KEYWORD: Guideline B
DIGEST: Applicant’s arguments regarding mitigation of property and relatives in Pakistan do
not demonstrate that the Judge erred.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 11-04742.a1
DATE: 06/20/2012
DATE: June 20, 2012
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 11-04742
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On August 12, 2011, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
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the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On April 4, 2012, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Paul J. Mason denied
Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶
E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Applicant seeks reversal of the Judge’s adverse decision under Guideline B arguing that the
Judge should have found the security concerns presented by Applicant’s family members and farm
in Pakistan mitigated due to his favorable employment record and his strong ties to the United
States.  His argument does not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or
contrary to law. 
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of
fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence
outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 08-09346 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Mar.
14, 2011).
A review of the record indicates that the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by
Applicant against the seriousness of the disqualifying circumstances and considered the possible
application of relevant conditions and factors.  He found in favor of Applicant as to several of the
SOR factual allegations.  However, he reasonably explained why the evidence which the Applicant
presented in mitigation was insufficient to overcome all of the government’s security concerns.  The
Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable record evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.  The Board
concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for
the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore,
the Judge’s unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
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Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jean E. Smallin     
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody      
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields     
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board