1
 
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-09208
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Candace L. Garcia, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Alan V. Edmunds, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
Applicant signed an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) on September 17, 2009. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on September 20, 2011, detailing
security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence. The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines For Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information (AG) implemented on September 1, 2006. 
 
GE 1; GE 5; Tr. 27-29, 45-46, 50.1
2
Applicant received the SOR on October 4, 2011 and answered it on October 7,
2011. Applicant retained counsel and requested a hearing before an administrative
judge. DOHA received the request, and Department Counsel was prepared to proceed
on January 23, 2012. I received the case assignment on May 1, 2012. DOHA issued a
Notice of Hearing on May 17, 2012, and an amended notice of hearing on May 25,
2012. I convened the hearing as scheduled on June 7, 2012. The Government offered
exhibits marked as GE 1 through GE 5, which were received and admitted into evidence
without objection. Applicant testified. He submitted exhibits marked as AE A through AE
P, which were received and admitted into evidence without objection. The record closed
on June 7, 2012. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on June 24, 2012.
Procedural and Administrative Notice Rulings
Notice
Applicant received the hearing notice less than 15 days before the hearing. (Tr.
9.) I advised Applicant of his right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the Directive to receive the notice
15 days before the hearing. After consulting with counsel, Applicant affirmatively waived
his right to the 15-day notice. (Tr. 9) 
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to Afghanistan. The request was not admitted into evidence, but
was included in the record as Hearing Exhibit 1. The facts administratively noticed will
be limited to matters of general knowledge and matters not subject to reasonable
dispute, and are set out in the Findings of Fact below. 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the factual allegations in the
SOR. His admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. He also provided
additional information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance. After
a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following
additional findings of fact.  
Applicant, who is 57 years old, works in Afghanistan as linguist, media advisor,
and cultural advisor for a Department of Defense contractor. He began his work in
September 2009 for another company and with his current employer in July 2010. To
perform his work, he must live and work in Afghanistan.1
Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. In December 1975, he started
school in Iraq to learn petroleum production. Upon completion of his education in Iraq,
he moved to Kuwait in August 1977, where he worked in construction until December
GE 1; GE 5; AE L; Tr. 48.2
GE 1; GE 5; AE H; AE I; Tr. 24-27.3
AE I; Tr. 38-39. 4
AE F; AE G; Tr. 38-40, 74.5
3
1984. While in Kuwait, the Afghanistan government decided not to extend his passport.
Because of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1980s and the resulting
problems in Afghanistan, Applicant did not want to return. He initially sought asylum in
the United States, but the United States denied his request. He immigrated to the
United States in January 1985 on a visa and has lived in the United States since then.
Applicant became a U.S. citizen in 2000.2
Applicant’s wife was born in Afghanistan and immigrated to the United States
with her parents and siblings before Applicant met her. She is a U.S. citizen. She has no
immediate family in Afghanistan. Applicant and his wife married in 1990. They have two
daughters, ages 21 and 18, who were born in the United States and live in the United
States. His oldest daughter attends college, and the younger daughter will begin college
in August 2012.3
After arriving in the United States, Applicant worked as a field engineer for eight
years, as a machine operator for over six years, and in the mental health field for ten
years. His wife works for the U.S. Government.4
Applicant and his wife purchased their home in 2005 and a condo in 2010. All
their assets are in the United States. They do not own any property in Afghanistan nor
do they hold any bank accounts or other assets in Afghanistan. He will not inherit any
property or money from any relatives still in Afghanistan.5
Applicant’s parents and his father-in-law are deceased. His mother-in-law,
brother-in-law, and two sisters-in-law live in the United States. Applicant’s two brothers
and three sisters are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. His oldest brother, age 67,
retired from the Afghan police force in 1987 as a colonel. Applicant visited with this
brother in 2007 and 2011 in Afghanistan. He talks with this brother about once a month,
but he does not know if this brother receives a government pension. His 60-year-old
brother works as a teacher in Afghanistan. He last visited with this brother in 2007 and
talks with him about once a year. Applicant sends this brother between $100 and $150
once or twice a year for financial support. Applicant last saw his three sisters in 2007,
when he visited Afghanistan. He does not talk with them on the phone or communicate
with them by e-mail. He knows in what Afghanistan cities they live, but not their street
addresses. They are housewives. He does not know the occupations of their husbands.
Applicant visited with his Afghan cousin, a civil engineer working for the Afghanistan
government, and a friend living in Afghanistan in 2007. He does not communicate with
his cousin or friend. His closest friend, who is also a contractor in Afghanistan, lives
GE 1; GE 5; Tr. 35-43, 51, 55-65.6
Tr. 51–54, 68-69, 77.7
Tr. 78-79.8
Tr. 33-34, 39, 65-66, 74.9
4
near Applicant in the United States. They visit with each other when they are in the
United States, but do not have any contact with each other in Afghanistan.6
Applicant’s oldest brother knows that Applicant is working in Afghanistan, but
Applicant has not discussed his job with this brother. Applicant trusts this brother to
keep this information confidential. Applicant has not told his other siblings, his cousin or
his friend that he is working in Afghanistan. Because his 60-year-old brother and his
family live in insurgency territory, Applicant will not tell them he is working in Afghanistan
for their safety and his. Safety is the primary reason he has not and will not tell his other
Afghanistan family members that he is working in Afghanistan. For this same reason, he
has not had contact with his Afghan family members, except his oldest brother, since he
began working in Afghanistan in 2009. After receiving permission from his superiors,
Applicant met with his older brother in a public place near his residence.7
Since 2009, Applicant has lived and worked in Afghanistan. He lives in a
compound with other contractors. Local Afghani workers enter and exit the compound
throughout the day. Because Applicant is of Afghani descent, his entering and leaving
the compound does not stand out. Along with several others, he travels about four miles
from his compound to his work site by armored truck. He works 12 hours a day, leaving
him with little time for personal activities.8
In May 2012, a car bomb exploded at his compound, about 300 feet from his
room. He was not injured, but one security guard was killed and several pedestrians,
including children were injured. The night before the hearing, Applicant and his family
talked about his return to Afghanistan after this incident. His family does not want him to
return. Applicant explained his reasons for returning to work in an area he knows is
dangerous. The United States gave him a good life. His job is a way for him to give
something back. He also wants his family in Afghanistan to be safe and secure. The
only way to secure this goal is to fight and defeat the terrorists. Applicant remembers
the many hardships his family suffered during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in
the early 1980s. This experience has no concerns for him today, but is one of the
reasons for his decision to work against terrorists.9
Applicant has never been approached by an official of the Afghanistan
government. He has no concerns about problems from the Afghanistan government;
however, he has a concern about terrorists. If he is approached by someone to give up
secrets, he would tell his supervisor and call the police. If placed in a position to choose
between his family in the United States and his family in Afghanistan, he would chose
his family in the United States. He cannot help his family in Afghanistan if they are
GE 2; Tr. 32-33, 50, 71.10
AE A - AE E; AE O; AE P; Tr. 27-28.11
5
attacked or pressured about his work. To his knowledge, none of the members of his
family have been targeted by terrorists or the government.  10
Applicant provided five letters of recommendation from his supervisors, co-
workers, and a friend. They describe him as honest and hardworking. He is a peace
loving man of integrity. He is a reliable employee, who is dedicated to supporting the
United States’ mission in Afghanistan. All think highly of Applicant. Applicant met the
Secretary of Defense during a visit to Afghanistan. He received a medal from the
Secretary of Defense as a souvenir of their meeting.11
I take administrative notice of the following adjudicative facts. Afghanistan is an
Islamic Republic and emerging democracy. With the support of the U.S. and other
nations, its new government endeavors to build a new system of government and to
rebuild the country’s infrastructure. Its Army and police force are well trained. It
continues to face significant challenges from the insurgency and terrorist organizations
supported by the ousted Taliban and Al Qa’ida. The government is not complacent
about the terrorist threat or the insurgency; rather it actively seeks to eliminate both with
the assistance of the U.S. and NATO. The new government is working to reverse a long
legacy of serious human rights abuses, but serious problems remain. Afghanistan is
now an active member of the international community, has signed a “Good Neighbor”
declaration with six nations bordering it, and promotes regional cooperation. The U.S.
supports the emergence of a broad-based government in Afghanistan. Sometime ago,
the leaders of both countries concluded a strategic partnership agreement committing to
a long-term relationship between both countries. Despite its differences with the U.S.,
Afghanistan continues to seek U.S. support as it moves forward towards democracy
and stability. None of the documents offered in support of the request for administrative
notice indicate whether Afghanistan is an active collector of intelligence information.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
6
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
7
AG ¶ 7 describes the disqualifying conditions that could raise security concerns. I
have considered all the conditions, and the following are potentially applicable: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Applicant’s immediate family, which includes his wife and his children, live with
him in the United States. His in-laws are residents of the United States. Thus, no
security concern is raised by these family members. His sisters and brothers are
citizens and residents of Afghanistan. Applicant maintained a normal familial
relationship with his siblings until he started working in Afghanistan. Since 2009, he has
limited his telephone contact with four of his siblings to once a year or not at all because
he does no want to place them in harm’s way. He last visited with them in 2007. He
talks with one brother by telephone once a week and visited with him in Afghanistan in
2011. He does provide his other brother with small amounts of money when needed.
His family relationships are not per se a reason to deny Applicant a security clearance,
but his contacts with his family members must be considered in deciding whether to
grant Applicant a clearance. The Government must establish that these family
relationships create a risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion by terrorists or would create a potential conflict of interest between his
obligations to protect sensitive information and his desire to help his family members
who may be threatened by terrorists. 
In determining if such a risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationships and
contacts with his family members as well as the activities of the government of
Afghanistan and terrorist organizations within this country. The risk that an applicant
could be targeted for manipulation or induced into compromising classified information
is real, not theoretical. Applicant’s relationship and contacts with his siblings in
Afghanistan raise a heightened risk of security concern because the terrorist threats to
safety and security are real and of great concern. The evidence of record fails to show
that the Afghanistan government engages in espionage activities in the United States or
that it targets U.S. citizens in the United States or Afghanistan by exploiting,
manipulating, pressuring, or coercing them to obtain protected information. Thus, the
concern that the Afghanistan government will seek classified information is low.
Under the guideline, the potentially conflicting loyalties must be weighed to
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of U.S.
interests. In determining if Applicant’s contacts in Afghanistan cause security concerns,
I considered that Afghanistan and the United States have a close relationship, and that
Afghanistan and the United States are working together in the fight against terrorism
8
and to continue developing democracy in Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the
Afghanistan government targets U.S. citizens for protected information. The human
rights issues in Afghanistan continue to be a concern, and the terrorist organizations,
not the Afghanistan government, target U.S. citizens and interests in Afghanistan. While
none of these considerations by themselves dispose of the issue, they are all factors to
be considered in determining Applicant’s vulnerability to pressure or coercion because
of his family members in Afghanistan. Because of the significant activities of terrorist
organizations in Afghanistan, Applicant’s presence in Afghanistan and his occasional
contacts with his family raise a heightened risk under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b).
AG ¶ 8 describes the mitigating conditions that could raise security concerns. I
have considered all the conditions, and the following are potentially applicable: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interests; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Applicant’s normal relationship with his family members is not a basis to deny
him a security clearance; however, his burden of proof on mitigation requires him to
provide information that shows that his family is not subject to coercion. His family
members have never held a political position, although one brother works for the
Afghanistan government and one brother is a retired Afghanistan police officer. His
family members have not been targeted by the Afghanistan government or terrorists.
His family members in Afghanistan have not suffered any abuses from the Afghanistan
government or been threatened by terrorists, although his 60-year-old brother and his
family live in insurgent territory. His immediate family members are citizens and
residents of the United States. He owns no property nor does he have financial assets
in Afghanistan. Since beginning work in Afghanistan, Applicant has taken specific care
not to contact four of his siblings to let them know he is working in Afghanistan for their
safety. Balancing these factors as well as the efforts by the Afghanistan government in
attacking terrorism within its borders, and the lack of evidence that the Afghanistan
government targets U.S. citizens for protected information against Afghanistan’s human
rights record, I find that Applicant would resolve any conflict in favor of the U.S.
interests. Likewise, any threats by terrorists organizations against Applicant’s family in
9
Afghanistan would be resolved in favor of U.S. interests because Applicant will be
unable to help his family members in Afghanistan if there are any threats to them. His
loyalties are to the United States, not Afghanistan or terrorist organizations. Applicant
has mitigated the Government’s security concerns as to his family contacts specified in
the SOR under AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(b).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole-person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of denial. In
reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant
immigrated to the United States more than 27 years ago and became a U.S. citizen 12
years ago. His immediate family lives in the United States and wants him to remain in
the United States and not return to Afghanistan because of the dangers. Applicant is
grateful for the life provided to him in the United States and wants to give something
back to his adopted homeland. He also wants his family in Afghanistan to live in safety.
To accomplish both goals, he agreed to work as a linquist, media advisor, and cultural
advisor in Afghanistan, a war zone. Despite the attack on his compound and the close
contact he came with injury or death and over the objections of his family, he decided to
return to Afghanistan to continue his work on behalf of the United States. His willingness
to place himself in harm’s way weighs heavily in his favor as it reflects his loyalty to the
See ISCR Case No. 07-00034 (App. Bd. Feb. 5, 2008).12
10
United States. He has not contacted four of his siblings in Afghanistan since he started
working there in 2009 for their safety and his. His caution reflects his understanding of
the dangers in Afghanistan. He cannot help his Afghanistan family members should
they be threatened by terrorists and will not do so. Afghanistan is dangerous because of
the terrorist activities of the Taliban and Al Qa’ida. Even so, Applicant is willing to risk
his life and return to continue his work for the United States military.  Overall, the12
record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and
suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated
the foreign influence security concerns under Guideline B.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge