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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Redacted] )  ISCR Case No. 11-02311 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Tovah Minster, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Joseph R. Price, Esq. 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines G (Alcohol 
Consumption), E (Personal Conduct), and F (Financial Considerations). Eligibility for 
access to classified information is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on September 17, 
2010. On April 11, 2012, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified 
him that it was unable to find that it was clearly consistent with the national interest to 
continue his access to classified information, and it recommended that his case be 
submitted to an administrative judge for a determination whether to continue or revoke 
his clearance. DOHA set forth the basis for its action in a Statement of Reasons (SOR), 
citing security concerns under Guidelines G, E, and F. DOHA acted under Executive 
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), 
as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the Department of Defense on September 
1, 2006.  
 
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 Applicant received the SOR on April 18, 2012; answered it on May 4, 2012; and 
requested a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA received the request on May 
9, 2012. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on June 7, 2012, and the case was 
assigned to me on June 14, 2012. After coordinating with Applicant’s attorney, DOHA 
issued a notice of hearing on July 11, 2012, scheduling it for August 7, 2012. I 
convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 through 7 were 
admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified, presented the testimony of 
three witnesses, and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A and B, which were admitted 
without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on August 13, 2012. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.e, 
2.a-2.c, 2.f, 2.h, and 3.a. He denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 2.d, 2.e, and 2.g. His 
admissions in his answer and at the hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 38-year-old project manager employed by a federal contractor 
since February 2006. He completed college and received a bachelor’s degree in May 
1996. He has held a security clearance for about eight years. (Tr. 67.) He submitted his 
most recent SCA to obtain a higher-level clearance. (Tr. 68.) 
 
Applicant married in June 2003 and divorced in October 2008. Two sons, now 
ages 11 and 6, were born during the marriage.  
 
 In April 1997, Applicant was convicted of being drunk in public. In December 
1997, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of driving while intoxicated.  
 
 In July 2005, Applicant was charged with assault and battery on a family member 
after admitting that he shook his infant son on three or four occasions, punched him on 
three or four occasions, placed a pillow over him for a moment on two occasions, and 
bit his leg on two occasions. His abuse of his infant son occurred over a period of three 
or four months. (Tr. 96.) He disclosed his conduct during a polygraph examination 
conducted by another government agency (AGA). He told the polygraph examiner that 
the incidents occurred because he became frustrated when his son, then three or four 
months old, would not stop crying during the night. The AGA reported the incident to 
local civilian authorities. (GX 4 at 3-4.) 
 
The charges of domestic assault were dismissed because there was no 
independent corroboration of Applicant’s admissions. However, he was required to 
complete anger management counseling. (GX 4 at 3-4.) The licensed clinical social 
worker who provided the court-ordered counseling testified that Applicant came from a 
“very chaotic” family background, and that it is not unusual for family behavior patterns 
to be passed from one generation to the next. The focus of his treatment was on stress 
reduction, teaching Applicant better coping mechanisms. He saw Applicant seven times 
between July 2005 and December 2005. His treatment did not involve Applicant’s 
 
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alcohol use. He found that Applicant was a fast learner, very cooperative, “painfully 
honest,” embarrassed by what had happened, and “appropriately remorseful” for his 
conduct. At the hearing, he described Applicant as one of the most honest people he 
has seen. Applicant returned to him for counseling in March 2011 and has been seeing 
him every week. (Tr. 40-44, 46)  
 
 Applicant’s ex-wife testified that the abuse of their son occurred during the winter 
of 2004 and continued into 2005, but she was unaware of it until the civilian authorities 
contacted her in April 2005. (Tr. 25.) Applicant moved out of the family home, and they 
never resided together again. (Tr. 26.) For the past three or four years, Applicant has 
visited his sons once a week and they have stayed with him every other weekend for 
three nights. She testified that Applicant has a “wonderful” relationship with their sons. 
He is very involved in their activities, coaches their sports teams, and is very dedicated 
to them. (Tr. 27-28.) At present, his ex-wife has no concerns about Applicant spending 
time alone with their children. (Tr. 29.) To the best of her knowledge, Applicant does not 
consume alcohol when he is with their children. (Tr. 31.) In spite of their marital 
difficulties, Applicant’s ex-wife considers him very honest. She described him as “very 
forthcoming with information in most cases, and possibly even to a fault.” (Tr. 39.) 
Applicant testified that his boys still make him angry at times, but that he has learned to 
step away, “cool down,” and use the coping mechanisms he has learned. (Tr. 105-06.) 
 
 In December 2005, Applicant resigned from his job after his supervisors 
discovered that he was viewing pornographic videos on his work computer. He told his 
estranged wife about his resignation and the reason for it. (Tr. 32.) 
 
From January 2006 to September 2008, Applicant voluntarily received 
counseling for alcohol abuse, marital problems, and the effects of physical and sexual 
abuse he had suffered as a child. His medical records reflect a history of weekend binge 
drinking. He was discharged from the treatment program with a diagnosis of alcohol 
dependence and major depressive disorder in full remission. His discharge summary 
reflects that he met all treatment goals, gained insight into his behavior, and was taking 
care of his physical and emotional needs. No further mental health services were 
recommended. The clinician who provided his diagnosis and treatment holds 
credentials as a licensed marriage and family therapist and a licensed professional 
counselor. (GX 2 at 4-7; AX A; Tr. 76, 98.) 
 
 In August 2009, Applicant was charged with driving under the influence. He was 
convicted of impaired driving and sentenced to probation for one year. He was required 
to attend an alcohol safety awareness program (ASAP), required to pay court costs and 
fines, and required to complete 38 hours of community service. He successfully 
completed all the court-ordered requirements. (GX 4 at 3; GX 5; Tr. 75.) 
 
 In response to DOHA interrogatories in October 2011, Applicant stated that he 
continues to drink alcoholic beverages, mostly beer. He stated that he drinks beer 
weekly, about two to four beers on each occasions. He also stated that he drinks to the 
point of intoxication “every other month or so.” (GX 3 at 3.) At the hearing, he testified 
 
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that his response to DOHA interrogatories was still “fairly accurate,” but that his drinking 
to the point of intoxication was becoming less frequent and he could not remember 
when it last occurred. (Tr. 101.) He also testified that he does not believe that the 
diagnosis of alcohol dependence was a “true depiction.” (Tr. 108.) 
 
When Applicant submitted his SCA in September 2010, he answered “Yes” to 
Question 13c, asking if during the last seven years he had been fired, quit a job after 
being told he would be fired, left a job by mutual agreement following charges or 
allegations of misconduct, left a job by mutual agreement following notice of 
unsatisfactory performance, or left a job for other reasons under unfavorable 
circumstances. He explained his affirmative answer by stating that he left his job 
because the work and travel schedule were too hectic. He did not disclose that he 
resigned in lieu of termination after being caught viewing pornography at work. (GX 1 at 
27.) 
 
 Applicant’s facility security officer (FSO) testified that he consulted with her about 
the need to disclose the pornography incident on his SCA. She testified that Applicant 
told her about the incident, she asked him if he had resigned because of it, and he 
answered “No.” Based on his answer, she told him he need not reflect it as the reason 
for resigning. (Tr. 54.)  
 
 Applicant’s FSO considers him “very genuine.” She described him as a person 
who “wears his heart on his sleeve.” (Tr. 60.) 
 
On October 26, 2010, a security investigator questioned Applicant about the 
domestic assault on his infant son. Applicant told the investigator that he had an 
incident of shaking his son and tossing him onto the bed. He did not disclose the full 
extent of his physical abuse of his son. (GX 4 at 3.) The investigator also asked him 
about his resignation from a job in December 2005, and he explained that he left his job 
because of the travel and type of work. He did not disclose that he resigned in lieu of 
termination. (GX 4 at 6.) Within a few days after this interview, Applicant told his FSO 
that he needed to contact the investigator and “come clean.” (Tr. 62.) 
 
In a subsequent interview by the security investigator on January 11, 2011, 
Applicant admitted that he resigned in lieu of termination and that he did not disclose 
the reason for his resignation because he was embarrassed. He also told the 
investigator that he consulted with his FSO and she advised him not to disclose the 
incident involving pornography. (GX 4 at 9.) 
 
 On his SCA, Applicant also answered “Yes” to Question 21, asking if during the 
last seven years he had consulted with a health care professional regarding an 
emotional or mental health condition. The instructions under Question 21 told Applicant 
to answer “No” if the counseling was not court-ordered and was for “strictly marital, 
family, grief not related to violence by you; or strictly related to adjustments from service 
in a military combat environment.” He disclosed the court-ordered mental health 
 
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counseling from February 2005 to May 2005, but he did not disclose the voluntary 
alcohol-related counseling from January 2006 through September 2008.  
 
Applicant answered “Yes” to Question 24a, asking if during the last seven years 
his use of alcohol had a negative impact on his work performance, professional or 
personal relationships, his finances, or resulted in intervention by law enforcement or 
public safety personnel. He also answered “Yes” to Question 24b, asking if during the 
last seven years he had been ordered, advised, or asked to seek counseling or 
treatment as a result of his use of alcohol. Finally, he answered “Yes” to Question 24c, 
asking if during the last seven years he had received counseling or treatment for use of 
alcohol. He disclosed his ASAP counseling in 2010 but did not disclose the alcohol-
related counseling from January 2006 through September 2008.  
 
Applicant’s FSO testified that she told him that Question 21 required him to 
disclose court-ordered counseling or counseling as a result of harming someone, but he 
was not required to disclose voluntary grief or marital counseling. (Tr. 56.) Applicant 
testified that he did not disclose the January 2006-September 2008 counseling because 
he thought the question required disclosure only of mandatory counseling. (Tr. 85.) He 
admitted in his answer to the SOR that his January 2006-September 2008 program 
included alcohol counseling. However, he testified that he did not disclose the January 
2006-September 2008 counseling in response to Question 24c because it was primarily 
for marital problems and other aspects of his life. (Tr. 86.) 
 
 When Applicant and his wife separated, he was earning about $90,000 per year. 
He rented a basement apartment for $950 per month, including utilities. He was paying 
spousal and child support payments of $3,000 per month. He had two credit card 
accounts and reached his credit limit on both. One had a credit limit of $2,000. His credit 
report reflects that the other credit card had a limit of $34,200 and that he had exceeded 
that limit. He was making minimum payments of $1,000 per month on the second card. 
About five years before filing for bankruptcy, he negotiated a reduction in his minimum 
payment to $690. He also depleted the $18,000 in his individual retirement account and 
borrowed from his 401(k) retirement plan. (Tr. 78-81, 94-95, 100-01; AX B at 7.) His 
spousal and child support obligations terminated in October 2009. He filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy in March 2011 and received a discharge in July 2011. The two credit card 
debts, totaling $29,839, were the only debts discharged. (GX 6; GX 7.)  
 
Applicant now earns about $110,000 per year. (Tr. 96.) He has paid off the loan 
on his ten-year-old car, is keeping up with his financial obligations, and has a credit 
score of 695. (Tr. 80-81; AX B at 16.).  
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
 
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President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, 
past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 
 
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01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption 
 
 The SOR alleges that Applicant was charged with DUI in August 2009 and 
convicted of impaired driving (SOR ¶ 1.a), received treatment for alcohol use from 
January 2006 to September 2008 and was diagnosed with alcohol dependence in full 
remission (SOR ¶ 1.b), pleaded guilty to DUI in December 1997 (SOR ¶ 1.c), and was 
convicted of being drunk in public in April 1997 (SOR ¶ 1.d). It also alleges that from the 
age of 16 until at least October 2011, he consumed alcohol to excess and to the point of 
intoxication; and that, as of October 2011, he was drinking to intoxication approximately 
every other month (SOR ¶ 1.e). 
 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 21: “Excessive alcohol 
consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to 
control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability and 
trustworthiness.” Applicant’s admissions, corroborated by medical and court records, 
establish the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: 
 
AG ¶ 22(a): alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving 
while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the 
peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual 
is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent; 
 
AG ¶ 22(c): habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of 
impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as 
an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent; 
 
AG ¶ 22(e): evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a 
licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized 
alcohol treatment program;1 and. 
 
AG ¶ 22(f): relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and 
completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program. 
 
 Security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated if “so much time has 
passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual 
                                                          
1 The clinician who evaluated Applicant was not a licensed clinical social worker. However, AG ¶ 22(e) is 
not limited to the specific credentials that are enumerated. Instead, it “contemplate[s] a broad range of 
providers who, by education and by position, are qualified to diagnose and treat alcohol dependence and 
other substance abuse disorders.” ISCR Case No. 07-00558 at 5 (App. Bd. Apr. 7, 2008). 
 
 
 
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circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” AG ¶ 23(a). The first prong of this 
mitigating condition (“so much time has passed”) focuses on whether the conduct was 
recent. There are no Abright line@ rules for determining when conduct is Arecent.@ The 
determination must be based on a careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence. If 
the evidence shows Aa significant period of time has passed without any evidence of 
misconduct,@ then an administrative judge must determine whether that period of time 
demonstrates Achanged circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of 
reform or rehabilitation.@ ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). 
 
 Applicant’s arrest for DUI was three years ago, but he admitted that he continues 
to drink to the point of intoxication, albeit less frequently than in the past. He admitted in 
response to DOHA interrogatories that he had become intoxicated around July 2011. At 
the hearing, he was vague about his current drinking habits, admitting that his estimate 
of drinking to intoxication every other month was “fairly accurate” but testifying that he 
could not remember when it last occurred. Applicant has not presented sufficient 
evidence to establish that his drinking to the point of intoxication is not recent, is 
infrequent, or occurred under unusual circumstances. I conclude that AG ¶ 23(a) is not 
established. 
 
 Security concerns also may be mitigated if “the individual acknowledges his or 
her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to 
overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol 
dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser).” AG ¶ 23(b). Applicant’s testimony 
at the hearing established that he has not fully acknowledged that he is alcohol 
dependent, and he continues to drink to the point of intoxication. I conclude that AG ¶ 
23(b) is not established. 
 
 Finally, security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated under AG ¶ 
23(d) if:  
 
the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient 
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has 
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or 
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as 
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar 
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified 
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff 
member of a recognized alcohol treatment program. 
 
 Applicant successfully completed his counseling program in September 2008. No 
aftercare was prescribed. However, this mitigating condition is not fully established 
because he did not receive a prognosis and he continues to drink to the point of 
intoxication. 
 
 
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Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 
 The SOR alleges that Applicant resigned from a job in lieu of termination after he 
was discovered viewing pornography on his work computer (SOR ¶ 2.a). It also alleges 
that he was charged with assault and battery on his infant son (SOR ¶ 2.f). It further 
alleges that he falsified his SCA by failing to disclose his resignation in lieu of 
termination, failing to disclose his alcohol-related counseling from January 2006 to 
September 2008, and failing to disclose the full extent of his physical abuse of his infant 
son (SOR ¶¶ 2.b, 2.d, and 2.e). It further alleges that he falsified material facts during a 
security interview by failing to disclose his resignation in lieu of termination and the full 
extent of his physical abuse of his infant son (SOR ¶¶ 2.c and 2.g). Finally, it alleges 
that he received a Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge in July 2011 (SOR ¶ 2.h).  
 The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15:  
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions 
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful 
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other 
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.   
 
 The disqualifying condition relevant to Applicant’s answers to Questions 13C, 21 
and 24 on his SCA is AG ¶ 16(a): “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of 
relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire . . . .” Applicant admitted 
falsifying his answer to Question 13C by failing to disclose that he resigned from a job in 
lieu of termination, but he denied falsifying his answers to Questions 21 (consulting with 
a health profession for emotional or mental health condition) and 24 (alcohol-related 
counseling or treatment). Applicant’s admission establishes AG ¶ 16(a) for his false 
answer to Question 13C. 
 
 When a falsification allegation is controverted, as in this case, the Government 
has the burden of proving it. An omission, standing alone, does not prove falsification. 
An administrative judge must consider the record evidence as a whole to determine an 
applicant’s state of mind at the time of the omission.  See ISCR Case No. 03-09483 at 4 
(App. Bd. Nov. 17, 2004).  
 
 Applicant testified that he was advised by his FSO that he was not required to 
disclose his January 2006-September 2008 counseling in response to Question 21 
unless it was court-ordered or violence-related, and his FSO corroborated his testimony. 
His answer to Question 21 was incorrect, because the counseling included his alcohol-
related problems and was not for “strictly marital, family, grief not related to violence” 
and it was not “strictly related to adjustments from service in a military combat 
environment.” However, his explanation was plausible and corroborated by his FSO. 
Thus, I conclude that Applicant did not intentionally falsify his answer to Question 21. 
 
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 Applicant testified that he did not disclose his January 2006-September 2008 
counseling in response to Question 24c because it was primarily for purposes other 
than alcohol abuse. However, he admitted in his answer to the SOR and his hearing 
testimony that he received treatment for his alcohol use. Thus, I conclude that AG ¶ 
16(a) is established for his incomplete disclosure in response to Question 24c. 
 
 The disqualifying condition relevant to Applicant’s false answers to a security 
investigator in October 2010 regarding the reasons for his termination of employment 
and the extent of his physical abuse of his infant son is AG ¶ 16(b): “deliberately 
providing false or misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer, 
investigator, [or] security official, competent medical authority, or other official 
government representative.” Applicant admitted falsifying the reasons for his December 
2005 termination, and his admission is sufficient to establish AG ¶ 16(b).  
 
 Applicant denied falsifying the extent of his child abuse. In his answer to the 
SOR, Applicant stated that he did not specify the frequency of his conduct during the 
interview, but that the memory of his conduct was painful and he was ashamed of it. 
The extent of Applicant’s disclosure to the investigator is not clear from the summary of 
the interview, which describes it in the singular (“the incident”), but it was sufficient to 
trigger a referral to civilian authorities. I conclude that Applicant’s description of the 
incident was incomplete, but that he did not intend to mislead the investigator. It 
appears that Applicant was not asked for more details, and he did not volunteer more 
information because it was a painful and embarrassing topic. Thus, I conclude that 
Applicant did not intentionally provide misleading information to the investigator about 
the extent of his child abuse. 
 
 The following additional disqualifying conditions are established by Applicant’s 
physical abuse of his infant son and his use of a workplace computer to view 
pornography. His Chapter 7 bankruptcy, although alleged under this guideline, is more 
appropriately discussed below under Guideline F. 
AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue 
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other 
single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a 
whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information; 
AG ¶ 16(d): credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered 
under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an 
adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available 
information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable 
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to 
comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that 
the person may not properly safeguard protected information. This 
 
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includes but is not limited to consideration of . . . a pattern of dishonesty or 
rule violations; and  
AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's 
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress, such as . . . engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the 
person's personal, professional, or community standing.  
 The following mitigating conditions are relevant to false or misleading answers on 
a security clearance application or during a security interview: 
 
AG ¶ 17(a): the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the 
omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the 
facts; or 
 
AG ¶ 17(b): the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment 
was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate 
advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the 
individual specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon 
being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the 
information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully. 
 
 AG ¶ 17(a) is established for Applicant’s false answer to Question 13C on his 
SCA and misleading response during the follow-up security interview on October 26, 
2010, regarding the reasons for his resignation from a job. He contacted his FSO shortly 
after the follow-up interview, contacted the security investigator, and corrected the 
falsification on January 11, 2011. AG ¶ 17(a) is not established for his misleading 
answer to Question 24c. 
 
 AG ¶ 17(b) is established for Applicant’s incorrect answer to Question 21 
(counseling for emotional or mental health condition). The evidence shows that he was 
advised by his FSO that disclosure of counseling was not required unless it was court-
ordered or as a result of harming someone. However, AG ¶ 17(b) is not established for 
his misleading omission of alcohol-related counseling in response to Question 24c. 
 
 Security concerns raised by personal conduct may be mitigated by any of the 
following: 
 
AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the 
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the 
individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained 
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to 
alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused 
 
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untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such 
behavior is unlikely to recur; or 
 
AG ¶ 17(e): the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. 
 
 AG ¶¶ 17(c), (d), and (e) are established for Applicant’s physical abuse of 
his infant son. His conduct occurred seven years ago. He has acknowledged his 
behavior, expressed profound remorse, obtained counseling, disclosed his 
conduct, and has demonstrated by his current relationship with his children that 
his conduct is unlikely to recur.  
 
 AG ¶¶ 17(c), (d), and (e) also are established for Applicant’s misuse of a 
workplace computer to view pornography. The incident was a one-time 
occurrence. Applicant was embarrassed and remorseful, and is unlikely to repeat 
his conduct.  
 
 No mitigating conditions are established for Applicant’s incomplete and 
misleading responses to Question 24c on his SCA. Applicant admitted at the 
hearing that his January 2006-September 2008 treatment included alcohol-
related counseling. His explanation that he failed to disclose it because the 
counseling was primarily related to other issues was implausible and 
unconvincing.  
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
The SOR cross-alleges Applicant’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy under this guideline. 
The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18:  
 
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds. 
 
 This concern is broader than the possibility that an applicant might knowingly 
compromise classified information in order to raise money. It encompasses concerns 
about an appellant’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting 
classified information. An individual who is financially irresponsible may also be 
irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified 
information. See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). 
 
 
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 The relevant disqualifying conditions under this guideline are: 
 
AG ¶ 19(a): inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;  
 
AG ¶ 19(c): a history of not meeting financial obligations; and 
 
AG ¶ 19(e): consistent spending beyond one’s means, which may be 
indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high 
debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis. 
 
 Applicant’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy and the reasons underlying it establish AG ¶ 
19(a), (c) and (e). He provided minimal information about his financial history, and it is 
unclear how he accumulated more than $34,000 in credit card debt. He was employed 
in a well-paying job and his rent and utilities were low. The amount of his car payment is 
not reflected in the record. His biggest financial obligation was the spousal and child 
support, but those obligations ended in October 2009.  
 
 The relevant mitigating conditions under this guideline are: 
 
AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not 
cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; 
 
AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were 
largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business 
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or 
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; 
 
AG ¶ 20(c): the person has received or is receiving counseling for the 
problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being 
resolved or is under control; 
 
AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue 
creditors or otherwise resolve debts;   
 
 AG ¶ 20(a) is not established because his bankruptcy discharge was recent. The 
evidence is sparse regarding the circumstances causing him to accumulate the debts 
that were discharged in bankruptcy, making it difficult to conclude that recurrence is 
unlikely.  
 
 AG ¶ 20(b) is not fully established. Although Applicant’s marital breakup was 
arguably a condition beyond his control, it also was a product of his child abuse and 
involvement with pornography. Furthermore, without more information about his 
financial circumstances after the marital breakup, I cannot conclude that he acted 
responsibly under the circumstances. 
 
14 
 
 
 AG ¶ 20(c) is established. While there is no evidence of financial counseling, 
Applicant’s financial situation is currently under control. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(d) is not established. While Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a legally 
permissible solution to excessive indebtedness, it does not constitute a good-faith effort 
within the meaning of this mitigating condition. See ISCR Case No. 03-20347 (App. Bd. 
Oct. 26, 2006). 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process 
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines G, E, and F in my whole-
person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those 
guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. 
 
 Applicant is a mature adult who has worked for his current employer for more 
than six years, held a clearance for about eight years, and is being sponsored by his 
current employer for a higher-level clearance. Notwithstanding their divorce, his ex-wife 
considers him very honest. His FSO described him as “very genuine,” and a person who 
“wears his heart on the sleeve.” His current therapist considers him one of the most 
honest people he has seen. Applicant appears to have learned how to deal with stress 
and control his anger. On the other hand, his continued consumption of alcohol to 
excess and his lack of candor during the security clearance process raise serious 
doubts about his trustworthiness and good judgment. His financial history is 
troublesome, and his bankruptcy discharge is recent. Insufficient time has passed for 
him to demonstrate a track record of financial responsibility. 
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines G, E, 
and F, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by his alcohol consumption, 
 
15 
 
 
personal conduct, and financial problems. Accordingly, I conclude he has not carried his 
burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to continue his 
eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption): AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:     For Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 2.b-2.d:    For Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.e:     Against Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 2.f-2.g:    For Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.h:     Against Applicant2 
 
 Paragraph 3, Guideline F (Financial Considerations): AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 3.a:     Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to continue 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge 
                                                          
2 The analysis supporting this adverse finding is contained in the discussion of SOR ¶ 3.a.