not personally visited Pakistan since his father’s funeral,
he has close relationships with his mother and sister, both of whom have ongoing
relationships with other close relatives who are resident citizens there. His sister’s
position as a teacher in an elite Pakistani military college is also significant. His
communication and contact with his Pakistani family members since he came to the
U.S. were neither casual nor infrequent. Accordingly, he failed to establish the mitigating
conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8 (a) and (c).
The evidence also fails to establish significant mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant was adamant that he had no assets in the United States. Both the home and
business that he owns apparently involve more debt than equity. His only close family
member here was his mother, who returned to live in Pakistan shortly after being
granted permanent U.S. residence in 2007 because she did not like living here. She had
recently returned here with Applicant, but was unlikely to remain once he returned
overseas shortly after his hearing. Applicant was seriously injured while serving as a
contract interpreter/translator for a U.S. Marine Corps combat unit, but did not establish
that he sought or accepted that lucrative employment for reasons that would sufficiently
demonstrate deep or longstanding U.S. relationships or loyalties under Appeal Board
precedent.
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Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct is not in
question here. He is a mature, educated, and experienced individual, who has acted
responsibly and provided valuable service to U.S. military forces deployed in combat.
However, the inherent potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress from the
presence and, in this case, government connections of Applicant’s immediate Pakistani
family members, remains unmitigated. Placing Applicant in a position wherein it is
foreseeable that he could be forced to choose between the security interests of the
United States and the interests of his mother or sister is the harm to be avoided. He
failed to show that such potential has diminished. 
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He failed to meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign influence considerations.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge