Authorized by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), Section E3.1.2.2.1
 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.2
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)
[NAME REDACTED] )       ISCR Case No. 10-09431
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Allison O’Connell, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
On May 17, 2010, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to obtain a security clearance required for his work as
an employee of a defense contractor. After reviewing the results of the ensuing
background investigation, adjudicators for the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued to Applicant a set of interrogatories  to augment or clarify information in1
his background. After reviewing the results of the background investigation together with
his response to interrogatories, DOHA adjudicators were unable to make a preliminary
affirmative finding  that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to allow Applicant2
access to classified information. On January 30, 2012, DOHA issued to Applicant a
 The adjudicative guidelines were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. These3
guidelines were published in the Federal Register and codified through 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).
 Directive E3.1.17.4
2
Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts which raise security concerns addressed in
the adjudicative guidelines  under Guideline B (foreign influence).3
On February 21, 2012, Applicant responded to the SOR (Answer) and requested
a hearing. The case was assigned to a DOHA administrative judge on April 13, 2012,
and scheduled to be heard on May 24, 2012. The case was transferred to me on May
23, 2012, and I convened the hearing as scheduled. DOHA received the transcript of
hearing (Tr.) on June 4, 2012. 
The Government presented two exhibits – Applicant’s e-QIP (Gx. 1) and his
response to interrogatories (Gx. 2). They were admitted without objection. The
Government also asked that administrative notice be taken of certain facts germane to
the issues presented by the pleadings. I granted that request and admitted as Gx. 3
Department Counsel’s eight-page memorandum, supported by 15 enclosed documents
(Attachments I - XV; Tr. 33 - 39). Applicant testified in his own behalf, presented one
witness, and proffered six exhibits (Ax. A - F), which were admitted without objection.
Procedural Issue
The SOR was amended at the hearing to conform to the evidence.  The4
Government had alleged at SOR 1.d that Applicant’s “wife’s six siblings are citizens and
residents of the People’s Republic of China.” Applicant denied this allegation and
averred that his wife has only one sibling, a brother. He admitted that his brother-in-law
is a citizen of and resides in the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter, China).
Without objection, SOR 1.d was amended to read as follows: “Your wife’s brother is a
citizen and resident of the People’s Republic of China.” (Answer; Tr. 17 - 21)
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline B, the Government alleged that Applicant’s mother (SOR 1.a),
mother-in-law (SOR 1.b), four siblings (SOR 1.c), one brother-in-law (SOR 1.d, as
amended), four uncles and four aunts (SOR 1.e), two nieces and three nephews (SOR
1.f), and multiple friends (SOR 1.g) are citizens of and reside in China. It was also
alleged that Applicant’s wife maintains three bank accounts in China, to which Applicant
has access, to provide financial help to Applicant’s mother and mother-in-law (SOR
1.g). Applicant admitted, with explanation, all of the SOR allegations (Answer).
Applicant’s admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. Having reviewed the
response to the SOR, the transcript, and exhibits, I make the following additional
findings of fact.
 Applicant has referred to this person alternatively as his step-sister and as his half-sister. At hearing, he5
verified she is a step-sister. (Tr. 108 - 109)
3
Applicant is 65 years old. Since August 1998, he has worked for the same
employer as a services information developer. He is currently assigned as a senior
database administrator and has access to sensitive information through a position of
trust he first received around the time he was hired. His position of trust was last
renewed in April 2004. In 2006, he was assigned to work on a contract that required he
have a security clearance. He applied and was interviewed for a clearance in 2006.
Applicant worked for about two years on that contract with an interim clearance.
However, the contract ended before adjudication of his clearance was complete. His
current request for a security clearance arose because he is working on a military
contract which processes a large amount of personally identifiable information (PII) (Gx.
1; Gx. 2; Tr. 61, 107-108)
Applicant was born and raised in Shanghai, a large urban area on the east coast
of China, about 800 miles southeast of Beijing. He and his wife, also a naturalized U.S.
citizen who was born and raised in China, have been married since November 1971.
They have a daughter, age 39, who was born in China, but was naturalized as a U.S.
citizen in July 2000. Applicant’s daughter joined Applicant in the United States in 1992.
His wife followed in 1994. Applicant and his wife have owned and lived in the same
house since May 1997. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 68, 71)
After Applicant and his wife, a chemical engineer, were married, they were
assigned to state jobs at sites more than 1,000 miles apart. For several years, they
rarely lived together. In 1977, Applicant was allowed to take a job as an instrument
engineer at a state-owned oil refinery near his wife. He worked there until 1986, when,
after earning his master’s degree in biomedical engineering, he became an assistant
professor at a Chinese university near where his wife was working. Applicant taught
biomedical engineering and related subjects. In October 1987, he was sent to study as
a visiting scholar at a prestigious university in the United States.(Answer; Gx. 2; Tr. 84 -
85)
After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, Applicant decided not to return to
China. He has lived continuously in the United States since 1987. Applicant also
obtained a master’s degree from a U.S. university in May 1992. Applicant became a
naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2000. (Answer; Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 65 - 68)
Applicant’s mother is 92 years old and in poor health, having suffered a stroke in
2011. Applicant also has three siblings, a brother and two sisters, as well as a step-
sister,  who are citizens of and live in China. Their ages range from 55 to 80. Applicant’s5
mother lives with the older of his two sisters. That sister, along with his 63-year-old
brother and 80-year-old step-sister are retired from non-government jobs and receive
the equivalent of social security payments from the Chinese government. Applicant’s
55-year-old sister works as a pharmaceutical salesperson and is expected to retire soon
4
on a state pension. Applicant’s other sister, age 62, is a retired employee of a medical
supply company. (Answer; Ax. A; Ax. B; Tr. 79 - 81, 102 - 103)
Applicant’s mother-in-law is 99 years old. She lives in a nursing home, has
dementia, and suffered a broken leg in 2011. As is customary in China, she is
supported and looked after by her son, Applicant’s wife’s brother, who works as a
property and maintenance manager for a travel agency in Shanghai. (Gx. 2; Ax. A; Ax.
B; Ax. E; Tr. 83 - 84) 
In 2004, Applicant’s wife opened three bank accounts in China. They are used
for ensuring her mother and Applicant’s mother, and the people caring for them, have
funds for basic medical care that would otherwise not be available to their mothers. (Tr.
112 - 113) Applicant also has access to the accounts, but his wife manages them and it
does not appear that he involves himself directly with the financial support of his mother
and mother-in-law. The total balance of funds in the three accounts is currently about
$3,000. In response to medical needs at the time, the account balances totaled about
$20,000 in 2008. (Answer; Gx. 2; Ax. B; Ax. C; Tr. 74 - 76)
None of Applicant’s relatives is or was a civilian or military official of the Chinese
government. Also, none of them have been directly employed by or associated with the
Chinese government. However, most places of employment in urban areas of China,
such as Shanghai, have historically been state-owned and state-run. This means that,
technically, most people working in those areas are state employees. (Answer; Gx. 2;
Tr. 78, 85)
Applicant first traveled back to China in 2000, after he became a U.S. citizen. He
also traveled there in 2008 and in 2010. All of his visits have been to see his mother.
When in China, he stays with his younger sister and may see his other siblings if they
are available. Applicant also has several aunts and uncles who may visit him at his
sister’s house. Applicant sometimes has contact with some of his cousins, nieces and
nephews, but only if they accompany their parents, Applicant’s aunts, uncles, and
siblings. Applicant speaks by telephone each month with his sister who is caring for
their mother. He has less frequent contact with his other siblings. (Tr. 86 - 88) 
Applicant’s wife travels to China more frequently than Applicant. Although she
was educated as a chemical engineer in China, she was only able to work in food
service jobs in the United States. She is no longer working and, so, has the time and
inclination to be more involved than Applicant in the care of their mothers. (Answer; Tr.
88)
Applicant was asked, through extensive DOHA interrogatories, to list any friends,
relatives, or other associates with ties to a foreign government through employment,
military service, education, government service, or business. He responded by listing
most of his immediate and extended family in China, including some who are deceased,
and many who are retired. He listed them all because, as is the case with most citizens
5
employed in or near Chinese cities, they worked in state-owned businesses, attended
state-run universities, or are receiving government pensions. (Gx. 2) 
Applicant was also asked to simply list his family, friends, or associates who are
citizens of and who reside in a foreign country. Applicant again listed his entire family,
including extended family members with whom he has little or no contact. He also listed
32 associates, mostly from his academic career in China. Again, many are retired and
some are deceased. Many also now live outside of China, including in the United
States. (Id.) Applicant has, at most, sporadic contact with the associates other than his
family listed in his response. The only government official with whom Applicant has had
contact since leaving China is a former university classmate, who was appointed a vice
chairman of an unnamed Chinese agency or ministry. That person has been retired for
several years. Applicant received an email from him in about 2003, but that is the extent
of their contact since they were at university together. (Answer; Gx. 2; Tr. 94 - 95)
Applicant also disclosed that he had contact with a Chinese government agency
in 2008. As a favor to his wife’s family, he and his wife’s brother went to a real estate
agency to inquire about land that belonged to his wife’s parents before the Chinese
government confiscated it in the 1950s. Although there is a recent change in Chinese
policy that provides for the return of such property, Applicant and his brother-in-law
were unsuccessful in reclaiming any property. (Answer; Gx. 2; Tr. 65 - 66, 94)
Having reviewed the documents received through Department Counsel’s
Request for Administrative Notice (Gx. 3), I make the following findings of fact regarding
China.
China is an increasingly industrialized world economic and military power. The
country has a population in excess of one billion people who are governed by an
authoritarian, communist regime. Geographically vast and demographically diverse, the
country has significant natural resources to help support its growing economy. China
devotes most of its industry and domestic production to its military forces, and it has a
strategic nuclear arsenal. (Gx. 3, Attachment I) China is in direct competition with the
United States in many geopolitical and economic areas, and it is known to actively
collect military, economic and industrial information about the United States. In 2008, it
was reported to Congress that China was the leading threat to the security of U.S.
technology. (Gx. 3, Attachments IV - VI) 
However, China and the U.S. also are major trading partners and share other
common interests. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the two countries
worked closely in counter-terrorism efforts. China and the U.S. also have worked closely
on regional issues, especially those involving North Korea. However, U.S.-China
relations are sometimes complicated by events in Taiwan and Hong Kong. China is one
of the most active collectors of U.S. defense information and technology.
The Chinese government has an abysmal human rights record. Officials continue
to engage in suppression of personal and electronic expressions of political dissent.
 Directive. 6.3.6
6
Arbitrary arrest and detention, forced confessions, torture, and other prisoner
mistreatment are commonplace. Government and law enforcement practices are largely
unchecked by any independent judicial review. (Gx. 3, Attachment III)
Applicant has long been opposed to the policies and practices of the Chinese
government. His parents were disenfranchised of their property and livelihoods in the
1950s and 1960s as part of the government’s imposition of a communist society.
Applicant understands the practices of the Chinese government regarding intelligence
gathering and espionage. He is extremely wary of associating with Chinese-American
societies in the United States because he suspects most of them are run or at least
monitored by the Chinese government. (Answer; Tr. 64 - 68, 104 - 107) During visits
with his family, Applicant has been careful not to discuss his work or to even disclose
that he has access to protected information. He credibly averred that he would not
compromise the interests of the United States even in the face of pressure by the
Chinese government on his family members. (Answer; Gx. 2; Tr. 122 - 125)
Applicant’s only financial or property interest overseas consists of the bank
accounts used to help his mother and mother-in-law. Applicant has disclosed those
accounts to the U.S. Treasury as part of his compliance with U.S. tax and foreign
financial disclosure laws. He has owned the same house in the U.S. for about 15 years.
He also has several retirement, investment, and insurance accounts in the U.S. He
does not want to rely on social security or any form of welfare after he stops working.
Applicant’s net worth is in excess of one million dollars. (Answer; Gx. 2; Tr. 92, 101 -
102)
Applicant has an excellent reputation in the workplace. A co-worker, who has
known Applicant for most of the time Applicant has worked at their company, testified
that Applicant is a loyal American who would never do anything to harm U.S. interests.
He praised Applicant for his professional expertise and his excellent work ethic.
(Answer; Ax. F; Tr. 109 - 113)
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,6
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the adjudicative
guidelines (AG). Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors listed in ¶ 2(a)
of the new guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole person” concept, those
factors are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).7
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.8
 See Egan; AG ¶ 2(b).9
7
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information. In this case, the pleadings and the information presented by the parties
require consideration of the security concerns and adjudicative factors addressed under
AG ¶ 6, Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to7
have access to classified information. The Government bears the initial burden of
producing admissible information on which it based the preliminary decision to deny or
revoke a security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, the Government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the government meets its burden, it
then falls to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a “right” to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy
burden of persuasion.  8
A person who has access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. Thus, the Government
has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests as his or her
own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of
any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the
Government.9
Analysis
Foreign Influence 
The facts established by Department Counsel’s information and by Applicant’s
admissions raise security concerns about Applicant’s personal relationships and other
interests in China. Specifically, as stated in AG ¶ 6, 
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[f]oreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
The Government presented sufficient information to establish the following AG ¶
7 disqualifying conditions:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
Applicant’s immediate and extended family members live in a country that
presents a heightened risk of exploitation by that country’s government. China’s human
rights record, combined with its history of aggressive espionage against the United
States, indicates a willingness by the Chinese government to exert pressure on
Applicant through his ties of affection in China. Applicant and his wife assist their
mothers with relatively modest (when compared to his U.S. net worth) sums of money
deposited in Chinese bank accounts. They are both close to their immediate family and
have traveled to China several times to visit them. 
By contrast, Applicant’s ties to the numerous associates and friends he listed in
response to DOHA interrogatories are casual, at best, and he has only had passing
contact with a few of those individuals since leaving China. Only one foreign associate,
a retired former classmate who served as a deputy chief of a Chinese government
agency or ministry, is a potential concern here. However, Applicant had one unsolicited
email contact with that person a few years ago and they have not had a close or
ongoing relationship since Applicant came to the United States 25 years ago. 
9
As to Applicant’s extended family, such relationships are presumed to be close.
However, the only contact he has had with his aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces and
nephews, has been incidental to visits with his mother and his siblings. 
Applicant’s contact with his immediate family consists of regular phone calls to
the sister who cares for his mother, and less frequent contact with his other siblings. All
of his siblings are, or soon will be, retired and living on government pensions. While it is
possible that the Chinese government could pressure Applicant’s family through their
pensions, the more likely scenario is that Applicant would make funds available to his
family, as he has for his mother and mother-in-law, rather than accede to coercion.
Applicant is, by all accounts, a loyal American with substantial interests in the U.S. His
family ties and other associations in China are not likely to cause him to act adversely to
the U.S.
All of the foregoing supports application of the following AG ¶ 8 mitigating
conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Also indicative of Applicant’s position in favor of the U.S. are his statements
about his awareness of the risks posed by Chinese government policies, and his
wariness of seemingly benign activities, such as Chinese-American societies. Applicant
was painstakingly detailed in his reporting of his associates in China, and he has been
more than forthcoming about his personal, professional, academic, and financial ties to
China and Chinese citizens. His candor in this regard shows his understanding of the
importance of putting U.S. interests ahead of his own. On balance, he has mitigated the
security concerns about possible foreign influence. 
10
Whole-Person Concept
I have evaluated the facts presented and have applied the appropriate
adjudicative factors under Guideline B. I have also reviewed the record before me in the
context of the whole-person factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant is a mature,
responsible, and highly accomplished 65-year-old defense contractor employee. He has
assimilated into American society, and he shows every sign of being a committed and
loyal U.S. citizen. Since 1998, Applicant has been a reliable, trustworthy and diligent
employee, who has worked without incident while holding access to sensitive and
protected information. His ties to China and his activities there are solely for personal
family reasons. His awareness of the security issues regarding China govern his
approach to his duties, as well as his dealings with his community and his overseas
family. There has been no misconduct here and there is nothing inappropriate or illegal
about Applicant’s contacts overseas. A fair and commonsense assessment of all
available information shows Applicant has overcome the doubts about his suitability
under these circumstances.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a - 1.h: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the foregoing, it is clearly consistent with the national interest for
Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a security
clearance is granted.
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge