1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-00541
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Robert Kilmartin, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Steven H. Levin, Esq.
______________
Decision
______________
CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Between 2002 and 2005, Applicant disseminated sensitive and proprietary
information to an independent consultant without authorization. Although this conduct
does not constitute a violation of the U.S. Systems Procurement and Integrity Act (the
Act), as the Government alleged, it raises security concerns under the guideline
governing the handling of protected information. Also, Applicant’s conduct raises
broader questions about his personal conduct which he failed to mitigate. Clearance is
denied.  
Statement of the Case
On August 4, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a  Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under the
guidelines covering the handling of protected information and personal conduct. The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
2
1992), as amended (Directive), and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by
DoD on September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR on September 1, 2011. He denied all of the
allegations and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on April 12, 2012.
On May 8, 2012, a notice of hearing was issued scheduling the case for May 23, 2012.
The hearing was conducted as scheduled. I received three Government exhibits (GE 1-
3) and eight Applicant exhibits (AE A-H). Also, I considered the testimony of one
Government witness and two Applicant witnesses. At the close of the hearing, I left the
record open for Department Counsel to identify which provision of the Procurement
Integrity Act was allegedly violated, and for Applicant’s counsel to prepare a response.
Within the time allotted, Department Counsel provided a one-page memo that I
incorporated into the record as Hearing Exhibit I. Applicant’s counsel did not respond.
The transcript was received on June 12, 2012.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 60-year-old married man with four children. He has been married
three times previously. All of his prior marriages ended in divorce. His two youngest
children, ages two and five, are from his current marriage. The older children, both
adults, were from prior marriages. 
Applicant served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1974 until his retirement in 1995.
While in the Marines, he earned a bachelor of arts degree in natural science and a
master’s degree in human resources management. (Ex. A; Tr. 14) Since retiring, he has
worked in the unmanned vehicle industry. (Ex. C) Applicant has held a security
clearance for more than 35 years. (GE 2 at 12) Currently, Applicant works for a defense
contractor that is developing technology for enhancing situational awareness between
manned and unmanned aircraft, and technology for identifying friendly unmanned
aircraft from unmanned aircraft operated by adversaries. He has worked for this
company since 2010. (Ex. A)
From March 2002 to February 2010, Applicant worked for another defense
contractor that specialized in unmanned combat systems. He was responsible for
developing acquisition strategies and ensuring that the system specifications for the
government’s unmanned vehicles met Federal Aviation Administration regulations. (Ex.
A) His job performance was good. Over the years, his supervisors have characterized
him as “far-thinking” and “dependable.” (Ex. H at 10, 28)  Similarly, the company’s
customers were pleased with Applicant’s performance. (Ex. H at 16) 
 
From September 2004 to August 2005, Appellant performed part-time consulting
services for Mr. X, an independent contractor specializing in marketing and business
development of unmanned vehicle systems technology. (Ex. 3 at 9, 194) Mr. X did
consulting work for several defense contractors in this field. 
3
In August 2005, the federal government initiated a multi-agency investigation of
Mr. X after several defense contractors complained that he had somehow obtained
some of their proprietary information and was distributing it to his principal employer.
Because his employer was a competitor of these other defense contractors, the concern
was that Mr. X was giving his company an unfair advantage when competing for
procurement contracts. (GE 3 at 9, 18, 23)
Investigators then met with counsel for Mr. X’s client. After the meeting, Mr. X’s
client provided several documents it had received from Mr. X. Many of the documents
were “pre-decisional” and “procurement sensitive.” (GE 3 at 7) On November 17, 2005,
the lead investigative agency obtained a search warrant for Mr. X’s business and
residence. As part of the search, it seized Mr. X’s computer. (GE 2 at 6) Among other
things, the investigators discovered six e-mails from Applicant to Mr. X with attached
documents labelled either “source selection sensitive” “Distribution D,” or “For Official
Use Only” [FOUO]. (Tr. 146, 152; GE 3 at 54) According to Applicant, “source selection”
documents are proposals from contractors. The government agency reviews them and
then decides who is going to perform the work. (Tr. 152) “Distribution D” information is
government-generated information that may only be reviewed by DoD contractors and
DoD employers with a need to know.  (Tr. 152) 
In December 2007, investigators contacted Applicant and interviewed him. (Tr.
78) During the interview, Applicant stated that as part of his job he had access to
government documents and information for the research and development of unmanned
aerial vehicles. The investigators showed Applicant copies of each e-mail seized from
Mr. X’s computer, which Applicant had sent, and asked him if he should have sent
them. The first e-mail (E-Mail 1) was dated April 9, 2005. E-Mail 2 was dated January 7,
2005, E-Mail 3 was dated March 25, 2005, E-Mail 4 was dated January 6, 2005, E-Mail
5 was dated December 24, 2004, and E-Mail 6 was dated August 15, 2002. (GE 3 at
55-64) Applicant admitted sending all of the e-mails except E-Mail 4. He stated that
neither the government nor his employer authorized him to send any of the information
that he forwarded to Mr. X. Although he did not admit sending E-Mail 4, he did not
explicitly deny sending it. Rather, he stated that he did not remember sending it, but if
he did, the information attached was not something that Mr. X was authorized to
receive. (GE 3 at 56) 
Each e-mail that Applicant sent to Mr. X included brief messages with
attachments. For example, E-Mail 1 includes, in part, the following:
This is the whole kitchen sink. Pull what you want and be careful. Took me
all day to get my hands on. (GE 3 at 58)
An excerpt from E-Mail 3 reads as follows:
Here is the draft we are working on. Disguise the words so as not to
identify the source. (GE 3 at 60)
The grand jury related to the government’s investigation of Mr. X. Applicant was not a target of the1
investigation. (Tr. 83)
4
At the hearing, Applicant testified that he asked his supervisor for permission to
consult part-time, and that his supervisor granted him permission. (Tr. 153) Applicant’s
supervisor and the president of the company where he worked during the period he e-
mailed the information to Mr. X were interviewed as part of the criminal investigation of
Mr. X. They told the criminal investigative agent that they were unaware that Applicant
was working on the side. Also, neither knew  Mr. X. (GE 3 at 82)
Applicant testified that the information he provided to Mr. X was all open source
information that was in the public domain when he sent it. (Tr. 146) Per a “handshake”
agreement with Mr. X, Applicant was paid $100 per hour to research the Internet for
information about unmanned aerial technology that Mr. X may find helpful. (Tr. 158) It is
unclear from the record when Applicant started consulting for Mr. X. Also, Applicant
testified that he did not commit procurement fraud because the competitive bidding had
already occurred before he forwarded the information. Consequently, neither Mr. X nor
anyone to whom Mr. X forwarded the information received any unfair competitive
advantage.
When asked on cross-examination why his testimony contradicted what he told
the investigator, Applicant attributed the contradiction to a misunderstanding as to
whether Mr. X was a licensed DoD contractor. Specifically, he testified that before the
interview, the investigative agent told him Mr. X was an unlicensed contractor. Some
time after the interview, immediately before testifying before a grand jury,  the1
prosecutor informed Applicant that Mr. X was a licensed DoD contractor. Applicant
contends that his statements were not contradictory because his disclosure to the
investigative agent was predicated upon the agent’s misinformation that Mr. X was an
unlicensed contractor, whereas, his hearing testimony is based on his understanding
that Mr. X was a licensed DoD contractor. (Tr. 82, 173)
The project manager of the agency that Applicant supported testified. He stated
that Applicant reported primarily to him when he was assigned to the project. He served
in the capacity of program director at or about the time Applicant was providing part-
time consulting services for Mr. X. The project manager described his agency as public
sector venture capitalists who typically “develop a piece of technology to a point where it
is . . . validated.” (Tr. 190) After developing the technology, it is provided to one of the
branches of the armed services where the technology is “mature[d] further” and made
operational. (Tr. 190) The process of transitioning a technology from the development
agency to the armed service branch is large-scale and complex and requires a defense
contractor to coordinate, together with multiple subcontractors. (Tr. 180, 188-190) 
Applicant was part of a team hired to expedite the transition of the new
technologies to the armed service branch. (Tr. 180) Consequently, he was required to
“actively engage the contractor and government community outside of [the agency] with
material such as the information at issue. (Tr. 180) Any material “related to operations
5
requirement documents [or] statement of work . . .” was expected to be released. (Tr.
185) The project manager, testifying by phone, stated that he had reviewed the
attachments to E-Mails 1 and 3 through 5. He concluded that Applicant was authorized
to release this information. (Tr. 178-180) On cross-examination, the project manager
acknowledged that he did not know whether Mr. X was part of the future combat
systems  contractor community that was authorized to receive this information. (Tr. 185-
186)
E-Mail 6 is a message between two government employees that had been
forwarded to Applicant, who then forwarded it to Mr. X. As part of the government
investigation, the sender of the e-mail was interviewed. (GE 3 at 68) He told the agent
that Applicant, as part of the team, would have been allowed to see the e-mail, but he
should not have forwarded it to anyone outside the program. To his knowledge, Mr. X
was not part of the program. (GE 3 at 68)
On March 20, 2008, the investigator interviewed the lead contracting officer of
the armed services branch that was working with the research agency to develop the
unmanned aviation technology. (GE 3 at 69) He stated that Applicant’s dissemination of
the documents was inappropriate, but that it did not affect the procurement process
because it occurred after contractors were already selected. (GE 3 at 69)
One of the investigators who interviewed Applicant as part of the investigation of
Mr. X testified. According to the investigator, the issue of whether Mr. X was an
authorized DoD contractor was never discussed during the interview. 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
6
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” Applicant
has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.
Analysis
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information
Under this guideline, “[d]eliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and
regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an
individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard
such information, and is a serious security concern” (AG ¶ 33). The Government alleges
that Applicant violated the Act by providing sensitive information to Mr. X, a contractor,
without authorization.
Under the Act, any person by virtue of his office, employment, or relationship with
the federal government, who has access to contractor bid or proposal information, or
source selection information shall not disclose such information before the award of the
procurement contract to which the information relates. (41 U.S. Code §§ 2102(a)(1);
(a)(3)(B)).  According to the lead contracting officer of the armed service branch on the
base where Applicant was working, the information that Applicant shared with Mr. X had
no affect on the procurement process because it had already occurred before Applicant
shared it. Absent any other evidence regarding a violation of the Act, and in light of
Applicant’s denial, I conclude that Applicant’s disclosure of information to Mr. X did not
constitute a violation of the Act.
  Although Applicant did not violate the Act, this does not end the analysis of
whether he violated any rules for protecting classified or sensitive information. The
information was either sensitive, protected, or proprietary regardless of whether its
disclosure violated the Act.  Applicant contends that he was authorized to disclose it,
whereas, the Government contends that he was not authorized to disclose it. This
raises the issue of whether AG ¶ 34(a), “deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified
or other protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to
personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at seminars,
meetings, or conferences,” applies.
The project manager for the agency where Applicant was assigned testified that
Applicant was authorized to release the information, such as that which was released to
Mr. X.  However, he did not know specifically whether Mr. X was a licensed contractor.
Moreover, the project manager only testified about four of the six e-mails that Applicant
forwarded to Mr. X. He did not testify about E-Mail 2 and E-Mail 6. Moreover, E-Mail 6
was an e-mail conversation between two government employees, and the e-mail’s
sender told the investigator that it was okay for Applicant to have seen the e-mail, but
not to have forwarded it to anyone else.
Most important, Applicant initially admitted that he should not have forwarded the
information to Mr. X. He states that his earlier investigative statement was based on
7
misinformation provided to him by the investigators regarding Mr. X’s contractor status.
One of the investigators who interviewed Applicant testified. He stated that he never
discussed with Applicant the issue of whether Mr. X was a licensed contractor. (Tr. 227-
255)
Applicant testified untruthfully about whether his employer knew he was
performing independent consulting work part-time. This false testimony undermines the
credibility of his assertion that the agent misled him about whether Mr. X was an
authorized contractor. Conversely, there is nothing either in the documentary record or
that was gleaned from cross-examination for me to conclude that the agent was not
credible. I conclude that AG ¶ 34(a) applies without mitigation.
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
Under this guideline, “conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified
information” (AG ¶ 15). 
Applicant’s conduct triggers the application of AG ¶ 16(d)(1) “untrustworthy or
unreliable behavior  to include . . . release of proprietary information [or] unauthorized
release of sensitive corporate or other government protected information.” I conclude
that none of the mitigating conditions apply for the same reasons, as discussed above.
none of the mitigating conditions under the guideline concerning handling protected
information, as discussed above, do not apply.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Applicant enjoyed a successful career in the Marines, retiring after 21 years of
service. During this time, he earned both an undergraduate degree and a master’s
degree. He is a highly talented individual who has nurtured a productive career in the
defense contracting industry. 
8
However, Applicant chose to perform part-time consulting work without the
knowledge of his supervisors, and provided sensitive, protected information, and
proprietary information to his part-time employer without authorization. He compounded
this security violation by testifying about it untruthfully. Upon considering this case in
light of the whole-person concept, I conclude Applicant has failed to mitigate the
security concerns.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline K: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge