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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
--------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 11-14528
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Christopher Graham, Esquire
                                                                            
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Decision
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MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
On March 9, 2012, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative
guidelines (AG) effective within the DOD on September 1, 2006. 
In an April 19, 2012, response to the SOR, Applicant admitted with explanations
the two sub-allegations raised under Guideline B and requested a hearing. I was
assigned the case on July 16, 2012. The parties agreed to a hearing date of September
7, 2012, and a notice to that effect was issued on August 17, 2012. The hearing was
convened as scheduled.  
During the hearing, Applicant gave testimony and offered five documents, which
were accepted into the record without objection as exhibits (Exs.) A-E. Department
Counsel introduced three exhibits, which were accepted without objection as exhibits
(Exs.) 1-3. No country-specific materials were offered for purposes of administrative
notice. At the conclusion of the hearing, the reference to Applicant’s brother-in-law’s
 Ex. G (Brother’s statement, dated Sep. 20, 2012).1
 Ex. F (Brother’s statement, dated Sep. 14, 2012).2
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position in SOR allegation ¶ 1.b was changed to comport with the evidence. Applicant
was given until September 19, 2012, to offer any additional documents for
considerations. The transcript (Tr.) was received on September 17, 2012. On
September 17, 2012, Applicant forwarded one additional document, which was
received and accepted as Ex. F without objection. On September 20, 2012, Applicant
submitted one additional document. Absent objection from the Government, that
document was accepted as Ex. G and the record was closed.  Based upon a thorough
review of the exhibits and testimony, security clearance is granted.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 43-year-old systems engineer who has worked for his present
employer, a defense contractor, for about 18 months. He has owned the company for
which he currently works since 1999. Applicant earned a bachelor’s degree in electrical
engineering from a prestigious college, and subsequently earned a master’s degree in
software engineering. He and his wife are raising three minor children. 
Applicant’s brother is a U.S. citizen. He is also a celebrated academician and
researcher. Since the early 1980s, he has been employed by or associated with
numerous educational institutions, boards, and panels both in the United States and
abroad. He has conducted classified research at a U.S. facility on at least one
occasion. He has written several books, contributed to multiple texts and publications,
and authored nearly 500 articles. He has also written at least seven reports for U.S.
Governmental entities. The vast majority of his work has been based in the United
States.
In 2002, Applicant’s brother served in a consulting capacity with a group that
eventually became a research organization under the auspices of a Republic of
Singapore ministry. He continued as a paid consultant with that organization while
working as a full-time university professor at home in the United States. His consulting
was limited to scholarly collaboration, the product of which was published in scholarly
journals and literature. It involved no classified work, nor did it involve work related to
any military.  It was the type of consultancy similar to researchers in his field both in the1
United States and internationally. In 2009, he accepted a managerial position with the
Singapore-based entity and moved with his wife to Singapore, where they rented living
quarters and opened a local bank account for the sole purpose of receiving salary
disbursements and making local payments. They returned to the United States about
three times a year to visit Applicant’s mother, their three adult children, and Applicant. 
During Applicant’s brother’s tenure abroad, Applicant’s brother “did no work for
Singapore’s military nor did [he] have access to any Singapore classified information.”2
Early in 2012, he was offered a prestigious professorship at a top-ranked university in
the United States. His wife, who never cared for living in Singapore, rushed back to the
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United States in July or August 2012 to find them a new home. Applicant’s brother
resigned from the Singapore-based entity. His last day working for it was in September
2012. Before moving back to the United States, he paid his final financial obligations on
his Singapore bank account, including utility payments, telecommunications payments,
credit card payments, and extraneous bills. 
The day following Applicant’s brother’s last day of work in Singapore, Applicant’s
brother returned to the United States and began his work for the American university.
He is leaving his Singapore bank account open until his final payments have cleared
the account. At present, that account has less than $10,000 in it. The account was
previously reported to the U.S. Government in accordance with Report of Foreign Bank
and Financial Accounts (FBAR) regulations. Although he is no longer a managerial
employee of the Singapore-based entity, Applicant’s brother is retaining the consultant
status with the entity that he enjoyed previously enjoyed. This tenure and scope of his
consultancy remains the same as it was before 2007.
 Neither Applicant, his brother, nor Applicant’s sister-in-law have any past
connections with the Republic of Singapore. Applicant owns no foreign property and
does not maintain any foreign accounts or investments. He personally has no ties to
foreign governments or entities. Applicant’s brother and sister-in-law’s three grown
children are U.S. residents and citizens. They merely lived in Singapore due to
Applicant’s brother’s tenure at an entity located there. At one time, they owned a car in
Singapore which they have since sold. There is no evidence indicating that Applicant’s
brother has any nexus with Singapore except for his association with the
aforementioned research entity. There is no evidence that Applicant’s brother maintains
social or emotional ties with any of his business contacts in Singapore. 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations
for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions, which are required in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to
classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead,
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” All available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, must be and were considered in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching my
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).3
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).4
 Id.5
 Id.6
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.7
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decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence submitted.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a3
preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  4
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access5
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.   The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily6
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the7
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
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Analysis
Guideline B – Foreign Influence
The concern under Guideline B is that foreign contacts and interests may be a
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government
in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. Consideration should be given to the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to,
such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S. citizens to
obtain protected information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. Conditions
pertaining to this adjudicative guideline that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security concerns, are discussed in
the conclusions below. The Government provided no documents or materials related to
the Republic of Singapore that suggest it targets U.S. citizens for protected information
or is associated with a risk of terrorism. Notice is taken, however, that the Republic of
Singapore is commonly considered a strong economic ally of the United States and a
partner in the fight against terrorism. 
Applicant’s brother and sister-in-law, both U.S. citizens, moved to Singapore in
2009, where Applicant’s brother worked in a managerial position for a Singapore-
sponsored research consortium, Due to Applicant’s brother’s nexus to a foreign
governmental agency, Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions AG ¶ 7(a) (contact
with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other
person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) and
AG ¶ 7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information) apply. With disqualifying conditions thus raised,
the burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns
Applicant is understandably close to his brother and sister-in-law. Applicant’s
brother is a renowned academic. He is a prolific author, researcher, lecturer, and
advisor. While much of his career has been in the United States and at U.S.-based
organizations, his scientific endeavors have had a naturally international bent in terms
of collegial research. To that end, his career has moved from project to project,
regardless of where his current assignment or position is based. From 2002 until 2009,
he served as a consultant to a Singapore-based scientific organization while working
full-time at universities in the United States and elsewhere abroad. From 2009 until
September 2012, he accepted an on-site managerial position at the Singapore-based
institute. He and his wife have since returned to the United States, where Applicant’s
brother is currently working for a major U.S. university. 
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While in Singapore, Applicant’s brother’s main nexus to that republic was his
employment with its research organization, his residence, and a bank account required
for receipt of his salary. There, he served in a managerial capacity. He performed no
work for the Singapore military, nor did he have access to Singapore classified
information. After resigning from that post, but before returning to the United States in
September 2012, Applicant’s brother paid his Singapore-related debts, relinquished his
apartment, and is poised to close his Singapore bank account once his outstanding
payments and checks have cleared. He now maintains no apparent or significant nexus
with Singapore. He owns no property in Singapore, and there is no evidence he
maintains any other investment in that country. He has no family or notably close
friends residing in Singapore. He has never expressed a desire to seek citizenship in
Singapore; indeed, his wife disliked living there, away from her children. His current
consultancy with the Singapore consists solely of the same literary collaboration that he
enjoyed before accepting the Singapore-based position as a manager. Given the facts,
his profession, and the nature of his work, it appears that any loyalties he may have in
Singapore are related to the continued support of collegial research, not to the
Singapore government or citizenry.   
In contrast, Applicant’s brother’s family are all residents and citizens of the
United States. He is close to his relations. The majority of his career has been based in
the United States. His current employment is in the United States, where he and his
wife now both reside. Absent evidence Singapore seeks to cull sensitive information
from U.S. citizens, Applicant’s brother’s return to the United States, and the fact that
any loyalties that brother may have had to Singapore appear to be limited to the
transient research conducted there, are sufficient to raise Foreign Influence Mitigating
Conditions AG ¶ 8(a) (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that
country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to
choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government
and the interests of the U.S.); AG ¶ 8(b) (the individual’s sense of loyalty to or obligation
 to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the there is no
conflict of interest, either because individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest); and ¶ 8(c) (contact or
communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the
Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should
consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a). Under AG ¶ 2(c), the
ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an
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overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and
the whole-person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.
Applicant is a mature man who is well-educated, successful, mature, and highly
credible. His family, children, home, investments, company, work, and social life are
firmly planted in the United States. There is no suggestion that either he or his conduct
pose a security concern. 
Applicant’s brother has been associated with a foreign research organization
connected to the Republic of Singapore for a decade. Although he has been connected
with other foreign-based entities during his career, this particular post seems to have
raised security concerns because, at the time of the SOR, Applicant’s brother and
sister-in-law were residing in Singapore while the brother worked at the Singapore entity
in a managerial capacity. There, he had no access to Singapore military or classified
information, nor is the suggestion he shared any U.S.-based secrets of which he may
have been privy. His participation with this entity was strictly toward the establishment
of a sound and well-regarded research council. With his resignation from that body and
his return to the United States, he untethered himself from any potential of coercion,
manipulation, or influence related to his tenure there. His continuing consultancy is
strictly performed long-distance with regard to scholarly collaborations that are
published in the open scholarly literature; it involves no classified or military work or
exchange.
Applicant’s brother and sister-in-law are citizens of the United States. Applicant’s
brother was educated here. He and his wife raised three children, all of whom continue
to reside in the United States as U.S. citizens. The vast majority of Applicant’s brother’s
career and research has been in the United States, where they again reside. There is
no evidence that his time in Singapore was anything more that a temporary opportunity
to participate in the development of a world-class research organization. He did not
seek foreign citizenship, nor did he invest in Singapore-based interests. He has no
significant financial, business, or property interests remaining there. There is no
evidence he endeavored to flourish socially there. There is no evidence he retains any
loyalties or interests directly connected with the government or people of Singapore that
could be used to manipulate either Applicant or his brother. Indeed, his return to
consultancy for the entity is based on his commitment to scholarly research, not to
Singapore, its military, or any other foreign interest. Moreover, his return to the United
States and his resumption of a professorial career in the United States indicate that his
loyalties are foremost to his country and to his research, not to the government of
Singapore. Based on these considerations, I find that Applicant mitigated foreign
influence security concerns. Clearance is granted. 
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a-1.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance granted.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge