1
 
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-06095
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Candace L. Garcia, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se  
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
Applicant completed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on December 13, 2010. The Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on May 30, 2012,
detailing security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, and Guideline F,
financial considerations. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
Adjudicative Guidelines For Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
(AG) implemented on September 1, 2006. 
 
W hen  SOR allegations are controverted, the Government bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient1
to prove controverted allegations. Directive, ¶ E3.1.14. “That burden has two components. First, the
Government must establish by substantial evidence that the facts and events alleged in the SOR indeed took
place. Second, the Government must establish a nexus between the existence of the established facts and
events and a legitimate security concern.” See ISCR Case No. 07-18525 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2009),
(concurring and dissenting, in part) (citations omitted). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection
between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See
ISCR Case No. 08-06605 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 4, 2010); ISCR Case No. 08-07290 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 17,
2009).
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Applicant received the SOR on June 5, 2012, and he answered it on June 22,
2012. Applicant requested a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA received the
request, and Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on July 25, 2012. I received
the case assignment on July 30, 2012. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on August 8,
2012, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on August 28, 2012. The Government
offered exhibits (GE) marked as GE 1 through GE 10, which were received and
admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant testified. He submitted exhibits (AE)
marked as AE A and AE B, which were received and admitted into evidence without
objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on September 7, 2012. I held the
record open until September 21, 2012, for Applicant to submit additional matters.
Applicant twice requested additional time to submit his documentation. His requests
were granted, with his final submission date as October 4, 2012. Applicant timely
submitted AE C - AE K, which have been marked, received, and admitted without
objection. The record closed on October 4, 2012.
Procedural Ruling
Notice
Applicant received the hearing notice on August 14, 2012, less than 15 days
before the hearing. I advised Applicant of his right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the Directive to
receive the notice 15 days before the hearing. Applicant affirmatively waived his right to
the 15-day notice. (Tr. 12) 
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to Vietnam. The request was not admitted into evidence, but
were included in the record as Hearing Exhibit 1. The facts administratively noticed will
be limited to matters of general knowledge and matters not subject to reasonable
dispute, and are set out in the Findings of Fact below. 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a,
1.b, 2.a, 2.b, and 2.d of the SOR. His admissions are incorporated herein as findings of
fact. He denied the factual allegations in ¶ 2.c of the SOR.  He also provided additional1
GE 1; AE J; Tr. 27.2
GE 1; GE 2; GE 5; GE 6; AE F; AE H; AE I; Tr. 27-29, 34, 51-52.3
GE 5; Tr. 29-33, 47-61.4
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information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance. After a complete
and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following additional findings
of fact.  
Applicant, who is 40 years old, works as an engineer for a Department of
Defense contractor. He has worked for his employer or its predecessor company for
more than 12 years. His supervisor describes him as a very capable engineer and the
“go-to-person” on his team. His performance evaluations are good, and his supervisor
expects to increase his skills and responsibilities in the future.2
Applicant was born in Vietnam and became a United States citizen in October
1994. His mother, three brothers, and sister are naturalized citizens of the United States
and reside in the United States. His father is deceased. He married his first wife, a
citizen of the Peoples Republic of China in 2000, and they divorced in January 2007. He
does not have any contact with his first wife and does not know her current
whereabouts. He married his second wife in December 2008 in Vietnam. She is a
current resident and citizen of Vietnam. He hired an attorney to help him with the
paperwork needed to bring his wife to the United States. Applicant obtained a social
security number for her through the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
and claimed her as a dependent on his federal tax returns for 2009 and 2011.  3
Applicant met his wife through friends while on a trip to Vietnam in March 2008.
She lives in a small village several hours from the capital city. His wife’s family are
citizens and residents of Vietnam. Her mother is a homemaker with whom she lives and
to whom she provides some care. Her brother is a farmer, who is married and the father
of two children. His wife’s family is not involved in politics, and they do not work for the
Vietnamese government. His mother-in-law owns land which he estimated was worth
$30,000 to $50,000. To his knowledge, they have no contacts with the Vietnamese
government. He talks with his wife by telephone and communicates with her through e-
mail one or two times a week. He rarely talks with her mother when he calls. His wife’s
family knows he is an engineer, but does not know for whom he works or what his job
duties entail. His wife has never visited the United States, and her mother will remain in
Vietnam when she relocates to the United States. His wife has a small fish business,
which she works with her family. He does not provide her with financial assistance. He
has not returned to Vietnam since his marriage.4
Applicant experienced debt problems in the past, which he resolved. He incurred
additional debts when he and his first wife divorced because they fought over who
would pay the debts and taxes owed on their income taxes. He also resolved his tax
debt and most of his marital debts sometime ago. After his divorce, Applicant twice
GE 5 - GE 7; Tr. 34-35, 40-42, 62-63.5
Applicant provided copies of many money order receipts showing varying amounts of payments to6
unidentified creditors. This evidence is given little weight because the payees are unknown. AE K.
AE A - AE C; AE E; AE K; Tr. 35-39, 44, 62-64, 67.7
AE D; AE G.8
Tr. 43, 66-68.9
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signed rental leases for friends, who either stopped paying the rent or damaged the
property, leaving him with the responsibility for paying these bills. He also allowed a
friend to drive his motorcycle. The police impounded his motorcycle after discovering his
friend did not have a driver’s license. He did not receive any notice that his motorcycle
had been impounded. After 30 days, the bank sold the motorcycle, and he still owes
money on his loan.5
Applicant retained the services of a credit counseling company in 2011. With the
help of this company, he has resolved four debts totaling $11,375. These payments
included two SOR debts, which are identified in allegations 2.b ($1,920) and 2.c
($8,683). Applicant made at least two payments of $565 to the creditor in allegation 2.c
before he retained the services of his credit counselor.   His credit counselor continues6
to work with the two remaining creditors to settle or develop a payment plan for the
debts in allegations 2.a ($4,188) and 2.d ($10,000).7
Applicant currently earns $7,408 in gross monthly income and $3,560 in net
income. His monthly expenses include $1,000 for rent and $500 for food, clothing and
miscellaneous items. He sets aside $600 a month for payment of his debts. His assets
include $10,000 in savings, $70,000 in investments, and $15,000 in personal assets
(car and furniture). Applicant has sufficient income each month to pay his bills and his
past debts.8
At the hearing, Applicant indicated that he stopped renting apartments for friends
and lending his vehicles to friends. Neither he nor his wife have a sense that the
Government of Vietnam is watching them. If his wife or her family were harassed by the
Vietnamese government, he would report the contacts to his security officer and to the
police.9
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Vietnam. Vietnam is ruled
by the Communist Party of Vietnam, an authoritarian government. China remains a
large trading partner. The United States established diplomatic relations with Vietnam in
1995 because overlapping security concerns and economic interests led to the need to
form a strategic partnership. However, tension exists between the two nations with
respect to Vietnam’s human rights record. The human rights record of the Government
of Vietnam continues to worsen as the Government cracks down on anti-government
activity. Arbitrary detentions remain a problem. Although Vietnam law provides for
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freedom of speech and the press, the Vietnam government continues to restrict those
freedoms by controlling the internet and by limiting citizen’s privacy rights. The
Government has a surveillance system, which it uses to watch its citizens. The
Vietnamese government has opened mail, confiscated packages and letters, and
monitored telephone conversations. The Vietnamese government encourages visitation
and investment by emigrants, but it sometimes monitors them carefully. Vietnamese
security personnel may place foreign visitors under surveillance and may monitor their
hotel rooms, phone conversations, fax transmissions, and e-mail communications. The
record contains no evidence that the Government of Vietnam seeks to obtain classified
information or economic data from the United States nor is there evidence of terrorist
activities in Vietnam.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
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grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes the disqualifying conditions that could raise security concerns. I
have considered all the conditions, and the following are potentially applicable: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Applicant’s mother, three brothers, and sister live in the United States and are
citizens of the United States. Thus, no security concern is raised by these family
members. His wife, her mother, and her brother and his family are citizens and
residents of Vietnam. Applicant maintains a normal familial relationship with his wife,
with whom he talks by telephone at least once a week. He also emails her once a week.
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He has not visited his wife in Vietnam since their marriage in 2008. He does not talk
with her family members when he calls her. He does not provide his wife or her family
with financial assistance. His family relationships are not per se a reason to deny
Applicant a security clearance, but his contacts with his wife must be considered in
deciding whether to grant Applicant a clearance. The Government must establish that
these family relationships create a risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion by terrorists or would create a potential conflict of interest
between his obligations to protect sensitive information and his desire to help his family
members who may be threatened by terrorists. 
In determining if such a risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationships and
contacts with his wife, as well as the activities of the Government of Vietnam and
terrorist organizations within that country. The risk that an applicant could be targeted
for manipulation or induced into compromising classified information is real, not
theoretical. Applicant’s relationship and contacts with his wife in Vietnam raise a
heightened risk and a security concern because the monitoring and surveillance
activities of the Vietnamese government intrude upon the privacy of its citizens. The
evidence of record fails to show that the Vietnamese government engages in espionage
activities in the United States or that it targets U.S. citizens in the United States by
exploiting, manipulating, pressuring, or coercing them to obtain protected information.
Thus, the concern that the Vietnam government will seek classified information is low.
Under the guideline, the potentially conflicting loyalties must be weighed to
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of U.S.
interests. In determining if Applicant’s contacts in Vietnam cause security concerns, I
considered that Vietnam and the United States have a relationship, which includes
working together on international security issues. There is no evidence that the
Vietnamese government targets U.S. citizens for protected information. The human
rights issues in Vietnam continue to be a concern. While none of these considerations
by themselves dispose of the issue, they are all factors to be considered in determining
Applicant’s vulnerability to pressure or coercion because of his wife in Vietnam.
Considering the significant activities of Vietnamese government against its citizens,
Applicant’s contacts with his wife and occasional contact with her family raise a
heightened risk under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b).
The Foreign Influence guideline also includes examples of conditions that can
mitigate security concerns. I have considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 8(a) through 8(f),
and the following are potentially applicable:                                                                 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
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(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Applicant’s normal relationship with his wife and his rare contact with her mother
is not a basis to deny him a security clearance; however, his burden of proof on
mitigation requires him to provide information that shows that his family is not subject to
coercion. His wife and her family members have never held a political position or a job
with the Vietnamese government. His wife’s family members have not been targeted by
the Vietnamese government or terrorists. His family members in Vietnam have not
suffered any abuses from the Vietnam government or been threatened by terrorists. His
mother, three brothers and sister are citizens and residents of the United States. He
owns no property nor does he have financial assets in Vietnam, although his mother-in-
law owns some land. Applicant credibly testified that if the Vietnamese government
harassed his wife and her family, he would report the incident to his security officer and
the police. Balancing these factors as well as the lack of evidence that the Vietnamese
government targets U.S. citizens for protected information against Vietnam’s human
rights record, I find that Applicant would resolve any conflict in favor of the U.S.
interests. Likewise, any threats by terrorists organizations against Applicant’s family in
Vietnam would be resolved in favor of U.S. interests because Applicant will be unable to
help his family members in Vietnam if such threats are made. His loyalties are to the
United States, not Vietnam or terrorist organizations. Applicant has mitigated the
Government’s security concerns as to his family contacts specified in the SOR under
AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(b), His contact with his mother-in-law is so infrequent and casual that
there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. AG
¶ 8(c) applies to SOR allegation 1.b.
Guideline F, Financial Considerations
The security concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations is set
out in AG & 18:      
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended
is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. 
In assessing whether an Applicant has established mitigation under Guideline F, the Appeal Board10
provided the following guidance in ISCR Case No. 07-06482 at 3 (App. Bd. May 21, 2008):
In evaluating Guideline F cases, the Board has previously noted that the concept of
“‘meaningful track record’ necessarily includes evidence of actual debt reduction through
payment of debts.” See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-01920 at 5 (App. Bd. Mar. 1, 2007).
However, an applicant is not required, as a matter of law, to establish that he has paid off
each and every debt listed in the SOR. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-25499 at 2 (App. Bd.
Jun. 5, 2006). All that is required is that an applicant demonstrate that he has “. . . established
a plan to resolve his financial problems and taken significant actions to implement that plan.”
See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 04-09684 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 6, 2006). The Judge can reasonably
consider the entirety of an applicant’s financial situation and his actions in evaluating the
extent to which that applicant’s plan for the reduction of his outstanding indebtedness is
credible and realistic. See Directive ¶ E2.2(a) (“Available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a
determination.”) There is no requirement that a plan provide for payments on all outstanding
debts simultaneously. Rather, a reasonable plan (and concomitant conduct) may provide for
the payment of such debts one at a time. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-25584 at 4 (App. Bd.
Apr. 4, 2008). Likewise, there is no requirement that the first debts actually paid in
furtherance of a reasonable debt plan be the ones listed in the SOR.
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AG ¶ 19 describes the disqualifying conditions that could raise security concerns.
I have considered all the conditions, and the following are potentially applicable: 
(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; and
(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations. 
Appellant developed significant financial problems when he and his first wife
divorced and he signed rental contracts with friends. Some of the debts have not been
resolved. These two disqualifying conditions apply.
The Financial Considerations guideline also includes examples of conditions that
can mitigate security concerns. I have considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 20(a) through
20(f), and the following are potentially applicable:10
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual=s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment;
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely
beyond the person=s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is
under control; and
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(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or
otherwise resolve debts.
Applicant’s debtsare continuing and recent. Most of his debts occurred after his
divorce and are not the result of circumstances beyond his control. Thus, AG ¶¶ 20(a)
and (b) do not apply. Applicant has hired a credit counselor, who has worked with him to
resolve his debts. Through this individual, Applicant has resolved four debts, including
two SOR debts. Prior to hiring this individual, Applicant made an effort to resolve
several of his debts, as shown by payments made to at least one creditor. He has
sufficient income to pay his monthly expenses and save money. He pays his current
bills and is setting aside money each month to resolve his two remaining debts. His
debts arose not because of his spending habits, but because he trusted his friends who
were not reliable. Because he made some payments to at least one creditor, AG ¶ 20(d)
is partially applicable. He has mitigated the security concerns arising from his finances
under AG ¶ 20(c).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole-person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of denial. In
reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
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conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is
a naturalized U.S. citizen, whose wife is a resident and citizen of Vietnam. She lives in a
small town many miles from the capitol city. Her family operates a small fish business
and her brother works on a farm. They have little contact with the Vietnamese
government, and they are not involved in politics, which could make them a target of the
current government. His wife and her family live quietly and simply. His wife knows he is
an engineer, but she and her family do not have knowledge about his specific work
duties. His wife’s current residence and citizenship raises little concern that he will be
placed in a position where he can be coerced, exploited or pressured to reveal
classified information.
 Applicant’s finances have been a problem off and on for a number of years. In
the past, he paid his debts and managed his finances. After his divorce, he incurred
debts, most of which were resolved. Later, his generosity to his friends created unpaid
debts because they reneged on their obligations for which he provided assistance. He is
taking responsibility for their conduct given he co-signed the leases on their apartments.
He realizes that he should not help his friends financially and has learned from this
mistake. He has been and continues to work with a credit counselor to resolve his
remaining debts. He has shown a track record to resolve debt and will continue to do
so. While he still owes money on two debts, these debts cannot be a source of improper
pressure or duress. Of course, the issue is not simply whether all his debts are paid: it is
whether his financial circumstances raise concerns about his fitness to hold a security
clearance. While some debts remain unpaid, they are insufficient to raise security
concerns because he is actively working to resolve the two remaining debts. (See AG &
2(a)(1).)
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his finances under
Guideline F and his wife in Vietnam in Guideline B.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: For Applicant
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Subparagraph 2.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge