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    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
  DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
  
  
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 10-04803 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Ray Blank, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Alan Edmunds, Esq. 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HEINY, Claude R., Administrative Judge: 
 
 Applicant’s brother and parents are citizens and residents of Egypt. His parents 
are permanent legal residents of the United States. His brother has applied for a U.S. 
visa and is waiting for the processing of that request to be completed. Once the visa is 
issued, they will all come to the United States. Applicant has rebutted or mitigated the 
security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. Clearance is granted. 
 
History of the Case 
 
 Applicant contests the Department of Defense’s (DoD) intent to deny or revoke 
his eligibility for an industrial security clearance. Acting under the relevant Executive 
Order and DoD Directive,1 the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued 
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on August 26, 2011, detailing security concerns under 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence. 
  
                                                          
1
 Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines 
(AG) effective within the DoD on September 1, 2006. 
 
2 
 On November 23, 2011, Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing. 
On April 9, 2012, I was assigned the case. On March 13, 2012 and April 2, 2012, DOHA 
issued Notices of Hearing for the hearing held on April 12, 2012.  
 
 The Government offered exhibits (Ex.) one through three, which were admitted 
into evidence without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Exhibits A through J, 
which were admitted into evidence without objection. On April 23, 2012, DOHA received 
the hearing transcript (Tr.). 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
In Applicant’s Answer to the SOR, he admitted his parents and brother are 
citizens and residents of Egypt. After a thorough review of the pleadings and exhibits, I 
make the following findings of fact. 
 
 Applicant is a 34-year-old system administrator who has worked for a defense 
contractor since July 2011. In January 2008, he worked as a linguist for the U.S. Army. 
He has spent 46 months working for defense contractors in Kuwait, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. He was stationed in Kuwait in October 2008 – March 2009, in Afghanistan 
August 2009 – January 2010, and in Iraq January 2008 – April 2009, and June 2010 – 
July 2011. (Ex. 2, Tr. 75, 78, 79, 80) He was the personal linguist for an Army brigadier 
general. (Ex. I, Tr. 73) He seeks to maintain a security clearance. (Ex. A) Immediately 
after arriving in Iraq, he underwent one of the worst periods of rocket and mortar attacks 
experienced in Baghdad’s International Zone. He also came under hostile fire in 
Afghanistan. (Tr. 120)  
Applicant’s co-workers, supervisors, and friends state: Applicant is reliable, 
dedicated, a true professional and team player of the highest moral character and 
integrity. (Ex. I) In December 2011, he received a monetary award for outstanding duty 
performance. (Exs. C and D) He is able to handle a high-volume workload. (Ex. I) He 
demonstrates superb leadership and management skills.  
A Marine Corps major, who lived and worked with Applicant for six months in 
Iraq, was very impressed with Applicant’s duty performance and formed a positive 
opinion of him. (Tr. 36) He stated Applicant is a hard worker, honest, loyal, would not be 
vulnerable to pressure, coercion, or exploitation, and would be a valuable asset in any 
capacity in which he served. (Tr. 40 - 46) His supervisor who worked with him daily in 
Iraq and Kuwait believes Applicant to be honest, trustworthy, and a good asset to the 
company. (Tr. 50 – 62).  
 
Applicant was born in Egypt and became a U.S. citizen in September 2006. (Ex. 
1) When he became a U.S. citizen, he renounced all loyalty and allegiance to Egypt. In 
December 1995, when he came to the U.S. on a student visa, he was 18 years old and 
had just finished high school. (Tr. 65) At the time, his older brother was also a student in 
the U.S. In December 2004, he obtained a bachelor’s of science degree in computer 
network management from a U.S. college. In 2008, he earned a master’s in business. 
(Tr. 67) He is married to a native-born U.S. citizen. They have two sons ages five and 
 
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three. (Ex. 1, Tr. 68) They moved and now live close to her parents. (Tr. 115) He owns 
no property or assets outside of the U.S. (Tr. 68) He has approximately $100,000 of 
assets in the U.S. (Tr. 136)  
 
In 1975, prior to Applicant’s birth, his father retired from the Egyptian Navy as a 
captain. (Tr. 87) He then worked as a supply boat captain in the private sector until he 
retired in 2010. (Tr. 87, 99, 104, 109) Applicant’s mother was a homemaker. (Ex. 2, Tr. 
89) His parents and older brother are permanent legal residents of the United States. 
(Ex. J) His mother received her green card in 2008 and his father received his in April 
2011. (Tr. 109, 115) His older brother has filed for U.S. citizenship, has a case number, 
and should receive his U.S. citizenship within the next few months. (Tr. 92, 105) His 
mother is eligible to file for U.S. citizenship and will soon do so. (Tr. 92)  
 
Applicant’s other brother is a citizen of Egypt and was working as an engineer for 
an oil company in Dubai. (Tr. 125) This brother is seeking an E-2 investor’s visa to allow 
him to reside in the U.S. (Tr. 118) His brothers are seven and nine years older than him. 
(Tr. 106)  
 
 After Applicant married and had children, his mother started coming to the United 
States every year to see her grandchildren. (Tr. 107) As soon as his father retired, his 
father visited Applicant’s older brother for a year and a half. (Tr. 109) For the last few 
years, Applicant’s parents have been living in the U.S. with Applicant’s older brother (Tr. 
88) His parents would spend nine months in the U.S. and two or three in Egypt. After his 
father received his green card in April 2011, his parents returned to Egypt to sell their 
assets so they can proceed with their son’s E2 visa. (Tr. 87, 90, 109) The assets, which 
included apartments, cars, and vehicles, have now been sold and they plan on moving 
to the United States within the next few months. (Tr. 125) They are waiting for the 
brother’s paperwork to be processed.  
 
 The family has decided to invest most of his older brother’s savings and his 
father’s retirement account into a pizza business in the United States. (Tr. 91) 
Applicant’s older brother already owns two pizza shops. (Tr. 91) Applicant has frequent 
contact with his parents. (Tr. 108) None of his relatives are involved in politics. (Tr. 122)  
 
 Applicant understands the concern of having relatives in a foreign country. (Tr. 
122) He states he swore an oath to protect the U.S. Constitution and would never 
compromise information. (Tr. 95) He would report any incidents regarding his family to 
his security officer or the military police. (Tr. 96) Due to his wife and children, the 
amount of time he has living in the U.S., the training he has received, and his 
employment for the last four years, he would protect U.S. interests. (Tr. 125) He 
understands the importance of a security clearance. (Tr. 127) His loyalty is with the U.S. 
He chose to put himself in harm’s way to serve his country and help the U.S. military.  
 
 
 
 
 
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Request for Administrative Notice 
 
 Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to Egypt. (Tr. 13) The request and the attached documents were 
not admitted into evidence, but were included in the record as Hearing Exhibit 1. The 
facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.  
 
Egypt 
 
I take administrative notice of the following facts. Egypt is a republic with a strong 
executive that has entered into a period of profound uncertainty.2 In February 2011, 
Hosni Mubarak, the president for the past 29 years, resigned and a Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces exercises executive authority.3  
 
In the past, the United States and Egypt enjoyed a strong and friendly 
relationship based on shared mutual interests in Middle East peace and stability, 
strengthening trade relations, and promoting regional security.4  
 
The threat of terrorism in Egypt remains high and transnational terrorist groups 
and local terrorist groups pose threats in Egypt despite Egypt’s aggressive pursuit of 
terrorists and extremism. In 2003, Egypt discovered and disrupted a terrorist plot 
against U.S. interests. Between 2004 and 2006, Egypt suffered a series of deadly, 
coordinated terrorist bombings, which caused many deaths and hundreds of injuries, 
including U.S. citizens.5 Although the Egyptian government took measures against the 
perpetrators of the attacks, there is a persistent, indigenous threat of terrorist activities. 
In April 2009, the Egyptian government uncovered a Hezbollah cell clandestinely 
operating in Egypt.  
 
Terrorists use overt, covert, and clandestine activities to exploit and undermine 
U.S. national security interests. Terrorist organizations currently target the U.S. for 
intelligence collection through human espionage and other means.6 Terrorist groups 
conduct intelligence activities as effectively as state intelligence services.  
 
                                                          
2
 CRS Report for Congress, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, dated February 4, 2011 (CRS 
Background 2010) at 1.  
 
3
 CRS Report for Congress, Egypt in Transition, dated November 18, 2011 at Summary.  
 
4
 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Egypt, dated November 10, 2010 at 9. 
 
5
 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 2 – Country Reports: Middle East and 
North Africa Overview, April 30, 2007. (Ex E III) 
 
6
 Statement for the Record by Michelle Van Cleave from the National Counterintelligence Executive, 
Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Hearing on 
Sources and Methods of Foreign National Engaged in Economic and Military Espionage.  
 
 
5 
The State Department notes that Egypt’s human rights record is poor and serious 
abuses continue in many areas. Problems include: restriction of freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, and association, denial of fair trial, lack of due process, limitations on 
the right of citizens to change their government, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, 
poor prison conditions, political prisoners and detainees, torture, as well as executive 
branch limitation on an independent judiciary. Torture in Egyptian detention centers is 
pervasive.  
 
Opposition parties continue to lodge credible complaints about election 
manipulation by the government even though recent elections were more transparent 
and better executed than in the past. There remain significant restrictions on the political 
process and freedom of expression for non-governmental organizations. The 
government of Egypt considers all children born to Egyptian fathers to be Egyptian 
citizens. 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the interests of security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 
2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
 
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relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
  
AG ¶ 6 explains the Government’s security concern regarding foreign influence: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in United States interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or 
coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and 
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign 
contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. The two conditions applicable to this case are: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion, and  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. 
 
Applicant’s parents and brother are citizens and residents of the Egypt. His 
parents are both permanent U.S. residents currently residing in Egypt. One brother is 
also a permanent U.S. resident residing in the United States, and his other brother is a 
 
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citizen and resident of Egypt, who has applied for a U.S. visa. Applicant’s contact with 
his parents is frequent. His connections to his family also create a potential conflict of 
interest because the relationships are sufficiently close in nature and could raise a 
security concern over his desire to help his parents and brother.  
 
The government presented sufficient evidence to support the factual allegations 
in the SOR. AG ¶ 7(a) and 7(b) apply.  
 
Two of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable:  
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
United States; and 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be expected to 
resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States interest. 
 
Applicant has professed his total loyalty to the United States. He has no financial 
interest located in the Egypt or in any other foreign country. It was Applicant’s decision 
to stay in the United States and not return to Egypt after obtaining his education.  
 
Based on Applicant’s relationship and depth of loyalty to the United States, 
Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of United States 
interests. He has lived in the United States since 1995, when he arrived to attend 
university. After earning an undergraduate and advanced degrees, he began working in 
the United States. In 2006, he became a United States citizen. His ties to Egypt have 
become minimal over the years. 
 
I have considered the information of which I have taken administrative notice 
concerning Egypt. That information discloses that Egypt is a country that is in a state of 
flux and turmoil. It has experienced a degree of political and economic instability since 
February 2011, when the president for the previous 29 years left office. The country’s 
future is uncertain.  
 
As to the potential for coercion, available information shows that Egypt is an 
open, market society, governed through a democratically elected legislature and 
executive, checked by an independent judiciary. It is not a hostile, totalitarian state 
seeking to project its power worldwide through the brute intimidation or coercion of its 
citizens domestically and abroad. However, citizens are subject to terrorists’ acts and 
other actions of lawless individuals. While there are notable problems regarding human 
 
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rights abuses in Egypt, all of the available information shows Applicant=s parents and 
brother are not likely to be subject to coercive methods to obtain information from 
Applicant. I conclude there is little likelihood Egypt, a nation previously friendly toward 
the United States, will try to leverage Applicant=s relationship with his parents and 
brother to gain access to the information with which Applicant works.  
 
 Neither his mother, a housewife, nor his brother, an engineer, are in positions 
connected with the Egyptian government or engaged in activities that would likely cause 
Applicant to be exploited or placed in a position of having to choose between them and 
the United States. His father is receiving a pension as a retired captain with the 
Egyptian Navy. He has been retired 37 years. Considering all available information 
about Egypt, Applicant is entitled to substantial consideration under AG ¶ 8(a). 
 
Applicant established the application of AG ¶ 8(b) based on his relationship and 
depth of loyalty to the United States. He can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of United States interests. Based on the foregoing, I conclude SOR & 
1.a – 1.c for the Applicant, and further conclude available information is sufficient to 
mitigate the security concerns raised under Guideline B. Even if there were insufficient 
mitigation under Guideline B, I would mitigate the security concerns under the whole-
person concept.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The Appeal Board requires the 
whole-person analysis address “evidence of an applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature 
and extent of an applicant’s family’s ties to the United States relative to his [or her] ties 
to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the United States; and many other 
 
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[factors] raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. 
Jan. 5, 2007). Substantial mitigating evidence weighs toward granting Applicant a 
security clearance under the whole-person concept.  
 
As indicated in the statement of facts, there are many positive attributes to 
Applicant=s life as a U.S. citizen that weigh towards granting a clearance. Applicant has 
close ties to the United States. His closest family members are his wife and children, 
U.S. citizens born and raised, who live with him. Additionally, his brother lives in the U.S 
and has applied for U.S. citizenship. Because his wife and brother live in the United 
States, they are not vulnerable to coercion or exploitation by a foreign power, except 
possibly his brother indirectly through relatives in Egypt who will soon move to the 
United States.  
 
 Applicant is fully entrenched in the United States, has no foreign financial 
interests, and is unlikely to compromise his life here. Applicant is a mature person. He 
has lived in the United States for 17 years, most of his adulthood, and has been a 
naturalized citizen for the past six years. He earned an undergraduate degree and an 
advanced degree from United States institutions. He is a successful member of his 
business community, providing services to the United States Government and private 
industry. His ties to the United States are much stronger than his ties to Egypt. 
Applicant and his wife have no foreign assets and approximately $100,000 in assets in 
the United States. There is no evidence he has ever taken any action that could cause 
potential harm to the United States. He takes his loyalty to the United States seriously, 
and he renounced his Egyptian citizenship after taking his U.S. oath of citizenship. 
There is no derogatory information about him in the record. 
 
The Awhole person@ analysis in a Guideline B case should include Athe totality of 
an applicant=s conduct and circumstance[s] (including the realistic potential for 
exploitation).@ In 2008 through 2011, Applicant served in combat zones coming under 
hostile fire. His co-workers and supervisors speak highly of his duty performance during 
those stressful times. Applicant=s potential for exploitation is low. I base this finding on 
his credible and sincere testimony, and I do not believe he would compromise national 
security, or otherwise comply with any Egyptian threats.  
 
A fair and commonsense assessment of the entire record before me shows the 
Government=s doubts about Applicant=s suitability to have access to classified 
information are based solely on his parents and brother being citizens and residences of 
Egypt. His parents are permanent U.S. legal residents and his brother has applied for a 
visa. They would currently be living in the United States were it not for the wait 
associated with the processing of Applicant’s brother’s visa. Overall, the record 
evidence leaves me without questions as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a 
security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the security 
concerns arising from foreign influence.  
 
 
 
 
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Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, B, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.c:  For Applicant 
   
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.  
 
 
 
_______________________ 
CLAUDE R. HEINY II 
Administrative Judge