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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
       
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 12-00327 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
  
  
Appearances 
 
For Government: Tovah Minster, Esquire, Department Counsel 
 
For Applicant: Martin P. Hogan, Esquire 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
ANTHONY, Joan Caton, Administrative Judge: 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony in this case, I 
conclude that Applicant failed to rebut or mitigate the Government’s security concerns 
under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. Clearance is denied. 
 
                                                  Statement of the Case 
  
On May 9, 2011, Applicant signed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for 
Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On August 13, 2012, the Defense Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (DOHA) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security 
concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. DOHA acted under Executive Order 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and 
 
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the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense for SORs 
issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 On August 28, 2012, Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing 
before a DOHA administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on September 27, 
2012. I convened a hearing on November 9, 2012, to consider whether it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for 
Applicant.   
 
The Government called no witnesses and introduced two exhibits (Ex.) 1 and Ex. 
2, which were entered in the record without objection. The Government also offered for 
administrative notice two summary memoranda containing facts about Israel and India. 
The facts about Israel were drawn from 12 official U.S. Government documents, and the 
facts about India were drawn 14 official U.S. Government documents. The Government 
provided, for the record, the source documents from which the facts in the summary 
memoranda were derived. I marked the Government’s summary memorandum and 
accompanying source documents about Israel as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I. I marked the 
summary memorandum and accompanying source documents about India as HE 2. 
Applicant did not object to my taking notice of the facts about Israel and India in the 
summary memoranda or in the source documents. 
 
Applicant testified and called no witnesses. At the hearing, he introduced three 
exhibits, which were identified as Ex. A through Ex. C and entered in the record without 
objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on November 19, 2012. 
                                                    
Findings of Fact 
 
 The SOR contains nine allegations under Guideline B, Foreign Influence (SOR 
¶¶ 1.a. through 1.i.). In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all nine allegations. 
Applicant’s admissions are admitted as findings of fact.   
 
 After a thorough review of the record in the case, including Applicant’s testimony, 
all exhibits, all relevant policies, and the applicable adjudicative guideline, I make the 
following findings of fact:  
 
 Applicant is 40 years old, married, and the father of two young children. He was 
born and raised in India.  Applicant and his wife, who was also born and raised in India, 
were married in the United States in 1998, and they became U.S. citizens in 2006. (Ex. 
1; Tr. 84-85.) 
  
 As a citizen and resident of India, Applicant earned an undergraduate degree 
and received additional training in computer science. He came to the United States in 
1997 as the employee of an Indian technology company. In 1998, Applicant took a 
position with a U.S. technology firm, which sponsored him for permanent resident 
status. He earned a Master’s degree in information technology at a U.S. university in 
2001. After achieving permanent resident status, Applicant took a position with another 
 
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company where he worked for four and one-half years as an analyst in information 
technology and software development. He formed his own information technology 
company in 2005. Since April 2010, he has worked for his current employer as a 
software developer specializing in continuous integrations. (Tr. 33-35, 42-54.) 
 
 Applicant was raised in the Jewish faith in India. In 1996, his parents immigrated 
to Israel and became Israeli citizens. In 2002 and in 2011, Applicant’s mother visited 
him and his family in the United States. Applicant speaks with his mother in Israel once 
a week. (Tr. 67, 101, 103, 105.) 
 
  In 2007, Applicant was informed that his father was dying. He left the United 
States as soon as possible to visit his father, who died in Israel in January 2007. 
Applicant remained in Israel for two weeks to take part in religious ceremonies 
connected with his father’s death and burial. One month later, he returned for Israel for 
his father’s grave marking. For each of the five years since his father’s death, Applicant 
has returned to Israel to take part in commemorative religious ceremonies. He also 
traveled to India in 2009 to attend a religious ceremony for his nephew, and he visited 
family in Israel in July 2010. In August 2012, he traveled to Israel to visit his 72-year-old 
mother, who was not feeling well. (Tr. 68-69,100, 130.)      
  
 Applicant has four siblings: two brothers and two sisters. His two brothers are 
residents and citizens of Israel. Applicant’s older brother is 49 years old. He works in the 
hotel business in Israel. He is married to a woman who is of Nepalese citizenship. 
Applicant’s believes his sister-in-law, who works as a housekeeper, has applied for 
permanent resident status in Israel. Applicant speaks with his older brother and his wife 
once or twice a year on the telephone, and he also exchanges e-mails with this brother. 
He sees his older brother and his wife once each year when he visits Israel.  (Tr. 110-
112.) 
 
 Applicant’s younger brother is 37 years old and works as a quality manager for a 
U.S. technology firm in Israel. This brother serves in the Israeli military reserves, and he 
is married to a Russian-born Israeli citizen. Applicant’s sister-in-law works as a nurse in 
Israel. Applicant speaks on the telephone with his younger brother once or twice each 
month because his mother now resides in the younger brother’s household, and 
Applicant calls his brother to check on his mother’s health. Applicant also sees this 
brother and his wife when he travels to Israel each year. (Tr. 113-117.) 
 
 Applicant has a 45-year-old sister who is a citizen and resident of Israel. This 
sister works as an exchange rate manager in an Israeli discount bank. The sister’s 
husband, an Israeli citizen who was born in India, works as an electrician. Applicant 
speaks with his older sister at least once a week when his mother is staying with his 
sister. Applicant sees his older sister and her husband once a year when he visits his 
family in Israel. (Tr. 102-106.) 
 
 Applicant also has a 42-year-old sister who is a citizen and resident of India. 
Applicant’s sister and her husband, also a citizen and resident of India, work as 
 
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accountants. Applicant speaks with his sister in India once or twice a year by telephone. 
He sees her and her husband whenever he travels to India. (Tr. 107-109.)   
 
 Applicant’s wife’s parents, who are retired, were citizens and residents of India. 
However, since Applicant’s wife’s brother also resides in the United States, her parents 
came to the United States frequently to visit their adult children and their families. When 
visiting the United States, Applicant’s in-laws stayed with Applicant and his wife. They 
have recently become permanent residents of the United States, and they now live in 
senior citizen housing in the United States. (Tr. 117-120.) 
   
 Applicant and his siblings grew up in a condominium apartment in India. The 
building is old and may someday be torn down to make way for a new condominium. 
Applicant’s mother gave the family condominium to him. Applicant accepted the gift 
from his mother with the understanding that he and his four siblings would share 
ownership of the apartment and any increase in value that may come in the future. The 
current value of the property is approximately $73,000. Applicant estimates that his 
share of the property is about $10,000, after payment of Indian taxes. He also has a 
bank account in India with a balance of approximately $70 that he uses to pay expenses 
associated with the family condominium. (Ex. A; Tr. 74-79, 85-88, 93-96.) 
 
 Applicant estimated the net worth of his holdings in the United States at 
$1,780,000. He and his wife own two automobiles and two homes, one of which he 
rents. He has set aside $90,000 in a college fund for his two children, and he has 
approximately $600,000 in life insurance. He values his 401(k) plan at $130,000. (Tr. 
91-94.) 
 
 Applicant provided a letter of character reference from a supervising team leader. 
The individual praised Applicant’s professionalism and work ethic, and he stated that 
Applicant is a valued and trustworthy employee. (Ex. C.) 
    
 I take administrative notice of the following facts about Israel, as contained in 
official U.S. Government documents provided by Department Counsel to Applicant and 
to me: 
 
Israel is a parliamentary democracy whose prime minister heads the 
government and exercises executive power. Israel has a diversified, 
technologically advanced economy that is growing at about 5% a year, 
and the United States is Israel’s largest trading partner. The major 
industrial sectors include high-technology electronic and biomedical 
equipment, chemicals, and transport equipment. 
 
Although the United States and Israel have developed a close friendship 
based on common democratic values, religious affinities, and security 
interests, there are some issues in U.S.-Israeli relations. The United 
States is concerned with Israeli military sales, inadequate protection of 
U.S. intellectual property, and espionage cases. The United States and 
 
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Israel have regularly discussed Israel’s sale of sensitive security 
equipment and technology to various countries, especially China. Israel 
reportedly is China’s second major arms supplier, after Russia. 
 
In November 1985, Jonathan Pollard (a civilian U.S. Naval intelligence 
employee) and his wife were charged with selling classified documents to 
Israel, and Mr. Pollard was sentenced to life in prison. Four Israeli officials 
also were indicted, although the Israeli government claimed the espionage 
was a rogue operation. In 1996, Israel granted Mr. Pollard citizenship and 
[in 1998] acknowledged that Mr. Pollard had been its agent.  
 
The National Counterintelligence Center’s 2000 Report to Congress on 
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage lists Israel as one 
of the active collectors of proprietary information. The 2006 Report states 
that the major collectors have been repeatedly identified as targeting 
multiple U.S. Government organizations since at least 1997. Furthermore, 
Israeli military officers have been implicated in this type of technology 
collection in the United States. 
 
There have been cases involving the illegal export, or attempted illegal 
export, of U.S. restricted, dual use technology to Israel, including: (1) 
oscilloscopes that are export controlled “for nuclear nonproliferation and 
anti-terrorism reasons”; (2) epitaxial wafers and oscillator chips that could 
be used in communications and radar systems; (3) an infrared camera, 
the export of which is controlled “for national security reasons because of 
its potential application in military surveillance”; and (4) diode lasers that 
have “potential military applications and are controlled for national security 
and nuclear nonproliferation reasons.” Foreign government entities, 
including intelligence organizations and security services, have capitalized 
on private-sector acquisitions of U.S. technology, and acquisition of 
sensitive U.S. technology by private entities does not slow its flow to 
foreign governments or its use in military applications.    
 
Several groups operating in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza have been 
designated by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations. U.S. citizens, including U.S. Government personnel, have 
been injured or killed by terrorists while in Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza. In the past, armed gunmen have kidnapped foreigners, including 
Americans, in Gaza and the West Bank. 
  
I take administrative notice of the following facts about India, as provided by the 
Government to Applicant and to me: 
 
According to its constitution, India is a “sovereign, socialist, secular 
democratic republic.” 
 
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India’s political history since it gained independence from Great Britain in 
1947 has included: (a) wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and 
the 1999 intrusion of Pakistani-backed forces into Indian-held territory that 
nearly turned into full-scale war; (b) a 1975 declaration of a state of 
emergency, with the suspension of many civil liberties; (c) the 
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984; (d) the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 while he was 
campaigning for parliamentary elections; (e) sporadic outbreaks of 
religious riots, in which numerous people have been killed; and (f) violent 
attacks by a variety of separatist and terrorist groups in different parts of 
the country. In late November 2008, terrorists coordinated attacks in 
Mumbai, targeting areas frequented by Westerners, which highlighted the 
risk of Americans becoming intended or unintended victims of terrorism in 
India.  
 
India continues to experience terrorist and insurgent activities that may 
affect U.S. citizens. Anti-Western terrorist groups, some on the U.S. 
Government’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, are active in India, 
including Islamist extremist groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami, 
Harakat ul-Mujahidin, India Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and 
Lashkar-e Tayyiba. India is one of the world’s most terrorism-afflicted 
countries and one of the most persistently targeted countries by 
transnational terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. 
 
The Soviet Union was India’s main foreign benefactor for the first four 
decades of Indian independence. After the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, India implicitly supported the Soviet occupation. India had 
long-standing military supply relationships with the Soviet Union, and India 
continues to obtain the bulk of its military supplies from Russia. 
 
Although the United States has sought to strengthen its relationship with 
India, there are some differences between the United States and India, 
including differences over India’s nuclear weapons programs and the pace 
of India’s efforts in economic reforms. In July 2009, however, the United 
States and India issued a joint statement of their intentions to foster 
bilateral relations by establishing working groups to address (1) strategic 
cooperation, (2) energy and climate change, (3) education and 
development, (4) economics, trade, and agriculture, and (5) science and 
technology, health, and innovation. 
 
The 2008 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial Espionage lists India, along with seven other countries, as being 
involved in criminal espionage and U.S. export controls enforcement 
cases in 2008. An earlier version of that report specifically lists India as 
being among the most active collectors of U.S. economic and proprietary 
 
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information and highlights specific incidents wherein India engaged in 
attempts to acquire export-restricted products. 
 
There have been numerous instances of violations of U.S. export laws 
involving India, which evidences India’s desire to acquire U.S. technology 
regardless of the laws protecting that technology. In March 2008, the 
owner of an international electronics business pleaded guilty to conspiracy 
to illegally export controlled technology to government entities in India that 
participate in the development of ballistic missiles, space launch missiles, 
and fighter jets. Furthermore, there have been other cases involving the 
illegal export, or attempted illegal export, of U.S. restricted, dual use 
technology to India, including: (1) high-tech testing equipment that posed 
an unacceptable risk of being diverted to a weapons of mass destruction 
program; (2) equipment which can be used in military and civilian aircraft 
to extract vibration information from engines and to simulate output for 
calibrating, servicing, and testing that equipment; (3) equipment that is 
used to manufacture a material that improves the accuracy of strategic 
ballistic missiles with nuclear capabilities; (4) an animation system to an 
Indian entity determined to present an unacceptable risk of diversion to 
programs for the development of weapons of mass destruction or their 
means of delivery; (5) nuclear pulse generators to two Indian entities that 
have been determined to present an unacceptable risk of diversion to 
developing weapons of mass destruction or missiles used to deliver these 
weapons; and (6) heat treating containers to an Indian entity ‘determined 
to present an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing weapons of 
mass destruction or missiles used to deliver these weapons. The National 
Counterintelligence Executive warned that the threat to the United States 
from foreign economic intelligence collection and industrial espionage has 
continued unabated with foreign collectors continuing to target a wide 
variety of unclassified and classified information in a range of sectors.  
 
                                                  Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the 
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, and 
it has emphasized that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the 
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the 
authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine 
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. 
at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant 
an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.    
  
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an 
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
 
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to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, the administrative judge applies these guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion in seeking to obtain a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Foreign Influence 
 
  AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” 
stating: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 indicates three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation. 
 
AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), and 7(e) apply in this case. Applicant’s mother, his older 
brother, his younger brother and his spouse, and one of his sisters and her spouse are 
citizens and residents of Israel. He has one sister who is a citizen and resident of India.  
 
Applicant’s wife’s parents are citizens of India who have been granted permanent 
resident status and reside in the United States. SOR ¶ 1.g. alleges that Applicant’s 
father-in-law is a citizen and resident of India. SOR ¶ 1.h. alleges that Applicant’s 
mother-in-law is a citizen and resident of India.  Accordingly, since SOR ¶¶ 1.g. and 1.h. 
do not accord with the facts derived at the hearing, I conclude them for Applicant. 
 
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Applicant has close connections with family members living in Israel and in India. 
He is particularly close to his mother, who is a citizen and resident of Israel. He speaks 
with her by telephone once a week.  Additionally, Applicant owns a condominium in 
India, which could subject him to a heightened risk of foreign influence.  
 
While the United States and Israel share common democratic values, religious 
and cultural affinities, and security interests, the United States has concerns about 
Israel’s inadequate protection of U.S. intellectual property. Moreover, Israel is an active 
collector of proprietary information and has targeted major U.S. Government 
organizations in order to acquire U.S. technology.  Attempts have been made to illegally 
export U.S. restricted, dual-use technology to Israel. American citizens with immediate 
family members who are citizens or residents of Israel could be vulnerable to coercion, 
exploitation, inducements, or pressure by those seeking to acquire proprietary or 
otherwise restricted U.S. technology. 
 
India is also known to be an active collector of U.S. economic and proprietary 
information. In recent years, India has attempted to illegally acquire export-restricted 
technology products from U.S. companies that are federal contractors. In 2008, 
terrorists attacked areas in Mumbai, India, that were frequented by Westerners. Since 
that time, there has been a continuing threat that U.S. citizens might become the 
intended or unintended victims of terrorism in India. 
 
Applicant became a U.S. citizen in 2006. Since 2007, he has traveled to Israel 
nine times, and he has traveled to India once. Applicant has undertaken these trips to 
visit his mother and siblings, to carry out family duties, and to take part in religious 
ceremonies. When he returns to the United States, Applicant communicates frequently 
with his mother and with at least two of his siblings in Israel. He is in less frequent 
contact with one brother in Israel and his sister in India. He sees most of his family 
members when he travels to Israel once a year. 
 
Applicant’s relationships with his mother and his siblings and their spouses are 
sufficient to create “a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, 
pressure, or coercion.” His relationships with citizens and residents of Israel and India 
create a potential conflict of interest between Applicant’s “obligation to protect sensitive 
information or technology and [his] desire to help” family members who are in Israel or 
India. For example, if either the Israeli or the Indian governments wanted to coerce 
Applicant, it could exert pressure on his family members in Israel or India.  
 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its record in seeking protected or proprietary information held by U.S. government 
contractors is relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members 
are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, persuasion, 
or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country is known to conduct intelligence 
collection operations against the United States. The relationships of Israel and India 
with the United States place a significant, but not insurmountable, burden of persuasion 
on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships with his family members living in 
 
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Israel and India and his spouse’s relationships with her family members who are 
citizens of India do not pose a security risk. Applicant should not be placed in a position 
where he might be forced to choose between loyalty to the United States and a desire 
to assist his mother, siblings, or in-laws.  
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States 
over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, 
we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, 
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. See ISCR Case No. 00-0317 
at 4-5 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  
 
While there is no evidence that intelligence operatives from Israel or India seek 
or have sought classified or economic information from or through Applicant, his 
spouse, or his family members living in India and Israel, it is not possible to rule out 
such a possibility in the future. Applicant’s continuing relationships with family members 
create a potential conflict of interest because these relationships are sufficiently close to 
raise a security concern about his desire to assist his family members in the event they 
should be pressured or coerced for sensitive or classified information.  
 
AG ¶ 8 lists six conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns 
including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country 
is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding 
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected 
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;  
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or 
are approved by the cognizant security authority; 
 
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(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency 
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from 
persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
    
AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c) have limited applicability. From 2007 to the present, 
Applicant has traveled to Israel nine times and to India once. He has close relationships 
with his family members in Israel and India. Because of these relationships and 
connections, Applicant is not able to fully meet his burden of showing there is little 
likelihood that his relationships with relatives who are Israeli and Indian citizens could 
create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.    
 
AG ¶ 8(b) partially applies. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s 
“deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” Applicant has resided in 
the United States since 1996. He became a U.S. citizen in 2006, and he has built his 
personal and professional life in the United States. He reported a net worth of 
approximately $1,780,000. His children are U.S. citizens, and Applicant has set aside 
funds to provide for their educations.   
 
Applicant’s relationship with the United States must be weighed against the 
potential conflict of interest created by his relationships with his family members in  
Israel and India. He communicates frequently with his mother and his relatives in Israel. 
There is no evidence, however, that terrorists, criminals, or those conducting espionage 
have approached or threatened Applicant or his family in attempts to coerce Applicant 
or his family for classified or sensitive information. However, there is an increased 
possibility that Applicant or Applicant’s family would be specifically selected as targets 
for improper coercion or exploitation. While the Government does not have any burden 
to prove the presence of such evidence, if such record evidence were present, 
Applicant would have a heavy evidentiary burden to overcome in order to mitigate 
foreign influence security concerns.      
 
While AG ¶¶ 8(d) and 8(e) do not apply, AG ¶ 8(f) applies in this case.  Applicant 
has a property interest in a condominium in India. However, he testified credibly that his 
actual interest in the property is only one-fifth of its total value of $73,000. It is unlikely 
that Applicant’s minimal interest in the Indian property could cause a conflict of interest 
or be used to coerce him. 
 
In sum, the primary security concern is Applicant’s close relationship with family 
members in Israel and India, two countries with histories of seeking proprietary and 
other protected information from U.S. Government contractors. Nothing in Applicant’s 
answers to the Guideline B allegations in the SOR suggested he was not a loyal U.S. 
citizen. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that industrial security 
 
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clearance decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a 
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”   
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of the 
whole-person concept and all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. 
Applicant has worked diligently to provide value to his employer. He is attentive and 
devoted to his mother and siblings who are citizens and residents of Israel and India. He 
is an admirable family member. However, he failed to mitigate the security concerns 
raised by his close familial contacts and relationships with his mother, siblings, and in-
laws who are citizens and residents of Israel and India.   
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For these reasons, I 
conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising under Guideline B, 
Foreign Influence.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the 
amended SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a. - 1.f.:                        Against Applicant 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.g. - 1.i.:   For Applicant 
 
14 
 
 
                                                 Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
                                               
 
_______________________________ 
Joan Caton Anthony 
Administrative Judge