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                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-06080
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Braden M. Murphy, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: , Personal Representative
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. He went to Pakistan as a refugee,
then became a U.S. resident after marrying his first wife. His mother and three siblings
are resident citizens of Afghanistan; he inherited part ownership of their family farm
there; and his current wife’s parents are Afghan citizens residing in Pakistan. He failed
to mitigate resulting security concerns. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits,
and testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 86) on January 19,
2010. On December 22, 2011, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under
Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
effective within the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
GE 1; Tr. 41-42, 45.1
AR.2
GE 2 through 4. Although not previously adopted by Applicant, he specifically agreed to the accuracy and3
admissibility of his Personal Subject Interview after being advised that it would not be admitted if he chose
to object to it. Tr. 29-33.
2
Applicant answered the SOR in writing (AR) on March 7, 2012, and requested a
hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed
on July 31, 2012, and the case was assigned to me on August 6, 2012. DOHA issued a
Notice of Hearing on August 30, 2012, and I convened the hearing, as scheduled, on
September 25, 2012. Department Counsel participated in the hearing via video
teleconference. The Government offered exhibits (GE) 1 through 4, which were
admitted without objection. The Government also offered hearing exhibits (HE) I and II,
and administrative notice documents in support of the HE I and II requests that I take
administrative notice of the facts contained therein concerning Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Applicant had no objection to the request for administrative notice of the facts
set forth in HE I and II, and I granted those requests. Applicant offered exhibits (AE) A
through G, which were admitted subject to review and possible objection by Department
Counsel. Applicant’s wife and Applicant testified on his behalf. On September 26, 2012,
after reviewing Applicant’s exhibits, Department Counsel had no objection to their
admission into evidence. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on October
4, 2012.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a defense contractor, where he has
worked as an interpreter assisting U.S. forces in Afghanistan for about three years. He
has never held a security clearance and has no military service. He completed high
school in Afghanistan and has taken some English as a Second Language classes at a
U.S. community college. He is married for the second time, and has three children ages
19, 5, and 3.  In his response to the SOR, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶1
1.b through 1.f and 1.h. He denied those in SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.g.  Applicant’s2
admissions, including those made in previous statements to security investigators,  are3
incorporated in the following findings.
Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. His father, who passed away in
1995, was a farmer. His mother did not work outside their home. Applicant went to
Pakistan, as a refugee from the Russian invasion in 1982. In 1990 he married his first
wife, who was an Afghani with U.S. permanent resident status and has since become a
naturalized citizen. She sponsored him to immigrate to the United States in 1993. After
a domestic violence incident and ongoing money problems, they divorced in 1995. He
became a naturalized U.S. citizen on May 21, 2003, and married his current wife in an
arranged marriage in Pakistan in September 2003. His second wife became a
GE 1; GE 2; GE 4; Tr. 43-47, 81-83.4
AR; GE 1; GE 2; GE 3; GE 4; Tr. 60-70.5
AR; GE 1; GE 3; GE 4; Tr. 68-69.6
AR; GE 1; GE 3; GE 4; Tr. 44, 48-60, 65-67, 69-71, 75-78.7
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naturalized U.S. citizen in February 2010 and holds a current U.S. passport. His three
children were all born in the United States.  4
Applicant’s mother, who is in her late 70's, lives with one of his brothers on the
farm in Afghanistan that Applicant’s father left to his sons upon his death. Applicant
gave various estimates ranging from $250,000 to $600,000 concerning the value of this
property, primarily due to his poor facility with the English language. During the hearing,
his wife explained that his stated and admitted valuation of $600,000 was intended to be
600,000 Afghani, which at current exchange rates would be less than $12,000. She also
said something about i t possibly being sold, but that was not clear particularly since she
said Applicant’s mother and brother still live there. The farm is apparently not very
profitable, and the brother who lives there also owns and operates a shop. Unti l he
began working with the U.S. military as an interpreter in January 2010,  he had
telephonic contact with these family members about once per week. He was not
permitted to contact them while working in Afghanistan.5
Applicant has a sister and another brother who are also resident citizens of
Afghanistan. His sister has been a widow for about 12 years, and never worked outside
her home. The brother studied to become a teacher, but most recently has worked for
the United Nations as a driver. Applicant also has three Afghani sisters-in-law who
reside in that country. One is the widow of one of his brothers who was a teacher and
died in 2000. The other two are married to the brothers described above. None of them
worked outside their homes either. Applicant’s former brother-in-law, who remains a
friend and is his first wife’s brother, previously worked for the Afghan government in the
Ministry of Health. He no longer works for the government.  6
Applicant has two other brothers who retain their Afghani citizenship but live in
Sweden. One of them works as a taxi driver and the other is a hospital nurse. Although
Applicant admitted the allegation in his response to the SOR, there is no record
evidence to support the SOR ¶ 1.e allegation that he has a sister residing in Pakistan.
Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are both Afghan citizens who are longtime
residents in Pakistan. Three of his wife’s brothers and one of her sisters also live there
with their parents. Applicant has another sister-in-law who is a U.S. citizen and works
with the Department of Defense overseas. She also has two brothers who reside in
Great Britain. Applicant and his wife have regular contact with their family members,
except that Applicant contacts only his wife during periods he is deployed to
Afghanistan working with U.S. forces. Except for a visit to his brothers in Sweden from
December 2006 to January 2007, the last time Applicant saw any of his family members
in person was in Pakistan during summer 2003 when he and his wife were married.  7
GE 1; GE 3; Tr. 72, 79-81.8
AE A.9
AE B through AE G. 10
4
From the time he immigrated to the U.S. in 1993 until he obtained his current
employment in January 2010, Applicant was unemployed and lived off public
assistance. He and his wife rent their home, and own no property in the U.S. His wife
does not work outside their home.  8
Applicant’s program manager wrote him a letter thanking him for “the tremendous
service [he had] provided to our U.S. Troops in Afghanistan,” and complimenting his
loyalty and dedication to mission accomplishment. He also received a Certificate of
Achievement recognizing his completion of 730 days in theater, excellent performance,
and dedication to the Operation Enduring Freedom mission in Afghanistan.9
Commanding officers and company first sergeants from four different Marine units for
whom Applicant served as a linguist/interpreter provided letters of recommendation and
certi ficates of appreciation or commendation. They described his loyal and courageous
professionalism and effective service during daily interactions with local officials and
more than 600 combat patrols. While they did not comment on his eligibility or suitability
for a security clearance, they were highly complimentary of his character and work, and
recommended him for further service supporting the U.S. armed forces.10
I took administrative notice of the facts set forth in HE I and HE II concerning the
Islamic Republics of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are incorporated herein by
reference. Of particular significance are the poor human rights situation; and the active
and hostile presence of Al Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist groups that generate
instability and openly attack police and military forces of the respective governments, as
well as U.S. persons and interests.   
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
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The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern i f the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel argued that substantial evidence in this case
established two of them: 
Tr. 85.11
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(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.11
After considering the SOR allegations and the record evidence, I find that two additional
DCs under AG ¶ 7 are raised in this case:
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion; and 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation. 
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have significant internal anti-western terrorism
threats that operate openly contrary to U.S. interests. Accordingly, family and property
connections there have more potential to generate heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶¶ 7(a), (d), and
(e), than would similar connections in many other countries. For example, I find no
substantial evidence in the record to support security concerns arising from Applicant’s
relationship with his two brothers who are permanent residents of Sweden despite their
ongoing Afghan citizenship.
Applicant’s mother, sister, and two brothers, with whom he maintains regular
communication and familial relationships, are resident citizens of Afghanistan. He has
lesser relationships with his three sisters-in-law and his former brother-in-law who are
also resident citizens there. He and his four surviving brothers inherited ownership of
the family farm on which they were raised, and where his mother and one brother’s
family still live. I find that, regardless of Applicant’s confused valuation of this property, it
is of significant importance to him as his family home. Applicant shares living quarters
with his wife, whose parents are Afghan citizens and reside in an area of Pakistan
identified in HE II as particularly susceptible to militant, insurgent, and terrorist presence
and activity. He has an entirely legitimate, serious interest in the welfare of her family
members in Pakistan, as well as his own family in Afghanistan.
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These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising all four of the
aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s contacts, relationships, and
connections with Afghanistan and Pakistan through his relatives residing there shift a
heavy burden to him to prove mitigation under applicable Appeal Board precedent. 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a), (b), (d), and (e) security concerns are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interest is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be
used to effectively influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Considered in light of the substantial anti-western terrorism threat and impending
departure of most NATO military forces from the region, Applicant did not demonstrate
that it is unlikely he could be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual or government and those of the U.S. due to his family
ties there. Even though he has not personally visited Pakistan or seen his Afghan family
members since his wedding in 2003, he has close relationships with them, and a strong
interest in protecting his mother, brothers and sister, and his wife’s family who are
residents or citizens of those two countries. His communication and contact with his
Afghani and Pakistan-resident family members since he came to the U.S. are neither
casual nor infrequent. Accordingly, he failed to establish the mitigating conditions set
forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (c), except with respect to his two brothers in Sweden and the
siblings-in-law alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.d and 1.g.
The evidence also fails to establish significant mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant has no assets in the United States, and lived off public assistance for the first
17 years that he lived here. He finally obtained employment and served effectively as a
contract linguist/interpreter for several U.S. Marine Corps combat units, but did not
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establish that he sought or accepted that lucrative employment for reasons, or endured
life-threatening conditions, which would sufficiently demonstrate deep or longstanding
U.S. relationships or loyalties under Appeal Board precedent. Finally, regardless of the
confused state of the evidence concerning the monetary value of Applicant’s interest in
his family’s farm in Afghanistan, it is his only property and the family home where his
mother still lives. Accordingly, it retains the potential to support a conflict of interest and
could be used for manipulation or pressure. AG ¶ 8(f) does not apply.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct is not in
question here. He is a mature and experienced individual, who has acted responsibly
and provided valuable service to U.S. military forces deployed in combat. However, the
inherent potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress from the presence  of
Applicant’s family members and property in Afghanistan, and his wife’s family in
Pakistan, remains unmitigated. Placing Applicant in a position wherein it is foreseeable
that he could be forced to choose between the security interests of the United States
and the interests of his or his wife’s family is the harm to be avoided under Appeal
Board precedent. He failed to show that such potential is diminished to any reasonable
extent. His loyal and dedicated service in support of Marine units in Afghanistan is
highly commendable, but does not justify placing him or his relatives at risk of
exploitation due to his access to classified information. 
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He fai led to meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign influence considerations.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge