KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence was not sufficient
to demonstrate error.  The Appeal Board cannot consider new evidence on appeal.  Adverse
decision affirmed.  
CASE NO: 11-00982.a1
DATE: 06/12/2012
DATE: June 12, 2012
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 11-00982
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On September 30, 2011, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested the case be decided on the written record.  On March 29, 2012, after considering the record,
Administrative Judge Arthur E. Marshall, Jr. denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
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Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
In this case, Applicant elected to have a decision based on the written record, and then filed
a limited response to the government’s file of relevant material (FORM).  On appeal, he seeks
reversal of the Judge’s adverse decision arguing that “the [J]udge makes no mention of the historic
real estate market crash,” and that the Judge’s whole-person analysis failed to consider the totality
of Applicant’s circumstances including his accomplishments and character.  In support of his
argument, he submits an extensive amount of new evidence, including a detailed statement addressing
the allegations in the SOR and multiple documentary exhibits, such as e-mail communications, short
sale forms, tax forms, leases, financial data, evidence of home improvements, and articles on the
housing market.  The Board cannot consider this new evidence on appeal.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.29.
Applicant’s presentation does not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary,
capricious or contrary to law.  Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the
burden shifts to the applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some
mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.
As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable
evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 09-04601 at 2 (App. Bd. May 11,
2011).
In his decision, the Judge weighed the available evidence, evaluated the seriousness of the
disqualifying circumstances, and considered the possible application of relevant conditions and
factors. He specifically discussed the decline in the housing market and the favorable whole-person
evidence present in the record, but reasonably explained why there was insufficient mitigating
evidence to overcome the government’s security concerns.  Decision at 2-6.  The Board does not
review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the
relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United
States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is that a clearance may be
granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s unfavorable security clearance
decision is sustainable.
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Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jean E. Smallin            
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody           
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields          
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board