1 
 
                                                              
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
In the matter of: ) 
)
) ISCR Case No. 09-01701
)
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Alan V. Edmunds, Esq.
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________
NOEL, Nichole L., Administrative Judge:
Applicant’s relationships with family me mbers who are resident s and citizens of
Afghanistan and Pakistan are mitigated by his deep and long-standing ties to the United
States. However, his mental health issues remain a concern. Clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case 
 
Acting under the relevant Exec utive Order and DoD Directive, 1 on October 19,
2011, the Defense O ffice of Hearings and Appeals ( DOHA) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) explaining that it was unable to find that it is clearly consist ent with the
national interest to grant Applic ant access to classified information. The SOR, whic h
detailed the reasons for t he action under the psychological c onditions and foreign
                                                          
1 This case is adjudicated under Executive Order (EO) 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within 
Industry, signed by President Eisenhower on February 20, 1960, as amended, as well as DoD Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program, dated January 2, 1992, as
amended (Directive). In addition, the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 
Classified Information (AG), effective within the Defense Department on September 1, 2006, apply to this
case. The AG were published in the Federal Register and codified in 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).
The AG replace the guidelines in Enclosure 2 to the Directive.
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influence guidelines, recommended the case be submitted to an administrative judge for
a determination to revoke or deny Applicant’s access to classified information.
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing. T he case was
assigned to me on F ebruary 7, 2012. The hearing took plac e as scheduled on April 3,
2012. At hearing, Government’s Exhibits (GE) 1 through 10, as well as Hearing Exhibit
(HE) 1, a demonstrative exhi bit detailing Applicant’s foreign family members, were
admitted without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A
through J, which were also adm itted without objection. At A pplicant’s request, I left the
record open until April 30, 2012 t o allow him to submit a medical evaluation. He timely
submitted the evaluation, which was admitted as AE K, without objection. I received the
transcript (Tr.) on April 10, 2012.
Request for Administrative Notice 
Department Counsel submitted a written request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts about Afghani stan and Pakistan. Without obj ection from A pplicant, I
approved the request. The request and the a ttached documents have been included in
the record as HE 2. The pertinent facts are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a federal c ontractor who works as a
translator and linguist. Born in Afghanistan, Applicant immigrated to the United States
as a refugee in 1993, joining his parents and four brothers – two of whom also work as
translators for federal contractors. Marri ed in December 2000 to an Afghan citizen who
is a permanent resident of the United States, he is the father of five children between
the ages of 18 months and 10 years old. All are U.S. citizens by birth. Applicant’s
parents-in-law are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. Ap plicant believes that his
father-in-law, now retired, served in the Afghanistan Nati onal Assembly; however, he
does not know the details of his father-in-law’s public service. Applicant speaks to his in-
laws by telephone twice each year on holidays. Applicant ’s two sisters and their
husbands are residents and citizens of Pakistan. He speaks to his sisters, one of whom
is a teacher, the other a housewife, ever y two months by telephone. Neither of
Applicant’s brothers-in-law works for the government.2
Between 1999 and 2008, Applic ant worked in the fast-food indus try, frequently
changing jobs to earn more money to support his growing family. In 2008, he obtained a
position as a translator supporting military operations overseas. While on assignment in
February 2010, Applicant was hospitalized for five days after exhibiting erratic behavior.
The details of the episode are unclear. In one acc ount Applicant claim s he was
hospitalized after being found as leep on the job; in another he claims that he suffered
from stress issues and suic idal thoughts. After being re leased from the hospit al,
Applicant voluntarily r esigned his position and was esco rted home by his employer.
During the multi-day trip, Applicant continued to display erratic behavior. During the first
                                                          
2 Tr. 41, 45-49; GE 1, 9, 10.
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leg of the trip, Applic ant became unresponsive when he and his escort reached the
security check point. His escort had to physi cally move him through the security check
point. Applicant displayed a similar unrespo nsiveness during the second leg of the trip.
He refused to comply with the security pr otocol at the airport. As Applicant became
more uncooperative, airport police and air line security were called to res olve the
problem. Eventually, law enforcement made the decision to take Applicant t o a medical
center for diagnosis.3
Applicant continued to resist the security officers, refusing to sit in the wheelchair
waiting to take him to the medic al center. On ly after the threat of force did Applicant
voluntarily sit in the wheelch air. During transport, Applicant sprang from the chair and
began to walk quickly through the terminal causing security to chase and restrain him.
After being medicated and cleared for travel by the treating physician, Applicant and his
escort resumed their travel to the United States. The third leg of the trip began with
Applicant’s continued refusal to cooperate with the air port security procedures, but he
was overpowered by his escort and airport security. The escort struggled to ge t
Applicant through the terminal and onto the pl ane because Applicant kept t rying to s it
down as t hey walked through the airport. Once on the plane, the escort seated
Applicant in the section of the plan reserved for them. After the plane took off, Applicant
went to sleep only waking to eat or use the restroom.4
Three hours before landing in the United States, Appl icant awoke and resumed
his bizarre behavior. Every few minutes, A pplicant would leave his seat, run to a
window, open the shade, look out, close the shade, run back to his seat, and lay down.
He continued this pattern with quickening sp eed until the escort noti ced that the other
passengers and the f light attendant were becoming alarmed. The escort managed to
restrain Applicant for a few minutes; how ever, Applicant resumed the behavior at a
more rapid rate. The escort explained to Applicant that his behavior could get him
detained by federal authorit ies. Applicant remained seated throughout the remainder of
the flight, but the escort struggled to keep Applicant in an upright position as the plane
landed.5
Deplaned without incident, Applicant’s erratic behavior resumed once he cleared
immigration. Applicant attempted to walk past the customs offi cer without completing
the process. He was able to move on afte r the esc ort intervened on his behalf. At
baggage claim, Applicant tried to sit down on the baggage belt and then on the floor.
When the escort went to inquire about their missing luggage, Applicant laid on the floor,
drawing the attention of airport security. Again, the escort defused the situation and took
Applicant to a location where they could wa it for his family to pick him up. As they
waited in the terminal, Applicant again laid on the floor. When his brother-in-law came to
retrieve him, Applicant became instantly alert and talkative. According to the escort, he
                                                          
3 Tr. 25, 35, 59-60; GE 1, 7, 9.
4 GE 7.
5 GE 7.
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walked out of the air port as if nothing had happened. Applicant does not recall any
details of this trip.6
Upon returning home, Applicant entered in tensive outpatient treatment at a local
hospital. He was diagnosed by his treating p sychiatrist as having a psychotic disorder
not otherwise specified (NOS), major de pressive order with psychotic features, and
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Appl icant received a similar diagnosis in 2006
after being hospitaliz ed for hearing voices and hav ing suicidal thoughts. Applicant
reported being stressed about maintaining his family’s financial stability. Applicant was
prescribed anti-psychotic medications, which he s topped taking shortly after his
discharge. During his 2010 treatment, the treating psychiatrist prescribed an
antidepressant, which was the only medicat ion Applicant agreed to take at the time. He
was instructed to take one pill a day for six months. He stopped taking the anti-
depressant in June 2010 and has refused to take any psychotropic medicines since.7
Around the time Applicant decided to st op taking his prescribed anti-depres sant,
he interviewed for a position with his current employer. Initially, Applicant was told that
he could not be hired for certain contracts if he was taking an ant i-depressant. He was
hired by his current employer in August 2010.8
Before the issuance of the SOR, DO HA requested that Applic ant undergo a
psychological evaluation. Although the evalua ting psychologist noted that at the time of
the evaluation Applicant appeared to be symp tom free, he did not make a specific
diagnosis. He concluded that Applicant’s lack of insight in to his behavior and den ial of
his mental health iss ues may adversely a ffect Applicant’s judgment, reliability, and
trustworthiness. In response, Applic ant obtained a second opinion from another
psychologist, which was completed in April 2012. While this evaluation is also bereft of
a diagnosis, the evaluating psy chologist determined that Applic ant is not currently
displaying any psychological dysfunction that could prevent him from resuming his work
as a translator. However, given Applicant’ s apparent vulnerability to high levels o f
stress, the psychologist observed that Applicant could return to his translator job under
circumstances that allow for adequate sleep, rest, and relaxation.9
Applicant does not believ e that he has ever suffered from any mental health
issues. He attributes his inc idents in 2006 and 2010 t o sleep deprivat ion. He testified
that while working abroad he was nev er exposed to any event that could hav e
negatively impacted his mental h ealth. He only complained of long hours and lack of
sleep.10
                                                          
6 Tr. 60 - 61; GE 7.
7 Tr. 52-58; GE 6, 9.
8 Tr. 66-69; GE 1.
9 GE 8, AE K.
10 Tr. 34-35, 52-55, 59-60, 71-75.
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As the sole provider for his family, Applic ant is anxious to return to work. In the
year and a half he has been home, he has work ed as a cashier at a fast food
restaurant. In 2011, he earned $17,000, down from the $21 0,000 he earned as a
translator working ov erseas. Applicant is no t currently receiving medical treatment for
his mental health issues.11
 
Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan is located in s outhwestern Asia. Pakistan borders it on the ea st and
the south. Iran borders it on the west and Russia on the nort h. Afghanistan is presently
an Islamic Republic of 18 million people. The country has exper ienced a turbulent
political history, including an invasion by the Russians in 1979 and fighting among the
various ethnic, clan and religious militias after the Russians withdrew from the country in
1989. By the end of 1998, the Taliban rose to power and controlled 90% of the country,
imposing aggressive and repressive policies. In October 2001, U.S. forces and coalition
partners led military operations in the co untry, forcing the Taliban o ut of power b y
November 2001. The new democ ratic government took power in 2004 after a popular
election. Despite that election, terrorists and the Taliban continue to assert power within
the country.12
The country’s human rights record remains poor. Problems include: extrajudicial
killings; widespread official impunity; offici al corruption; and v iolence and societa l
discrimination against women. Violence is rampant. According to recent reports from the
U.S. Department o f State, insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings of
Americans and other Western nat ionals. Travel warnings are ongoing. No section of
Afghanistan is safe or immune from violence.13
 
Pakistan 
Pakistan is a parliamentary federal republic in Southwest Asia. It i s a low-income
country, with a population t hat is 97 perc ent Muslim. After September 11, 2001,
Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the Taliban regime of
Afghanistan. However, Pakistan reassessed it s relations with the Taliban and pledged
support to the United States and the inter national coalition in Operation Enduring
Freedom, which aimed at remo ving the Taliban from power . Despite this support,
members of the Taliban are kn own to be in the Federally Administered Tribal Area s
(FATA) of Pakistan and in the Balochistan Prov ince, which borders Iran and
Afghanistan. The leaders of the Taliban operate openly in Pakistan. Extremists led by
the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Talib an “TTP”) commander and other Al-Qaida
extremists have re-exerted their hold over areas in the FATA and the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP). Taliban financing, wh ich crosses the border of Pakistan to
                                                          
11 Tr. 76-77; GE 9 – 10.
12 HE 2.
13 HE 2.
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Afghanistan, has a llowed the insurgency in Afghanistan to strengt hen its military an d
technical capabilities.
The security situation in Afghanis tan worsened in 2008, incl uding an increase in
Al-Qaida’s presence to levels unseen sinc e 2001-2002, driven in part by insurgent
access to safe havens in western Pakistan through the porous Afghan-Pakistan border.
Although Al-Qaida’s core organization in the tr ibal areas of Pakistan was under greater
pressure in 2009 than in 2008, it remained the most dangerous component of the larger
Al-Qaida network. In early 2009, the FATA in Pak istan continued to provide vital
sanctuary to Al-Qaida and a number of foreign and Pakistan-based extremist groups. 
Al-Qaida exploits the permissive operat ing environment to support the Afghan
insurgency, while also planning attacks against the United States and Western interests
in Pakistan and wor ldwide. Together with the Afghan Tali ban and other extremist
groups, Al-Qaida uses this sanctuary to train and recruit operatives, plan and prepare
regional and transnational attacks, disseminate propaganda, and obtain equipment and
supplies.
The Pakistani government has a poor human rights record. R eported human
rights violations include extrajudicial killings, torture and rape by security forces, lack of
judicial independence, arbitrary arrest, widespread corruption, disappearance and
imprisonment of political oppo nents, and trafficking in wo men and children. As of
February 2009, the government maintained domestic intelligence services that
monitored political activists, suspected te rrorists, the media, and suspected foreign
intelligence agents. The Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the risks of travel to
Pakistan in light of threats of terrorist acti vity. Since 2007, American citizens have been
kidnapped for ransom or other reasons. Credible reports i ndicated that authoritie s
routinely intercepted and opened mail without requisite court approval, and monitored
mobile phones and electronic messages.14 
 
Policies 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitabi lity for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must cons ider the adjudicative guidelines . In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluatin g an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines ar e not inflexible ru les of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, adminis trative judges apply the guidelines in
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶ 2( c), the entire process is a c onscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider a ll
available, reliable information about the person, past and pr esent, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
                                                          
14 HE 2.
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The protection of the national sec urity is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning pe rsonnel being cons idered for access to
classified information will be re solved in f avor of national secu rity.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only t hose conclusions that are re asonable, logical, and based
on the evidence.
Under Directive ¶ E3. 1.14, the Government must present evidence to es tablish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Direc tive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant i s
responsible for presenting “wit nesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by the applic ant or proven by Department Counsel.” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.
A person who seeks access to classifi ed information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predi cated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in indi viduals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applic ant may deliberat ely or inadvertently fail to safeguard
classified information. Such decisions ent ail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation of potential, ra ther than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information.
Section 7 of EO 10865 provides that adverse decisions shall be “in terms of the
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3. 1(b) (listing multiple pr erequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis 
 
Psychological Conditions 
 
The security concern relating to the guideline for Psychological Conditions is set
out in AG & 27:
Certain emotional, mental and personality conditions can impair judgment,
reliability, or trustworthiness. A fo rmal diagnosis of a disorde r is not
required for there to be a conc ern under this guideline. A duly qualified
mental health professional (e.g. clin ical psychologist or ps ychiatrist)
employed by or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government,
should be consulted when evaluat ing potentially disqualifying and
mitigating information under this guideline. No negative inference
concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised on the basis of
seeking mental health counseling.
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All of the disqualifying conditions available under AG ¶ 28 apply:
(a) the behavior that casts doubt on an indiv idual’s judgment, reliability, or
trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline, including but
not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent,
paranoid, or bizarre behavior;
(b) an opinion by a duly qualified ment al health pr ofessional that the
individual has a condit ion not covered under any other guideline that may
impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; and
(c) the individual has failed t o follow treatment advice relat ed to a
diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g., failure to take
prescribed medication.
Applicant experienced psychotic epi sodes in 2006 and 2010 that required
hospitalization. During the latter event, wh ich occurred while Ap plicant was working
overseas, his behavior was so bizarre and erra tic, that his employer removed him from
the contract and sent him home. On bo th occasions, Applicant willingly entered
treatment, but Applic ant has refused to ta ke the pre scribed psychotropic drugs after
being discharged. The psychologist who evaluat ed Applicant in connection with this
security clearance investigation concluded that Applic ant’s inability to acknowledge his
mental health issues may compromise his security worthiness.
None of the mitigating c onditions under the AG ¶ 29 apply. Applicant has
displayed little ins ight into the source of his mental health is sues. Based on the
available medical records, sleep deprivation, while a potentially aggravating factor, does
not appear to be the root cause of his psychological dysfunction. As is astutely noted by
the psychologist hired by Applic ant, he is ex tremely vulnerable to stress. However,
Applicant has not pr ovided any evidence to show that he is able to manage th is
significant trigger. While both evaluating psy chologists are in agree ment that Applicant
is not currently showing sympt oms of the previously diagnosed psychotic order, neither
provided any prognosis regarding Applicant’s mental or emot ional stability. Becaus e
Applicant is not currently receiving medic al treatment, there is no indicat ion that his
condition – while episodic – has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
 Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be ma nipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.”15
                                                          
15 AG ¶ 6.
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AG ¶ 7 indicates two conditions that are disqualifying in this case:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professiona l
associate, friend, or ot her person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign per son, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the indi vidual’s obligation to
protect sensitive infor mation or tec hnology and the individ ual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Applicant’s parents-in-law are citizens of Afghanistan. He believes that his father-
in-law, now retired, w as a member of the national assembly. His two sisters and their
husbands are citizens and residents of Pakistan. None of his relatives in Pakistan are
employed by the gov ernment. The mere posse ssion of close ties with foreign family
members is not, as a matter of law, dis qualifying under Guideline B. However, if an
applicant has a close relationship with even one re lative living in a foreign c ountry, this
factor alone is sufficient to create the potent ial for foreign influence and could potentially
result in the compromise of classified information.
The nature of a nation’s gov ernment, its relationship with the United States, and
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coer cion or inducement. T he risk of coercion ,
persuasion, or duress is signifi cantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian
government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government or
the country is known to conduct intellige nce collection operations agains t the United
States. However, this inquiry is not limited to countri es hostile to the United States.
Friendly nations can have profound dis agreements with the United States over matters
they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
The relationship of Afghanistan and Paki stan with the United States places a
significant, but not insurmountable burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate
that his relationships with his relatives livin g in those countries do not pose a security
risk. Applicant should not be placed in a position wher e he might be forced to choose
between loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist his relatives living in
Afghanistan and Pakistan who might be coerced by terrorists or other governmental
entities in those countries. Wh ile there is no evi dence that intelligence o peratives or
terrorists from Pakistan or Afghanistan seek or have sought classified or economic
information from or through Applicant, or his rela tives, it is not possible to rule out such
a possibility in the future. Given the perilous conditions in these countries caused by the
operation of the Taliban, te rrorist groups, the wide-spread corruption within both
governments, and the countries’ poor human rights records, a heightened risk exists.
10 
 
The following mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 are potentially applicable:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or t he positions or activities of those
persons in that count ry are suc h that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choos e between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the in terests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, ei ther because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is li ttle likelihood that it coul d create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Applicant has lived in the United States for 19 year s and has established deep
roots. He owns his home, and his fiv e children are U.S. citizens. The majority of
Applicant’s immediate family, his wife, children, parents, and four of his s ix siblings,
reside in the United St ates and live in the same community as Applicant. Conversely,
Applicant has two immediate family members, two brothers-in-law, and his parents-in-
law living in Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively. Applicant does not maintain
regular contact with them. Wh ile his contacts with his fo reign relatives cannot b e
considered casual, they are infrequent. Viewed in totality, Applicant’s connections to
the United States outweigh those to his foreign relativ es. As such, I find that he is not
vulnerable to foreign exploi tation, inducement, manipulatio n, pressure, or coercion
because of his foreign relations. As such, t hese relationships do not create a potential
conflict of interest.
Whole-Person Concept 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this ca se. In doing so, I have also considered
the whole-person concept and have doubts about Applicant’s ability to protect classified
information. Applicant’s desire to return to his lucrative translator position is
understandable; however, his untreated mental health i ssues pose an una cceptable
security risk. Having Applicant perform hi s translator duties in an environment that
allows adequate sleep, rest, and relaxation does not mitigate the security risk. Applicant
refuses to acknowledge his mental health issues; in doing so, he also has not learned to
manage the conditions that tri gger his epis odic psychosis. Applicant’s suffers fro m a
condition that, when exacerbat ed, impairs his judgment and reliab ility and has the
potential to compromise the security of those around him. Clearance is denied.
11 
 
Formal Findings 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline I: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagr aphs 1.a -1.d: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.d.: For Applicant
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances present ed by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent wit h the natio nal interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a securit y
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
________________________
Nichole L. Noel
Administrative Judge