Consisting of the transcript (Tr.), Government exhibits (GE) 1-7, hearing exhibits (HE) I-II, and Applicant1
exhibit A.
DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February2
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG)
effective within the DoD on 1 September 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-04980
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Alison O’Connell, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  I grant Applicant’s clearance.1
On 6 January 2012, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guideline
B, Foreign Influence.  Applicant timely answered the SOR, requesting a hearing. DOHA2
assigned the case to me 21 February 2012, and I convened a hearing 15 March 2012.
DOHA received the transcript 26 March 2012.
 
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the allegations of the SOR. He is a 50-year-old construction
superintendent employed by a defense contractor since August 2010. He has not
previously held an industrial clearance. He held a clearance while in the U.S. military
1983-1989, and has had non-DoD clearances in most of his jobs since leaving the
military, to include working on nuclear power plants.
Applicant was born and raised in the U.S. Both his parents are native-born U.S.
citizens, although his father is now deceased. Applicant has three brothers and a sister,
all native-born U.S. citizens. He served on active duty in the U.S. military from February
1983 to August 1989.
He married his first wife, a native-born U.S. citizen, in July 1984. They had three
children together before divorcing in September 1996: two sons born in October 1985
and April 1987, and a daughter born in January 1989. All are native-born U.S. citizens,
although his daughter was born in Germany while Applicant was stationed there during
his military service. Their first-born son died three years ago in an automobile accident.
Applicant married his second wife in July 2008. She is 18 years Applicant’s
junior, and immigrated to the U.S. from Belarus in 2000, when she was granted political
asylum in the U.S. She also works in the construction industry. Indeed, they met in
about 2004, when they both worked for the same construction company. She has
applied for U.S. citizenship and is awaiting her citizenship interview (AE B). They have
no children together, and are unlikely to have children because of medical issues.
Applicant’s wife is a citizen of Belarus, but a legal permanent resident (LPR) of
the U.S. His parents-in-law are resident citizens of Belarus. They are both retired
engineers. They speak no English; Applicant speaks no Belarusian. He has contact with
them once or twice per year, through his wife. He met them once, in August 2008, when
he and his new wife traveled to Belarus to meet her family. His wife speaks to her
mother by phone weekly.
Applicant’s wife has one sister, who is married to a retired Russian army general.
They are resident citizens of Russia, as is their daughter. Applicant’s sister-in-law is a
nurse; his brother-in-law was an engineer in the Russian army. Their daughter is in
grade school. Applicant has contact with them once or twice per year, through his wife.
Applicant visited them in Belarus for ten days in August 2008. Applicant’s brother-in-law
and sister-in-law speak no English; Applicant speaks no Russian. Applicant’s sister-in-
law and her daughter stayed with Applicant and his wife for two weeks in July 2010.
Applicant’s wife speaks to her sister about twice per month.
Applicant reported his foreign relatives as required on his clearance application
(GE 1). He discussed his contacts with his foreign relations extensively during subject
interviews in November 2010 (GE 2).
3
Belarus purports to be a democratic republic, but is in fact an autocratic regime
ruled by its president, who has systematically undermined its democratic institutions and
concentrated power in the executive branch of government by flawed referenda,
manipulated elections, and arbitrary decrees. A former Soviet Republic, Belarus
declared its sovereignty in July 1990 and its independence from the Soviet Union in
August 1991. However, Belarus maintains close historical and cultural ties with Russia.
The U.S. recognized Belarus as an independent state in December 1991. Belarusian
authorities have severely restricted the constitutional rights of its citizens. There have
been sweeping violations of human rights during elections, including disregard for
freedom of assembly, association, and expression. Elections have been conducted in a
climate of insecurity, fear, and problematic vote counts. Belarus exports significant
quantities of defense materials, dual-use items, weapons, and weapons-related
technology to countries of concern to the U.S., including state sponsors of terrorism. It
has attempted to expand relations to countries of concern, including Iran, Sudan, and
Syria. Naturalized U.S. citizens from Belarus do not automatically lose Belarusian
citizenship. No evidence was presented that Belarus collects economic or military
intelligence.
Russia—also a former Soviet Republic—is a nominal democracy with a mixed
human rights record. It has been the target of terrorist activity in recent years. Russian
federal forces pursuing terrorists act with impunity while engaging in torture, summary
executions, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. Additional problems include
corruption, media suppression, life-threatening prison conditions, and corruption in law
enforcement.
Russia imposes rigid visa requirements on foreign travelers entering, and
traveling within, Russia. U.S. citizens who have at one time held Russian citizenship
may be required to renounce Russian citizenship before applying for a Russian visa in
their U.S. passport. Unless a Russian citizen has formally renounced his or her Russian
citizenship, he or she risks being considered a Russian citizen and not allowed to depart
except on a Russian passport.
Unlike Belarus, Russia has an active, significant, recent, and ongoing collection
program focusing on the U.S. As of 2005, Russia was one of the two most aggressive
collectors of sensitive and protected U.S. technology and accounted for much of such
targeting. Much of Russia’s targeting occurs through direct visits to U.S. facilities.
However, the record does not indicate if Russia targets U.S. citizens through family
members residing in Russia to obtain protected information. Furthermore, the U.S. and
Russia cooperate over a broad spectrum of foreign-policy issues, particularly counter-
terrorism efforts.
Applicant does not discuss the specifics of his work with his wife. He has not told
any of his foreign relatives the specifics of his work, nor has he told them that he is
applying for a clearance or that he has had other sensitive access in the past. The
Government investigator who interviewed Applicant in November 2010 (GE 2)
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
4
concluded that “[q]uestioning did not disclose any indications of foreign influence or
preference.”
Applicant’s work references (AE A) consider him extremely honest and
trustworthy. He had unaccompanied access at his previous project site (a sensitive non-
DoD facility) for the last five years without incident or concern.
Applicant and his wife own their home in the U.S., as well as three other houses.
He estimates the value of the four houses at $900,000, and his net worth at over
$1,000,000. Their combined annual income is about $175,000 (GE 3). They have no
financial interests in Belarus or Russia, and provide no financial support to her relatives
in Belarus and Russia.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to classified information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guideline is Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s security clearance. The Government
must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does,
the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.3
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
AG ¶ 6.4
AG ¶ 7 (a).5
AG ¶ 7 (c).6
AG ¶ 7 (e).7
AG ¶ 7 (f).8
See, ISCR Case No. 05-00939 (App. Bd. 3 October 2007).9
5
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information4
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Further,5
security concerns may arise through connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.  In6
addition, security concerns may be raised by a substantial business, financial, or
property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated
business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.  Finally, failure to report, where required, association with a foreign national7
may raise security concerns.8
In this case, the Government established a case for disqualification under
Guideline B regarding Applicant’s Russian relatives, but not regarding his Belarusian
relatives. And in both cases, Applicant has mitigated the security concerns, both
regarding Guideline B disqualifying and mitigating conditions as well as the whole-
person factors.
As a matter of common sense and human experience, there is a rebuttable
presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family
members of the persons spouse.  However, common sense and human sense equally9
suggest that these imputed or derivative ties are both not as strong as, and are more
easily rebutted than, direct ties. Thus, while this case rests on an assessment of
Applicant’s direct contacts with his foreign relatives as well as his wife’s contacts with
6
her foreign relatives, the most important focus is necessarily Applicant’s relationship
with his foreign relatives.
Considering Applicant first, he was born in the U.S. and has lived in the U.S. all
his life except for an overseas military tour over 20 years ago. All his immediate family
by birth are native-born, resident citizens of the U.S. His immediate family members by
his first marriage, including his two surviving children are native-born, resident citizens
of the U.S. Applicant has no financial assets in any foreign country, and a net worth in
the U.S. of over $1,000,000. He has held security clearances or other unrestricted
physical access based on trustworthiness determinations more or less continuously
since 1983 without incident. This includes the 12 years he was married to his first wife,
the 12 years he was single after his divorce, and the eight years of contact with his
current wife, to whom he has been married since 2008.
Applicant’s direct contacts with his foreign relatives are either non-existent or
infrequent. Given the language barrier between Applicant and his foreign relatives it is
virtually non-existent. He has met all four on only one 2008 visit, occasioned by his
marriage. He had a second visit with his sister-in-law on her 2010 visit to the U.S.
Otherwise, he has twice-yearly telephone contact with them, through his wife.
Considering Applicant’s wife, she immigrated to the U.S. in 2000 on a grant of
political asylum. She has been an LPR of the U.S. since then, and her application for
U.S. citizenship is pending. Her direct physical contact with her foreign relatives
appears to be the same as Applicant’s: the wedding trip to Belarus in 2008 and her
sister’s return visit to the U.S. in 2010. Her direct contacts by telephone to her mother
(weekly) and sister (bi-monthly) are more regular than Applicant’s, and not limited by a
language barrier, presumably more enlightening. However, there is no indication of
regular travel to Russia or Belarus, no indication of more extensive contacts like
exchanges of presents on holidays or special occasions, no evidence of more intimate
contact beyond the telephone calls.
Considering the foreign relatives themselves, there is no evidence tying
Applicant’s parents-in-law to the Belarusian government or his sister-in-law to the
Russian government. The brother-in-law, retired from the Russian military as a senior
officer, obviously has some tie to the Russian government. However, that does not end
the inquiry. Russia is not a monolith, and the brother-in-law was an engineer, now
retired. There is no evidence that he was connected in any way to Russia’s intelligence
gathering apparatus.
Considering the foreign countries themselves, while Belarus has a poor human
rights record, there is no evidence that it is involved in collecting economic or military
intelligence, or beyond that, that it targets its ex-patriot citizens in any fashion to obtain
such information. On the other hand, Russia and the U.S. enjoy competitive foreign
relations, although they cooperate on a wide variety of issues. Nevertheless, while
Russia is actively engaged in the collection of U.S. information, there is no evidence
suggesting that it targets its expatriate citizens such that would make Applicant or his
AG ¶ 8 (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are10
located or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual
will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;
AG ¶ 8 (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individuals sense of obligation to the foreign11
group is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
AG ¶ 8 (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little12
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;
7
family members likely targets for coercion, duress, or influence. In this case the putative
chain of influence is even more attenuated, proceeding from the brother-in-law
(Russian) through the sister-in-law (Russian) through Applicant’s wife (Belarusian ex-
patriot) to Applicant.
Examining Applicant’s circumstances, his contacts with family in Belarus raise
little heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion. Applicant has resided in the U.S. all his life. His extensive financial interests
are all in the U.S. His contacts with his foreign relatives is minimal at best. Further,
Applicant is well aware of his reporting obligations should any of these foreign contacts
attempt to obtain protected information, and he has a demonstrated history of reporting
contacts. Belarus does not collect economic or military intelligence. Belarus does not
target its ex-patriot citizens for such information. Applicant’s parents-in-law do not
appear to be in a position to be exploited through Applicant’s wife, much less Applicant.
Even finding a potential case for disqualification under ¶¶ 7 (a) and (b) regarding
Russia, I find the security concerns mitigated. Applicant and his wife have no direct
connection to Russia. Applicant’s wife left Belarus seeking political asylum in the U.S.
Her family in Russia is not so situated as to be a likely source of pressure, and in any
event Russia does not appear to utilize those tactics to collect sensitive information.10
Her loyalty to the U.S. is clearly established and Applicant’s loyalty to the U.S. is
undisputed. Certainly, his relationships and loyalties in the U.S. are so long deep and
longstanding, and his sense of loyalty or obligation to his foreign relatives so short and
minimal (notwithstanding his second marriage), that he can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of U.S. interests. Consequently, there is no conflict of interest
that can be exploited.  Finally, there is no reasonable characterization of his contacts11
with family in Russia as other than casual and infrequent.  His wife’s contacts are not12
casual and infrequent, but neither are they so strong that Applicant would chose his
imputed or derivative interests in Russia over U.S. interests. I conclude that it is unlikely
he can be pressured based on his limited contacts with his family in Russia.
Accordingly, I resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
Consideration of the nine “whole-person” factors requires the same result.
Security clearance decisions are not rooted in risk aversion, but in risk management.
Were this not the case, there would be no point to having the Directive or a right to due
8
process before an impartial trier of fact. I would note first of all that Applicant is a U.S.
citizen, born in this country of parents who themselves are U.S. citizens. He has four
siblings, all of whom are U.S. born citizens as well. Therefore, Applicant is in a position
different from many others under Guideline B in that he has not become a U.S. citizen
only recently, nor has he faced a shifting of national loyalties that might be expected to
accompany the naturalization process. Additionally, his children are U.S.-born citizens
of his first wife and his second wife has been an LPR of this country since 2000. He and
his wife hold substantial assets in the U.S. and none in Russia or Belarus. All in all his
family history, his immediate family, and his financial holdings suggest greater
psychological ties to the U.S. than might be found in many other cases under this
Guideline. Certainly, they are overwhelmingly greater than his ties to Russia or Belarus,
even factoring in his wife’s relationship to her family there. I conclude that Applicant’s
security concerns can be mitigated as a matter of law merely through the application of
relevant mitigating conditions. Belarus presents no heightened risk because it does not
collect U.S. information and—its poor human rights record notwithstanding—maintains
civil diplomatic relations with the U.S. Russia and the U.S. enjoy competitive foreign
relations, and Russia is an active collector of U.S. information. However, it does not
target its ex-patriot citizens to obtain such information and does not pursue foreign
policies inherently inimical to U.S. interests, as perhaps do Iran or North Korea.
However, I am not limited to AG mitigating conditions when deciding whether an
applicant has demonstrated extenuation or mitigation. I may conclude that no mitigating
condition will per se justify the granting of a clearance yet nevertheless decide in an
Applicant’s favor in view of the whole-person analysis. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-
05110 at n 7 (App. Bd. Mar. 22, 2004); ISCR Case No. 99-0542 at 7 (App. Bd. Mar. 21,
2003). Thus, even if I could not conclude as a matter of law that Applicant’s security
concerns were mitigated through the application of relevant mitigating conditions, I
would still conclude as a whole (1) that Applicant has been a U.S. citizen since birth; (2)
that his parents and siblings are themselves U.S. citizens by birth; (3) that his wife has
been an LPR of the U.S for 12 years; (4) that Applicant’s children are U.S. citizens by
birth, and have no foreign citizenship; (5) that Applicant’s financial assets, valued at
over $1 million, are located in the U.S.; (6) that neither Applicant nor his wife own
property in Russia or Belarus; (7) that Applicant has previously held a DoD security
clearance or other trustworthiness-based access since 1983 without incident or
concern; and (8) that Applicant’s direct contact with his foreign in-laws is either non-
existent or infrequent. After examining these facts in light of the record, I conclude that
the real probability of Applicant becoming a danger to national security is sufficiently low
to warrant a favorable decision.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraphs a-e: For Applicant
9
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.
 
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge